(By Our Naval Correspondent)
German newspapers and publicists appear to be in a questioning mood at present in regard to the doings of their Fleet. In every German citizen’s mouth, says the Rotterdam Courant there has been of late the question: “What on earth is our Fleet doing?” and the general feeling of disappointment has not been alleviated by accounts of a recent journalistic visit to the ships, during which target practice was restricted to a few rounds from the smaller guns because every shot from the heavy ordnance cost such an enormous amount of money. Even Captain Persius adopts a very apologetic tone in his review of the events of 1916 for the Tageblatt. He ascribes the “small activity” of the German squadrons of battleships and armoured cruisers to the British endeavour to subdue Germany by a blockade without risking our main fighting Fleet.
Although it is not often publicly expressed, there exists an impression that the British Navy might do more in the war than it does. As in the early days of the conflict, our great superiority in material strength is pointed to as affording tis the means for doing practically what we will on the seas, if that material is effectively handled. Englishmen, as well as Germans, sometimes ask, “What is the Fleet doing?”
There is some excuse for this attitude. It is born of the policy of secrecy in which so much of the Navy’s work is enveloped. It is also attributable in part to the fact that in the eyes of many people the Navy means the Fleet in the North Sea. Such people forget that under the aegis of the Grand Fleet in the northern mists many other powerful forces of the Navy are performing an immense amount of work in all parts of the world. The German Fleet is advertised in the official announcements of the enemy as performing many stirring deeds, but leave out of account the submarine activity, and it is in reality doing nothing. The British Fleet is very rarely mentioned in our official reports, yet its power, exerted in every sea, is the basic factor which keeps the war going.
ARDUOUS AND VARIED.
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Those who profess to be disappointed with our naval achievements ought also to be reminded of this fact. The Fleet might do much more if it had entire freedom to act according to its own desires, without regard to other needs of the Allied cause. How differently, for instance, might our sea forces be utilized if there were not vast transport undertakings to safeguard; if military enterprises at Salonika, East Africa, and elsewhere had not to be supported; if a strict commercial blockade of the enemy’s coasts and ports had not to be exercised day and night; and if the largest mercantile marine in the world did not need ships to protect it.
A moment’s reflection will convince anyone at all acquainted with the matter that the Navy’s work could scarcely be more arduous and varied. In what Mr. Rudyard Kipling has called the “Fringes of the Fleet” there is an amount of unremitting toil, heroic endeavour, and successful achievement which would surprise everyone if it were made known.
It is to be regretted that the Admiralty cannot see their way to reveal more particulars about this work of the auxiliary forces - the trawlers, drifters, patrol boats, and the like - which are the creation of the war. The men in the small craft of the Navy carry on the trench warfare, as it were, of the sea fighting, but there is no daily bulletin of their performances. Although they are continuously up against the barbed wire of the minefields - more deadly than any on land - and are always exposed to submarine attack, added to which are the ordinary hazards of the sea, it is only by chance that the nature of their duties, and the success which attends them, reach the public A typical but glorious incident was that of the rescue by a destroyer of the crew of the burning oil steamer Conch on the morning of December 8, of which a correspondent of The Times supplied an account on December 23.
Another phase of the work of the Navy about which little or nothing is heard is that of the transport service. Now and then there is an intimation of loss, such as the torpedoing of the Ivernia, but such events are very rare. There have been fewer than a dozen serious mishaps to British transports all through the war; yet the voyages undertaken must certainly run into hundreds of thousands, seeing that about one half of our entire total of merchant ships is on charter to the Government. The protective duties in connexion with such large operations are manifestly important, and of their effectiveness the comparative immunity of the service affords a striking guarantee.
A large amount of additional work and anxiety was thrown on the officers engaged in these undertakings by the extension of the submarine menace to wider areas, but nothing is told of the result of the counter-measures which must obviously have been taken by the Navy. The public may have to wait until Mr Kipling or Mr Noyes is commissioned to relate some of the stories associated with the undertaking.
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Good as these series of articles are, the Navy and the public would better appreciate extracts from the actual dispatches of the officers engaged. These would be more calculated to bring home to the people what is really happening afloat than the selection of incidents thrown together to form newspaper articles.
THE NORTH SEA BLOCKADE
Another class of work which is daily and hourly proceeding is the blockade in the North Sea, in regard to which there has not yet been a single official dispatch. Only on one occasion has the veil which hides this important undertaking from the public been partly lifted, and that was when Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley De Chair, who commanded the Tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Squadron until March 6, 1916, gave an interview to an American journalist. A modern blockade, as the Admiral pointed out, is not a ring of ships, steaming within sight of each other, forming a sort of fence across sea-tracks to enemy countries. Our North Sea blockade consists of the strategic placing of units of patrolling squadrons, all out of sight of each other, but within easy steaming distance - usually 20 miles apart. The working of this network of blockade ships cannot fail to be attended with a crop of incidents which, if related, would indicate how valuable and effective is the seamen’s work.
There are other phases of the service of the British sailor which are likewise a closed book to people in general, giving rise to ill-informed questions as to what the Navy is doing. When the people do not see or hear of the events taking place, they cannot be expected to understand them. A little less reticence on the part of the authorities concerning this routine duty of the Fleet in time of war would be welcome. It is all very well to speak of “the silent Navy,” but to maintain unbroken silence about the sea warfare is not to the advantage of the nation generally.