Monthly seminars "chaire ACPR"
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The ACPR Research Initiative seminar highlights high-quality research addressing issues of regulation and systemic risk for both banks and insurance firms.
The seminar takes place on the first Wednesday of the month from 10.00 to 11.30 in the premises of the ACPR: 4, place de Budapest, Salle Liège (rez-de-jardin) - See access plan.
The seminar is open to everybody. Registration by email at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr is free but compulsory in order to attend. If you wish to be informed of upcoming events, please send an email to the same address.
The ACPR Studies Department organizes independent seminars as well: the page dedicated to the ACPR research seminars is available here.
NEXT EVENTWednesday, 5th June 2024, 10.30 am – 12 pmGlenn Rudebusch (Brookings Institution et New York University) will present “The Effect of U.S. Climate Policy on Financial Markets: An Event Study of the Inflation Reduction Act”
Abstract: The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) represents the largest climate policy action ever undertaken in the United States. Its legislative path was marked by two abrupt shifts as the likelihood of climate policy action fell to near zero and then rose to near certainty. We investigate equity price reactions to these two events, which represent major realizations of climate policy transition risk. Our results highlight the heterogeneous nature of climate policy risk exposure. We find sizable reactions that differ by industry as well as across firm-level measures of greenness such as environmental scores and emission intensities. While the financial market response to the IRA was economically significant, it did not lead to instability or financial stress, suggesting that transition risks posed by climate policies even as ambitious as the IRA may be manageable.
Please note that this seminar will take place in a hybrid mode (the seminar will take place at the ACPR 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris , and will also be streamed online). (Free) registration (for both in person or online participation) is compulsory by mail at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr If you opt for online participation, the connection details will be sent to you in the following days. |
PREVIOUS EVENTSWednesday, 22th Mai 2024, 10.30 am – 12 pmMelina Papoutsi (BCE) will present “Borrowing Beyond Bounds: How Banks Pass On Regulatory Compliance Costs”
Abstract: Banks in the euro area must inform supervisors about each exposure that exceed 10% of the bank’s capital. Using a granular dataset that combines banks’ loan and security portfolios, we test whether banks pass on the cost of complying with the large-exposure framework to borrowers above the threshold. We show that after a decrease in the reporting threshold, small banks react by shifting more exposures just below the threshold. In addition, banks charge a sizable 76 basis point interest rate premium for large exposures, relative to firms just below the threshold. This premium is more pronounced for small banks and borrowers with fewer banking relationships and hence fewer outside options. In response, when firms approach their bank’s large exposure threshold, they become more likely to borrow from other banks. Despite the “large-exposure penalty”, we find no statistical evidence for bunching below the threshold, suggesting that there are substantial frictions that prevent firms from switching to better-capitalized banks to reduce interest expenses.
Please note that this seminar will take place in a hybrid mode (the seminar will take place at the ACPR 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris , and will also be streamed online). (Free) registration (for both in person or online participation) is compulsory by mail at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr If you opt for online participation, the connection details will be sent to you in the following days.
Wednesday, 3rd April 2024, 10.30 am – 12 pmEnrico Sette (Bank of Italy) will present “Interlocking directorates and competition in banking”
Abstract: We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.
Please note that this seminar will take place in a hybrid mode (the seminar will take place at the ACPR 4 Pl. de Budapest, 75009 Paris , and will also be streamed online). (Free) registration (for both in person or online participation) is compulsory by mail at chaireACPR@acpr.banque-france.fr If you opt for online participation, the connection details will be sent to you in the following days. |