Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024)

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Appendix B Five Eras of Nuclear Terrorism1 Policymakers have thought about nuclear security since the early days of U.S. nuclear weapons development. While initially the emphasis was on protecting against espionage, discussions evolved to focus on other threats. Incidents like the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics, which demonstrated the danger of a small group of well-armed militants, focused international attention on the threat of non-state actors.2 Soon after, the United States developed new approaches to protecting nuclear facilities from non-state actors, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began developing physical protection recommendations, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which remains the only treaty that obligates countries to implement security measures for civilian nuclear material in international transport, was opened for adoption. It was not until the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, that governments began to consider preventing nuclear terrorism an international priority. Since the early 1990s, there have arguably been five periods where high-level U.S. attention to international nuclear security has adapted and adjusted based on significant world events: the rapid response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-9/11 era, the nuclear security summit era, the post-summit era, and the era of rapidly evolving risks. B.1 RAPID RESPONSE The first era was dominated by bilateral cooperation between two countries—the United States and Russia. Beginning in 1991, the United States led an emergency effort in response to the grave nuclear security risks emanating from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Concerns about inadequate security and the risk of stolen nuclear weapons or materials amid the economic, political, and institutional crisis brought about by the Soviet collapse, led to the introduction of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, a multi-billion dollar program of U.S. technical assistance to Russia and other former Soviet republics. Over its lifetime, CTR was enormously successful, leading to dramatic security improvements at Russian facilities with nuclear materials. In its early stages in particular, the signature characteristics of CTR projects were large financial investments, bilateral donor-recipient transactions. While ultimately unsustainable in either country, this work led to the development of strong personal relationships between Americans and Russians engaged in nuclear security. 1 In response the committees mandate for this study, the committee felt it was important and valuable to stake holders and decision makers to put in context the historical eras for nuclear security. For this reason, the committee asked Nicholas Roth to summarize his presentation to the committee from June 21, 2022 as this appendix. 2 Matthew Bunn, Beyond Crises: The Unending Challenge of Controlling Nuclear Weapons and Materials, February 27, 2012, https://npolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Beyond_Crises- The_Unending_Challenge_of_Controlling_Nuclear_Weapons_and_Materials.pdf. Prepublication Copy 121 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction B.2 9/11 RESPONSE The second era of nuclear security began with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that killed 3,000 civilians in the United States. These unprecedented attacks demonstrated what organized, well-financed, sophisticated non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, could achieve. They also highlighted the dangers of complacency to low-probability, high-consequence threats. Motivated by evidence that Al Qaeda was pursuing nuclear weapons and had considered targeting U.S. nuclear power plants, the United States redoubled efforts to strengthen security at civilian and government nuclear facilities within its own borders.3 The shock of the 9/11 attacks also motivated other countries to take action to strengthen their nuclear security. During this period, the United States expanded its bilateral nuclear security cooperation with Russia. Beginning in 2005, under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, the United States and Russia intensified their collaboration focused on upgrading security of Russian nuclear facilities, expanding emergency response, enhancing nuclear security culture, accelerating research reactor conversions and fuel repatriation, and sharing best practices.4 While the U.S.-Russian initiative still represented the bulk of the international nuclear security cooperation, there were further developments in bolstering international nuclear security architecture. In 2005, parties to the CPPNM agreed to an amendment that expanded the convention’s scope to include the protection of nuclear materials located in nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful uses and to strengthen protection against sabotage of nuclear facilities. The amendment also requires a conference five years after entry into force to review implementation. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also negotiated and ratified in this period. Although dominated by the same bilateral dynamics as the first era of nuclear security, this second era expanded the focus to strengthening nuclear security in more countries. B.3 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMITS The third era began when the Obama administration made strengthening international nuclear security one of its signature policy priorities. Driven by the United States, the four nuclear security summits that took place from 2010 through 2016 shifted the focus of international nuclear security cooperation from the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia to a much broader effort among dozens of nations and, most importantly, elevated nuclear security to the highest levels of governments around the world. Over this period, countries eliminated thousands of kilograms of nuclear materials; developed stronger designs basis threats, adopted new insider threat protection measures, expanded performance assessment 3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 2004), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 4 U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. And Russia Complete Nuclear Security Upgrades Under Bratislava Initiative (Washington, D.C.: DOE, December 2008), https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-and-russia- complete-nuclear-security-upgrades-under-bratislava-initiative. Prepublication Copy 122 

Appendix B and testing, and adopted new security culture programs; and the international institutions and legal instruments bolstering international nuclear security were significantly strengthened.5 While this was occurring, however, U.S. cooperation with countries that possessed the most weapons-useable nuclear material and faced the most significant risks was either stagnant or in decline. In 2014, nuclear security cooperation at Russian nuclear facilities stopped after Russia invaded Ukraine.6 The United States played an important role in creating China’s nuclear security Center of Excellence, but that effort did not ultimately lead to expanded cooperation.7 There was little progress in strengthening nuclear security cooperation with India and other countries with nuclear facilities or weapons-useable materials. The Nuclear Security Summit era extended beyond the summits themselves. States followed through on commitments they made during the summit’s months or, in some cases, years after the last summit in Spring 2016. For example, in September 2017, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that it had removed the last batch of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from Kazakhstan’s Institute of Nuclear Physics’ VVR-K reactor; overall, more than 200 kilograms of HEU was removed from the facility.8 In August 2017, South Africa converted its Mo-99 production from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets and, in January 2018, The Netherlands converted its Mo-99 production to LEU targets.9 Numerous countries continued to upgrade their physical protection requirements after the summits. Countries continued to join international agreements.10 B.4 POST-SUMMIT ERA The fourth era of nuclear security began in 2018 after many of the commitments made during the nuclear security summit process had been accomplished. Building upon the success of the summits proved elusive, and high-level attention to nuclear security waned. Despite some statements to the contrary, for the first time in over two decades nuclear security did not appear 5 For more on what was achieved, see Martin B. Malin, Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth and William H. Tobey, “Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 18, 2015, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/advancing- nuclear-security-evaluating-progress-and-setting-new-goals. 6 See Matthew Bunn, “Steps for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Cooperation,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/ publication/a434_1.pdf. 7 The White House, U.S.-China Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, March 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/2016/03/31/us-china-joint-statement-nuclear-security-cooperation. 8 U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA partners with Kazakhstan Research Institute to Remove All of its Highly Enriched Uranium (Washington, D.C.: DOE, September 2017), https://www.energy.gov/ nnsa/articles/nnsa-partners-kazakhstan-research-institute-remove-all-its-highly-enriched-uranium. 9 U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA’s Molybdenum-99 Program: Establishing a Reliable Domestic Supply of Mo-99 Produced Without Highly Enriched Uranium (Washington, D.C.: DOE), https://www. energy.gov/nnsa/nnsas-molybdenum-99-program-establishing-reliable-domestic-supply-mo-99-produced- without. 10 Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly, The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010–2016 (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association and Fissile Materials Working Group, 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/ files/Reports/NSS_Report2018_digital.pdf. Prepublication Copy 123 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction to be an international priority. The U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation that dominated the first years of nuclear security work had almost completely come to an end. The political momentum created by multilateral nuclear security summits subsided. The IAEA, which was supposed to be the focal point for international nuclear security efforts after the summit process, remains focused on nuclear energy, safety, and technology, and not as much on nuclear security. After a decade of freefall, budgets for U.S. nuclear security programs only showed modest growth primarily driven by Congress (see Figure B-1). FIGURE B-1 Requested and Allocated Funding for U.S. Department of Energy International Nuclear Theft Prevention Programs. B.5 ERA OF RAPIDLY EVOLVING RISKS As attention has declined to nuclear security, new challenges have emerged. The incorporation of digital technologies within nuclear facilities is creating new potential vulnerabilities and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and drones are providing adversaries with dangerous new capabilities. Increasingly destructive natural disasters like hurricanes and wildfires are generating new challenges for all aspects of nuclear security operations. Two recent crises, the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a country with a large nuclear infrastructure, have raised questions about how regulatory oversight, physical protection systems, and even international institutions should prepare for and respond to protracted anthropomorphic or naturally occurring crises.11 Domestically, political polarization is changing society in ways that challenge systems to detect and mitigate insider threats. 11 Christopher Hobbs, Nickolas Roth & Daniel Salisbury (2021) Security Under Strain? Protecting Nuclear Materials During the Coronavirus Pandemic, The RUSI Journal, 166:2, 40-50, doi: 10.1080/03071847.2021.1937302. Prepublication Copy 124 

Appendix B Beyond immediate challenges to physical protection systems, there are challenges to the political relationships that underpin the international nuclear security architecture. As the two countries with by far the most weapons-useable nuclear material, U.S. and Russian cooperation and leadership are essential to the viability of this architecture. Yet, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities not only raises questions about Russia’s commitment to nuclear security but also about the future of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. With relations between the United States and Russia at a historical nadir, it is unclear when, or if, nuclear security cooperation will resume or what form that cooperation would take in the future. Even areas of bilateral cooperation where norms are much stronger, like legally binding, verifiable limits on nuclear weapons deployments, are in doubt with Russia’s decision to suspend its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Broader multilateral cooperation has also been impacted. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was co- chaired by Russia and the United States, has been suspended, leaving a gap in internationally coordinated nuclear security exercises. Beyond the immediate implications of degraded bilateral relationships, there are important conceptual shifts in nuclear security. For decades, international nuclear security cooperation has been premised on the idea that non-state actors were the primary threat to nuclear facilities. While not the first incident where a state attacked a nuclear facility, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed that paradigm. In this new and evolving nuclear security model, governments will need to develop a novel policy toolkit for discouraging states from engaging in nuclear sabotage. Countries should be prepared for so-called beyond-the-design-basis threat scenarios. These are important not just for times of war, but also in addressing the uncertainty of rapidly evolving technological risks or other political, economic, or natural disruptions. While Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine are the latest crises to impact nuclear facilities, they will certainly will not be the last. Prepublication Copy 125