Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024)

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NUCLEAR TERRORISM ASSESSMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIES TO PREVENT, COUNTER, AND RESPOND TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Nuclear Threats Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board Division on Earth & Life Studies Consensus Study Report Prepublication Copy 

NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 This activity was supported by a contract between the National Academy of Sciences and U.S. Department of Defense. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-XXXXX-X International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-XXXXX-X Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/27215 This publication is available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Keck 360, Washington, DC 20001; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313; http://www.nap.edu. Copyright 2024 by the National Academy of Sciences. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and National Academies Press and the graphical logos for each are all trademarks of the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Cover credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Andre’ Askew Printed in the United States of America. Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https:/doi.org/10.17226/27215. 

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COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING, COUNTERING, AND RESPONDING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TERRORISM: NUCLEAR THREATS STEPHEN E. FLYNN (Chair), Northeastern University MADELYN R. CREEDON (Vice Chair), The George Washington University JULIE A. BENTZ, U.S. Army (retired) MICHAEL DUNNING, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired) ROBERT C. DYNES, University of California, San Diego STEVEN A. FETTER, University of Maryland, College Park WILLIAM H. GOLDSTEIN, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (until May 5, 2023) EDWARD B HELD, Sandia National Laboratories (retired, until May 19, 2022) ELEANOR MELAMED, National Nuclear Security Administration (retired) BRENDAN G. MELLEY, National Defense University SCOTT ROECKER, Nuclear Threat Initiative JESSICA STERN, Center for Naval Analyses (as of June 15, 2022) KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, University of Michigan RODNEY K. WILSON, Sandia National Laboratories (retired) Staff MICHAEL T. JANICKE, Study Director CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director JENNY HEIMBERG, Senior Program Officer AYANNA LYNCH, Research Assistant (until July 11, 2023) KAYANNA WYMBS, Research Assistant Consultants NICKOLAS ROTH, Nuclear Threat Initiative Prepublication Copy v 

NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD WILLIAM H. TOBEY (Chair), Los Alamos National Lab AMY BERRINGTON de GONZALEZ (Vice Chair), The Institute of Cancer Research SALLY A. AMUNDSON, Columbia University Medical Center STEVEN M. BECKER, Old Dominion University MADELYN CREEDON, The George Washington University LAWRENCE T. DAUER, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center SHAHEEN A. DEWJI, Georgia Institute of Technology PAUL T. DICKMAN, Argonne National Laboratory DONALD P. FRUSH, Duke University Medical Center ALLISON M. MACFARLANE, The University of British Columbia ELEANOR MELAMED, National Nuclear Security Administration (retired) PER F. PETERSON, University of California, Berkeley R. JULIAN PRESTON, Environmental Protection Agency MONICA C. REGALBUTO, Idaho National Laboratory Staff CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director MICHAEL T. JANICKE, Senior Program Officer LAURA LLANOS, Financial Business Partner DARLENE GROS, Senior Program Assistant LESLIE BEAUCHAMP, Senior Program Assistant Prepublication Copy vi 

BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES ANN ARVIN (Chair), Stanford University DENISE BAKEN, Shield Analysis Technology TANYA BERGER-WOLF, Ohio State University VALERIE BONHAM, Kennedy Krieger Institute PATRICK BOYLE, Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc. DOMINIQUE BROSSARD, University of Wisconsin-Madison MAURO COSTA-MATTIOLI, Baylor University GERALD EPSTEIN, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security INDIA HOOK-BERNARD, Engineering Biology Research Consortium BERONDA MONTGOMERY, Michigan State University LOUIS MUGLIA, Burroughs Wellcome fund ROBERT NEWMAN, Aspen Institute LUCILIA OHNO-MACHADO, University of California, San Diego SUDIP PARIKH, American Association for the Advancement of Science NATHAN PRICE, Institute for Systems Biology SUSAN SINGER, St. Olaf College DAVID WALT, Harvard Medical School PHYLLIS WISE, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Staff KAVITA BERGER, Director ANDREW BREMER, Program Officer NANCY CONNELL, Senior Scientist JESSICA DE MOUY, Research Associate CYNTHINA GETNER, Senior Financial Business Partner LYLY LUHACHACK, Program Officer DASIA MCKOY, Program Assistant STEVEN MOSS, Senior Program Officer (until August 25, 2023) CHRISTL SAUNDERS, Program Coordinator AUDREY THEVENON, Senior Program Officer TRISHA TUCHOLSKI, Associate Program Officer SABINA VADNAIS, Research Associate NAM VU, Program Assistant Prepublication Copy vii 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL RAYMOND JEANLOZ, University of California JOHN HILDEBRAND, University of Arizona ANDREW ALLEYNE, University of Minnesota LINTON BROOKS, Independent Consultant MARIANA BUDJERYN, Harvard University MATTHEW BUNN, Harvard University NANCY CONNELL, John Hopkins Center for Health Security LINDA ELKINS-TANTON, Arizona State University STEVEN FETTER, University of Maryland, College Park DAVID FRANZ, Midwest Research Institute RICHARD GARWIN, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, Stanford University DIANE GRIFFIN, John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health MARGARET HAMBURG, Nuclear Threat Initiative MORIBA JAH, University of Texas at Austin ALASTAIR JOHNSTON, Harvard University ROBERT LATIFF, R. Latiff Associates JAMES LEDUC, University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston JEFFREY LEWIS, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey HERBERT LIN, Stanford University DOUGLAS LOVERRO, Loverro Consulting, LLC RICHARD MESERVE, Carnegie Institution for Science RICHARD MIES, The Mies Group, Ltd. PETER PALESE, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai LORA SAALMAN, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute VICTORIA SAMSON, Secure World Foundation RACHEL SEGALMAN, University of California, Santa Barbara JIM TIMBIE, Stanford University Staff MICAH LOWENTHAL, Director RITA GUENTHER, Senior Program Officer HOPE HARE, Administrative Assistant CANDANCE HUNTINGTON, Research Associate BENJAMIN RUSEK, Senior Program Officer ALEX TEMPLE, Program Officer Prepublication Copy viii 

BOARD ON CHEMICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY GERARD BAILLELY, Proctor & Gamble Company RUBEN G. CARBONELL, North Carolina State University SCOTT COLLICK, DuPont De Nemours Chemical and Plastics JENNIFER SINCLAIR CURTIS, University of California, Davis JOHN FORTNER, Yale University KAREN I. GOLDBERG, University of Pennsylvania JENNIFER M. HEEMSTRA, Emory University JODIE LUTKENHAUS, Texas A&M University SHELLEY D. MINTEER, University of Utah AMY PRIETO, Colorado State University MEGAN L. ROBERTSON, University of Houston SALY ROMERO-TORRES, Thermo Fisher Scientific REBECCA T. RUCK, Merck Research Laboratories ANUP SINGH, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory VIJAY SWARUP, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company Staff CHARLES FERGUSON, Senior Board Director LINDA NHON, Program Officer LIANA VACCARI, Program Officer BRENNA ALBIN, Senior Program Assistant THANH NGUYEN, Financial Business Partner KAYANNA WYMBS, Research Assistant MEGAN HARRIES, Program Officer (until 2022) MARIE KIRKEGAARD, Program Officer (until 2022) JESSICA WOLFMAN, Research Associate (until 2023) AYANNA LYNCH, Research Assistant (until July 11, 2023) Prepublication Copy ix 



Reviewers This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We thank the following individuals for their review of this report: DAVID E. ASPNES (NAS), North Carolina State University DANIEL BLUMENTHAL, U.S. Department of Energy PETER BOYNTON, Northeastern University BROOKE BUDDEMEIER, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory MICHAEL BURNS, TechSource, Inc. MICHAEL DINE (NAS), University of California Santa Cruz CHRISTOPHER FORD, Missouri State University, The Hoover Institution TODD C. HELMUS, RAND Corporation, Pardee RAND Graduate School JOHN M. HOLMES, STAX Engineering MAJA LEHNUS, Private Consultant DAVID LUCKEY, RAND Corporation LINDA LOURIE, WestExec Advisors CHESLAN SIMPSON, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this report nor did they see the final draft before its release. The review of this report was overseen by SALLIE ANN KELLER (NAE), University of Virginia, and GRANT H. STOKES (NAE), MIT Lincoln Laboratory. They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies. Prepublication Copy xi 



Acknowledgments Many individuals, organizations, and U.S. government agencies contributed to the successful completion of this report. The committee and National Academies’ staff appreciate their kind assistance. Presenters for the numerous briefings are listed in Appendix A. Volunteering their time to give valuable insight was crucial to the information gathered and compiled in this report. The committee would like to give a special thanks to colleagues that helped arrange the meetings for this challenging project spanning many topics, domestic and international, and provided documents and reports necessary to assess the landscape of counterterrorism especially in a rapidly changing world confronted by current events. Those colleagues are • National Nuclear Security Administration: Jay Tilden, Dallas Boyd, Kasia Mendelson, and Victor Jones • Department of Homeland Security: Gary Rasicot, Michael Kangior, William Bilicic, Frederick Breaux, and Gregory Abide • Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Cynthia Jones • Embassy of Canada, Washington D.C.: Jodie McGrath • National Security Council: Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Pranay Vaddi, and Brooke Samples Prepublication Copy xiii 



Preface “The most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin (sic) and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media, or in the Congress.[…] Al Qaeda’s new brand of terrorism presented challenges to U.S. governmental institutions that they were not well-designed to meet.” The 9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks “Nuclear and radiological threats will persist far into the future.” Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security March 3, 2023 Are U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological1 terrorism keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape? Almost twenty years after the release of “The 9/11 Commission Report,” the unanimous conclusion of the National Academy Committee members who have prepared this study report is that, overall they are not. The nightmare scenario of a terrorist nuclear attack on U.S. soil is a risk that has not diminished. The efforts to manage this risk must be expanded and they must be enduring. Success has the potential to breed complacency. The significant attention paid to preventing terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the success of the U.S programs to reduce the terrorism risk has made it possible for a new generation of Americans to grow up without experiencing a catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland. The downside of this achievement is that, not having had a major shock or crisis that provides confirmation that a threat is clear and present, the nation’s attention has started to drift. This loss of focus has in the past, and can be expected in the future, to translate into waning interest and investment in capabilities that are required to prevent, detect, deter, respond to, and recover from a future catastrophic terrorist event. In the decade prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, most Americans paid little attention to the nuclear terrorism threat. The capture of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber rattling placed the nuclear risk back in the headlines. This has not, however, resulted in renewed attention to nuclear terrorism. Instead, it has contributed to the accelerated shift in focus by the national security community to Great Power Competition with Russia and China. Preventing terrorist attacks, and effectively responding to and recovering from incidents when they occur requires vigilance and sustained effort. The sophisticated counter-terrorism intelligence and military capabilities developed after the attacks of September 11, 2001 require continuous attention to ensure the necessary levels of interagency coordination and international, 1 The UN defines nuclear terrorism as the unlawful and intentional use of radiological material with the intent to cause death, injury, or serious damage to property or the environment, or to compel “a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act” (see https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-15.pdf). Therefore, in the rest of this document, we will use “nuclear terrorism” to refer to terrorist acts that utilize either a detonable nuclear device or radioactive substances to cause harm. Prepublication Copy xv 

Preface state, and local engagement. But, challenges presented by state actors are now being prioritized over those posed by non-state actors. While this may be understandable given the rapidly changing threat environment, it risks the erosion of efforts that have worked to date in preventing terrorist groups from obtaining or building and deploying a nuclear or radiological device. A cautionary tale for current times is what happened to U.S. counter-insurgency capabilities in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War. During that conflict, the U.S. military services developed special forces that were highly capable of conducting joint special operations deep inside North Vietnam (Atlamazoglou 2020). When the war ended in 1975, however, there was a significant reduction in defense spending along with a shift by the armed services in training and strategic focus to conventional warfighting to counter the Soviet Union. Mission planning and inter-service operability for conducting special operations degraded. The tragic consequence of this played out in April 1980 with the catastrophic failure of Operation Eagle Claw. President Jimmy Carter had authorized a military rescue attempt of the 52 American diplomats and citizens taken hostage after the Iranian takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines were all involved in the operation, but only five of eight helicopters arrived at the staging area in operational condition and then one of the remaining helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft destroying both aircraft and killing eight servicemen. (Kyle and Eidson 2002; Williamson 2020). The operation was then aborted. The post-mortem investigation concluded that “a lack of coordination between military services – evidenced in part by compartmentalized training and inadequate equipment maintenance” contributed to the aborted operation (Lambert 2023). The failure of Operation Eagle Claw2 illustrated how quickly “procedural memory” and defense competencies can fade once new priorities consume most of the funding and focus. This committee is concerned that history may repeat itself, this time with respect to our counter-terrorism capabilities. Fortunately, there are many dedicated people across the U.S. government who have been involved in and continue to support the successful management of the nuclear terrorism risk. These dedicated individuals recognize the imperative for sustaining capabilities and regular exercising of the capabilities needed to counter the risk. All presidents since President Clinton have made confronting the threat of nuclear terrorism a top strategic priority. Most recently, in March 2023, President Joe Biden signed National Security Memorandum 19 on “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security.” (The White House 2023) In a meeting to coincide with the release of NSM-19, Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, traced the decades-long bipartisan history of confronting this risk that predates the Cold War but expanded rapidly at its end. She emphasized the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, created by the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act. CTR was instrumental in helping to secure and dismantle significant numbers of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, secure fissile materials, and support non- proliferation programs in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union (Bernstein and Wood 2010). Had this not been done, Soviet nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise, may have ended up in the hands of rogue actors. Dr. Sherwood-Randall also discussed the challenge of 2 Out of the Operation Eagle Claw failure came a series of congressionally led reforms that created the special operations capabilities which in 2011 conducted the successful raid (Operation Neptune Spear) into Abbottabad, Pakistan resulting in the death of Osama bin Laden (Counterterrorism Joint Task Force 1980). Prepublication Copy xvi 

Preface addressing the decrease in high-level political attention coincident with the collective success of nuclear security. In addition, she noted that “though countering terrorism has been a top priority for the United States for more than two decades, the terrorist threat has evolved […] It’s become more ideologically diffuse, and geographically diverse.” (Johnson, 2023) This committee embraces Dr. Sherwood-Randall’s admonition that “the Nation cannot lapse in this no-fail mission where the consequences are so high.” Nuclear terrorism represents a uniquely consequential threat to the United States and the entire global community that is domestic, international, and transnational. This reality makes the need for sustained U.S. leadership in addressing the ongoing nuclear terrorism threat a critical national priority. This report provides a number of findings and recommendations that support existing programs but note where more needs to be done and where U.S leadership is indispensable. The committee members are hopeful that Congress and the American people will take these recommendations to heart and implement them. The stakes involved with getting this right could not be higher. As mentioned previously the committees concerns are increasing, this time with respect to the United States counter-terrorism capabilities as events evolved while this report was under review. The persistence of the terrorism threat and its capacity to be a destabilizing geopolitical force was once again highlighted by the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israel that killed 859 Israeli civilians and at least 345 Israeli soldiers and police officers, and the taking of over 240 hostages. The attacks also demonstrated the blurred line between state and non-state actors given Hamas role as a governing organization in the Gaza Strip and the support it has received from Iran and Gulf States (Boxerman 2023; Fabian 2023a, 2023b, 2023c). Stephen E. Flynn, Chair Madelyn R. Creedon, Vice Chair Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Nuclear Threats References Atlamazoglou, Stavros. 2020. “How A ‘Successful Failure’ Deep Behind Enemy Lines 50 Years Ago Changed The Way Us Special-Operations Units Plan Missions.” Business Insider. Https://Www.Businessinsider.Com/Successful-Failure-Vietnam-War-Son-Tay-Raid- Changed-Special-Ops-2020-12. Bernstein, Paul I., And Jason D. Wood. 2010. “The Origins Of Nunn-Lugar And Cooperative Threat Reduction.” Https://Inss.Ndu.Edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Case%20studies/ Cswmd-Cs3.Pdf. Boxerman, Aaron. 2023. “What We Know About The Death Toll In Israel From The Hamas-Led Attacks.” New York Times, November 12, 2023, 2023. https://Www.Nytimes.Com/2023/ 11/12/World/Middleeast/Israel-Death-Toll-Hamas-Attack.Html. Bunn, Matthew. 2016. “The Nuclear Security Summit: Wins, Losses, And Draws.” All Nuclear Security Matters. Https://Dash.Harvard.Edu/Handle/1/37375266. Cordesman, Anthony H. June 30, 2021 2021. Iran And U.S. Strategy Looking Beyond The Jcpoa. Center For Strategic And International Studies (Csis). Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/Resrep 33760. Counterterrorism Joint Task Force. 1980. Holloway Commission. Edited By Joint Chiefs of Staff. Earnhardt, Rebecca L., Brendan Hyatt, And Nickolas Roth. 2021. “A Threat To Confront: Far-Right Extremists And Nuclear Terrorism.” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists. Prepublication Copy xvii 

Preface Https://Thebulletin.Org/2021/01/A-Threat-To-Confront-Far-Right-Extremists-And-Nuclear- Terrorism/. Fabian, Emanuel. 2023a. “Authorities Name 395 Soldiers, 59 Police Officers Killed In Gaza War.” The Times Of Israel, 8 October 2023, 2023a. Https://Www.Timesofisrael.Com/Authorities- Name-44-Soldiers-30-Police-Officers-Killed-In-Hamas-Attack/. ---. 2023b. “Israeli Border Officer, 13 Palestinians Killed In West Bank Clashes, Airstrike.” The Times Of Israel, 19 October 2023, 2023b. Https://Www.Timesofisrael.Com/10-Israeli- Officers-Hurt-5-Palestinian-Killed-In-West-Bank-Clashes-Airstrike/. ---. 2023c. “Officer Dies After Being Critically Hurt In Terror Stabbing Near Jerusalem’s Old City.” The Times Of Israel, 6 November 2023, 2023c. Https://Www.Timesofisrael.Com/2-Police- Officers-Hurt-One-Critically-In-Terror-Stabbing-Near-Jerusalems-Old-City/. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1996. Emergency Management And Assistance. Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office. Gill, Amandeep S. 2020. Nuclear Security Summits A History. Palgrave Macmillan Cham. Hoffman, Bruce, And Jacob Ware. 2023. American Hatred Goes Global. How The United States Became A Leading Exporter Of Whitesupremacist Terrorism. Foreign Affairs. Accessed September 19, 2023. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2023. “Verification And Monitoring In The Islamic Republic Of Iran In Light Of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) “ Gov/2023/24. Https://Www.Iaea.Org/Sites/Default/Files/23/06/Gov2023-24.Pdf. International Panel On Fissile Materials. 2022. “Global Fissile Material Report 2022.” Https://Fissilematerials.Org/Library/Gfmr22.Pdf. Kyle, James H., And John Robert Eidson. 2002. The Guts To Try: The Untold Story Of The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission By The On-Scene Desert Commander. Orion Crown Pub. Lambert, Laura. 2023. “Operation Eagle Claw.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Https://Www.Britannica.Com/Event/Operation-Eagle-Claw. Lerner, K. Lee. 2022. “Policymakers Must Now Assume That Iran Has The Enriched Uranium It Needs To Build A Nuclear Weapon.” Taking Bearings. Harvard Blogs (June 1). Https://Blogs.Harvard.Edu/Kleelerner/Iran-Now-Has-The-Enriched-Uranium-It-Needs-To- Build-A-Nuclear-Weapon/. Murphy, Francois. 2023. “Iran Expands Stock Of Near-Weapons Grade Uranium, Iaea Reports No Progress.” Reuters, September 4, 2023, 2023. Https://Www.Reuters.Com/World/Middle- East/Iaea-Reports-No-Progress-Iran-Uranium-Stock-Enriched-60-Grows-2023-09-04/. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. 10 Cfr Part 73—Physical Protection Of Plants And Materials. The White House. 2023. Fact Sheet: President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum To Counter Weapons Of Mass Destruction Terrorism And Advance Nuclear And Radioactive Material Security. Williamson, Justin. 2020. Operation Eagle Claw 1980: The Disastrous Bid To End The Iran Hostage Crisis.Raid: Osprey Publishing. Prepublication Copy xviii 

Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... xxiii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................. 3 1 BACKGROUND AND STUDY TASK ............................................................................................ 14 1.1 Charge to the Committee, 14 1.2 Study Approach, 15 1.3 The U.S. Government Agencies Focused on Nuclear Terrorism, 15 1.4 Organization of the Report, 19 1.5 Previous/Relevant National Academies Reports, 20 2 NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS ............................................................................................ 24 2.1 Introduction to Nuclear Threats, 24 2.2 Defining Terrorism, 25 2.3 Nuclear Terrorism, 26 2.4 Tools and Types of Nuclear Terrorism, 27 3 NEW DYNAMICS IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM POSE NEW RISKS ...................................... 40 3.1 Terrorists’ Longstanding Interest in Nuclear and Radiological Weapons, 41 3.2 New Era in Nuclear Terrorism, 42 3.3 Domestic and International Terrorism: Blurring Boundaries, 43 3.4 The Continuum Between State and Non-State Actors, 44 3.5 The Limits of Deterrence in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, 45 3.6 New Types of Millenarianism and Terrorist Recruitment of Military Personnel, 46 4 GEO-POLITICAL AND OTHER CHANGES ERODING LONGSTANDING NUCLEAR SECURITY NORMS AND PRACTICES .................................................................. 54 4.1 Background, 55 4.2 Weakening Political, Societal, and Technological Environment, 56 4.3 The Era of Great Power Competition and Countering Nuclear Terrorism, 57 5 THE EVOLVING CIVIL NUCLEAR SECTOR: ADAPTING APPROACHES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES ................................................................................................................. 62 5.1 Expanding Civil Nuclear Energy Sector Security, 63 5.2 Expanding Global Nuclear Energy, 65 5.3 Design Basis Threat, 66 5.4 International Standards and Regulations, 67 5.5 The Important Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 67 5.6 Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, 68 6 THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM ... 72 6.1 Special Nuclear Material, 73 6.2 Security of Nuclear Materials, 75 Prepublication Copy xix 

Contents 7 MANAGING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.......................... 82 7.1 Radioactive Sources – Risks and Benefits, 82 7.2 NNSA’s Programs to Reduce Risk, 85 7.3 Current Programs to Reduce Radiological Risk, 85 7.4 The Evolving Security Landscape, 87 7.5 Update on Radioactive Source Replacements, 88 8 DETECTION AND INTERDICTION EFFORTS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE GLOBAL SUPPLY SYSTEM........................................................................................................... 92 8.1 The Longstanding Challenge of Policing the Global Supply Chain, 93 8.2 Efforts to Improve Detection and Interdiction, 93 8.3 The Risk Nuclear Terrorism Poses to the Global Supply Chain, 96 8.4 Enhancing the Means to Monitor Cargo Shipments, 97 8.5 Detection and Interdiction at Ports of Entry, 99 9 RESPONSE AND RECOVERY TO NUCLEAR INCIDENTS .................................................. 104 9.1 Current Response Capabilities, 104 9.2 Messaging During Nuclear Incident, 106 9.3 State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Capabilities and Needs, 108 9.4 Communications After a Nuclear Incident, 111 9.5 Recovery From a Nuclear Incident, 112 9.6 An All-of-Society Approach, 113 APPENDIXES A PRESENTATIONS AT THE COMMITTEE’S PUBLIC INFORMATION-GATHERING SESSIONS ............................................................................... 116 B FIVE ERAS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM ................................................................................. 121 C COMMITTEE, CONSULTANT, AND STAFF BIOGRAPHIES .............................................. 126 BOXES, FIGURES, AND TABLES BOXES 1-1 Statement of Task, 14 2-1 Chapter 2 Summary, 24 2-2 Nuclear and Radiological Nuclear Material, 27 3-1 Chapter 3 Summary, 40 4-1 Chapter 4 Summary, 54 5-1 Chapter 5 Summary, 62 6-1 Chapter 6 Summary, 72 7-1 Chapter 7 Summary, 82 7-2 IAEA Categories for Radiological Sources, 84 8-1 Chapter 8 Summary, 92 9-1 Chapter 9 Summary, 104 9-2 Immediate Messaging, 107 Prepublication Copy xx 

Contents FIGURES 1-1 A member of the Russian military guarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southeastern Ukraine, May 2022, 13 1-2 Abridged list of U.S. Government Agencies focused on nuclear terrorism mapped to the missions of preventing, countering, and responding to nuclear threats that were able to brief the Academy committee, 16 2-1 Radiation and burn injury ranges overlaid on damage zones demonstrating the extent of outdoor 1 Gy (100 rad) initial radiation and second-degree thermal burns for unobstructed 0.1, 1, 10, and 100 kT surface detonations, 23 3-1 Impact of terrorism in countries according to the Global Terrorism Index, 39 4-1 Partner Nations in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 53 5-1 Nuclear Newcomers 2021, 61 6-1 Agreement Nonproliferation Strength vs. Nuclear Theft Risk: Emerging Nuclear Countries, 71 7-1 Workers remove a cesium-137 irradiator from Medstar Georgetown University Hospital in 2018, 81 8-1 Mobile Radiation Detection and Identification System (MRDIS, orange structure in upper and lower images) allows vehicles with containers to pass through and be scanned for radioactive signatures (lower image), 91 9-1 Blast damage zones after a 10 kT detonation (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2022), 103 B-1 Requested and Allocated Funding for U.S. Department of Energy International Nuclear Theft Prevention Programs, 124 TABLE 6-1 Countries That have Eliminated Weapons Usable Nuclear Materials, 74 Prepublication Copy xxi 



Acronyms and Abbreviations AI Artificial Intelligence ARDP Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program CBP Customs and Border Protection CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CDC Center for Disease Control CFR Code of Federal Regulations CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIRP Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency CoM Consequence Management CONOPs Concept of operations CPPNM Conventional on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreements CRCs community reception center CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors CsCl Cesium chloride CSI Container Security Initiative CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies CSTs Civil Support Teams CTCP Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation CTPAT Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction CWMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction DBT Design Basis Threat DHS Department of Homeland Security DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy DOE-NE Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy DOJ Department of Justice DOS Department of State DOT Department of Transportation DNN Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DSIC Decision Sciences International Corporation DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency E.O. Executive Order EPA Environmental Protection Agency FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FRPCC Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GBq Gigabecquerel GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative Prepublication Copy xxiii 

Acronyms and Abbreviations GW Gigawatt HALEU high assay low enriched uranium HE high explosive HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICSANT International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism IMO International Maritime Organization IND improvised nuclear device INL Idaho National Laboratory INS International Security Program INSTAR International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization IPS International Port Security ISI Islamic State of Iraq ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security Code ITWG Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group JAEIC Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee JTOT Joint Technical Operations Team LEU low enriched uranium LINAC Linear Accelerator LMIC low-to-middle income countries MDM misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information MOX Mixed Oxide MMPDS Multi-Mode Passive Detection System MPC&A Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NARR National Alliance for Radiological Readiness NAS National Academy of Science NASEM The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCBC National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements NCTC National Counterterrorism Center NDAs non-disclosure agreements NEST Nuclear Emergency Support Team NHSI Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative NIH National Institutes of Health NII non-intrusive inspection NIC National Intelligence Council NIMS National Incident Management Systems NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration NOAA National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration NPP nuclear power plant NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission Prepublication Copy xxiv 

Acronyms and Abbreviations NSC National Security Council NSDD Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence NSM National Security Memorandum NSTS National Source Tracking System NTD Nuclear Threat Device O9A Order of 9 Angels ODNI Director of National Intelligence ORS Office of Radiological Security OSRP Off-Site Source Recovery Project PPE personal protective equipment PSI Proliferation Security Initiative R&D Research and Development RANET Response Assistance Network RDD radiological dispersal devices RED radiological exposure device REMVE Russian racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERT Radiological Emergency Response Team RIM Russian Imperial Movement ROSS Radiological Operations Support SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist SLTT State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial SME Subject Matter Expert SMR small modular reactors START Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism TBq Terabecquerel TEUs twenty-foot equivalent unit U.S. United States USCG United States Coast Guard USG United States Government USGS U.S. Geological Survey UN United Nations UNSCR 1540 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 WMD weapon of mass destruction Prepublication Copy xxv