Charles Cozette’s Post

The Kaya Identity can and should be adapted to companies' decarbonization strategies. The Kaya Identity is a tentative formula breaking down (some of) the factors driving carbon emissions: population, GDP per capita, energy intensity, and carbon intensity. It highlights the relationship between some macroeconomic variables and CO₂ emissions. In the picture below shared by erable°, the Kaya Identity has been adapted to fit corporate frameworks. This variation highlights the factors driving a company’s CO₂ emissions: turnover, volume per turnover, energy per volume, and CO₂ per energy. It is a helpful framework for identifying the main levers to decarbonize and reduce carbon intensity. More on the Kaya Identity in Jean-Marc Jancovici's article: https://lnkd.in/eGjYBWvN. #ClimateAction #Sustainability #CarbonEmissions #KayaIdentity #Decarbonization

The European Union's carbon price and associated reforms encourage market actors to modify their planning horizons and think long-term. The article suggests reforms, including the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) and the ‘Fit for 55’ package, encouraged market actors to extend their planning horizons, shifting from myopic (short-term) to farsighted (long-term) behaviors. Authors have tested a potential shock scenario to determine whether such positive behaviors from market actors could be reversed. Policy credibility, they argue, could significantly distort carbon prices and affect the private sector's behaviors. Just saying... Link to the article: https://lnkd.in/eGNWeyqe Cc Joanna Sitarz, Michael Pahle, Sebastian Osorio, Gunnar Luderer, Robert Pietzcker PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Technische Universit��t Berlin

Focusing predominantly on reducing those hard-to-abate emissions is the most sensible thing we ought to do. A new study highlights demand and technology mitigation measures that can significantly limit the dependence on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies in a 1.5 ℃ scenario, i.e., by substantially reducing CO₂e emissions with, for example, direct electrification for industrial processes (e.g., electric arc furnaces). The study estimates that a comprehensive adoption of these strategies could save up to $1.5 trillion in cumulative costs by 2050 compared to a scenario heavily reliant on CDR. However, not all measures are equally feasible. The quick takeaway: CDR is the last resort and shouldn't be a reason to limit efforts for decarbonization on carbon-intensive sectors such as transport, buildings, industry, and agriculture. Kudos to Oreane Edelenbosch et al. from various research centers in the Netherlands (Utrecht University, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU Amsterdam), etc.).

You've probably heard someone saying: "I can't afford x. This climate transition is for rich people." Now replace x with home retrofitting, solar panels, or an electric vehicle, and they're probably right due to higher up-front costs. Improving access to green substitutes is essential to making carbon pricing more broadly accepted and affordable beyond the wealthy environmentalists. In theory, revenue recycling from carbon pricing should facilitate consumers' shift, especially with tighter monetary policy. In practice, the effects are primarily regressive, straining more citizens at lower income levels. Greater financial access to the least able to switch is critical for consumer costs not to be raised where real income has declined. A timely example is the second European Union Exchange Trading Scheme (EU ETS II), which will be introduced in 2027-28. It will cover additional building and road transport emissions, likely trickling down to consumers. For the first time, it will be accompanied by a Social Climate Fund, where a share of the revenues will be used toward financing energy-efficient buildings and less carbon-intensive transportation, easing the burden of "greenflation." As with the EU ETS II, policymakers must get creative to help swallow the pill across income levels. Cc Linus Mattauch, Thomas Douenne, Adrien Fabre Technische Universität Berlin, Columbia University, CIRED, University of Amsterdam.

A recent report published by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) zoomed into demand drivers, one of the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) market bottlenecks. ➤ Across scenarios, CDR seems unavoidable in reaching net zero. By 2050, 6 to 10 gigatons (Gt) per annum of durable CDR will be necessary to counterbalance residual emissions, projected to remain between 2 to 8 Gt globally. ➤ Policymaking is one of the most significant leverages to drive up demand. Expanding carbon pricing mechanisms, regulatory requirements in aviation, shipping, and power sectors, and government procurement could drive 0.5 to 2.5 Gt per annum of durable CDR demand by 2050. ➤ Projected residual emissions and CDR generation look asymmetrical. Europe and North America will likely lead in CDR adoption, while Asia Pacific (APAC) will likely be less systematic about adoption despite concentrating the majority of projected residual emissions. It is a great read and a reminder that the why of CDR is almost unequivocal, but the how and where remain to be seen and are in the hands of policymakers, corporations, and carbon project developers worldwide. Cc Amy Sims, Thomas Baker, Paulina Ponce de Leon Barido, Alex Dewar, Habib Azarabadi. #carbonremoval #CDR #netzero

I’m French, and witnessing the hard-right close to power challenges what I thought we were immune of. The Economist extensively covered this issue in this week’s Europe edition, ahead of the first round of the snap election scheduled for today. Macron’s government passed needed domestic reforms (e.g. pension reform) and made France significantly more attractive internationally for both finance (e.g. J.P. Morgan chose Paris as his main European trading floor) and tech (21 out of the 100, $100bn startup in Europe to watch are French according to GP Bullhound), partly due to a pro-business agenda (e.g. flat tax on investment), all the while taking a leading role in the European Union in the last years, especially after Merkel’s departure. The hard-left and the hard-right are no long-term alternative for the country. They surf on discontent and earn voters’ confidence on elementary scapegoating, simple narratives and promise reforms that are projected to worsen the fiscal state of the country where it must control its deficit. Here’s a short summary of why Macron looks fragile ahead of the first round: « Mr Macron has also fallen into traps, some of his own making. The legacies of covid-19 and inflation make this a rotten time to face voters. One reason Mr Macron struggled to deal with them better is that he chose to construct an Olympian presidency. He believed that the power of the office could unite the country, but is instead seen as arrogant and out of touch. His other mistake was to leave no opposition in the centre ground. An axiom of democratic politics is that voters grow tired of incumbents. When they do, they will turn to the alternative. In France, as elsewhere, that alternative could do grave harm. »

The benefits of the energy transitions generally outweigh their material impacts. Yet, mitigation strategies are needed. In a recent article, authors have projected the demand evolution of critical materials, such as cobalt, aluminum, and iron, to enable the energy transition and suggested efficiency measures to reduce those requirements (Link: https://lnkd.in/eBW_Cg2h). This paper calls for interdisciplinary systems modeling to identify opportunities and trade-offs in demand-led mitigation strategies to effectively reduce emissions at a relevant scale and avoid carbon leakages. It also considers other socioeconomic factors associated with surging material demand, which shouldn't be disregarded. Saying that the energy transition has no trade-off is a lie. The positive takeaway is that we can and should do something about it. Cc Felix Creutzig, Sina Leipold, Peter Berrill, Oreane Edelenbosch et al., Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) gGmbH, etc.

I recently submitted my master's thesis on "Climate Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Identifying and Leveraging Determinants to Meet Climate Targets." Africa, particularly SSA, is disproportionately affected by climate change, and significant funding is needed to finance adaptation and mitigation policies. Yet, the latest data suggests a massive gap between what's required and the actual financial flows. This work intended to identify potential determinants of climate finance inflows in SSA (48 countries) from the international climate finance architecture (public, multilateral, private, etc.) to mobilize additional climate finance. Climate finance flows were measured using the OECD - OCDE dataset, using data from 2009 to 2019 (~27k observations). Independent variables included The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the CPIA policy and institutions for environmental sustainability rating, and projected greenhouse gas emissions 2050 from Yale University's Environmental Performance Index. The assembled dataset had 1 million + data points. Here are some results: • Higher projected GHG emissions in 2050 are associated with lower climate finance inflows in SSA (p = 0.00395). • Higher levels of rule of law positively influence climate finance inflows. At the same time, accountability, control of corruption, and political stability show paradoxical inverse relationships (Accountability p < 0.0001, Rule of Law p = 2.012e-05, Control of Corruption p = 0.0176, Political Stability p = 0.00325). • Higher GDP per capita negatively impacts climate finance inflows (p = 1.37e-06). Population size and environmental policy scores have insignificant effects. Meanwhile, higher debt-to-GDP was associated with higher climate finance inflows (p = 4.42e-05). If you feel like skimming through the thesis and checking the policy recommendations, comment, and I'll forward it! Thanks, Claudia Doblinger, for your supervision! 😊 Cc Richard Amalvy, Dr. Phemelo Tamasiga, Florian Egli, TUM Campus Straubing, African Union, African Development Bank Group, Green Climate Fund.

[This piece is personal] Weeks before graduating from the Technical University of Munich, I reflect on what has and has not been higher education to me (Link: https://shorturl.at/m2ecM). Middle school has been incredibly chaotic. Family events made me miss almost two academic years before entering high school (equivalent to K8-K9). It was tough, and I considered stopping entirely several times. In high school, Scholae: Independent Private Boarding High School - Middle School reignited this insatiable thirst for knowledge. It was a rebound. They personalized learning, adapting to students' strengths and weaknesses. Years later, I'm wrapping up my MSc, and my impressions have just been reinforced: it incentivizes too much futile and short-term memory learning rather than durable knowledge acquisition. But for me, the deal was straightforward: higher education was about meeting inspiring people and getting exposed to new ideas, not necessarily about learning actionable skills. Now that access to information is revolutionized with increasingly relevant AI use cases, higher education is even more likely to become redundant unless the academic offer and incentives are profoundly modified. I'm curious to know how higher education has been for you and whether it has been useful. And if yes, how? Cc jean mortreux, Université Paul Valéry - Montpellier III, HEIP - Hautes Études Internationales & Politiques, Technical University of Munich