Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024)

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2 Nuclear Terrorism Threats BOX 2-1 Summary The world faces an ongoing risk that non-state actors will gain access to and use a nuclear weapon. A more likely threat is that a terrorist organization will seek out fissile materials and designs to assemble an improvised nuclear device (IND), a radiological dispersal devise (RDD), or radiological exposure device (RED). There is also the potential for a physical or cyber-attack on nuclear facilities that could include power plants. The current information age is generating new capabilities for terrorists to obtain sensitive nuclear-related information. It is also providing the means to create confusion in the aftermath of a nuclear incident by using misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information (MDM). Preventing, countering, and responding to nuclear terrorism focuses on denying access to nuclear and radiological material, re-capturing illegally acquired material and exercising the tools necessary to respond to the discovery or use of a nuclear device. These efforts have not been fully adapted to the changing nature of terrorism and to dangers associated with AI and other information technologies. Highlights • Weapons-useable nuclear material remains at risk. While obtaining state weapons remains difficult for non-state actors, there are sources of nuclear and radiological materials that are not as secure. Also, nuclear power plants can be targeted by state and non-state actors that could lead to significant radiation dispersion. • Construction of an improvised nuclear device with fissile material is challenging. Radiological dispersal devices (dirty bombs) and radiological exposure devices, which have designs that are more simple than nuclear weapons, remain persistent concerns. • Sabotage at nuclear facilities by knowledgeable insiders has occurred. Concern about cyber- attacks is growing with the targeting of nuclear facilities becoming more commonplace, varying in degree of sophistication and threat, by both state and non-state actors. • Information operations by nuclear terrorists that tap into the widespread dread of radiation and nuclear weapons could be very influential and harmful given growing public susceptibility to misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information (MDM). • New developments and access to artificial intelligence (AI) could make MDM even more damaging with unknown consequences and generates added challenges to preventing and countering influence operations by terrorists. 2.1 INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR THREATS In 2008, while the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were still fresh in the minds of Americans, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism submitted their final report to President George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress (Graham et al., 2008). This Commission was tasked to “assess … any, and all of the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism” (U.S. Congress 2007). The resulting report, entitled “World at Risk,” identified important, actionable recommendations to address the WMD threat. Prepublication Copy 24 

Nuclear Terrorism Threats The WMD Commission focused on the perilous crossroads of terrorism and proliferation in poorly governed parts of the world, and the prevention of biological and nuclear terrorism. It also analyzed the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as the world entered a period of expected growth in nuclear energy production. Given the many recent destabilizing geopolitical developments, all these issues remain relevant today and reinforce the germaneness of the Commission’s call for vigilance in addressing the ongoing nuclear terrorism risk. Fifteen years have passed since the WMD Commission’s report was completed, and there has been no known terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon, improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device. Still, Al Qaeda showed interest in nuclear terrorism to include conducting inert-material implosion testing in Afghanistan, undertaking efforts to steal materials and recruit scientists (Albright 2010; Mowatt-Larssen 2020, 2010). On August 4, 2014, the Doel 4 nuclear power plant in Belgium was shut down automatically as a result of an act of sabotage by an unidentified organization. Notwithstanding the many changes in the international security environment, the risk of nuclear terrorism remains significant. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government instituted very effective cooperative programs with the Russian Federation to dismantle Soviet weapons and weapon infrastructure and improve the security of components and materials of concern. Programs (among them U.S.-FSU science cooperation, the DOE Nuclear Cities Initiative, the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation, and the “Lab to Lab” program) also were established to engage Soviet weapon scientists in non-weapon work, with the intent of reducing the potential their skills might be procured by nefarious entities (National Research Council 1996; Rotblatt 1998). In addition, the United States and Russia completed the “Megatons to Megawatts” program, which eliminated 500 metric tons of HEU by blending it down to low-enriched uranium fuel for civilian nuclear reactors. Much has changed in the strategic environment since these successful programs were put in place, especially with respect to Russia’s relationship with the United States. Today there are other nuclear-armed states that could experience instability and governance challenges that would potentially result in a loss of control of nuclear weapons, fissile materials, or expertise. Possible examples include economic collapse in Pakistan or the fall of the Kim regime in North Korea. As the breakup of the Soviet Union demonstrated, such events can be sudden and difficult to predict. Among the disturbing changes to the global security landscape is that terrorist organizations have proliferated, with a growing number of terrorists movements operating globally and transnationally. Political polarization within the United States is also on the rise with “home grown” extremist groups developing new capabilities and working together for shared goals. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. New technologies, such as remotely piloted and autonomous air, ground, and sea vehicles; digital fire-control systems for small arms; and machine learning algorithms that enable image recognition and empower deep fakes and other forms of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information (MDM) have provided terrorist groups with new capabilities. 2.2 DEFINING TERRORISM Given the committee’s tasking, the appropriate starting point for this assessment is to determine the current state of nuclear terrorism and to assess the risk that a terrorist group, or Prepublication Copy 25 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction individual, would conduct a nuclear attack. This is not as straightforward a task as it might first seem, beginning with the challenge of navigating the myriad definitions and typologies of terrorism. (Schmid 2004; Dolliver and Kearns 2022). Even within the U.S. government, agencies use different definitions. After more than two decades after the attacks of 9/11, a consensus definition has proved difficult to achieve. This is partly because some apply the term to express disapproval of a given actor’s aims and actions and partly because the lines between terrorism and other forms of violence are often blurred (Wilson 2021). There are two characteristics, however, that taken together, distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence. These characteristics have guided this committee’s work. First, terrorists deliberately aim at civilians, which makes terrorism distinct from legal acts of war. Second, terrorists use violence, or the threat of violence, primarily to communicate their support for an ideology, whether religious or political, to generate public attention for their cause. In this way, terrorists are distinct from mass shooters, who generally lack a clear ideological motivation.1 The target audience for terrorism⎯the groups the terrorists aim to influence⎯is larger than the actual victims of the attack, with the goal of achieving a radius of fear that is much greater than the radius of injury and destruction. To accomplish this, terrorists often attack symbols of “enemy” nations or organizations. 2.3 NUCLEAR TERRORISM The United Nations defines nuclear terrorism as involving the unlawful and intentional use of radioactive material with the intent to cause death, injury, or serious damage to property or the environment, or to compel “a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.” (United Nations (UN) 2005) The committee has aligned its assessment of nuclear terrorism to the UN definition by incorporating not just the threat or use of a nuclear explosive device, but also the threat or dissemination of nuclear materials (United Nations 2005). Nuclear terrorism involves the use or threat to use: (1) an illicitly obtained nuclear weapon; (2) an improvised nuclear device (IND); (3) a radiological dispersal device (RDD) commonly referred to as a “dirty bomb” or a radiological exposure device (RED) that exposes unknowing people to radiation; or (4) attacks on nuclear power plants or other facilities that store or use radiological materials. The committee’s work covers all of these types along with cyber threats. In addition, the committee looked at how misinformation, disinformation, and mal- information (MDM), assisted by Artificial Intelligence could both facilitate and amplify the impact of nuclear terrorist attacks. The growing MDM issue is a particular concern for first responders and emergency managers who worry the public may not follow critical lifesaving guidance during a nuclear incident. 1 The “salad bar” phenomenon – which involves violent extremists picking and choosing from a variety of ideologies, (e.g., eco-fascism, which endorses the great replacement conspiracy theory embraced by some on the hard right and eco-terrorism adopted by some on the hard left), and “side-switching,” suggests the possibility that terrorists’ ideological commitment could be getting somewhat thinner over time (The Nonprofit Security Grant Program and Protecting Houses of Worship: A View from the American Jewish Community 2022; Threats to the Homeland 2020). The term “side-switching” was first used by Koehler, D. (2020), “Switching Sides: Exploring Violent Extremist Intergroup Migration Across Hostile Ideologies,” Political Psychology, 41: 499-515 (Koehler 2020). Prepublication Copy 26 

Nuclear Terrorism Threats BOX 2-2 Nuclear and Radiological Nuclear Material Nuclear and radiological materials are substances that can emit radiation and with potential applications in various fields, including energy production, medicine, petrochemical, and military. As a material, they are referred to by the specific isotope from different elements, as different isotopes have difference radiological properties (Friedlander et al., 1981). Understanding the difference between nuclear and radiological materials is crucial in managing and handling these substances effectively (National Academies of Sciences 2021a). This report will use the following definitions for these materials. Nuclear materials primarily refer to substances that are used in nuclear reactions, such as nuclear power generation, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear technologies (the focus of Chapter 6). For this reason, they are often referred to as fissile material. The principal materials of concern that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction, releasing a significant amount of energy, are: • Uranium-235, a key material for nuclear fission reactions used in nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons. • Plutonium-239, another crucial material for nuclear fission and often used in nuclear weapons and fuel for nuclear reactors. Radiological materials emit ionizing radiation, which consists of particles or electromagnetic waves that have sufficient energy to ionize atoms or molecules (see chapter 7). Ionization is the process of removing tightly bound electrons from an atom, resulting in the formation of charged particles (ions). Radiological materials are often used in medical applications, industrial radiography, and certain devices; however, the ionizing radiation can also have dangerous health effects. Different radiological sources include: • Cobalt-60 and cesium-137 are gamma sources used in medical imaging, cancer treatment, and industrial testing. • For medicine, technetium-99m is a key material for medical imaging and iodine-131 is a primary treatment for thyroid illnesses and cancer. • Numerous radioactive tracers are used for various research purposes and well-logging for the petrochemical industry. These include scandium-46, lanthanum-140, manganese-56, sodium-24, antimony-124, iridium-192, iodine-131, silver-110, argon-41, and xenon-133 (International Atomic Energy Agency 2003). 2.4 TOOLS AND TYPES OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM FINDING 2-1: The possibility that insiders could assist a terrorist in obtaining a state- owned nuclear weapon should not be ruled out. Even if terrorists were unable to overcome use-control safeguards in a stolen weapon, they might still be able to remove fissile material for use in an improvised nuclear device (IND). 2.4.1 State-provided nuclear weapons A terrorist organization could potentially acquire a stolen nuclear weapon from one of the current nuclear states, either through theft or with insider assistance. Although this is considered highly unlikely (Lieber and Press 2013), it would have the greatest potential for destruction Prepublication Copy 27 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction because state-supplied nuclear weapons could be reliable, relatively small, rugged, and transportable, and could have yields up to hundreds of kilotons. One possible scenario is a nuclear state makes the strategic decision to hand over a nuclear weapon with the aim of having a non-state actor serve as a surrogate. This could potentially include providing the non-state actor with help to override the security and safeguard controls that would otherwise prevent unauthorized or accidental use. An important deterrent for a state transferring a nuclear weapon to a non-state actor is that if a nuclear weapon is captured or detonated, U.S. nuclear forensics would be able to assess its characteristics and identify or exclude likely contributors (National Academies of Sciences 2021b). This reality could lead a rogue state to try and modify a nuclear weapon or even fabricate a custom device to decrease the likelihood that it would be identified as the source of the device, or to implicate a different nuclear state as the source. Still another scenario is that a state-owned nuclear weapon could be stolen without assistance from any insiders from a deployment or storage site, or while in transit. In this instance, it is likely that the use controls in the nuclear weapon will prevent the unauthorized use. Although all U.S. nuclear weapons have use controls, little is publicly known about the use and effectiveness of use-control devices in foreign nuclear weapons. If terrorists are unable to overcome the use controls, and are thus unsuccessful in detonating the stolen nuclear weapon, they might still be able to extract fissile material for use in an improvised nuclear device. An improvised nuclear devise would be designed to generate a nuclear detonation, but could have a significantly smaller nuclear yield than state-owned nuclear weapons, although still with catastrophic consequences. FINDING 2-2: State-on-state warfare, political instability, corruption, or financial crises could provide incentives for a state with nuclear assets to assist a terrorist or terrorist group fabricate an improvised nuclear device (IND), radiological dispersal device (RDD), or radiological exposure device (RED). It is possible that a state might provide terrorists with components, materials, technology, and information needed to fabricate an improvised nuclear or radiological dispersal device. Such assistance would not necessarily have to come from a state that possesses nuclear weapons. Any state that has the ability to produce weapons usable fissile material and the knowledge to construct a device, could provide such assistance. State assistance of any nature would substantially increase the likelihood that a terrorist group could successfully fabricate a reliable improvised nuclear device with some nuclear yield, or a radiological dispersal device. 2.4.2 Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) FINDING 2-3: The most significant barrier to constructing an IND remains the acquisition of a sufficient quantity of fissile material. Even if this barrier were overcome, an IND would be less reliable, produce a less predictable yield, and be more vulnerable to accidental detonation than state-stockpiled weapons. Nevertheless, the political and psychological impact of any nuclear detonation would be consequential. Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND) are devices that are constructed using diverted or stolen weapons-usable fissile material. Concern about the IND risk has been raised publicly as Prepublication Copy 28 

Nuclear Terrorism Threats far back as 1977 when the U.S. Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment noted that: “a small group of people could possibly design a crude nuclear explosive device (assuming) sufficient quantities of fissile material have been provided.” (Office of Technology Assessment 1977) There is a remote potential that fissile material could be harvested from a stolen nuclear weapon, but the more probable scenario is that it could be provided with insider assistance. There is no lack of open-source information on INDs, although the accuracy of the origination can be suspect. That said, possessing the expertise is not the most significant barrier to constructing an IND. Instead, it is the challenge of obtaining enough fissile material to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. This underscores the importance of global efforts to reduce the stocks of HEU, separated plutonium, and other fissile materials and bolstering the security of the materials that remain. The DOE/NNSA had a long-running Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program designed to improve the localization, tracking, and control of those materials (National Nuclear Security Administration 2001; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2020). Given the many challenges involved, an IND is likely to be unreliable (Ferguson et al., 2005; Langewiesche 2006), have a low and unpredictable yield compared with sophisticated high-yield nuclear weapons developed by governments, and be vulnerable to accidental detonation. Nevertheless, the consequences of detonating an IND in a major city would still be catastrophic, potentially killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. 2.4.3 Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Device (RED) FINDING 2-4: The technical barriers to constructing and employing an RDD or RED are much lower than they are for a nuclear weapon or IND, making for a greater likelihood that terrorists will gain access to the means to disperse radiological materials. Two types of potential devices that terrorists might use that would not produce a nuclear yield but still have significant effects are the Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and the Radiological Exposure Device (RED). The successful employment of a RDD or a RED would have significantly less destructive potential than a nuclear explosion but would still be effective in causing significant economic, physical, and psychological damage and could include loss of life. The source materials for an RDD or an RED are more available and often less secure than the material needed for an IND and thus the probability of use is higher. In addition, the technical knowledge needed to fabricate these devices is much lower than that needed for an IND. The RDD is often referred to as a “dirty bomb.” It uses propellants, explosives, or other means to disperse radiological materials. An RDD could be constructed as a complete device, containing explosive/propellant mated to radiological material, or implemented as an explosive device detonated in close proximity to a source of radiological material, either stationary or in transit. An example of a dirty bomb scenario took place in 1995, when Chechen leader Shamil Basayev threatened to detonate radioactive containers in Russian cities. During an interview in November 1995, Basayev told a Russian television news crew where such a device was buried in a Moscow park. Russian authorities subsequently found a small explosive package with cesium- 137 buried a few inches below the ground. Basayev told the reporters that he wanted to demonstrate that Chechen rebels could conduct such an attack, and he intentionally disclosed the location as a “small disarmament” signal (Specter 1995; Bale 2004). Prepublication Copy 29 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction A detonated RDD would inflict local health, significant economic damage, and potentially trigger widespread panic. The impacted area could be several city blocks and would be closed off to the public during the resulting extensive and costly cleanup. Some loss of life cannot be ruled out, but would vary depending on the proximity of people to the explosion as well as its size and the radiological materials employed. The economic effect could be prolonged, well after the cleanup was completed as a result of lingering public anxiety and fear of residual radiation exposure. If explosives or propellants are employed, it is likely the RDD would be identified as such relatively quickly, allowing time to mitigate any potential health issues. An RED exploits existing radiological material or object containing radiological material. It is intended to expose people to radiation without their knowledge and with the intent of generating significant health effects for those exposed. An RED would not be as obvious as explosive RDD, and could remain in place for an extended period of time. Detecting an RED would be possible by a positive reading on radiation detection equipment, or if the object was in place for an extended period of time, it may be discovered only after individuals seek medical help for radiation-induced health issues such as skin reddening or acute radiation sickness. Detection via the latter method would be very slow and challenging. Reducing the amount of radiological materials and putting in place strong safeguards can contribute to reducing the RDD and RED risk. However, despite NNSA’s ongoing programs, such as the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) (Coel-Roback 2019), commercial and medical radiological materials remain widely distributed throughout the world. Some of these have been abandoned and others are under little or no control. RDDs also have often been described as “weapons of mass disruption” because their impact would be primarily psychological and economic(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2023). Deployment of an RDD at an economic choke point, such as a major seaport or transportation hub, could have outsized economic and social impact. The impact of an RED would be very different given the potential for long periods of public exposure to radiation in the impacted area along with the possibility of adverse health effects. Nevertheless, long-term economic damage is possible as a result a lingering fear of radiation exposure even after the object was removed and residual radioactivity cleaned up. 2.4.4 Attack or Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities FINDING 2-5: Based on intelligence information in government reports and open source literature, there have been instances of sabotage at nuclear facilities by knowledgeable insiders, but to date they have been rare. Vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities can make them susceptible to malicious acts and create opportunities for terrorists or criminal groups. Nuclear facilities are protected through redundant layers of physical protection measures designed to prevent access to the nuclear facility or nuclear material. Additional tools, such as remote monitoring, security guards and response forces, and intelligence are also used. (International Atomic Energy Agency 2023b). Nuclear facilities that require physical protection include nuclear reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and spent fuel storage and disposal facilities. Although site- and event-specific threat assessments are used to determine how much physical protection is required, common elements include physical protection areas that are graded to provide defense-in-depth with barriers and Prepublication Copy 30 

Nuclear Terrorism Threats controls for the Exclusion Area, Protected Area, Vital Area, and Material Access Areas. Physical protection systems include intrusion detection systems to notify the site security force of a potential intruder, typically with intrusion alarm assessment systems to help distinguish false or nuisance alarms from actual intrusions. An armed response capability may be necessary to defend nuclear material or a nuclear facility against an intrusion or attack and to protect public health and safety, depending on the nature and quantity of the material. In addition, local, State, and Federal agencies may be called on to provide off-site assistance in an emergency at a U.S. facility (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2020). Sabotage at nuclear facilities by knowledgeable insiders has occurred but reports of such incidents have been rare. The ultimate aim of sabotage would be to damage the facility causing a radiological release harmful to nearby populations. Nuclear facilities use multiple physical and other systems to prevent sabotage, with safety-critical systems subject to the highest levels of engineered and administrative controls by the facility operators. Examples of non-physical systems include employee behavioral observation programs, psychological testing, fitness for duty criteria, and measures such as “two-person or three-person rules” requiring that two or three operators must be present and responsible for certain high-consequence activities (World Nuclear Association 2022). A recent NAS report has identified that “transportation is the most vulnerable phase in protecting nuclear materials from a security standpoint, as the material is removed from the confines of the nuclear facility” (National Academies of Sciences 2023). This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Regulatory, technical and operational considerations are part of an overall strategy for providing secure transport of fresh and spent nuclear fuel. This is particularly important when transporting materials across international boundaries, as countries have different regulations based on their level of risk acceptance. Internationally, the IAEA provides umbrella guidance for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) obligations for materials in transport (International Atomic Energy Agency 2023a). Spent fuel security requirements for U.S. domestic transportation are defined in 10 CFR73.37, which provides detailed requirements that include development of a security plan with the full range of protective components needed to properly protect shipments during transport (National Academies of Sciences 2023). 2.4.5 Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Facilities FINDING 2-6: Intelligence analysts and journalists are reporting that there is a growing number of attempted cyberattacks on critical infrastructure targets, including nuclear facilities, varying in degree of sophistication and threat, and originating from both state and non-state actors. As with other industrial and infrastructure facilities, nuclear facilities rely on information and communication systems, thus making them potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks. At U.S. commercial nuclear facilities, information and communication systems are routinely evaluated for cyber risks and vulnerabilities. To reduce further the possibility of a successful cyber-attack, the utilization of such systems within vital areas of the facility is strictly regulated by the NRC and state regulatory agencies. As with the case of all infrastructure targets and the economic sector, cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities are increasing in number and sophistication. State and non-state actors routinely probe the security of critical infrastructure systems to find vulnerabilities that will permit access. Prepublication Copy 31 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction In the relatively small number of publicly-reported attacks where adversaries have succeeded in penetrating cyber defenses for nuclear facilities, post-mortems have documented the consequences to date to be limited to exfiltrated employee information, corporate data, and non- sensitive technical data. Operators of U.S. commercial nuclear facilities must notify the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission within one hour of discovering a cyberattack that adversely impacted safety, security, support systems, or emergency preparedness functions (including offsite communications), Longer notification timelines are allowed for successful attacks of lesser severity (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1973). Ransomware attacks have also occurred in a small number of cases worldwide. Some of these attacks have succeeded in penetrating and temporarily disabling plant monitoring systems although with no deleterious effects on plant operations or resultant radiological release (World Nuclear Association 2022). 2.4.6 Emerging Threat: Misinformation, Disinformation, Mal-information (MDM) FINDING 2-7: Nuclear terrorists can tap into the widespread dread of radiation and nuclear weapons to generate significant consequences by taking advantage of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information (MDM). New developments in AI could make MDM even more damaging. Both the 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism and the 2022 National Security Strategy highlight information operations as threats to U.S. national security (The White House 2022, 2021). Terrorists have long used information operations to recruit supporters and frighten their enemies. Information operations could be especially powerful in the context of nuclear terrorism, in part because people generally fear radiation and nuclear weapons (Stern 1999). The members of this committee are particularly concerned about the ways in which artificial intelligence could be used to amplify underlying public fears associated with nuclear risk. While mis-, dis-, and mal-information (MDM) have been used throughout history, the creation of new digital platforms has expanded the global means of communication and connections, thereby allowing users to exchange information quickly and widely (McBride et al., 2021). False information spreads more quickly than the truth (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018) and countering falsehoods is complicated by the fact that a majority of American adults are now getting their news from digital platforms. While some platforms are responsible, others have little to no safeguards to prevent use by nefarious actors including terrorists (Shearer 2021). This provides ample opportunities to expose large swaths of the American public to harmful MDM. MDM is a complex and nuanced phenomenon that can take many forms, including news media or social media posts. Nation-state adversaries are known to use MDM to amplify extremist ideologies, using MDM campaigns to cast doubt on official narratives, amplify political discord, spark confusion, and promote favorable narratives surrounding themselves, their allies, non-aligned countries, or certain domestic actors. For example, China, Russia, and Iran systemically amplified Q-Anon ideology on social media leading up to the January 2021 Capitol insurrection. One-fifth of all Q-Anon posts on Facebook in 2020 originated overseas (The Soufan Center 2021). These campaigns are part of broader efforts by adversaries to negatively impact the credibility and functioning of government (Colomina, Sánchez Margalef, and Youngs 2021). Their goal is to exacerbate societal divisions and grievances, spark civil Prepublication Copy 32 

Nuclear Terrorism Threats unrest and violence, and degrade the operational security and strategic functioning of the targeted country’s defense structure (Wolters et al., 2021). Given the open and widespread nature of the media environment, MDM has the potential to be used by a wide variety of terrorists, including nuclear terrorists. The terms misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information are often used interchangeably, despite each term having its own distinct meaning. According to Wolters, the difference between the terms of misinformation and disinformation lies in the intent of the content’s creator (Wolters et al., 2021). Misinformation occurs when the creator has no intention to deceive, yet still shares false information thinking it’s true (Wolters et al., 2021). Disinformation is when the creator shares false information with the goal of deceiving the consumer. For a piece of information to be considered disinformation, the user must know the information is false and be looking to intentionally mislead, harm, or manipulate (Wolters et al., 2021). Malinformation, however, is different from misinformation and disinformation in that it is based in fact (but can contain some false elements as well), yet is spread with the intent to cause harm. An example of malinformation can include leaks of personal or private information meant to damage the reputation or compromise the safety of an individual (Wolters et al., 2021). While all three concepts are critical to understanding how the information space can be weaponized, intentionally spreading false information in the context of nuclear terrorism could significantly impede an emergency response. Even poorly designed disinformation campaigns could impact confidence in government institutions and reputable journalistic outlets (Wolters et al., 2021) making it an extremely useful tool for nuclear terrorists. With the ability of MDM to amplify public anxieties, a nuclear or radiological device could have minimal actual destructive effect and yet have far-reaching psychological and political impact (Ackerman 2008). Studies demonstrate that humans pay more attention to information that arouses emotion, especially rage, fear, surprise, and disgust, making MDM’s use in the context of nuclear terrorism potentially devastating (Wolters et al., 2021). Indeed, AI- enhanced nuclear threats could be enough to spark widespread public fear and panic (Giorgidze and Wither 2019) (Johnson 2022) analogous to the widespread fear generated by the 1938 War of the Worlds radio broadcast. Terrorists could use targeted disinformation campaigns to encourage individuals working in secure locations, including at nuclear-related facilities, to engage in acts of sabotage. A potentially sobering scenario is one where a terrorist group uses MDM to try and provoke a nuclear weapons state to use a nuclear weapon. For example, in 2016, Pakistani defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif threatened to use nuclear weapons against Israel after reading a fake- news article claiming that Israel planned to “destroy [Pakistan] with a nuclear attack” if Pakistan sent troops to Syria (Goldman 2016). While this situation was peacefully resolved, the risk may grow as the methods and sophistication of MDM evolve. Another established motivation for terrorists is to generate attention. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once observed that “publicity is the ‘oxygen’ of terrorism” (Thatcher 1985). As Gary Ackerman has pointed out, a nuclear attack would undoubtedly provide unrivaled attention to a terrorist and their cause (Ackerman 2008). If a nuclear attack or accident were to occur, MDM could jeopardize the credibility of risk mitigation and response teams and discourage the public from cooperating or seeking help. This could also apply to public health responses following a nuclear disaster that are undermined by MDM akin to what impaired COVID-19 vaccination efforts (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) 2022). Lastly, continuous victimization could Prepublication Copy 33 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction occur through media campaigns that show pictures or videos of the devastation, which can be doctored to augment and prolong a society’s trauma. While the practical impact of MDM on nuclear terrorism remains to be seen, its use by both nation-state adversaries and non-state actors poses a significant threat to American and global security. It has led to the creation of groups working to combat MDM such as the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) MDM team, the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force, and the ODNI’s Foreign Malign Influence Center (U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission 2021). The distrust of government institutions by a growing segment of the U.S. population could manifest in a disinformation campaign designed to undermine government and scientific credibility and instill chaos and panic during a nuclear incident. Ideally there would be a cadre of trusted non-governmental scientific and technical experts at the state and local levels to augment national experts. If these non-government experts were trained in public communications, they would be in a position to assist governors, mayors, and tribal and territorial leaders in getting lifesaving information out during major emergencies. Polls generally show high levels of public trust in communications from health, scientific, technical, and educational professionals that are locally-based. (See, for example, Yi and Sawyer 2021, Kennedy, Tyson, and Funk 2022, Ferriman 2001). Exercises sponsored by DHS could involve these experts and they could also be incorporated into state and local emergency management plans.2 RECOMMENDATION 2-1: The Department of Homeland Security with support from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Governors Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, should undertake a multipronged effort involving all levels of government (Federal, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial) to include research and educational entities, civic associations, and media to raise public awareness and understanding how information can be used to confuse, mislead, and deceive during major crises. The effort should actively engage civil society that could be modeled on a recent program in Finland that strengthens the ability of the public to critically analyze the information they receive from all sources. (U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission 2021). As discussed in chapter 9, the United States at state and local levels needs to capitalize on the many sources of experts that can be marshalled to create a whole-of-country capability. References Ackerman, Gary. 2008. “Motivations for Engaging in Nuclear Terrorism.” FfP Threat Convergence Expert Series. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46247/Motivations%20for%20 Engaging%20in%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf. Albright, David. 2010. Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies. Free Press. 2 After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Department of Homeland Security funded the creation of an “Infrastructure Experts Team,” managed by Oak Ridge Associated Universities. The team, composed of about two dozen faculty from universities in the Washington, DC, area, conducted table-top exercises and carried pagers to respond to a terrorist attack or other emergency on short notice. Prepublication Copy 34 

Nuclear Terrorism Threats Bale, Jeffrey. 2004. “The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism.” https://www.nti.org/ analysis/articles/chechen-resistance-radiological-terror/. Coel-Roback, Rebecca J. 2019. Off-Site Source Recovery Program. (United States). https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1565825. Colomina, Carme, Héctor Sánchez Margalef, and Richard Youngs. 2021. The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/ EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf. Dolliver, Matthew J., and Erin M. Kearns. 2022. “Is It Terrorism? Public Perceptions, Media, and Labeling the Las Vegas Shooting.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 45 (1): 1 - 19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1647673. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2022. Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation Third Edition. edited by Biological Chemical, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Office Ferguson, Charles D., William C. Potter, Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wheling. 2005. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Routledge. Ferriman, Annabel. 2001. “Poll shows public still has trust in doctors.” BMJ 322 (7288): 694. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7288.694. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC1173253/. Friedlander, Gerhart, Joseph W. Kennedy, Edward S. Macias, and Julian M. Miller. 1981. Nuclear and Radiochemistry. Wiley. Giorgidze, Lasha, and James K. Wither. 2019. “Horror or Hype: The Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiolgical, and Nuclear Terrorism.” Occasional Paper Series. Goldman, R. 2016. “Reading Fake News, Pakistani Minister Directs Nuclear Threat at Israel.” The New York Times, December 24, 2016, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/asia/pakistan-israel-khawaja-asif-fake-news- nuclear.html. Graham, B., J. Talent, G. Allison, R. Cleavaland, S. Rademaker, T. Roemer, W. Sherman, H. Sokolski, and R. Verma. 2008. World at Risk: The Report of the Commision on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. United States: Random House. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. Radiation Protection and the Management of Radioactive Waste in the Oil and Gas Industry.Safety Reports Series: International Atomic Energy Agency,. ---. 2023a. “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment.” https://www.iaea.org/services/key-programmes/smr-platforms-nhsi. ---. 2023b. “Security of nuclear and other radioactive material.” https://www.iaea.org/topics/security-of-nuclear-and-other-radioactive-material. Johnson, James. 2022. “Inadvertent escalation in the age of intelligence machines: A new model for nuclear risk in the digital age.” European Journal of International Security 7 (3): 337- 359. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.23. Kennedy, Brian, Alec Tyson, and Cary Funk. 2022. “Americans’ Trust in Scientists, Other Groups Declines.” Trust in Science. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2022/02/15/ americans-trust-in-scientists-other-groups-declines/. Koehler, Daniel. 2020. “Switching Sides: Exploring Violent Extremist Intergroup Migration Across Hostile Ideologies.” Political Psychology 41 (3): 499-515. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12633. Prepublication Copy 35 

Nuclear Terrorism: Strategies to Prevent, Counter, & Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction Langewiesche, William. 2006. “How to Get a Nuclear Bomb.” December 2006, 2006. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/12/how-to-get-a-nuclear- bomb/305402/. Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl Press. 2013. “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Quarterly Journal: International Security 38 (1): 80-104. McBride, M., H. Wolters, K. Haney, and W. Rosenau. 2021. The Psychology of (Dis)information: Case Studies and Implications. CNA. https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/10/The- Psychology-of-%28Dis%29information-Case-Studies-and-Implications.pdf. Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. 2010. Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? ---. 2020. A State of Mind: Faith and the CIA. BookBaby. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine,. 2021a. Radioactive Sources: Applications and Alternative Technologies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. ---. 2021b. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence: Public Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. ---. 2023. Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advanced Nuclear Reactors. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. National Nuclear Security Administration. 2001. “MPC&A Program Strategic Plan.” https://media.nti.org/pdfs/32-nnsa.pdf. National Research Council. 1996. An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center:Redirecting Expertise in Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. The Nonprofit Security Grant Program and Protecting Houses of Worship: A View from the American Jewish Community. 117th (2022). Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. 10 CFR Part 73—Physical Protection of Plants and Materials. ---. 2020. “Physical Protection.” Last Modified March 11, 2020. https://www.nrc.gov/security/ domestic/phys-protect.html. Office of Technology Assessment. 1977. Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards. Rotblatt, Joseph. 1998. Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Schmid, Alex. 2004. “Terrorism - The Definitional Problem.” Case Western Reserve Journal of Interntaional Law 36 (2). https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/8. Shearer, Elisa. 2021. “More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News from Digital Devices.” https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans- get-news-from-digital-devices/. Specter, Michael. 1995. “Chechen Insurgents Take Their Struggle To a Moscow Park.” The New York Times, November 24, 1995, 1995. Stern, Jessica. 1999. The Ultimate Terrorists. Harvard University Press. Thatcher, Margaret. 1985. “Speech to American Bar Association (“we must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend”).” https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096. The Soufan Center. April 2021 2021. Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A Data-Driven Approach to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon. The Soufan Center. https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TSC-White- Paper_QAnon_16April2021-final-1.pdf. Prepublication Copy 36 

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FIGURE 3-1 The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analyzing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from Terrorism Tracker and other sources. Shown here are countries and levels of impact terrorism has ranging from very high to no impact. The map is presented as a reminder of the continuing activities of international and domestic terrorists, and, as this chapter discusses, how the distinction between domestic and international terrorism is becoming blurred. NOTE: The GTI defines terrorism as “the systematic threat or use of violence, by non-state actors, whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger group.” GTI recognizes many states commit terror against their citizens. Acting under the authority as a state is not included in the GTI. SOURCE: Institute for Economics & Peace 2023. Prepublication Copy 39