Journal Description
Games
Games
is a scholarly, peer-reviewed, open access journal of studies on game theory and its applications published bimonthly online by MDPI.
- Open Access— free for readers, with article processing charges (APC) paid by authors or their institutions.
- High Visibility: indexed within Scopus, ESCI (Web of Science), MathSciNet, zbMATH, RePEc, EconLit, EconBiz, and other databases.
- Rapid Publication: manuscripts are peer-reviewed and a first decision is provided to authors approximately 22.6 days after submission; acceptance to publication is undertaken in 3.9 days (median values for papers published in this journal in the first half of 2024).
- Recognition of Reviewers: reviewers who provide timely, thorough peer-review reports receive vouchers entitling them to a discount on the APC of their next publication in any MDPI journal, in appreciation of the work done.
Impact Factor:
0.6 (2023)
Latest Articles
Auctioning off a Non-Rivalrous Good with Interference
Games 2024, 15(4), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15040026 - 11 Jul 2024
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Auctions are a prevalent way to exchange goods and are well-studied for the exchange of rivalrous goods, but are less studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple bidders if their use
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Auctions are a prevalent way to exchange goods and are well-studied for the exchange of rivalrous goods, but are less studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple bidders if their use does not conflict with others; this simultaneous use directly affects the efficiency of the auction. A timely example includes the auctioning off of a radio spectrum by a licensed primary user to unlicensed secondary users who can use the spectrum simultaneously if they are located far enough apart to not cause interference. I examine a uniform price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are given under which an auction over groups generates higher social welfare than an individual auction. Additional conditions are given under which collusion in a group auction results in higher prices.
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Open AccessArticle
One Justice for All? Social Dilemmas, Environmental Risks and Different Notions of Distributive Justice
by
Ulf Liebe, Heidi Bruderer Enzler, Andreas Diekmann and Peter Preisendörfer
Games 2024, 15(4), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15040025 - 1 Jul 2024
Abstract
A just or fair distribution of environmental bads and goods is important for solving environmental social dilemmas and is a core idea of environmental justice politics and research. Environmental justice is mostly associated with egalitarianism as the sole justice principle for all people.
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A just or fair distribution of environmental bads and goods is important for solving environmental social dilemmas and is a core idea of environmental justice politics and research. Environmental justice is mostly associated with egalitarianism as the sole justice principle for all people. In contrast, we argue that it is important to uncover and consider heterogeneity in justice concerns to achieve socially accepted solutions to environmental social dilemmas. With noise pollution as an example, we explore citizens’ preferences for justice principles regarding the allocation of politically initiated environmental benefits. In our survey in four European cities, respondents were asked to choose between different outcomes of a program to reduce road traffic noise in line with the following four notions of distributive justice: equal shares, equal outcomes, the greatest benefit for the least advantaged (Rawls), and the greatest benefit for the greatest number (Bentham). We found that most respondents chose Rawls’ principle, a preference that was stable over time but weaker when explicitly introducing the veil of ignorance. The preference for Rawls notwithstanding, we observed substantial heterogeneity in justice preferences. Multinomial logit analyses of survey and geo-referenced data on noise exposure showed that respondents with a higher socio-economic status and lower exposure to traffic noise were more likely to choose Rawls’ principle. Taken together, our study confirms the prominence of Rawls’ principle, demonstrates empirically the heterogeneity of justice preferences, and calls for more direct measurements of such preferences in research on environmental social dilemmas, environmental justice, and beyond.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions)
Open AccessArticle
Strategic Synergies: Unveiling the Interplay of Game Theory and Cultural Dynamics in a Globalized World
by
Yufei Wang, Mangirdas Morkūnas and Jinzhao Wei
Games 2024, 15(4), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15040024 - 30 Jun 2024
Abstract
This literature review focuses on cultural-related studies and game theory. First of all, it analyzes how social dynamics and strategic interactions can be shaped by different cultural environments. Secondly, it examines how cultural norms can affect strategic decision making and how game theory
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This literature review focuses on cultural-related studies and game theory. First of all, it analyzes how social dynamics and strategic interactions can be shaped by different cultural environments. Secondly, it examines how cultural norms can affect strategic decision making and how game theory could predict cooperations and conflicts. Overall, this study aims to highlight the applicability of game theory in the modeling of cultural transformation and its interaction with behavioral economics. Moreover, this study also attempts to underscore the significance of game theory and cultural diversity in communication methods, plus the process of policy formulation. In addition to the above topics, the robustness of cross-cultural social norms, the economic study of different cultural heritage, and the cultural effects of tourism under game theory are also focal points of this study. Finally, this review delves into how game theory can represent social interactions, emphasizing the need to incorporate extensive cultural knowledge in order to enhance the efficacy of game-theoretic model’s applications.
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Open AccessArticle
Payment Systems, Insurance, and Agency Problems in Healthcare: A Medically Framed Real-Effort Experiment
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Manela Karunadasa and Katri K. Sieberg
Games 2024, 15(4), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15040023 - 28 Jun 2024
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Background: This study aims to examine the impact of different healthcare payment systems, specifically salary and fee-for-service (FFS) models, on service provision, patient welfare, and quality of care. The influence of payment models on healthcare delivery and patient outcomes, as well as
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Background: This study aims to examine the impact of different healthcare payment systems, specifically salary and fee-for-service (FFS) models, on service provision, patient welfare, and quality of care. The influence of payment models on healthcare delivery and patient outcomes, as well as how these models affect doctors’ decision-making based on patients’ insurance coverage, is not well understood. Methods: A medically framed real-effort task experiment was conducted. This study compared two payment systems: salary and FFS models. Key outcomes measured included the level of service provision, patient welfare, and quality of care. The analysis focused on how financial incentives and patient insurance coverage influenced healthcare decisions. Results: This study found overtreatment in FFS models and undertreatment in salary-based models. Healthcare decisions are significantly influenced by financial incentives and patient needs. Specifically, in FFS models, decisions are driven by self-interest, while in salary models, they are guided by patient needs. Within the FFS model, insurance coverage affects doctors’ decisions and patients’ benefits. Insured patients often receive unnecessary or incorrect procedures, indicating a supply-side moral hazard. Conclusions: Financial incentives and patient insurance coverage significantly influence healthcare decisions, with FFS models promoting self-interested decision-making and salary models focusing more on patient needs. This study contributes to the literature on supply-side moral hazard to health economics studies that use laboratory experiments to model medical decision-making.
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Open AccessArticle
Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study
by
Vincent Mak and Rami Zwick
Games 2024, 15(4), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15040022 - 25 Jun 2024
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We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures
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We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures complementary items from two heterogeneous sellers with endogenous choice of the order of bargaining. In addition, we implemented an information transparency manipulation regarding whether the sellers were informed about each other’s offers/counteroffers with the buyer. Experimental behavior exhibited deviations from equilibrium predictions that did not differ significantly by information condition, suggesting that sellers were not significantly influenced by direct social comparison between each other. Further analysis suggests that each seller demanded splitting the value of the deal approximately half-half with the buyer as a normative fairness benchmark. The buyers, on the other hand, did not have a demand for fairness that was based on a fairness benchmark.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Non-cooperative Strategic Interactions)
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Collusive Stability with Relative Performance and Network Externalities
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Yi-Shan Lu, Chien-Shu Tsai, Jen-Yao Lee and Chung-Yang Lee
Games 2024, 15(3), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030021 - 20 Jun 2024
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In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm’s objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product substitutability and
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In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm’s objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product substitutability and network effect when the network effect is sufficiently large (small). A competition agency might need to provide different guidance for anti-competitive regulation in the network industry.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics)
Open AccessArticle
Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer
by
Jeahan Jung and Jeong Yoo Kim
Games 2024, 15(3), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030020 - 31 May 2024
Abstract
We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller’s preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in
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We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller’s preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in the choice(s) of the buyer regardless of the state of the world. We first show that if the buyer is completely uninformed, only the babbling equilibrium exists. Then, we obtain our main result that even if the buyer has the slightest information, full revelation can be supported by using the crosschecking strategy of the buyer if and only if the seller has a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility function unless the buyer has too much information. In this equilibrium, the buyer can punish the seller who sends a message far above the buyer’s information by ignoring the seller’s message. Paradoxically, no information and too much information of the buyer both eliminate the fully revealing equilibrium with the crosschecking strategy. We also obtain a counterintuitive result that the seller prefers a more informed buyer than a less informed buyer.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Communication and Persuasion and Their Economic and Political Applications)
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Open AccessCommunication
A Controlled Discrete-Time Queueing System as a Model for the Orders of Two Competing Companies
by
Mario Lefebvre
Games 2024, 15(3), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030019 - 29 May 2024
Abstract
We consider two companies that are competing for orders. Let denote the number of orders processed by the first company at time n, and let be the first time that
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We consider two companies that are competing for orders. Let denote the number of orders processed by the first company at time n, and let be the first time that or , given that . We assume that is a controlled discrete-time queueing system. Each company is using some control to increase its share of orders. The aim of the first company is to maximize the expected value of , while its competitor tries to minimize this expected value. The optimal solution is obtained by making use of dynamic programming. Particular problems are solved explicitly.
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(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)
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Information Transmission and Countervailing Biases in Organizations
by
Saori Chiba
Games 2024, 15(3), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030018 - 22 May 2024
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A decision maker (DM) must choose between two projects or decide on no project. The expected benefits of these projects are correlated. The DM seeks advice from an agent with private information about the projects’ benefits. However, the agent’s divergent preferences for projects
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A decision maker (DM) must choose between two projects or decide on no project. The expected benefits of these projects are correlated. The DM seeks advice from an agent with private information about the projects’ benefits. However, the agent’s divergent preferences for projects and lack of consideration for the DM’s implementation costs may introduce two types of biases: project bias, favoring the agent’s project, or pandering bias, favoring the project preferred by the DM. Our findings reveal that project correlation leads to these biases countervailing each other, facilitating the transmission of information. The agent typically recommends a project based on private information to dissuade the DM from choosing no project, as this would be detrimental to the agent. Additionally, we explore optimal delegation within organizations. In contrast to the prevailing literature advocating for delegation to biased agents for enhanced information elicitation, our study suggests limited benefits in the context of project correlation.
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Open AccessArticle
Invariant Equilibrium in Discontinuous Bayesian Games
by
Blake A. Allison and Jason J. Lepore
Games 2024, 15(3), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030017 - 20 May 2024
Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form is
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We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form is better-reply secure. The invariance property then provides an existence result for all Bayesian games in the class. Results are shown for both pure strategy and behavioral strategy equilibrium. We illustrate the application of the results with an example of a class of contests with bid caps.
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(This article belongs to the Section Non-Cooperative Game Theory)
Open AccessArticle
Evolution of “Pay-It-Forward” in the Presence of the Temptation to Free-Ride
by
Satoshi Uchida, Tatsuya Sasaki, Hitoshi Yamamoto and Isamu Okada
Games 2024, 15(3), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030016 - 25 Apr 2024
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“Paying it forward” is a behavior in which people help someone else because they were helped in the past. Although experimental evidence exists that indicates that real human beings often “pay-it-forward” even in the face of free-rider risks, the theoretical basis for the
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“Paying it forward” is a behavior in which people help someone else because they were helped in the past. Although experimental evidence exists that indicates that real human beings often “pay-it-forward” even in the face of free-rider risks, the theoretical basis for the evolution of this behavior remains unclear. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model that explains how pay-it-forward behavior can evolve despite the temptation to free-ride. By assuming that human beings exhibit cognitive distortions, as predicted by prospect theory, and that free-riding is punished with a tiny probability, we demonstrate that pay-it-forward, alongside unconditional altruistic behavior, can evolve and effectively deter free-riding behavior.
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Open AccessArticle
The Evolution of Cooperation and Diversity under Integrated Indirect Reciprocity
by
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida, Isamu Okada and Hitoshi Yamamoto
Games 2024, 15(2), 15; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020015 - 18 Apr 2024
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms driving the evolution of cooperation in human societies. There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and downstream reciprocity. Cooperation in downstream reciprocity follows the pattern ‘You helped someone, and I will help you’, while
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Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms driving the evolution of cooperation in human societies. There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and downstream reciprocity. Cooperation in downstream reciprocity follows the pattern ‘You helped someone, and I will help you’, while the direction of cooperation is reversed in upstream reciprocity, which follows the pattern ‘You helped me, and I will help someone else’. These two types of indirect reciprocity often occur in combination. However, upstream and downstream reciprocity have mostly been theoretically studied in isolation. In this study, we propose a new model that integrates both types of reciprocity. In particular, we apply the standard giving-game framework of indirect reciprocity and analyze the three-strategy model including reciprocal altruists, indiscriminate altruists, and free riders using evolutionary game theory. We show that the model allows reciprocal altruists and free riders to coexist stably in well-mixed populations. We also find that by accounting for inattention in the assessment rule, the stability of this mixed equilibrium can be strengthened to prevent the invasion of infamous indiscriminate altruists and can even be made globally stable.
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(This article belongs to the Section Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining)
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Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy
by
Matt Malis and Alastair Smith
Games 2024, 15(2), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020014 - 17 Apr 2024
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Political leaders value public demonstrations of support from foreign leaders and frequently make concessions in order to obtain them. We model the bargaining dynamics surrounding these exchanges and their impact on the recipient leader’s political survival, with a focus on top-level diplomatic visits
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Political leaders value public demonstrations of support from foreign leaders and frequently make concessions in order to obtain them. We model the bargaining dynamics surrounding these exchanges and their impact on the recipient leader’s political survival, with a focus on top-level diplomatic visits as a means of signaling international support. Our model addresses two interrelated questions; first, we consider how symbolic displays of support from one leader to another can be informative even when they are “purchased” with concessions, and second, we derive the equilibrium price and political impact of a visit under different bargaining protocols. The incentive to make a concession in exchange for a visit generally undermines a visit’s signaling value. We identify a diplomatic resource curse, where the existence of opportunities for diplomatic exchange can force leaders into accepting visit-for-concession deals that leave them worse off than if they were diplomatically isolated. Visits never occur when negotiations are fully transparent. Mutually beneficial quid pro quo diplomacy requires opacity in negotiations.
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Open AccessArticle
Dynamic Awareness and Strategic Adaptation in Cybersecurity: A Game-Theory Approach
by
Katarina Kostelić
Games 2024, 15(2), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020013 - 8 Apr 2024
Abstract
Awareness and human factors are becoming ever more important in cybersecurity, particularly in the context of small companies that may need more resources to deal with cybersecurity effectively. This paper introduces a theoretical framework for game analysis of the role of awareness in
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Awareness and human factors are becoming ever more important in cybersecurity, particularly in the context of small companies that may need more resources to deal with cybersecurity effectively. This paper introduces a theoretical framework for game analysis of the role of awareness in strategic interactions between the manager and a hacker. A computable approach is proposed based on Bayesian updating to model awareness in a cybersecurity context. The process of gaining awareness considers the manager’s perception of the properties of the hacker’s actions, game history, and common knowledge. The role of awareness in strategy choices and outcomes is analyzed and simulated, providing insights into decision-making processes for managers and highlighting the need to consider probabilistic assessments of threats and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The accuracy of the initial frequencies plays a significant role in the manager’s success, with aligned frequencies leading to optimal results. Inaccurate information on prior frequencies still outperforms complete uncertainty, emphasizing the value of any available intelligence. However, the results suggest that other awareness modeling approaches are necessary to enhance the manager’s agility and adaptiveness when the prior frequencies do not reflect the immediate attacker’s type, indicating the need for improved intelligence about cyber-attacks and examinations of different awareness modeling approaches.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory for Cybersecurity and Privacy)
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Physics-Informed Graph Neural Operator for Mean Field Games on Graph: A Scalable Learning Approach
by
Xu Chen, Shuo Liu and Xuan Di
Games 2024, 15(2), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020012 - 30 Mar 2024
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Mean-field games (MFGs) are developed to model the decision-making processes of a large number of interacting agents in multi-agent systems. This paper studies mean-field games on graphs ( -MFGs). The equilibria of -MFGs, namely, mean-field equilibria (MFE), are challenging to solve
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Mean-field games (MFGs) are developed to model the decision-making processes of a large number of interacting agents in multi-agent systems. This paper studies mean-field games on graphs ( -MFGs). The equilibria of -MFGs, namely, mean-field equilibria (MFE), are challenging to solve for their high-dimensional action space because each agent has to make decisions when they are at junction nodes or on edges. Furthermore, when the initial population state varies on graphs, we have to recompute MFE, which could be computationally challenging and memory-demanding. To improve the scalability and avoid repeatedly solving -MFGs every time their initial state changes, this paper proposes physics-informed graph neural operators (PIGNO). The PIGNO utilizes a graph neural operator to generate population dynamics, given initial population distributions. To better train the neural operator, it leverages physics knowledge to propagate population state transitions on graphs. A learning algorithm is developed, and its performance is evaluated on autonomous driving games on road networks. Our results demonstrate that the PIGNO is scalable and generalizable when tested under unseen initial conditions.
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Open AccessArticle
Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts
by
Daniel Ripperger-Suhler
Games 2024, 15(2), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020011 - 30 Mar 2024
Abstract
A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify
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A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies. I find that the coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. I also find that the pattern of contracts is monotonic with respect to the type distributions of principals and agents.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics)
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Open AccessArticle
Random Informative Advertising with Vertically Differentiated Products
by
Rim Lahmandi-Ayed and Didier Laussel
Games 2024, 15(2), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020010 - 22 Mar 2024
Abstract
We study a simple model in which two vertically differentiated firms compete in prices and mass advertising on an initially uninformed market. Consumers differ in their preference for quality. There is an upper bound on prices since consumers cannot spend more on the
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We study a simple model in which two vertically differentiated firms compete in prices and mass advertising on an initially uninformed market. Consumers differ in their preference for quality. There is an upper bound on prices since consumers cannot spend more on the good than a fixed amount (say, their income). Depending on this income and on the ratio between the advertising cost and quality differential (relative advertising cost), either there is no equilibrium in pure strategies or there exists one of the following three types: (1) an interior equilibrium, where both firms have positive natural markets and charge prices lower than the consumer’s income; (2) a constrained interior equilibrium, where both firms have positive natural markets, and the high-quality firm charges the consumer’s income or (3) a corner equilibrium, where the low-quality firm has no natural market selling only to uninformed customers. We show that no corner equilibrium exists in which the high-quality firm would have a null natural market. At an equilibrium (whenever there exists one), the high-quality firm always advertises more, charges a higher price and makes a higher profit than the low-quality one. As the relative advertising cost goes to infinity, prices become equal and the advertising intensities converge to zero as well as the profits. Finally, the advertising intensities are, at least globally, increasing with the quality differential. Finally, in all cases, as the advertising parameter cost increases unboundedly, both prices converge increasingly towards the consumer’s income.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory in Economics: Recent Advances in Spatial Competition)
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Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure with Learning-by-Doing Production Technologies
by
Frago Kourandi and Nikolaos Vettas
Games 2024, 15(2), 9; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020009 - 29 Feb 2024
Abstract
Here, we study vertical foreclosure in a dynamic setup with learning-by-doing production technologies. There is a downstream monopoly and an upstream duopoly, where manufacturers produce differentiated products and can gain proficiency through the accumulation of their production. We study the dynamic interactions in
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Here, we study vertical foreclosure in a dynamic setup with learning-by-doing production technologies. There is a downstream monopoly and an upstream duopoly, where manufacturers produce differentiated products and can gain proficiency through the accumulation of their production. We study the dynamic interactions in the vertical chain when the monopolist sets the prices; we find that customer foreclosure may arise in equilibrium when the products are close substitutes and be welfare-enhancing. The rate of learning is lower than the social optimal and a social planner would tend to impose exclusivity more often compared to the downstream monopolist.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics)
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Open AccessArticle
Imitation Dynamics in Oligopoly Games with Heterogeneous Players
by
Daan Lindeman and Marius I. Ochea
Games 2024, 15(2), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020008 - 28 Feb 2024
Abstract
We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games. Within a framework of evolutionary competition between rational, myopic best-response and imitation heuristics with differential heuristics’ costs, we found that the equilibrium stability depends on the sign
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We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games. Within a framework of evolutionary competition between rational, myopic best-response and imitation heuristics with differential heuristics’ costs, we found that the equilibrium stability depends on the sign of the cost differential between the unstable heuristic (Cournot best-response) and the stable one (imitation) and on the intensity of the evolutionary pressure. When this cost differential is positive (i.e., imitation is relatively cheaper vis a vis Cournot), most firms use this heuristic and the Cournot equilibrium is stabilized for market sizes for which it was unstable under Cournot homogeneous learning. However, as the number of firms increases , instability eventually sets in. When the cost differential is negative (imitation is more expensive than Cournot), complicated quantity fluctuations, along with the co-existence of heuristics, arise already for the triopoly game.
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(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)
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Open AccessArticle
Nash Equilibria in Two-Resource Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions
by
Fatima Khanchouche, Samir Sbabou, Hatem Smaoui and Abderrahmane Ziad
Games 2024, 15(2), 7; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15020007 - 26 Feb 2024
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In this paper, we examine the class of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions introduced by Milchtaich, I. (1996). Focusing on the special case of two resources, we give a short and simple method for identifying all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We
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In this paper, we examine the class of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions introduced by Milchtaich, I. (1996). Focusing on the special case of two resources, we give a short and simple method for identifying all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We also provide a computation algorithm based on our theoretical analysis.
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