Brook Schoenfield

It is the information security architect’s job to prevent attacks by securing computer systems. This book describes both the process and the practice of assessing a computer system’s existing information security posture, often called, "threat modeling". Detailing the time-tested practices of experienced security architects, it explains how to deliver the right security at the right time in the implementation lifecycle.

Securing Systems: Applied Security Architecture and Threat Models… Show more

It is the information security architect’s job to prevent attacks by securing computer systems. This book describes both the process and the practice of assessing a computer system’s existing information security posture, often called, "threat modeling". Detailing the time-tested practices of experienced security architects, it explains how to deliver the right security at the right time in the implementation lifecycle.

Securing Systems: Applied Security Architecture and Threat Models covers all types of systems, from the simplest applications to complex, enterprise-grade, hybrid cloud architectures. It describes the many factors and prerequisite information that can influence an assessment. The book covers the following key aspects of security analysis:

When should the security architect begin the analysis?
At what points can a security architect add the most value?
What are the activities the architect must execute?
How are these activities delivered?
What is the set of knowledge domains applied to the analysis?
What are the outputs?
What are the tips and tricks that make security architecture risk assessment easier? Show less

I ran out of co-authors: Diomidis Spinellis, Jacob West.

The IEEE Computer Society Center for Secure Design intends to shift some of the focus in security from finding bugs to identifying common design flaws — all in the hope that software architects can learn from others' mistakes.

Most software that has been built and released typically comes with a set of defects — implementation bugs and design flaws. To date, there has been a larger focus on finding implementation bugs… Show more

I ran out of co-authors: Diomidis Spinellis, Jacob West.

The IEEE Computer Society Center for Secure Design intends to shift some of the focus in security from finding bugs to identifying common design flaws — all in the hope that software architects can learn from others' mistakes.

Most software that has been built and released typically comes with a set of defects — implementation bugs and design flaws. To date, there has been a larger focus on finding implementation bugs rather than on identifying flaws. Show less

Core Software Security expounds developer-centric software security, a holistic process to engage creativity for security. Developer-centric security (a term coined by Brook Schoenfield) is not only feasible but also cost effective and operationally relevant. The methodology builds security into software development, which lies at the heart of our cyber infrastructure. Includes a chapter by noted security architect Brook Schoenfield who shares his insights and experiences in applying the book’s… Show more

Core Software Security expounds developer-centric software security, a holistic process to engage creativity for security. Developer-centric security (a term coined by Brook Schoenfield) is not only feasible but also cost effective and operationally relevant. The methodology builds security into software development, which lies at the heart of our cyber infrastructure. Includes a chapter by noted security architect Brook Schoenfield who shares his insights and experiences in applying the book’s SDL framework Show less

The security evaluation of external vendors has been troubled by a lack of clearly defined criteria against which to measure security. This guide provides specific criteria against which to measure an organization's security practice for the purpose of doing business securely

A proven method for allowing external HTTP/S traffic to be processed securely by internal applications that may not be prepared for the level of attack typically experienced on the Public Internet

A proven set of criteria against which to measure the security of 3rd parties for the purpose of data interchange and business partnerships.

Granular security policies could be pulled together into a SOA-ready policy manager to ensure that security is equivalent across a SOA matrix

Just Good Enough Risk Rating is a lightweight risk rating methodology used by Cisco Systems Web Security Architecture. Co-authored with Vinay Bansal