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  • Author or Editor: Dmitry Shlapentokh x
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The internet discussions focused on the Russo-Georgian War of 7-12 August 2008 provide the insight into the mood of Russian public, including those ethnic Russians, who espouse nationalistic view. Some of them support the idea of Russian imperialism and punishing Georgia as the proxy of the USA. Still, the majority demonstrated quite different approaches. They had no interest in imperial build up and see in empire liability, which prevents ethnic Russians to live well. Putin’s regime was regarded as the manifestation of the imperialism, and these explain—in their view—why the regime was hostile to ethnic Russians. To understand the image of the war, in the minds of many Russians, requires describing several specifics of the present regime, which are quite crucial from their perspective. First, although Putin came to power with a programme to end the abuses of the Yeltsin era, his regime was actually a continuity of Yeltsin’s rule. Its most important socioeconomic element— robber-baron privatisation—was preserved. A few of the most notorious “oligarchs” either pushed for exile or ended their careers in prison, but most of them continued to prosper. The corrupt and hedonistic aspects of the post-Soviet regime continued to be prominent, yet the basic pro-Western orientation of Putin’s foreign policy remained unchallenged. These features of Putin’s regime made it as alien and hostile to many ethnic Russians, especially provincial people, as the Yeltsin’s regime had been. Its anti-Western actions, and especially proclamations, were not taken seriously; indeed, they were understood as limited in scope and practically sham. The hostility to the regime by many disenfranchised ethnic Russians was also increased by its tolerance of ethnic minorities, especially Jews. Despite its slogans, the regime was reluctant to press the most brazen form of Russian nationalism, its emphasis on the racial/biological aspects of Russianness. However, it did not demonstrate just tolerance to Jews, but even a Judeophilism that had been unknown in Russia since the early Soviet era.

In: Iran and the Caucasus

Abstract

The present regime in Russia has increased its control over media. This is especially the case with TV. Thus, one could assume that the images of the past that one could find on the TV screen could be seen as representing the official views of the past. These images, in approximately 2005-2007, which retrospectively could be seen as the high point of Putin's regime, present in the context of the past the official ideology of the regime. It was sort of a new edition of Stalin's National Bolshevism. Stalin's National Bolshevism tried to integrate the tsarist and Soviet regime in one historical continuum, as was done by Putin's ideologists with Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. While there were similarities between the regimes and ideologies, there were also substantial differences. Stalin's National Bolshevism was the ideology of the rising and future-looking totalitarian state, full of confidence and ready for expansion, Putin's National Bolshevism was the ideology of the regime, which, even at the peak of its strength, felt the limits of its power. The regime's concern was not so much expansion but, implicitly, the preservation of the status quo and, thus, has implications for the regime's selection of historical images, and their interpretation and presentation on the screen.

In: Russian History
Volume Editor:
Throughout most of Russian history, two views of who the Russians are have dominated the minds of Russian intellectuals. Westerners assumed that Russia was part of the West, whilst Slavophiles saw Russia as part of a Slavic civilization. At present, it is Eurasianism that has emerged as the paradigm that has made attempts to place Russia in a broad civilizational context and it has recently become the only viable doctrine that is able to provide the very ideological justification for Russia’s existence as a multiethnic state. Eurasians assert that Russia is a civilization in its own right, a unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic, mostly Turkic, people.
While it is one of the important ideological trends in present-day Russia, Eurasianism, with its origins among Russian emigrants in the 1920s, has a long history. Placing Eurasianism in a broad context, this book covers the origins of Eurasianism, dwells on Eurasianism’s major philosophical paradigms, and places Eurasianism in the context of the development of Polish and Turkish thought. The final part deals with the modern modification of Eurasianism. The book is of great relevance to those who are interested in Russian/European and Asian history area studies.
In: Russian History

Abstract

Russia, similar to many other parts of the globe, continues to be affected by terrorism, mostly since the beginning of the conflicts in the Caucasus. While started by the Chechens after the beginning of the First Chechen War (1994-1996), terrorism and resistance to Moscow in general soon moved outside Chechen borders, absorbing representatives from other ethnic groups of the Caucasus and beyond. As a result, what originally had been mostly a Chechen nationalist movement finally transformed itself into a multi-ethnic force where the liberation of Chechnya from Russian rule became just one aspect of the struggle. Moreover, nationalist-minded Chechens seemed to have moved to the margins of the resistance, for increasing numbers of the resistance members could well go to the official Chechen leadership. While nationalistic and, in a way, a moderate model of the Chechen resistance became increasingly unworkable, jihadism provided an increasingly acceptable modus operandi. To start with, jihadism emphasises an ideological, Muslim identity and discards any sense of ethnicity, nationalism in general, that separates Muslims from each other. Secondly, jihadism promulgates the creation of a universal Khalifat as the final goal. Khalifat is seen as the ideal society, in a way similar to that of the “thousand-year rule of Christ” and/or communism, each of which actually transcends history as it is known. All of this has led to the increasing influence of jihadists among the members of the Chechen resistance, and a final split between them and the nationalist-minded members of the resistance. This paper presents a detailed analytic account of the recent developments within the Chechen resistance, as well as the jihadist ideology, and terrorism in the North Caucasus and Russia in general.

In: Iran and the Caucasus

Abstract

The revolutionaries—and jihadists could be regarded as revolutionaries of the sort—often had two aspect of their approach to the reality. First, it is vision of the doctrine, often rigid and dogmatic. The other side is practical, and here jihadists changed their approached to the reality.

In the beginning of post-Soviet era jihadists were still influenced by the long traditions of Russian nationalism incorporated in Soviet ideology. According to these tradition, Russia plays the special role in the world history. In the view of jihadists, it was the territory of the Former USSR, which shall play the role of the leader of the global anti-Western revolt. Still, as time progress, Russia lost its centrality in the mind of jihadists, and it became just one of the places of the global struggle. Some of them think that the space of Russia shall be used for creation of sort of a new edition of Pakistan where ethnicities are downplayed, and Islam is the major way of identity.

In: Iran and the Caucasus