Nuclear Terrorism Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
8 Detection and Interdiction Efforts Within and Outside the Global Supply System
8 Detection and Interdiction Efforts Within and Outside the Global Supply System
Pages 92-103
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 92... ...
Opportunities exist to enhance supply chain transparency and accountability by strengthening industry partnerships and taking advantage of improvements in technologies to include artificial intelligence and machine learning. Within the global supply system, these technologies can expand the means for identifying anomalies and dangerous materials hidden within legitimate shipments.
|
From page 93... ...
8.2 EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DETECTION AND INTERDICTION FINDING 8-1: Post-9/11 efforts to improve transportation, cargo, and border security have significant limitations but provide a strong foundation for enhancing industry and international partnerships. Such partnerships are required to effectively deter and counter nuclear and radiological materials smuggling within the global supply system.
|
From page 94... ...
The current array of transportation, cargo, and border security measures were largely developed in the George W Bush Administration with the most prominent measures including: • The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)
|
From page 95... ...
CBP's Container Security Initiative is operating in 61 ports and prescreens cargo manifests and other trade information for more than 80 percent of U.S.-bound maritime containerized cargo (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2022)
|
From page 96... ...
Yet all these efforts have been advanced in an uncoordinated manner with uneven funding and staffing support to sustain them. No one agency or department has been assigned to serve as the overall lead for detection and interdiction efforts.3 8.3 THE RISK NUCLEAR TERRORISM POSES TO THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN FINDING 8-2: A nuclear incident involving the global supply system would expose gaps in the system's security and lead to catastrophic economic consequences arising from system-wide delays while new security measures were developed and deployed.
|
From page 97... ...
This requirement has been waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security at two-year intervals since 2007, but there would likely be enormous public and political pressure to immediately implement the law in the aftermath of a terrorist incident. One hundred percent inspections would result in the kind of vessel backups that took place during the COVID-19 emergency with the associated cascading global supply chain effects and impacts on worldwide economic activity.
|
From page 98... ...
The study The project used these records as the basis for a simulation analysis that estimated the effect of a number of inspection protocols on terminal operations. It determined that automatically scanning all containers upon arrival would be more operationally efficient and cost effective than conducting targeted pre-loading inspections of a very small percentage of U.S.-calculated that the cost of these inspection would average $110 each and could create a significant backlog at the inspection facility if overseas officials were directed to inspect as little as five percent of U.S.‐bound cargo at any given time using the Container Security Initiative protocol.
|
From page 99... ...
Despite these challenges, there are longstanding efforts to prevent drug and human trafficking and other contraband along illicit maritime, air, and land transit routes and as a part of border control efforts outside legal ports of entry. These counter-smuggling efforts position federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agents to play 8 Another way to minimize the impact on cargo handling by port-of-loading inspections is to have inspections that support the interception of contraband such as drugs, currency, or counterfeit goods be done at the port of arrival.
|
From page 100... ...
Code. Similarly, close collaboration between the IMO and the 1540 Committee to prevent the nuclear materials smuggling would be fully consistent with the maritime shipping safety and security imperative that drove creation of the ISPS Code; i.e., to "establish the new international framework of measures to enhance maritime security and through which ships and port facilities can operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector." Such cooperation would provide the 1540 Committee with a means to further member state compliance with the 1540 mandate and the IMO and would provide guidance to meet the mandates on the ISPS Code, while at the same time enhancing security at maritime borders worldwide.10 10 Specifically, the guidance contained in part B of the ISPS Code should include recommended practices for ensuring cargo entering port facilities does not pose a nuclear risk to the ships and crews transporting that cargo.
|
From page 101... ...
Coast Guard should take the lead in linking the currently disconnected global counterproliferation mandate set by UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the global port security requirements embedded in the International Maritime Organization's ISPS code to advance universal cargo scanning to detect prohibited nuclear materials at ports of loading. Shipping companies and marine terminal operators who directly handle most of the world's maritime containers should also be enlisted as full partners.11 With the technical support of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration, the U.S.
|
From page 102... ...
2012. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security.
|
From page 103... ...
FIGURE 9-1 Blast damage zones after a 10 kT detonation. The response and recovery will be different for each zone, including degrees of assistance and timing with which first responders can arrive.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.