Nuclear Terrorism Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (2024) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
3 New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks
3 New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks
Pages 40-53
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 40... ...
• Russian attacks on and occupation of Ukrainian power plants signal the end of a well established norm that such plants should be inviolate. • The demarcation between domestic and international terrorist organizations is blurring alongside the use of non-state actors as proxies by states.
|
From page 41... ...
Aum Shinrikyo's unsuccessful, repeated attempts to mine uranium, hire Russian nuclear scientists and purchase Russian nuclear technology in the 1990s; (2) al Qaeda's unsuccessful alleged attempts to purchase nuclear weapons and material from a variety of sources in the 1990s, recruit insiders, as well as attempts to design a nuclear weapon that would have included explosive testing in Afghanistan; and (3)
|
From page 42... ...
from a state actor or an insider, or o Financial or technical resources sufficient to acquire nuclear weapons, components, or fissile/radiological materials, or o Insider access to, or access to third-party insiders capable of supplying nuclear and/or radiological materials (plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU) , high activity radiological sources)
|
From page 43... ...
that is fostering violent white supremacists worldwide to include individuals within the United States.3 If one of these groups with domestic and international counter parts were to acquire nuclear material it would be particularly problematic for nuclear security. 2 International terrorism: Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored)
|
From page 44... ...
The committee recommends that the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget conduct a review of counterterrorism programs and agency budgets across the national security community to ensure that the attention being directed to Great Power Competition does not result in underinvesting in essential capabilities for managing and responding to the nuclear terrorism risk. RECOMMENDATION 3-2: The transnational links among some anti government/terrorist groups operating in the United States suggests that some of these groups might meet the criteria to be included on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which would make it illegal, not only to join these groups, but also to financially support them, as is the case for other listed FTOs.
|
From page 45... ...
. 3.5 THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM Many nuclear weapon scenarios involving state-sponsors, to include covert delivery via proxies, would be deterred if states assume their involvement could be attributed to the sponsoring state via nuclear forensics, or other intelligence, resulting in subsequent public identification and condemnation, and international retribution (National Academies of Sciences 2021)
|
From page 46... ...
However, it is also true that these kinds of non-state sponsored groups are less likely to have access to nuclear weapons and materials. They are also unlikely to possess the expertise and operational capabilities to carry out a successful nuclear terrorist attack.
|
From page 47... ...
. FINDING 3-5: Domestic violent extremism is a potential threat to the security of the nuclear weapons enterprise and to civil nuclear industry.
|
From page 48... ...
directed that Federal investigative standards "shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service … is consistent with the interests of national security." The new guidance requires that persons with access to classified information are subject to "continuous evaluation" and "continuous vetting." It explains that "‘Vetting' is the process by which covered individuals undergo investigation, evaluation, and adjudication of whether they are, and remain over time, suitable or fit for Federal employment, eligible to occupy a sensitive position, eligible for access to classified information, eligible to serve as a nonappropriated fund employee or a contractor, eligible to serve in the military, or authorized to be issued a Federal credential." These continuous monitoring programs should be supplemented by dedicated programs to train and motivate staff with access to sensitive information and areas to identify and mitigate insider threats.
|
From page 49... ...
security clearances, the Administration should include the Department of Defense's revised definitions of "extremist activities" and "active participation," as described in the Report on Countering Extremist Activity within the Department of Defense, in the investigative standards for all government workers and contractors who have access to sensitive information and facilities as part of Executive Order 13764 of January 17, 2017 and as a part of the U.S. continuous vetting process.
|
From page 50... ...
2023. "Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Information Project." https://fas.org/issue/nuclear-weapons/.
|
From page 51... ...
2020. "United States Designates Russian Imperial Movement and Leaders as Global Terrorists." U.S.
|
From page 52... ...
2021b. Report on Countering Extremist Activity Within the Department of Defense.
|
From page 53... ...
GICNT activities were paused after Ukraine was invaded by the Russian state, an example of how new geopolitical instability is challenging the U.S. efforts to prevent and counter nuclear terrorism.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.