Games, Volume 15, Issue 3 (June 2024) – 6 articles
Cover Story (view full-size image):
A decision maker (DM) must choose between two projects or decide on no project. The expected benefits of these projects are correlated. The DM seeks advice from an agent with private information about the projects' benefits. However, the agent has divergent preferences for projects, and the DM incurs agent implementation costs. As a result, project bias (favoring the agent's project) and pandering bias (favoring the project preferred by the DM) co-exist. We find that project correlation leads to these biases countervailing each other, facilitating the transmission of information. The agent typically recommends a project based on private information to dissuade the DM from choosing no project, as this would be detrimental to the agent. View this paper
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