Kyle Atwell

The moment in the sun for special operations sometimes appears to have passed, seemingly eclipsed by preparations for potential conflict under the guise of ‘great power’ competition, combined with failure in Afghanistan. Yet the war in Ukraine serves as a reminder that special operations play an even greater role today―before, during and presumably after conflict. The challenge remains dealing with current irregular and hybrid threats, at the same time as preparing for an uncertain future, as… Show more

The moment in the sun for special operations sometimes appears to have passed, seemingly eclipsed by preparations for potential conflict under the guise of ‘great power’ competition, combined with failure in Afghanistan. Yet the war in Ukraine serves as a reminder that special operations play an even greater role today―before, during and presumably after conflict. The challenge remains dealing with current irregular and hybrid threats, at the same time as preparing for an uncertain future, as threats and technologies evolve at a dizzying pace.

Focusing too much on the future of conventional warfare creates a void in national security discussions related to special operations. This book seeks to fill that gap, drawing on the expertise of scholars and practitioners in the field, from the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the United States, to answer what, if anything, special operations can or should seek to do, and how. The contributors explore such topics as proxies, non-state special forces, capabilities, innovation and transformation, artificial intelligence, and special operations in space and cyberspace. These chapters are united by their analysis that special operations will have future strategic and operational value, for allies and adversaries alike, provided that difficult choices are made in the present. Show less

After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has shifted to preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, it would be a mistake to discard hard-earned lessons from these conflicts. Despite contemporary advances in technology and important differences between current US competitors and the Soviet Union, irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition. It was a prominent form of US-Soviet… Show more

After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has shifted to preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, it would be a mistake to discard hard-earned lessons from these conflicts. Despite contemporary advances in technology and important differences between current US competitors and the Soviet Union, irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition. It was a prominent form of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War, is already used extensively by the United States and its competitors and remains attractive given concerns about escalation between nuclear-armed powers. Given the continued relevance of irregular warfare, we focus on two main lessons from the US experience. First, since irregular warfare is about influencing populations and achieving political goals without large-scale combat operations, influencing and working alongside the partner is the primary mission. The second lesson follows directly from the first; if irregular warfare is ultimately about achieving policy goals with an economy of military force, IW is a team sport requiring joint and interagency collaboration to be effectively implemented. Show less

What motivates state and non-state actors to sponsor proxy forces? Why do proxy forces accept support, even knowing it may come at a cost to their autonomy or legitimacy? Three causal logics explain decisions to sponsor proxies. First, sponsors often have secondary strategic objectives where alignment of interest or ideology, the pursuit of influence, or greed compels them to act but is insufficient to warrant more than limited intervention. Second, actors will work through proxies when they… Show more

What motivates state and non-state actors to sponsor proxy forces? Why do proxy forces accept support, even knowing it may come at a cost to their autonomy or legitimacy? Three causal logics explain decisions to sponsor proxies. First, sponsors often have secondary strategic objectives where alignment of interest or ideology, the pursuit of influence, or greed compels them to act but is insufficient to warrant more than limited intervention. Second, actors will work through proxies when they have constraints on direct action, to include cost sensitivity, political risk, and escalation avoidance. Third, working through proxies can be the optimal means to achieve security objectives, even for high-priority concerns and when the external actor has few constraints on action, because proxies have local knowledge or will be perceived as more legitimate than an external actor. On the other hand, proxies accept both materiel and non-materiel support to tilt the balance in their direct conflicts. At the tactical and operational levels, proxies seek sponsors who can fill gaps in their organic warfighting capabilities. At the strategic level, proxies seek sponsors who can provide political and ideological overhead, international advocacy, overhead, financing, and a greater sense of purpose. History is replete with proxy conflict, and a survey of the international system suggests proxy warfare will continue to play a prominent role in international relations. National security practitioners and security studies scholars must understand the motivations behind actors’ use of proxy war strategies. Show less

Civil Affairs professionals are well postured to design, conduct, and assess network engagement effects. They are not the only ones vested in network engagement efforts—there is typically present a diverse community consisting of development workers, private contractors, NGOs, and other agencies striving to improve local dynamics on the ground. Each brings their own expertise and value to the mission. A key observation is that cross-functional teams derive their influence through force… Show more

Civil Affairs professionals are well postured to design, conduct, and assess network engagement effects. They are not the only ones vested in network engagement efforts—there is typically present a diverse community consisting of development workers, private contractors, NGOs, and other agencies striving to improve local dynamics on the ground. Each brings their own expertise and value to the mission. A key observation is that cross-functional teams derive their influence through force multiplication—they corral dynamic and disparate actors from a multitude of backgrounds to work together in a networked effort to accomplish shared goals. This is absolutely essential, particularly in resource-constrained operating environments, where accomplishing US security objectives relies on achieving objectives through others. Show less

To incentivize advising over fighting in future expeditionary counter-insurgency operations, large footprints of ground troops should be avoided. Instead, small and tailored units of advisors with substantive enabling packages should support partner forces without crowding them out from ownership of security operations. Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in, at best, short-term and highly localized security, and ultimately resulted in a partner force ill-prepared to fill the security… Show more

To incentivize advising over fighting in future expeditionary counter-insurgency operations, large footprints of ground troops should be avoided. Instead, small and tailored units of advisors with substantive enabling packages should support partner forces without crowding them out from ownership of security operations. Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in, at best, short-term and highly localized security, and ultimately resulted in a partner force ill-prepared to fill the security vacuum once U.S. forces withdrew. While the failure manifested at the tactical level, the policy implications are strategic in nature and hold important lessons for how to conduct counter-insurgency and partner warfare in the future. Show less

American adversaries such as Russia and Iran are persistently challenging U.S. interests around the world through indirect attacks. Rather than threaten the United States head-on, these competitors employ nebulous tools like private military contractors, proxies, and cyber-driven disinformation campaigns that are difficult to attribute, enabling plausible deniability, and muddle the distinction between violent and nonviolent actions. The frequency and ubiquity of these incidents—whether in… Show more

American adversaries such as Russia and Iran are persistently challenging U.S. interests around the world through indirect attacks. Rather than threaten the United States head-on, these competitors employ nebulous tools like private military contractors, proxies, and cyber-driven disinformation campaigns that are difficult to attribute, enabling plausible deniability, and muddle the distinction between violent and nonviolent actions. The frequency and ubiquity of these incidents—whether in Syria, Afghanistan, or even back home—suggest that indirect attacks will remain a primary tactic in geopolitical competition for the foreseeable future. Yet, the implications of these indirect means of competition for U.S. policy are not well understood. The centerpiece of these attacks is adversaries’ ability to threaten U.S. interests repeatedly over time and geographies while obfuscating the seriousness of the threat and keeping the acts below the threshold of public attention. We find that by mitigating domestic political pressure in the targeted state to react decisively, indirect attacks provide that state the benefit of decision space for how to respond. The aggregate implication for national security is that the use of indirect attacks may have the overall effect of reducing the level of conflict in the international system by increasing opportunities to offramp escalation. For this to be true, however, states must take advantage of the space to leverage other tools like diplomacy to reduce tensions. Show less

Under President Donald Trump, the United States withdrew troops and resources from Africa as part of a broader national security shift from counterterrorism to great-power competition. The Trump administration used the euphemism “optimization” to describe the pivot away from Africa that began around 2018, but a more accurate term would be disengagement. It pared back efforts to fight jihadis in Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, downsizing the U.S. military footprint in some of the continent’s most… Show more

Under President Donald Trump, the United States withdrew troops and resources from Africa as part of a broader national security shift from counterterrorism to great-power competition. The Trump administration used the euphemism “optimization” to describe the pivot away from Africa that began around 2018, but a more accurate term would be disengagement. It pared back efforts to fight jihadis in Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, downsizing the U.S. military footprint in some of the continent’s most volatile regions. Show less

The Army just announced its next generation of battalion commanders, and the number of women selected is concerning. A snapshot of Operations Division branches (formally known as combat arms) highlights the disparity: 1/31 Engineer, 3/42 Aviation, 2/15 Military Police, 2/5 Chemical, and 0/11 Air Defense Artillery. Altogether, women represent 8% of the selected population in these five branches, a drop from 15% two years ago.

Battalion command is a pivotal milestone in an Army officer’s… Show more

The Army just announced its next generation of battalion commanders, and the number of women selected is concerning. A snapshot of Operations Division branches (formally known as combat arms) highlights the disparity: 1/31 Engineer, 3/42 Aviation, 2/15 Military Police, 2/5 Chemical, and 0/11 Air Defense Artillery. Altogether, women represent 8% of the selected population in these five branches, a drop from 15% two years ago.

Battalion command is a pivotal milestone in an Army officer’s career, and an important step on the path to becoming a general officer. Why were so few women selected this year? Is this year an exception, or part of a broader trend? Most importantly, what signal do these numbers send about the chances of career advancement to junior female officers? Show less