Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024)

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5 The Evolving Civil Nuclear Sector: Adapting Approaches and New Opportunities BOX 5-1 Summary Looking ahead there will be expanding opportunities for non-state actors to obtain access to nuclear materials or to target nuclear facilities. This is due to the projected increase in the number of civil nuclear facilities and the volume of nuclear fresh and spent fuel in transit. More civil nuclear material and nuclear facilities around the globe will require a strategy to ensure their security from terrorist attacks and to counter proliferation. International interest in civilian nuclear energy is growing due to its potential to provide clean power and support the goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions. At the same time, there are new safety and security considerations as nuclear power becomes more accessible due to unique designs and technological improvements in inherent in small modular reactors and other advanced reactors. Led primarily by non-U.S. corporations, the civil nuclear energy sector is now expanding into countries that lack experience with nuclear safety and safeguards, so-called nuclear newcomers. Meanwhile, Russian attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants and other energy supply and distribution systems have for the first time, introduced the possibility that an operating civil nuclear power plant could be targeted by state and non-state actors to terrorize residents and persuade them to bend to the will of the attacker. Keeping spent nuclear fuel in pools on the sites of nuclear power plants elevates the risk of radiation release as a result of a terrorist attack or military action at or near a facility. If most spent fuel is stored in licensed hardened storage containers, rather than in fuel pools, it will be less vulnerable. But, permanent solutions for disposal of spent nuclear fuel must be found, including in the United States. This is the most practical alternative for ensuring that spent nuclear fuel is adequately safeguarded for extended periods of time. The U.S. nuclear industry historically dominated the global market for nuclear power export throughout the 1970s and 1980s, thus collaterally exporting exceedingly high standards for nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation. Without U.S. leadership during the upcoming wave of deployment, assurance that new entrant reactor vendors and suppliers will adopt similarly high standards may be lost. Strong U.S. leadership and presence in global markets is essential as nuclear energy plays a larger role in clean energy transitions around the globe. This includes forging a transparent and productive partnership among the U.S. government, the nuclear industry, and the International Atomic Energy Agency in establishing the export and adoption of high standards of safety, security, and safeguards. Nuclear security is not as universally formalized and instituted as are nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards. The participation by U.S. government and private sector experts in international, multilateral initiatives such as the International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative has made a positive contribution toward achieving the goal of safe and secure deployment of small modular reactors and other advanced nuclear technologies, while maximizing the potential contribution of such technologies to achieve global clean energy goals. The United States, however, needs to move beyond participation and both lead and drive international standards setting and regulatory harmonization efforts for attaining high standards and norms around nonproliferation, materials control and accounting, and physical and cyber security for these advanced nuclear technologies. continued Prepublication Copy 62 

The Evolving Civil Nuclear Sector: Adapting Approaches and New Opportunities BOX 5-1 continued Highlights • As a result of increasing reliance on nuclear power, there will be more nuclear material and facilities around the globe. This requires new ways of thinking about security particularly in nuclear newcomer states. • Like most energy infrastructure, civil nuclear energy facilities are not hardened against a nation-state assault under military conditions of sustained war fighting as seen in Ukraine at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. • U.S. is working to regain leadership in nonproliferation, materials control and accounting, and physical and cyber security for advanced nuclear technologies. With adequate resources, the IAEA can play an indispensable role in strengthening international standards on nuclear safety, security and material control and accounting for advanced nuclear technologies. 5.1 EXPANDING CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR SECURITY Currently, nuclear reactors provide 20 percent of the electrical generation in the United States and are the largest single contributor to clean energy generation (over 70 percent) (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) 2023). As new sources of clean electricity generation are needed to meet expected future increases in electricity demand, new nuclear reactors and new types of nuclear reactors can play a role in meeting this new demand. These reactors will no doubt include small modular reactors (SMR), many of which will be derivations of light-water reactor technology, as well as new types of advanced reactors based on new fuel concepts and with substantially different designs from those operated commercially today. Some of these new reactors may also provide heat and power for non-electric applications (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) 2023). For example, advanced technology reactors may be uniquely suited for water desalination and cogeneration alongside various industrial processes, process heat, and hydrogen generation, and could be developed in smaller, truck portable, variations (Nuclear Energy Institute 2022). According to the International Energy Agency, nuclear power’s global contribution would need to double from 413 GW in early 2022 to 812 GW in 2050 to achieve desired net zero emissions scenarios. To achieve this level of production would require annual nuclear capacity additions averaging 27 GW per year in the 2030s, higher than any decade before. Emerging and developing economies would account for more than 90 percent of global growth, with China set to become the leading nuclear power producer before 2030 (International Energy Agency 2022). This would translate into new reactors being deployed in countries that have no history or experience with nuclear power or nuclear reactors, and thus no or limited experience with nuclear safety and safeguards. Some of the new technologies could use fuel with higher uranium enrichments than those commonly in use today. Although varying in design, many advanced reactor fuels would require what is termed “high assay low enriched uranium” or HALEU, using uranium enriched up to 19.95 percent. A category of advanced reactors, termed “fast” reactors, would be designed to breed more fissile material than they consume. Additional new fuel types could use plutonium, including surplus weapons grade plutonium. These new fuel and reactor types, some of which Prepublication Copy 63 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction could be more attractive terrorist targets compared to existing targets will need new approaches to safeguards and security, particularly those with new deployment concepts, such as mobile, sea based and remote sites. According to a global deployment analysis by Third Way, between 2021 and 2050, total electricity consumption is projected to approximately double to over 50,000 terawatt hours annually (Ahn and Allen 2022). Around 75 percent of new demand will come outside of developed countries. A total of 52 countries are projected to be markets for advanced nuclear power before 2050. Nine countries that do not currently have operating commercial nuclear plants are considered viable markets today and an additional 10 countries are anticipated to have advanced nuclear reactors by 2030, and likely would be by 2050 (Ahn and Allen 2022). The global market for nuclear power could potentially triple by 2050. Additional demand drivers such as water desalination, industrial heat, electric vehicles, and coal replacement, could increase projected new nuclear generation and market size even further. The Department of Energy received $230 million in fiscal year 2020 to start a program for an Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP). Elements of the new program include “risk reduction for future development, and advanced reactor safeguards” (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) 2023). The Office of Nuclear Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working with U.S. industry under the INSTAR program, to foster consideration of advanced security and safeguards concepts, early in the design cycle of advanced reactors (National Nuclear Security Administration 2022). In order to prevent the theft of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities, the International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) program partners with the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor industry and embarking nuclear power countries on improving the security of future U.S. advanced reactor exports. The focus is on three areas: (1) early integration of security by design; (2) building nuclear security capacity in countries embarking on new nuclear power programs; and (3) strengthening the global nuclear security regime by developing international guidelines and resources on evolving security considerations posed by advanced and small modular reactors. These partnerships help support the responsible international deployment of U.S. advanced reactor technologies while ensuring technological innovation in meeting global security legal obligations and requirements. INSTAR, a Congressionally mandated program, provides funding to DOE national laboratory experts to partner with vendors under Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) or non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). By working with INSTAR, U.S. companies will be better positioned to engage with global customers. Specific areas of support are customized to the vendor’s needs, reactor design concept, and technology readiness level. DOE/NNSA is mandated by Congress to work closely with DOE-NE and the U.S. NRC to support the development and integration of security-by-design in U.S. origin technology. INSTAR seeks to move U.S. civil nuclear technology development forward, recognizing the critical role it plays for meeting climate change goals. It seeks to accomplish this by integrating security considerations into the vendors existing processes without hampering development timelines (National Nuclear Security Administration 2022). Looking ahead, as the number of nuclear reactors increase globally, there will be both more opportunities for terrorists potentially to access nuclear materials at nuclear facilities and while those materials are in transit. Accordingly, there will be more nuclear material, nuclear Prepublication Copy 64 

The Evolving Civil Nuclear Sector: Adapting Approaches and New Opportunities facilities, and host countries that will need to develop new and advanced approaches to security and safeguards. Leveraging the U.S. domestic civilian nuclear sector is the most effective means by which high U.S. standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards can be exported around the world. The forecasted expansion of this sector in support of U.S. and global clean energy goals, will required broader authorized use of nuclear materials in commerce which could translate into a potential increase in opportunities for diversion and misuse (National Nuclear Security Administration and U.S. Department of Energy 2021; U.S. Department of Energy 2023). This makes it all the more imperative to advance a dominant presence of U.S. industry participants in the global nuclear market. The new nuclear renaissance provides an opportunity for the U.S. government to work with industry and the IAEA, to develop appropriate standards to prevent diversion of nuclear material and to keep nuclear terrorism at bay. A coordinated interagency forum, such as a working group or council, could be a mechanism to define issues, identify ongoing related work, coordinate disparate agency efforts, as well as provide an entry point for existing and new entrant domestic nuclear companies seeking to align with and advance U.S. interests in the sector. The IAEA Small Modular Reactor Regulators’ Forum is an example of this type of collaborative dialogue (International Atomic Energy Agency 2023b), where countries seek to achieve additional harmonization on nuclear safety topics between regulatory authorities of the participant countries. Ultimately, the substantive engagement of industry participants will be essential to the development of workable standards for both safety and safeguards, as suggested here. 5.2 EXPANDING GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY “We can design a system that’s proof against accident and stupidity; but we can’t design one that’s proof against deliberate malice.” Arthur C. Clarke 2001, A Space Odyssey FINDING 5-1: As a result of increasing reliance on nuclear power, more nuclear material and facilities around the globe will require new methods of security that moves beyond relying primarily on guns, guards, and gates to safeguard against nuclear terrorism. Russian attacks on nuclear power plants and the civil energy sector in Ukraine have broken the longstanding norm that has placed nuclear facilities off limits in times of conflict, as set out in the 1949 Geneva Convention, Section A, Rule 42 and Protocol 1, Article 56. Diplomatic efforts through the IAEA, and other multinational fora, with support from and led by the United States should seek to bolster international consensus agreements for reestablishing this norm. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether such agreements would be honored by those committing acts of aggression or terrorism that already violate national sovereignty, treaty commitments and basic international norms of behavior. Russia’s attacks and the ongoing terrorism risk have generated new concerns about the future targeting of the civil energy infrastructure, particularly nuclear power plants, by state and non-state actors. Such energy facilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, while robust, are not designed or constructed to repel a determined and sustained military assault. A regulatory requirement for existing facilities to withstand military assaults would almost certainly place a prohibitively high Prepublication Copy 65 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction economic burden on the sector. However, as new reactor technologies are being developed, there will be opportunities to think about the concept of inherent safety and security that could be included into the design where feasible. Engineers and regulators could explore new options in the design phase and then further analyze options to understand the costs and operational impacts, if any. Promising topical areas already under examination and development include robust nuclear fuel concepts, spent fuel storage technologies, and extended coping times prior to the need for auxiliary power supplies. 5.3 DESIGN BASIS THREAT FINDING 5-2: Civil nuclear energy facilities are not hardened against a nation-state assault under military conditions of sustained war fighting, and efforts to make them so are likely to be cost-prohibitive. However, additional international coordination could result in more states adopting additional control measures and contingency plans to reduce the resulting risk. As defined by the U.S. NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2023), the design basis threat (DBT) is “a description of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary, against which a security system is designed to protect. The NRC uses the DBT as a basis for designing safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material.” According to the IAEA, a DBT includes the capabilities of potential insider and external threats that include unauthorized removal of nuclear and other radiological material or sabotage of a nuclear facility. Physical protection systems are built to and reviewed on the basis of the DBT (International Atomic Energy Agency 2009, 2023a). The participation by U.S. government and private sector experts in international, multilateral initiatives such as the International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative has made a positive contribution toward achieving the goal of safe and secure deployment of small modular reactors and other advanced nuclear technologies. It also supports maximizing the potential contribution of such technologies for the achievement of global clean energy goals. The US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration leads several efforts to strengthen international safeguards. These programs include support to the IAEA for developing technology tools that can advance the more efficient and effective application of safeguards. They also include efforts with partner countries and organizations to reinforce the safeguards regime to include promoting universal adherence to IAEA Additional Protocol. Other efforts include developing approaches for safeguarding new and prospective new fuel cycle facilities, existing facilities, and emerging technologies. DOE/NNSA is working to incorporate Safeguards by Design elements into U.S. advanced reactor designs by engaging with nuclear industry stakeholders on improving opportunities for international deployment. DOE/NNSA also partners with U.S. industry on Security by Design for advanced and small modular reactors to improve the security of U.S. exports, make U.S. advanced nuclear reactor designs more competitive, and make future markets more resilient to evolving risks (National Nuclear Security Administration 2021a, 2021b). Given the scope and scale of global nuclear ambitions cited above, a significant expansion and acceleration of U.S. civil nuclear development efforts is needed to catch up with the many Russian and Chinese commercial nuclear ventures that are currently underway. Prepublication Copy 66 

The Evolving Civil Nuclear Sector: Adapting Approaches and New Opportunities 5.4 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS FINDING 5-3: The United States is working to drive international standards and regulatory harmonization around nonproliferation, materials control and accounting, and physical and cyber security for advanced nuclear technologies. NNSA is the lead technical advisor for U.S. 123 Agreement negotiations and leads implementation of a number of these agreements and implementing arrangements (Arms Control Association 2019; U.S. Department of State 2022). NNSA also provides robust support for the part 810 process to ensure exports of U.S. technology are not diverted or used for proliferant purposes (National Nuclear Security Administration 2023). A National Academies study committee recently completed an analysis of the challenges and potential support for the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. The committee recommended that the United States should develop a plan for increased and sustained long-term financial and technical support for capacity building in partner countries, including cost requirements for using U.S. national laboratories and universities as training platforms. This plan should include partnering with U.S. reactor vendors to develop a safety, safeguards, and security “package”. With this package, the United States and the vendor could offer customized support to a host country for developing and implementing new safety, safeguards, and security arrangements. [Recommendation 9-5, (National Academies of Sciences 2023b)] Our committee, although not having studied this and related issues in the same depth, endorses this recommendation as supporting efforts to advance nuclear security, at home and abroad. 5.5 THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FINDING 5-4: For nuclear new-entrant nations, efforts are urgently needed to bolster nuclear energy cooperation in developing training, education, safety, security, safeguards, and nuclear governance. FINDING 5-5: The IAEA and other multilateral fora are carrying out effective initiatives for strengthening international standards on nuclear safety, security and materials control and accounting for advanced nuclear technologies. Unfortunately, the IAEA lacks adequate resources including baseline funding and extra-budgetary contributions to fully address the demands of the expanding civil nuclear sector. The IAEA small modular reactors (SMR) Regulators’ Forum, created in March 2015, provides enabling discussions among Member States and other stakeholders to share SMR regulatory knowledge and experience. The Forum enhances nuclear safety by identifying and resolving common safety issues that may challenge regulatory reviews associated with SMRs and by facilitating robust and thorough regulatory decisions. The Forum’s work is intended to establish position statements on regulatory issues; suggestions for revisions to or new IAEA documents; information to help regulators enhance regulatory frameworks; reports on regulatory challenges with discussion on paths forward; and suggestions for changes to international codes and standards (International Atomic Energy Agency 2023c, 2023b). Prepublication Copy 67 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction The IAEA has also launched an initiative bringing together policy makers, regulators, designers, vendors and operators to develop common regulatory and industrial approaches to SMRs. The Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI) aims to facilitate the safe and secure deployment of SMRs and other advanced nuclear technologies to maximize their contribution to achieving decarbonization goals (International Atomic Energy Agency 2023c). The increasing presence of nuclear security in IAEA activities has spread to encompass the IAEA’s work on new and advanced reactors. In 2021, the IAEA began a nuclear security project to share information on SMR security systems and how requirements and guidance from the Nuclear Security Series can apply to SMRs (International Atomic Energy Agency 2021). This project will form the basis of future guidance and training programs. The current regular budget for IAEA nuclear security and safeguard activities is €6.4 million for nuclear security and €133.5 million for safeguards implementation (International Atomic Energy Agency 2019). The IAEA Division of Nuclear Security relies on extra-budgetary funding five or six times the amount of the regular budget to conduct its work (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2019). Furthermore, given the zero-growth constraints on the IAEA budget (International Atomic Energy Agency 2022) (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2019, p. 10) and an unwillingness by some IAEA Member States to reapportion the budget from other activities (see GAO 2019, pp. 30–32) efforts to make deployment of new and advanced reactors safeguarded and secure will be impaired unless there are significant changes in the current funding stream. These initiatives that aid potential partners for deploying U.S. new and advanced reactors, either bilaterally through U.S. government initiatives or multilaterally through the work of the IAEA, will require stepped-up efforts by the United States and the IAEA. The IAEA will need a considerable increase in its budget to meet the safety, security, and safeguards objectives for these new and expanded nuclear programs (National Academies of Sciences 2023b, 2023a). 5.6 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FINDING 5-6: The challenge of mitigating the domestic security risk of nuclear materials would be advanced by addressing the long-term disposal issue of spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored at nuclear power plants and other facilities across the United States. Addressing the need to permanently store spent fuel would reduce the risk of these nuclear materials being obtained or targeted by terrorists. Faced with a burgeoning nuclear power program in the 1970’s, the attention of U.S. policy makers eventually turned to resolving the long-term disposal issue of spent nuclear fuel being stored at nuclear power plants. This work culminated in the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 which designated the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada as the first disposal location. The Act also created a fee to be collected from electricity consumers to fund the development of the disposal program. Although over $44 billion has been collected from consumers, four decades after passage of this legislation, the United States is no closer to a functioning program for spent fuel disposal. Many studies have been completed on this issue by committees, commissions, and panels. This committee did not recreate that work, but notes the obvious. The absence of a long- term disposal solution leaves spent nuclear fuel housed at multiple locations throughout the United States, including locations at long dismantled former nuclear power installations that, but Prepublication Copy 68 

The Evolving Civil Nuclear Sector: Adapting Approaches and New Opportunities for the absence of a disposal or consolidated storage site for their spent fuel, could long since have been turned into brown field locations and returned to other uses. From a security perspective, this situation is broadly undesirable because it results in many more locations that must be secured and monitored. This committee endorses the result of many earlier expert panels that have recommended that the longstanding political impasse be resolved for the benefit of the nation and its security. The committee also notes that in December 2021 the DOE issued a request for information seeking feedback on consent based siting as an approach to managing spent nuclear fuel. RECOMMENDATION 5-1: A whole-of-government effort, in partnership with the civil nuclear sector, is needed to strengthen the U.S. presence in civil nuclear energy commerce and thereby enhance global standards for safety, security, and materials control. This effort could include: • Establishing an inter-agency working group to coordinate ongoing U.S. government activities related to civil nuclear exports strategy and to promote regulatory harmonization of safety, safeguards and security standards and licensing frameworks by: 1) Seeking additional opportunities to facilitate international nuclear energy cooperation for developing training, education, safety, security, safeguards, and nuclear governance required for nuclear new-entrant nations, while defining U.S. priorities and eliminating duplication of effort among agencies, and 2) Identifying gaps in international efforts and making recommendations for U.S. extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA or other multilateral fora, and advocate for similar actions by Allies and partners. The objective would be to advance and accelerate the development of global standards, and other harmonization and updates to national and international frameworks. • Encouraging the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to move beyond its traditional reticence in leading international regulatory harmonization efforts. This effort should be animated by a recognition that such efforts do not necessarily constitute technology advocacy, need not impair individual national sovereignty, would promote the attainment of higher global standards of safety and security, and are crucial to U.S. national security in an increasingly nuclearized world. References Ahn, Alan, and Todd Allen. 2022. “2022 Advanced Nuclear Map: Charting a Breakout Year.” http://thirdway.imgix.net/pdfs/2022-advanced-nuclear-map-charting-a-breakout-year.pdf. Arms Control Association. 2019. “The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance.” https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123. Holt, Katherine. 2021. “Advanced Reactor Civil Nuclear Security Project.” Conference: Proposed for presentation at the National Academies of Science Meeting - Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advance held May 18, 2021 in Washington, DC, US. https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1868438. Prepublication Copy 69 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction International Atomic Energy Agency. 2009. Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat.IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 10. ---. 2019. The Agency’s Programme and Budget 2020–2021. ---. 2021. Nuclear Security Report 2021. ---. 2022. The Agency’s Budget Update for 2023. ---. 2023a. “Design Basis Threat (DBT).” https://www.iaea.org/topics/security-of-nuclear-and- other-radioactive-material/design-basis-threat. ---. 2023b. “Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Regulators’ Forum.” https://www.iaea.org/topics/ small-modular-reactors/smr-regulators-forum. ---. 2023c. “The SMR Platform and Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI).” https://www.iaea.org/services/key-programmes/smr-platforms-nhsi. International Energy Agency. 2022. World Energy Outlook 2022. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine,. 2023a. Laying the Foundation for New and Advanced Nuclear Reactors in the United States. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. ---. 2023b. Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advanced Nuclear Reactors. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. National Nuclear Security Administration. 2021a. NNSA: Reducing Global Nuclear Threats. ---. 2021b. “Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (NPCR).” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/prevent-counter-and-respond-strategic- plan-reduce-global-nuclear-threats-npcr. ---. 2022. International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR). edited by International Nuclear Security. ---. 2023. “10 CFR Part 810.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/10-cfr-part-810. National Nuclear Security Administration, and U.S. Department of Energy. 2021. Prevent, Counter, and Respond—NNSA’s Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats FY 2022-FY 2026. Nuclear Energy Institute. 2022. “Advanced Nuclear Energy.” https://www.nei.org/fundamentals. U.S. Department of Energy. March 2023 2023. Department of Energy FY 2023 Budget in Brief. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/doe-fy2024-budget-in-brief-v5.pdf. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). 2023. “Nuclear Reactor Technologies.” https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies. U.S. Department of State. 2022. 123 Agreements. https://www.state.gov/fact-sheets-bureau-of- international-security-and-nonproliferation/123-agreements/. U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2019. Nuclear Security: The International Atomic Energy Agency Could Improve Priority Setting, Performance Measures, and Funding Stabilization. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2023. “Design-basis threat (DBT).” https://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/design-basis-threat-dbt.html. Prepublication Copy 70 

FIGURE 6-1 Plot of the strength of nonproliferation restrictions (y-axis) and state controls against the theft of nuclear materials (x-axis). Researchers coupled data on nonproliferation restriction strength with the Nuclear Security Index developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (Bidgood and Potter 2021). The results show that the agreements and nuclear export controls are best for nuclear newcomers in the upper right quadrant, with worrisome agreements and materials control for countries in the lower left. The lower right quadrant depicts countries identified with above average materials control and below average agreements, with the opposite true in the upper left quadrant, lower than average materials control and above average agreements. A qualitative measure of the amount of nuclear material possessed by a country is represented by the size of the diamond data points. The differences between cooperative agreements with Russia or the United States is a reflection of the changing political dynamic between the two countries discussed in Chapter 4. SOURCE: Dr. William C. Potter, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Prepublication Copy 71