Publicación de Joshua Novick

✨ Puede asombrar muchísimo...Una #startup del mundo #SaaS, con 18 meses de vida y sin ingresos, es valorada en 5 millones de euros por tres fondos de #CapitalRiesgo en una ampliación de capital de 1 millón de euros. 🤯A la vez que otra empresa del mundo SaaS con 10 años de vida, 2.5M de euros de ventas, más de 1000 clientes y 500.000 euros de EBITDA es adquirida por un competidor al mismo valor (5 millones de €) 🤔 ¿Cómo es posible que las dos #empresas valgan lo mismo❓ 📊 Métodos de #valoración diferentes: Los #VC buscan su precio de salida en potencialmente 5 años y calculan un múltiplo potencial de su inversión si todo sale bien (sabiendo que el 95% de las empresas en las que invierten no tendrán éxito). El comprador estratégico adopta un enfoque conservador, observando las ventas actuales y el EBITDA, el crecimiento pasado y calculando un período de recuperación de su inversión en X años. 🙈 Diversificación del riesgo: Los VC asumen mucho riesgo en muchas empresas diferentes dentro de un fondo, pero solo un riesgo limitado en una sola inversión. En una ampliación de capital, tal vez solo compren el 3% o 5% de una empresa, a veces incluso menos, mientras que un comprador asume el 100% del riesgo. Una cosa es arriesgar 300.000€ otra es escribir un cheque de 5.000.000€ 🛡️ Protección ante pérdidas: Los VC a menudo protegen su inversión con derechos preferentes. Están comprando a una valoración de 5 millones de €, pero probablemente el primer millón si la empresa se vende va para ellos (incluso si la empresa se vende por 1.1 millones de €). Los compradores típicamente no tienen protección ante pérdidas. De hecho, si las cosas salen mal, por ejemplo, si la empresa empieza a perder dinero post compra, podrían tener que aumentar su riesgo en el futuro. 🎉 Muchas start-ups celebran rondas de financiación y valoraciones como si fueran un #exit. Pero no lo son ⚠️. El emprendedor que ha vendido su empresa por 5 millones de €, ahora tiene 5 millones (posiblemente un poco menos debido a impuestos) en su cuenta corriente personal. 💊 El #emprendedor de la start-up que ha levantado 1 millón a una valoración de 5 millones de € está apenas iniciando su camino. Aunque potencialmente es rico 💰, si no logra rendir y crecer a un ritmo extremadamente rápido, no podrá obtener la siguiente ronda de financiación, lo que a menudo conlleva la desaparición de la empresa. Quizás algún día su start-up se venda por 100 millones de € , cumpliendo las expectativas del VC, pero también existe un alto riesgo de que se sume al 95% de las #startups que no llegan a ningún lado por mucho que haya levantado una ronda de VC.

🚨Muchas de las empresas que asesoramos en procesos de venta, desde Bondo Advisors, son pequeñas compañías que se apoyan en una #gestoría para la #contabilidad 🧑💼A menudo la gestoría (si no recibe instrucciones distintas) contabilizará las facturas emitidas en la fecha en la que se emiten o en el momento en que se ha recibido el pago. 📅 En algunos casos, al finalizar el año, puede que la compañia decida contabilizar algunas facturas (emitidas o recibidas) en un año fiscal u otro en función de la conveniencia fiscal (pago del IVA correspondiente y el efecto que puede tener en el beneficio antes de impuestos y el consiguiente pago de impuestos de sociedades). ⚠️ En operaciones de M&A el problema, si no se detecta antes, surge post #duediligence. El comprador que ha realizado una oferta (típicamente en base a ventas, EBITDA o resultado neto) de repente se percata de que algunos gastos o ingresos no corresponden al ejercicio fiscal sobre el cual está basada la oferta. 📊 Uno de los problemas más clásicos (que afecta el corte entre años) son los ingresos diferidos. Fundamentalmente, facturas emitidas y posiblemente ya pagadas por los clientes de servicios que no han sido realizados o no han sido plenamente servidos. 🚫Reconocer un ingreso/venta en un año fiscal no es lo mismo que facturarlo y/o cobrarlo. Se tiene que haber efectivamente prestado el servicio en el año correspondiente. 🎓 Por ejemplo, cuando un centro universitario matricula a un estudiante para cursar un máster de 12 meses de duración que empieza el 1 de septiembre de 2024 y termina el 31 de agosto de 2025, aunque el centro universitario haya facturado y cobrado la totalidad del curso en septiembre de 2024, solo podrá reconocerse 4 meses de ingresos en 2024 y 8 meses en 2025. 📉 Los ingresos diferidos pueden cambiar sensiblemente el aspecto de la cuenta de explotación de una empresa y la valoración de la compañía cuando afloran en el proceso de due diligence.

Still challenging times for #VentureCapital backed #exits. 📉 But on the bright side, the number of exits has picked up in the past two quarters compared to 2023. 📈✨

🌍 Aena, a spanish company, leads the pack of 19 publicly traded #airport #operators followed by Groupe ADP, Fraport AG, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacífico, etc 🏆 No surprise that the 2 leading countries in the world in #tourism (France with 89M visitors in 2023 and Spain with 83M) have the leading airport groups. 🛫 Aena operates 63 airports, 48 in Spain (basically a "monopoly" of the Spanish airport operations). 🌐 ADP is a more international play, operating 26 international airports and the Parisian international airports of Charles de Gaulle, Orly, and Le Bourget. 🏛️ Both groups were previously state-owned and are still majority owned by their respective governments. 📈 ADP slightly leads AENA in TTM (trailing twelve months) revenue: €5.5 billion versus €5.3 billion. 💰 AENA, on the other hand, is significantly more profitable: €3B EBITDA versus €1.9B for ADP and €1.75B net profit versus €0.6B. 📊 Not surprisingly, AENA is also worth almost 3X more than ADP: €28.5B market cap versus €12B. ✈️ ADP slightly leads AENA in total number of passengers in 2023: 336.4M versus 314.1M. AENA: 👥 Number of Passengers: 🔹314.1M passengers 🔹Spain represents 283.2M, Luton 18M, Brazil 13.8M In Spain: 🔹Madrid-Barajas: 60.2M 🔹Barcelona: 49.9M 🔹Canarias: 48.4M 🔹Mallorca: 31.1M Aéroports de Paris (Groupe ADP): 👥 Number of Passengers: 🔹336.4M passengers 🔹99.7M passengers (Orly + CDG), similar to the sum of Madrid and Barcelona (110.1M) 🔹Delhi: 72.2M passengers 🔹Orly: 67.5M 🔹CDG: 32.3M 🔹Antalya (Turkey): 35.5M But what do AENA and Aéroports de Paris precisely do? 🛫 Aviation Services: Services to airlines where they make money by billing passenger fees airlines pay on a per passenger basis, landing fees, airport parking fees, income from airport safety, and security services. 🛍️ Retail and Services: Rent and commissions from stores, duty-free, food, parking, VIP services, rent-a-car, advertising. 🏢 Real Estate: Rent or income from offices, hotels, shops, hangars, cargo stations, business premises on airport grounds. 🌍 International: Income from services or international airports, built, under management, concession, or lease. Often joint ventures with local governments or companies. #AENA: 🔹Aviation Income: €2,858M (55.6% of revenue), EBITDA €1,375M 🔹Retail and Services: €1,552M (30.2%), EBITDA €1,235M 🔹Real Estate: €107M (2%), EBITDA €72M 🔹International: €671M (12%), EBITDA €347M #GroupeADP: 🔹Aviation Income: €1,910M (34.7%), EBITDA €511M 🔹Retail and Services: €1,766M (32.1%), EBITDA €778M 🔹Real Estate: €314M (3.5%), EBITDA €125M 🔹International and Airport Development: €1,630M (29.7%), EBITDA €422M #Growth: 📈 Both companies are growing significantly: AENA grew revenue almost 20% in 2023, Aéroports de Paris 17%. Both grew an average of over 6% per year in the past decade. 🚀 Growth is not stopping: In the first Q of 2024, AENA reported a revenue growth of 20% , ADP reported growth of 11% in the 1st Q 2024.

El #EBITDA suele ser un KPI que se utiliza comúnmente en operaciones de M&A, más que el EBIT, porque permite comparar compañías de las mismas industrias eliminando el efecto de los intereses, los impuestos, la inversión en activos y cómo se amortizan y deprecian. 📊 El múltiplo de EBITDA en operaciones de #fusionesyadquisiciones en distintos sectores cambia sensiblemente por varios motivos. 🔍 📈 Uno es simplemente el reflejo del crecimiento de un sector y el crecimiento de las compañías de dicho sector versus otros sectores. A mayor crecimiento, mayor potencial del crecimiento del flujo de caja y del #payback. Los compradores, al fin y al cabo, están siempre calculando en cuánto tiempo pueden recuperar la inversión de compra con la generación de caja. 💰 Por otro lado, es también un reflejo de la capacidad de transformación de caja desde el EBITDA en una industria en concreto. 🔄 Hay industrias donde el EBITDA es prácticamente equivalente a la generación de caja, donde la transformación de EBITDA a cash es del 80 o 90 por ciento. Mientras que en otras industrias, puede ser tan bajo como el 35%. 🚀 En el sector tecnológico, especialmente en compañías más maduras, los múltiplos de EBITDA suelen ser particularmente altos porque se da la combinación de alto crecimiento y alta transformación de EBITDA en cash.

🚀 Procter & Gamble vs. Unilever: Who is the master of #ConsumerGoods sector❓ 📊 Revenue: 🥇P&G’s revenue ($84B TTM) is 27% above Unilever’s ($66B TTM). 🥈Unilever is still only about half the size of P&G (if you exclude their business in food/nutrition where they compete with giants like Nestlé and Danone , with brands like Lipton -correction-sold to CVC in 2022-, Hellmann's, or Ben & Jerry's). 📊 Growth Rates: P&G (Tide , Pantene , Olay , Crest , Gilette, etc)  has grown faster Unilever (Dove , Axe , Pond's , Vaseline, etc) in the past 5 years: 4.5% CAGR vs. 3% % CAGR but slower in the past decade: 1.1% versus 1.7% 🥉Other Players: Henkel: $24B (Persil, Schwarzkopf, Fa) Kimberly-Clark: $20B (Kleenex, Huggies, Scott) Colgate-Palmolive: $20B (Ajax, Colgate, Palmolive) Reckitt: $19B (Durex, Lysol, Finish) The sum ($83B) is less than the billings of P&G ($84B) 💸 #Profitability: 🥇P&G (almost $15B Net Profit) is substantially more profitable than 🥈Unilever ($7B Net Profit), more than 2❎. 📈 #MarketCap: 🏆P&G is the sweetheart of investors. Its market cap is 3X Unilever ($390B versus $135B). 🤑Unilever is currently trading at 14X EV/EBITDA (TTM) and 2.5X Sales (TTM). P&G is trading at a premium 17X EV/EBITDA (TTM) and 5X Sales (TTM). 🌍 #Global Presence: Both companies have a global footprint but with brands and products often adapted to the local tastes of consumers. They have grown through a combination of #acquiring existing successful brands and developing their own new brands. 🔍 Differences: #Procter: A pure player in home care and personal care. P&G's Sales Breakdown: 🔹Fabric & Home Care: 35% 🔹Baby, Feminine & Family Care: 25% 🔹Beauty: 18% 🔹Health Care: 14% 🔹Grooming (Gillette): 8% Geographic Sales: 🔹North America: 50% 🔹Europe: 21% 🔹Greater China: 9% 🔹Asia Pacific: 8% 🔹Latin America: 7% 🔹India, Middle East & Africa (IMEA): 5% #Unilever: Formed in 1929 from the merger of Margarine Unie and Lever Brothers. Unilever's Sales Breakdown (2023): 🔹Personal Care: 23% 🔹Home Care: 21% 🔹Beauty and Wellbeing: 21% 🔹Food Segment, Ice Creams, and Nutrition: 35% Geographic Sales: 🔹Asia/Pacific/Africa: 44% 🔹Americas: 36% (USA 20%) 🔹Europe: 20% 🔬 R&D Investment: 💊Both companies invest substantially in R&D, but P&G invests $2B (2023), twice as much as Unilever’s $1B.

#Selling your company: What is the better offer❓ 🤔 Deal A: 100% #acquisition at 5 times EBITDA (paid half in cash and half in stock) with an earn-out of an additional 1X EBITDA (of the current year) if management stays through 2027. Deal B: 51% acquisition at 6 times #EBITDA paid in cash with a put and call option for the remaining 49% at 5 times EBITDA of 2027. 🤔It’s not easy to say offhand which is better. Part of the payment in Deal A is in stock. 📈 📊 Is the company publicly traded, and is the stock liquid❓ ⏳ Is there a lock-up period that prevents you from selling the stock for a certain time❓ 💡 Do you believe the stock price is at an attractive valuation❓ In Deal B: 💼 💵 You receive 51% of the payment upfront and 49% based on future performance. 📈 Do you believe your company will perform better in the next three years, providing upside potential? 🛠️ Will you continue managing the company❓ 🌱 Are there synergies with the buyer that could enhance EBITDA growth in the coming years❓ Deal A, if the stock part is attractive, is definitely a safer deal because you receive more money upfront. However, Deal B is better if you believe your company can significantly grow EBITDA and you want to profit from future growth. When selling your company, you might encounter various deal structures that can make comparing and decision-making complex. Here are some types of deals buyers might propose: Cash Deal: 💵 The buyer pays the full purchase price in cash at the closing of the transaction. 💰 Ideal for sellers seeking immediate liquidity and a clean exit without ongoing investment concerns. Stock Deals: 📊 The seller receives shares in the acquiring company as compensation instead of cash. 📈 Ideal for sellers seeking to participate in the future growth of the combined entity, indicating confidence in the buyer's business. Hybrid Deals: 🔄 A combination of cash and stock. ⚖️ Ideal for sellers seeking a balance between securing immediate returns and maintaining investment in the business's future. Partial Minority Acquisition in 1st Stage: 🥈 The buyer initially acquires a minority stake, with plans for future stake purchases. 🌱 Ideal for sellers seeking to gradually transition out of the business while still retaining some upside. Majority Acquisition in First Stage: 🥇 The buyer acquires a majority stake without a predefined agreement to purchase the remaining shares. 🏦 Ideal for sellers wanting to secure cash while potentially retaining a minority stake without future sell-out obligations. Majority Acquisition with Future Acquisition Options: 🔄📈 The buyer acquires a majority stake with agreed-upon options (puts and calls) to buy the remaining shares based on certain multiples in the future. 🗓️ Ideal for sellers seeking to align the initial sale with a structured path to sell the remaining interest at potentially favorable terms.

🏆 Amazon is probably only a couple of years away, at current growth rates, from becoming the leader 🥇in revenue rankings worldwide, overtaking Walmart, the current leader. 📉 If you look at trailing twelve months revenue, #Amazon is only 10% below #Walmart, but it grew twice as fast in the past year: 12% versus 6%. 🏪 The two companies operate fundamentally in the same space (retail), although Amazon has a more diversified revenue split, with one-third of its business coming from non-retail sources, while Walmart's revenue is almost entirely retail. 📊 When you compare the revenue of the two companies, some interesting differences arise: 💵 TTM Total #Revenue: Walmart leads by 11% Walmart: 💲657B Amazon: 💲591B 🛒 #Retail Revenue: Walmart leads by 62% Walmart: 💲650B Amazon: 💲400B 💻 #ECommerce Revenue: Amazon is almost 4X Walmart Amazon: 💲375B Walmart: 💲100B 🏢 Physical Retail: Walmart is almost 30 times larger than Amazon Walmart: 💲550B Amazon: 💲20B 🔍 Where is Amazon a lot larger than Walmart to justify it being almost 4 times the market cap of Walmart❓ 📈 Growth: 23% CAGR in the past decade versus 3.5% for Walmart 💰 Gross Margin (TTM): Amazon $270B and Walmart $158B (+77%) 💼 EBITDA: Amazon $96B versus Walmart $40B (almost 2.5X) 📊 Net Profit: Amazon $38B versus Walmart $19B (2X more profit) 📈 On the other hand, Walmart is a very profitable retail business with almost $28B of operating profit on its $650B retail business. 💸 Amazon does not have a profitable $400B retail business, possibly because it has prioritized growth. Over two-thirds of Amazon's operating profit comes from its cloud business (Amazon Web Services), and probably the rest from its $47B advertising business (Walmart's ad business is barely $4B). Obviously, the ads business would not exist without the retail business and to an extent could be considered just another way to make money on retail. But then again, it is quite remarkable that Amazon is not profitable through the direct margin generated by the $375B of products they deliver to people's homes. 📚 A few more interesting numbers: 🔬 Amazon is super R&D intensive: it spent $85.5 billion on R&D in the past 12 months. 🏬 Walmart, being fundamentally a brick-and-mortar retailer, owns over 60% of its premises worldwide and 85% of its premises in the US. That is over 6,000 stores, $219 billion in property and equipment at cost (probably worth a lot more, since a lot of the real estate they bought was decades ago). 📏 Walmart stores have a total of 1,053,064,756 square feet, which translates to an average revenue per square foot TTM of $617. 🌐 Amazon, as I explained, is a much more diversified business. The split of revenue for 2023 was: #Online Stores: 40% 3rd Party Retail: 24% Amazon Web Services (AWS): 16% #Advertising: 8% #Subscriptions: 7% Physical Stores: 3.5% 🌍 Finally, both companies are still super US-centric. Amazon only has 27% of its revenue from outside the US. Walmart: 18%

How big is #Microsoft? Really massive. Microsoft's #revenue in the trailing 12 months is almost $50 billion (+25%) more than the combined revenue of the next 10 software companies. Microsoft's #marketcap is more than double the combined market cap of the next 10 highest revenue software companies: $3,150 billion versus $1,435 billion. And finally, Microsoft's trailing 12 months' #earnings ($105 billion) are two and a half times more than the combined earnings of the same list ($40 billion). 🥇Revenue TTM Ranking (in US$ billions): Microsoft 237 Oracle  53 Salesforce 34,9 SAP 34,4 Adobe 20 Intuit 15,8 ServiceNow Now 9,5 Constellation Software Inc. 8,9 OpenText  5,9 SS&C Technologies 5,6 Autodesk  5,3 🏆Market Cap Ranking (in US$ billions): Microsoft 3150 Oracle  339 Salesforce 235 SAP 225 Adobe 205 Intuit 160 ServiceNow 144 Constellation 59 Autodesk  46 SS&C Technologies 15 OpenText  7 🎖️Earnings TTM Ranking (in US$ billions): Microsoft 105 Oracle  14,7 Adobe 6,3 Salesforce 5 SAP 5 Intuit 4 ServiceNow 1,3 SS&C Technologies 1,3 Autodesk 1,1 OpenText 0,8 Constellation 0,6