Als je goed om je heen kijkt, zie je dat alles gekleurd is.

If you look around you carefully, you'll see that everything is colored.

K. Schippers

Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.

Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians (trans. R.G. Bury)

既使我與若辯矣，若勝我，我不若勝，若果是也？我果非也邪？我勝若，若不吾勝，我果是也？而果非也邪？其或是也，其或非也邪？其俱是也，其俱非也邪？我與若不能相知也。則人固受其黮闇， 吾誰使正之？使同乎若者正之，既與若同矣，惡能正之？使同乎我者正之，既同乎我矣，惡能正之？使異乎我與若者正之，既異乎我與若矣，惡能正之？使同乎我與若者正之，既同乎我與若矣，惡能正之？然則我與若與人俱不能相知也，而待彼也邪？

Now, suppose that you and I are having a dispute. If you beat me, and I don't beat you, are you then actually right and I actually wrong? If I beat you, you don't beat me, am I actually right and you actually wrong perhaps? Or is it perhaps so that one of us is right and one is wrong? Or perhaps that both of us are right and both wrong? If you and I cannot come to know this of each other, then any other person will surely remain in the dark.

Who could I ask to judge this? If I ask someone who agrees with you to judge it, then, since he already agrees with you, how could he judge it? If I ask someone who agrees with me to judge it, then, since he already agrees with me, how could he judge it? If I ask someone who disagrees with you and me to judge it, then, since he already disagrees with you and me, how could he judge it? If I ask someone who agrees with you and me to judge it, then, since he already agrees with you and me, how could he judge it? If so, then neither you, nor me, nor any other person can come to know this of each other, so do we perhaps depend on yet something else?

Zhuang-zi (https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/adjustment-of-controversies 齊物論 12）

夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於鷇音，亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？

Now, saying is not blowing breath. Saying has something to say. Only, what it says is never fixed. Have we then actually said something? Or have we perhaps never said something? If you consider it different from the twittering of baby birds, is there (really) a distinction, or is there no distinction? How does the Way remain hidden so that we have "real" and "false"? How does saying conceal so that we have "right/this (is an x)" and "wrong/(it) is not (an x)"?

Zhuang-zi (https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/adjustment-of-controversies 齊物論 4)

(The Zhuang-zi translations are my own. They are close to A.C. Graham's translations, but with a few adjustments that don't have a big impact on the overall meaning. I've tried to let the tentative modalities come out more clearly.)