Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024)

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3 New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks BOX 3-1 Summary The probability of nuclear terrorism is low, due in part to a number of programs, policies, and systems developed to secure and control access to nuclear weapons and weapons usable materials. Nuclear terrorism is also hindered by the challenges non-state actors must overcome to successfully fabricate an improvised nuclear device. Nonetheless, the number and types of groups who are motivated to try to use INDs or RDD/REDs is likely growing. While some non-state actors are more likely to be deterred by the near-certainty of attribution and retribution, others including millenarian groups such as ISIS and U.S.-based accelerationist groups, actively court retaliation to spark a wider war or to realize apocalyptic beliefs (Earnhardt, Hyatt, and Roth 2021). The risk of nuclear terrorism must also be evaluated in the context of changing norms and a potential renaissance in civil nuclear power. There are also the mounting dangers associated with cyberattacks on operating nuclear power plants. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to defy international norms by attacking and occupying Ukraine’s operating civilian nuclear power plants. Russia has also been employing proxies with a history of war crimes, and has deployed operatives to attack and poison individuals with advanced nerve agents and radiological substances. A particularly troubling development is the increase in domestic terrorism risk within the United States, which may also increase the risk of nuclear terrorism. This includes U.S.-based accelerationist groups who have been deliberately recruiting U.S. military personnel and have targeted critical infrastructure including nuclear facilities. Additionally, there are disturbing and growing U.S. domestic links with mercenary and terrorist groups across international borders. Extremists are utilizing social media to fuel radicalization and political polarization, as well as to propagate dis- and misinformation, and sow mistrust of government institutions and authoritative information. Social media is serving as a powerful organizational tool for terrorist groups, facilitating an increase in international connectivity among domestic and foreign terrorist organizations. In sum, managing the threat of nuclear terrorism will be challenged by the continued presence of international and domestic terrorist groups, some of who are motivated to carry out these kinds of attacks. Highlights • A new era of potential nuclear instability is emerging with the demise of traditional arms control agreements, and challenges to some longstanding non-proliferation arrangements and norms. • Russian attacks on and occupation of Ukrainian power plants signal the end of a well- established norm that such plants should be inviolate. • The demarcation between domestic and international terrorist organizations is blurring alongside the use of non-state actors as proxies by states. Terrorism is increasingly transnational. This has strategic, organizational, and operational implications for U.S. security efforts that assign roles and responsibilities based on whether a threat is state versus non-state and domestic versus international. • Extreme-right wing accelerationist groups are recruiting US military personnel, potentially posing an increased risk to security across the nuclear weapons enterprise and to the civil nuclear industry. Prepublication Copy 40 

New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks 3.1 TERRORISTS’ LONGSTANDING INTEREST IN NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Terrorist groups have been pursuing nuclear and radiological weapons and devices for decades (Ferguson et al., 2005). A few prominent examples include: (1) Aum Shinrikyo’s unsuccessful, repeated attempts to mine uranium, hire Russian nuclear scientists and purchase Russian nuclear technology in the 1990s; (2) al Qaeda’s unsuccessful alleged attempts to purchase nuclear weapons and material from a variety of sources in the 1990s, recruit insiders, as well as attempts to design a nuclear weapon that would have included explosive testing in Afghanistan; and (3) ISIS’s access to a cache of cobalt-60 when it overran Mosul (Ward 2018). In August 2014, an insider at the Doel 4 nuclear power plant in Belgium carried out a successful act of nuclear sabotage. The sabotage did not result in the release of radiological material, but the costs were significant. The saboteur was never identified, but the nuclear regulator added new requirements for defending against insider threats (Bunn et al., 2016). Although terrorists confront considerable challenges in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon or an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), the enormous consequences of a nuclear detonation call for continued vigilance by the United States and reinvigorated efforts by the international community to reduce the risk. Attacks involving nuclear sabotage or deploying a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) have fewer barriers for non-state actors to pursue. These risks reinforce the need for an ongoing international commitment to managing and reducing nuclear terrorism challenges. Radiological material found in secure nuclear power plants and other facilities can be used to make radiological dispersal devices (RDD aka “dirty bombs”) or radiological exposure devices (RED) (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, there have been over 80 attacks on nuclear facilities around the globe since 1963, the majority of which are understood to have been orchestrated by malicious actors (as distinct from protestors) (Ackerman 2023). In one notable instance, Belgian police discovered that individuals connected to ISIS secretly monitored a senior nuclear industry official who worked at nuclear access sites that contained enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear bombs (Bunn 2016). 3.2 NEW ERA IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM FINDING 3-1: A new nuclear era is emerging, in which (1) longstanding arms control treaties, and counterproliferation and non-proliferation norms and arrangements are eroding, (2) civil nuclear energy is becoming more widespread and utilizing new designs, and (3) the strategic focus on combatting international terrorist activity is waning. As evidenced in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian military, attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants signals the end of a longstanding norm that such plants should be inviolate. Recent Russian attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants are eroding the well-established norm that such plants should be inviolate. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russian president Vladimir Putin of “nuclear terrorism” for his attack and seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (Broad 2022). Zelensky also called out Russia for conducting missile strikes that hit the industrial equipment surrounding the Pivedennoukrainsk nuclear site Prepublication Copy 41 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (Ritter and Gambrell 2022). In occupying the Chernobyl nuclear site, Russian forces reportedly damaged power supplies that were necessary to prevent releases of radiation (Kuleba 2022). Russia’s attacks on nuclear sites have also occurred in cyberspace, where international norms against attack are less established. In March 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed charges on four Russian officials accused of hacking into the computer system of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in Kansas (Benner and Conger 2022). No sabotage of the facility resulted from these cyber-attacks, but it is troubling that Russia would undertake an attack, possibly intended to disrupt or compromise operations, on a nuclear facility (Nuclear News 2022), (Swan and Miller 2022). There is also the ongoing risk that nuclear states may lose control of the weapons in their possession. This is not only a risk for states such as Pakistan and North Korea. During the Cold War, the United States lost six nuclear weapons or components prior to 1968 that have never been recovered (Suciu 2021; Roza 2022), and the Soviet Union may have lost more (Federation of American Scientists 2023). Acts of nuclear terrorism ultimately require fulfillment of three elements (1) procurement of or access to nuclear weapons or radiological materials; (2) capability to steal, or develop, and deploy a nuclear weapon, IND or RDD/RED; and (3) the motivation to undertake such an attack. Each of these is discussed below: • Access: To be successful, terrorists must procure some or all of the following: o Nuclear weapon(s) from a state actor or an insider, or o Financial or technical resources sufficient to acquire nuclear weapons, components, or fissile/radiological materials, or o Insider access to, or access to third-party insiders capable of supplying nuclear and/or radiological materials (plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), high- activity radiological sources), and o A sanctuary, technical facility, and sufficient time to design, develop, and prepare the weapon. • Capabilities o Access to appropriately trained technical experts (such as metallurgists, engineers, chemists, and physicists); o Operational security (i.e., managing operations such that counter-measures by a state or the international community are less likely to identify and interrupt the activity); o Knowledge of or access to insiders capable of supplying the knowledge base for producing, handling and potentially testing INDs, RDDs, or REDs; o Covert transportation of material and equipment and other logistical support; and o Means of targeting and delivery1. • Possible Motivations include: o Incite civil war o Attract media attention to the cause 1 Transporting a nuclear device over long distances to a targeted location in the United States is problematic. Terrorists would likely prefer to maintain complete control over the device which means they would likely avoid major ports or border crossings to smuggle the device. However, if an adversary’s intent is to cause mass disruption to the intermodal transportation system, they may decide to send a nuclear device in a cargo container with the goal of targeting the arriving port facility. Prepublication Copy 42 

New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks o Create fear and chaos o Generate mass economic disruption and destructive cascading effects, for example, by targeting critical systems, e.g., ports, power and water infrastructure, or supply systems o Religious goals such as to influence deities or timing of apocalypse, o Promote opposition to nuclear power by attacking nuclear energy facilities o Demonstrate technical prowess to sympathizers as well as the targeted group 3.3 DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: BLURRING BOUNDARIES FINDING 3-2: The trends of the past years have demonstrated that domestic and international terrorist organizations are becoming more closely linked and difficult to differentiate. Countering these increasingly transnational organizations through close interagency and international cooperation will be challenged by the barriers associated with differing jurisdiction, authorities, and capacity along with the varying missions of the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Importantly, the risk of nuclear terrorism is probably greatest where the lines between domestic and international terrorists and between state and non-state actors is most unclear. The U.S. government divides terrorists into two categories: domestic and international. According to the FBI’s definitions, “international terrorists” are individuals or groups “inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations.” They define domestic terrorists as individuals or groups aiming “to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.”2 However, there are prominent examples of U.S. domestic and foreign terrorist groups becoming more integrated to include having meetings and establishing networks in contested territories such as southeastern Ukraine (Rekawek 2020). There is also the example of the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) that is fostering violent white supremacists worldwide to include individuals within the United States.3 If one of these groups with domestic and international counter parts were to acquire nuclear material it would be particularly problematic for nuclear security. 2 International terrorism: Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored). (U.S. Code 2021), see https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2009-title18/html/USCODE-2009-title18- partI-chap113B-sec2331.htm. Domestic terrorism: Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2023), see https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi- dhs-domestic-terrorism-definitions-terminology-methodology.pdf/view. 3 In April 2020, the Department of State designated the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), a Russian racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) organization suspected of attempting to incite violence in the United States, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization. The threat from RIM—and from the Imperial Legion, RIM’s military arm—lies not in the risk that RIM will attack the United States, but in the reality that RIM is actively fostering violent white supremacist extremists worldwide(Gartenstein-Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke). The group runs paramilitary training camps in St. Petersburg and provided training to two Swedish men who placed three bombs (two detonating successfully) at a center for asylum seekers in Gothenburg, Sweden (Pompeo 2020). As documented by Prepublication Copy 43 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction RECOMMENDATION 3-1: The blurring of boundaries between state and non-state adversaries such as the Wagner Group, Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS, raises the possibility that there may be gaps in U.S. government efforts to address nuclear threats. The committee recommends that the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget conduct a review of counterterrorism programs and agency budgets across the national security community to ensure that the attention being directed to Great Power Competition does not result in underinvesting in essential capabilities for managing and responding to the nuclear terrorism risk. RECOMMENDATION 3-2: The transnational links among some anti- government/terrorist groups operating in the United States suggests that some of these groups might meet the criteria to be included on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which would make it illegal, not only to join these groups, but also to financially support them, as is the case for other listed FTOs. The Committee recommends the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Defense and other relevant agencies examine these relationships and links to understand any such international connections and determine if any additional organizations are appropriate to add to this listing. 3.4 THE CONTINUUM BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS FINDING 3-3: Nuclear risks cannot be neatly divided between state and non-state actors. Instead, there is a continuum that blurs the line between state and non-state and challenges the distinction between acts of terrorism and acts of war. This gray-zone includes state actors who use non-state actors as proxies. Proxies can present a “principal-agent” problem, in which the principal can lose control of the agent, as happened with Russia’s Wagner Group in June 2023. ISIS is an example of a non-state actor that has attempted to hold territory and fulfill most of the functions of a state. Additionally, states continue to use proxy groups to conceal their involvement in domestic and international conflicts. For example, Pakistan’s ISI has played an important role in the creation and support of the Taliban and extremist groups involved in Kashmir. Iran has used Hezbollah to support the Assad regime in Syria and in border disputes with Israel. Iran has also supported Hamas in its conflict with Israel. Both Hezbollah and Hamas also play political roles in Lebanon and Palestine, respectively, complicating their status still further. A state’s imperfect control of these proxies (terrorist, paramilitary, hacking, or mercenary group) makes it possible to claim that the agents are acting independent of the state. The advantage of this kind of arrangement is that it gives the state at least somewhat plausible the Soufan Center in 2020, RIM has sent “foreign fighters” to conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and the Central African Republic. The Soufan Center also documents a 2017 meeting between a RIM delegation and Matthew Heimbach, founder of the American neo-Nazi Traditionalist Worker Party, who helped organize the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, which led to the death of a counter protestor in 2017 (The Soufan Center 2020). The threat of attacks influenced by RIM in foreign countries is well established. A combination of existing evidence about Russia’s malign influence efforts against the United States makes it clear that the threat to the Homeland is real and merits study and mitigation efforts. Prepublication Copy 44 

New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks deniability when attacks are successfully executed. The disadvantage is that the state may end up losing control of its agent. According to one well-established framework, states typically have three managerial strategies when it comes to proxy groups: (1) tacitly permitting (turning a blind eye), (2) orchestrating (actively funding or supporting a group in return for services) or (3) delegating (establishing command and control over the group). With each step toward “delegating,” the state becomes more involved in the decisions and actions of the proxy group (Canfil 2022) (Maurer 2018). The motivations of joining such groups vary. For example, in the case of an orchestrated proxy, the state and the proxy group are assumed to have similar interests; whereas, in the case of a mercenary group, the aim of the group is profit (McFate 2019). Direct state complicity in a terrorist attack can have far-reaching diplomatic and political consequences to include elevating the intensity of a conflict. Accordingly, using a proxy can be attractive because it positions a state to attempt to shift blame, better mold its narrative, and create plausible, or in some cases even implausible deniability surrounding an attack or mission. This method allows countries to advance their political or economic agenda over time and locations, while minimizing the risk of accountability for their efforts and discouraging public attention (Atwell, Portzer, and McCurdy 2021). (That said, for reasons spelled out earlier, the risk of discovery would presumably largely deter states from covert delivery of nuclear weapons via proxies.) According to a 2015 CSIS report on “Gray Zones,” “Today, the toolkit for coercion below the level of direct warfare includes information operations, political coercion, economic coercion, cyber operations, proxy support, and provocation by state-controlled Forces. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as non-state actors, are increasingly turning to these [gray- zone] strategies to overcome U.S. strengths in global diplomacy, law, and commerce.” (Atwell, Portzer, and McCurdy 2021) (Barno and Bensahel 2015) The Wagner Group is a well-known example of a private group that operates in the grey area between state and non-state. Wagner is a paramilitary organization that has been trained and sponsored by the Russian Federation. Russia has been using the group to promote its foreign policy objectives, gather intelligence, influence political outcomes, and provide foreign militia training. Suspected and confirmed operations have occurred in as many as 30 countries and across four continents, including Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Venezuela (Katz et al., 2020). Notably, the Wagner Group, among other Russian private military groups, was used to destabilize and consolidate Russian power in Crimea and eastern Ukraine leading up to and supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Russia’s loss of control of the group in June 2023 illustrates the principal-agent problem that proxy groups can present (Rácz 2020). 3.5 THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM Many nuclear weapon scenarios involving state-sponsors, to include covert delivery via proxies, would be deterred if states assume their involvement could be attributed to the sponsoring state via nuclear forensics, or other intelligence, resulting in subsequent public identification and condemnation, and international retribution (National Academies of Sciences 2021). In short, deterrence works for rational state actors. Deterrence measures can also work for many non-state actors. While individual terrorists or suicide bombers may not be inhibited from employing a nuclear weapon or IND, their leaders would presumably want to survive to continue Prepublication Copy 45 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction to pursue the terrorist groups’ goals, and maintain the public perception of their image and capabilities. Many terrorist groups could also be deterred by damage to their reputation, which might make them reluctant to violate nuclear norms. Principles of deterrence are less likely to dissuade millenarian groups. This is because deterrence works best for adversaries that seek to maximize their chances of survivability and therefore seek to minimize the risk of massive retaliation. But many millenarian groups may actively court retaliation in the hope of sparking a broader war (Stern 2004). In sum, when it comes to relying on deterrence for managing the nuclear terrorism threat, state-sponsored groups are more likely to be deterred than non-state sponsored groups. However, it is also true that these kinds of non-state sponsored groups are less likely to have access to nuclear weapons and materials. They are also unlikely to possess the expertise and operational capabilities to carry out a successful nuclear terrorist attack. Nonetheless, access and capability can change over time. If information becomes more available online, fissile and radiological materials proliferate without adequate security safeguards, and efforts to recruit insiders increase, more terrorist groups may be able to acquire the means to engage in nuclear terrorism. 3.6 NEW TYPES OF MILLENARIANISM AND TERRORIST RECRUITMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FINDING 3-4: Examples of new types of millenarian groups - the type of terrorist group most likely to ignore anti-nuclear norms – are emerging. There is also increasing evidence that extreme-right wing accelerationist groups are recruiting U.S. military personnel. If those personnel have insider knowledge about or access to nuclear facilities, materials, or intelligence, they may be in a position to compromise current U.S. nuclear security safeguards. Millenarianism is the belief that after a major cataclysm, society will be dramatically changed or “cleansed”. For secular millenarians, the kind of fundamental change they are pursuing arises by taking actions that have the potential to generate a political crisis to include sparking revolution. For example, there are contemporary domestic accelerationists who are actively seeking to incite a “second revolutionary war” in the United States. Since religious millenarians often believe that a savior or Messiah appear following a period of tribulation, they seek to participate in bringing on the cataclysmic events that will cleanse the world in preparation for the Messiah. The threat of retaliation would presumably not deter these kinds of millenarian groups from extreme acts of violence to include nuclear or radiological devices, as they believe that cataclysmic events presage positive transformative change in society and in themselves. These are groups that want, not a seat at the table, but to blow up the table (Lemann 2001; National Commission on Terrorism 1998). Examples of millenarian groups that have sought to acquire nuclear materials or weapons include not only al Qaeda and ISIS, but also the group Atomwaffen. According to an investigation by Propublica, authorities discovered an aspirational plan to blow up a nuclear facility over 40 miles from Miami (Thompson, Winston, and Hanrahan 2018a). The group’s name means “nuclear weapons” in German. Atomwaffen was formally disbanded in 2020 (Gais 2023), but it has evolved into a brand rather than a specific terrorist group (Lewis and Newhouse 2023) (Shadnia et al., 2022). Members of the coalition associated with the Atomwaffen brand in the United States seek to incite a race war and overthrow the federal government. Prepublication Copy 46 

New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks Particularly troubling is Atomwaffen’s recruitment of military or US government personnel. Notably, the group’s founder and leader, Brandon Russell, was arrested after authorities found homemade fuses, Geiger counters, and explosive and radiological materials in his garage. He had been serving in the 53rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion of Florida’s Army National Guard at the time of his arrest (Goldwasser 2021). He was described by a former roommate as “obsessed with nuclear weapons” (Fleer 2020). After his 2021 release from prison, Russell was indicted, in 2023, for allegedly planning to disable the power grid in Maryland (Weiner, et al., 2023). Josh Beckett, who served in the army from 2011-2015 as a combat engineer, trained Atomwaffen members in firearms and hand-to-hand combat and offered to construct weapons for the group (Thompson, et al., 2018b). Naval aviation machinist mate’s apprentice David Cole Tarkington was found to be a prolific Attomwaffen recruiter (Villarreal 2020). The Base is another accelerationist neo-Nazi group operating in the United States, Europe, and Russia with the objective of establishing a white ethno-state. It is led by American Rinaldo Nazzaro, who fled to St. Petersburg, Russia in 2020, where he still manages the group. Before founding The Base, Nazzarro was an analyst for the FBI and a contractor for the DOD. He has also made unsubstantiated claims that he is a U.S. military veteran, an expert in defense studies, and a former CIA officer (Center for International Security and Cooperation 2021). Those with military training and experience with firearms and explosives are particularly valuable to the group. Its online application asked recruits about their training in the military, science, and engineering (The Southern Poverty Law Center 2022). In 2019, a member of the group told a federal prosecutor that Nazzaro was a Russian spy. The BBC has also reported that he was listed as a guest at a Russian government security exhibition which “focused on the demonstration of the results of state policy and achievements” (Arsenault and Stabile 2020). The Order of 9 Angles (O9A) is a transnational accelerationist group that expresses admiration for both al Qaeda and Hitler. The O9A began as a British Satanic cult, but is now a part of the international fascist revival. O9A encourages its members to join military units. Several US military personnel have been identified as members. One of them, Private Ethan Melzer, was sentenced to 45 years in March 2023 for releasing classified information, including about troop movements, to members of the group, with the goal of facilitating a mass casualty attack on his own military unit (Levenson 2023). FINDING 3-5: Domestic violent extremism is a potential threat to the security of the nuclear weapons enterprise and to civil nuclear industry. The association of some U.S. government employees with domestic violent extremists provides them with additional capabilities that enhances their ability to carry out a successful attack. By recruiting veterans and law enforcement agents, extremist groups are not only seeking technical and tactical expertise, but political legitimacy and mainstream credibility (Schake and Robinson 2021).The growing insider risk involving U.S. military personnel has been recognized by the leadership of the Department of Defense. An April 9, 2021 memorandum from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (U.S. Department of Defense 2021a) established a Countering Extremist Working Group for DOD, that was directed to pursue four lines of effort: (1) Military Justice and Policy, (2) Support and Oversight of the Insider Threat Program, (3) Investigative Processes and Screening Capability, and (4) Education and Training. The resulting “Report on Countering Extremist Activity within the Department of Defense” was released in December 2021 (U.S. Prepublication Copy 47 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction Department of Defense 2021b), and consists of six recommendations and associated actions. The report identified the need to re-define the terms “extremist activities” and “active participation” found in Department guidance. It also calls for updating service member transition checklists and coordination to support veterans in guarding against extremist recruiting. Additionally, it recommends the review and standardization of screening questionnaires. Finally, it calls for a commission to further study extremist activity that includes DOD civilians and contractors. All these recommendations are well aligned with addressing the insider risk. But as of May 18, 2023, according to a Pentagon spokesperson, only the training recommendation has been implemented. FINDING 3-6. The committee supports the work of the Countering Extremist Working Group, and endorses DOD efforts to continue to enforce the identified measures for increasing awareness of domestic extremists. These efforts are relevant to all federal departments and agencies who have employees and contractors who have access to sensitive information and facilities. Concrete understanding and immediate identification of how Russia and other foreign actors exploit racially and ethnically motivated ideologies in online recruiting to radicalize vulnerable Americans and incite violence is critical to combating domestic terrorism and targeted violence. Ultimately, providing practitioners and policymakers involved in the work of designing prevention and intervention programs, including State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) educational, health, and civic organizations, with a clear a foundational understanding of this threat is critical. Such efforts led by DHS should also include enhancing the ability of local law enforcement to identify any suspected terrorist threat, including nuclear threats. Executive Order (E.O) 13764 of January 17, 2017 is another important recognition of the importance of addressing the insider threat. This E.O. modified the existing civil service rules concerning security clearances, suitability, and fitness for employment, “to ensure that all persons performing work for or on behalf of the Government are and continue to be loyal to the United States” (The White House 2017). For employees eligible for access to classified information, the E.O. directed that Federal investigative standards “shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service … is consistent with the interests of national security.” The new guidance requires that persons with access to classified information are subject to “continuous evaluation” and “continuous vetting.” It explains that “‘Vetting’ is the process by which covered individuals undergo investigation, evaluation, and adjudication of whether they are, and remain over time, suitable or fit for Federal employment, eligible to occupy a sensitive position, eligible for access to classified information, eligible to serve as a nonappropriated fund employee or a contractor, eligible to serve in the military, or authorized to be issued a Federal credential.” These continuous monitoring programs should be supplemented by dedicated programs to train and motivate staff with access to sensitive information and areas to identify and mitigate insider threats. RECOMMENDATION 3-3: The U.S. government should maintain as a strategic priority, the post 9/11 focus and effort on combatting terrorism through ongoing deep collaboration and coordination across the national security community in addition to international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) authorities, the Prepublication Copy 48 

New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society, and ensure that senior leaders at key agencies stay engaged in the counter-terrorism mission. RECOMMENDATION 3-4: To address the risk of radicalization by individuals who hold U.S. security clearances, the Administration should include the Department of Defense’s revised definitions of “extremist activities” and “active participation,” as described in the Report on Countering Extremist Activity within the Department of Defense, in the investigative standards for all government workers and contractors who have access to sensitive information and facilities as part of Executive Order 13764 of January 17, 2017 and as a part of the U.S. continuous vetting process. References Ackerman, Gary. 2023. “Nuclear Facilities Attack Database (NuFAD).” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). https://www.start.umd.edu/nuclear-facilities-attack-database-nufad. Arsenault, Elizabeth Grimm, and Joseph Stabile. 2020. “Confronting Russia’s Role in Transnational White Supremacist Extremism.” Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white- supremacist-extremism/. Atwell, Kyle, Joshua M. Portzer, and Daphne McCurdy. 2021. “Negotiating [Im]plausible Deniability Strategic Guidelines for U.S. Engagement in Modern Indirect Warfare.” PRISM 9 (2): 112-121. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27008979. Barno, David, and Nora Bensahel. 2015. “Fighting and Winning in the “Gray Zone”.” War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/. Benner, Katie, and Kate Conger. 2022. “U.S. Accuses 4 Russians of Hacking Infrastructure, Including Nuclear Plant.” The New York TImes, March 24, 2022, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/politics/russians-cyberattacks-infrastructure- nuclear-plant.html. Broad, William J. 2022. “Decades of Nuclear Reactor Strikes Predate Ukraine Power Plant Crisis.” The New York Times, October 9, 2022, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/09/science/ukraine-nuclear-power-plant-crisis.html. Bunn, Matthew. 2016. “Belgium Highlights the Nuclear Terrorism Threat and Security Measures to Stop it.” Nuclear Security Matters. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/belgium- highlights-nuclear-terrorism-threat-and-security-measures-stop-it. Bunn, Matthew, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey. March 2016 2016. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline? Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School, . Canfil, Justin Key. 2022. “The illogic of plausible deniability: why proxy conflict in cyberspace may no longer pay.” Journal of Cybersecurity 8 (1). https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyac007. https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyac007. Center for International Security and Cooperation. 2021. “The Base.” Mapping Militant Organizations. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/the- base#text_block_26733. Council on Foreign Relations. 2006. “Loose Nukes.” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/loose- nukes. Prepublication Copy 49 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction Earnhardt, Rebecca L., Brendan Hyatt, and Nickolas Roth. 2021. “A threat to confront: far-right extremists and nuclear terrorism.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin. org/2021/01/a-threat-to-confront-far-right-extremists-and-nuclear-terrorism/. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2023. “FBI: What We Investigate.” Last Modified July 18, 2023. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism. Federation of American Scientists. 2023. “Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Information Project.” https://fas.org/issue/nuclear-weapons/. Ferguson, Charles D., William C. Potter, Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wheling. 2005. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Routledge. Fleer, BreAnne K. 2020. “Radiological-weapons threats: case studies from the extreme right.” The Nonproliferation Review 27 (1-3): 225-242. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020. 1775987. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1775987. Gais, Hannah. 2023. “Atomwaffen Co-Founder Pleads Guilty to Double Murder Charges.” Hatewatch. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2023/05/11/atomwaffen-co-founder- pleads-guilty-double-murder-charges. Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, Samuel Hodgson, and Colin P. Clarke. 2020. “The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its Links to the Transnational White Supremacist Extremist Movement.” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://www.icct.nl/publication/russian-imperial-movement-rim-and-its-links- transnational-white-supremacist-extremist. Goldwasser, Rachel. 2021. “Extremism Among Active-Duty Military and Veterans Remains a Clear and Present Danger.” Hatewatch. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2021/10/12/extremism-among-active-duty-military- and-veterans-remains-clear-and-present-danger. Institute for Economics & Peace. 2023. Global Peace Index https://www.economicsand peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf. Katz, Brian, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington. 2020. “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars. The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies.” https://russianpmcs.csis.org/. Kuleba, Dymtro (@DmytroKuleba). 2022. “The only electrical grid supplying the Chornobyl NPP and all its nuclear facilities occupied by Russian army is damaged. CNPP lost all electric supply. I call on the international community to urgently demand Russia to cease fire and allow repair units to restore power supply 1/2.” Twitter, March 9, 2022, 6:11 AM. https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1501531157510426625. Lemann, Nicholas. 2001. “What Terrorists Want.” The New Yorker, October 21, 2001, 2001. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/10/29/what-terrorists-want. Levenson, Michael. 2023. “Former Army Private Sentenced to 45 Years in Neo-Nazi Plot to Kill Soldiers.” The New York Times, March 3, 2023, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/03/us/ethan-melzer-army-neo-nazi-sentenced.html. Lewis, Jon, and Alex Newhouse. 2023. “Be Careful Attributing Anything to AWD.” https://www.accresearch.org/shortanalysis/be-careful-attributing-anything-to-awd. Maurer, Tim. 2018. Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power. Cambridge University Press. McFate, Sean. 2019. Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Prepublication Copy 50 

New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine,. 2021. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence: Public Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. National Commission on Terrorism. 1998. Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. Nuclear News. 2022. “Indictment related to Wolf Creek computer hack unsealed.” Nuclear Newswire. https://www.ans.org/news/article-3818/indictment-related-to-wolf-creek- computer-hack-unsealed/. Pompeo, Michael R. 2020. “United States Designates Russian Imperial Movement and Leaders as Global Terrorists.” U.S. Department of State Press Release. https://2017- 2021.state.gov/united-states-designates-russian-imperial-movement-and-leaders-as- global-terrorists/. Rácz, András. 2020. “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State.” Understanding the Russian Military Today. https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet- post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state. Rekawek, Kacper. 2020. Career Break or a New Career? Extremist Foreign Fighters in Ukraine. Germany: Counter Extremism Project. Ritter, Karl, and Jon Gambrell. 2022. “Ukraine says a Russian missile struck close to a nuclear power plant.” The Associated Press, September 19, 2022, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/09/19/1123782942/ukraine-russian-missile-strike-near- nuclear-power-plant. Roza, David. 2022. “The US military is still missing 6 nuclear weapons that were lost decades ago.” https://taskandpurpose.com/history/us-military-nuclear-weapons-missing/. Schake, Kori, and Michael Robinson. 2021. “The Military’s Extremism Problem Is Our Problem.” The New York Times, March 02, 2021, 2021. https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the- militarys-extremism-problem-is-our-problem/. Shadnia, Deeba, Alex Newhouse, Matt Kriner, and Arthur Bradley. 2022. “Militant Accelerationism Coalitions: A Case Study in Neo-Fascist Accelerationist Coalition Building Online.” Tech Against Terrorism. https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/ www.middlebury.edu.institute/files/2022-06/REDACTED%20CTEC__TAT%20 Accelerationism%20Report%20.pdf?fv=zvPnbbzC. Stern, Jessica. 2004. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. Ecco. Suciu, Peter. 2021. “The U.S. Military Is Missing Six Nuclear Weapons.” The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/us-military-missing-six-nuclear-weapons-180032. Swan, Betsy Woodruff, and Maggie Miller. 2022. “Russian spies indicted in worldwide hacks of energy industry, including Kansas nuclear plant.” Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/24/russian-spies-indicted-hack-nuclear-plant- 00020217. The Soufan Center. 2020. “Inside the Russian Imperial Movement: Practical Implications of U.S. Sanctions.” https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/TSC-Report-Inside- the-Russian-Imperial-Movement-Practical-Implications-of-U.S.-Sanctions.pdf. The Southern Poverty Law Center. 2022. “The Base.” Hatewatch. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/base. The White House. 2017. Amending the Civil Service Rules, Executive Order 13488, and Executive Order 13467 To Modernize the Executive Branch-Wide Governance Structure Prepublication Copy 51 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Processes for Security Clearances, Suitability and Fitness for Employment, and Credentialing, and Related Matters. Federal Register. Thompson, A.C., Ali Winston, and Jake Hanrahan. 2018a. “Inside Atomwaffen As It Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student.” ProPublica, February 23, 2018, 2018a. https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white- hate-group. ---. 2018b. “Ranks of Notorious Hate Group Include Active-Duty Military.” ProPublica, May 3, 2018, 2018b. https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-hate-group-active- duty-military. U.S. Code. 2021. United States Code, 2018 Edition, Supplement 3, Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure. U.S. Department of Defense. 2021a. Immediate Actions to Counter Extremism in the Military and the Establishment of the Countering Extremism Working Group. ---. 2021b. Report on Countering Extremist Activity Within the Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Dec/20/2002912573/-1/-1/0/report-on-countering- extremist-activity-within-the-department-of-defense.pdf. Villarreal, Daniel. 2020. “Navy Kicks Out Alleged Recruiter for Neo-Nazi Group Atomwaffen Division After Investigation.” Newsweek, April 17, 2020, 2020. https://www.newsweek.com/navy-kicks-out-alleged-recruiter-neo-nazi-group- atomwaffen-division-after-investigation-1498704. Ward, Antonia. 2018. “Is the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic Threats?”. https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear- terrorism-distracting-attention.html. Weiner, Rachel, Jasmine Hilton, and Dan Morse. 2023. “Duo accused of neo-Nazi plot to target Maryland power stations.” The Washington Post, February 6, 2023, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/02/06/maryland-power-grid-neonazi- brandon-russell/. Prepublication Copy 52 

FIGURE 4-1 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a voluntary partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations with a mission to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, has multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations. The United States and the Russian Federation serve as co-chairs, while Morocco currently leads the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) under the guidance of the co-chairs. GICNT activities were paused after Ukraine was invaded by the Russian state, an example of how new geo- political instability is challenging the U.S. efforts to prevent and counter nuclear terrorism. SOURCE: U.S. Department of State 2017. Prepublication Copy 53