The F-35 joint strike fighter was supposed to be the answer to all the West’s air defence needs for the early decades of the 21st century. It is turning into an object lesson in the pitfalls of procurement. If the Ministry of Defence continues on its present course of too much credulity and too little scrutiny, it is in danger of finding that the planes intended to equip Britain’s two new aircraft carriers are vulnerable to hackers, unable to fly in full stealth mode and even in some cases too heavy to fly at all.
A Times investigation starting today reveals that the full cost of the 14 F-35s delivered to Britain so far is likely to be closer to £150 million per plane than the £77 million-£100 million range given by Lockheed Martin, the main US contractor. If taxpayers were getting an all-seeing, all-conquering defence platform for their money the cost overruns might be warranted in the long term, but they are not.
The most recent Pentagon report on the F-35 found that, even after more than a decade and a half of development, all versions of the aircraft “display objectionable or unacceptable flying qualities at transonic speeds”. In lay language, the plane flies poorly as it accelerates through the sound barrier, when stable, sensitive handling is a basic requirement for any modern fighter. Furthermore, test pilots have found the aircraft underpowered in dogfights. Engineers have found it to be unreliable even by the standards of the hugely complex stealth aircraft already in the Nato inventory. Worst of all, one of the F-35’s unique selling points is its purported ability to provide constantly updated information about enemy movements far beyond the horizon to other, older aircraft with which it goes into battle. Unfortunately this is possible in stealth mode only with the additional purchase of a suite of secure communications equipment that British officials, facing increasingly severe cuts, have so far opted not to buy.
One crucial piece of equipment is called the battlefield airborne communications node (BACN). Without it and other upgrades, according to Sir Richard Barrons, who until last year was in charge of all military information networks, Britain might as well have “recycled some old Harrier jets” for the new aircraft carriers.
Heedless of such warnings, Britain remains the Pentagon’s most enthusiastic foreign partner in what is now the most expensive defence programme in history. The Ministry of Defence has committed to buying 138 F-35s in all, and Sir Michael Fallon, the defence secretary, insists that the aircraft “immeasurably improves our situational awareness”. In reality this is precisely where British forces are in danger of being at a disadvantage if officials continue to prioritise hardware over soft. At the very least, Sir Michael and his civil servants have failed to give the F-35 programme the scrutiny it needs, or taxpayers the information they deserve. It is their money being mis-spent and their security at stake.
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The joint strike fighter programme was meant to produce three aircraft types from a single airframe design, to meet the needs of the US air force, navy and marines at minimum cost. A trillion dollars later it is clear that in trying to be jack of all trades, the F-35 is master of none.
Four of Britain’s first aircraft were an early version that testers have found may not be able to lift the weight of essential extra equipment. The failure to invest in BACN equipment means that British aircraft will be able to fly in stealth mode or in communication with other military assets, but not both. Officials insist that the project is on time, on budget and the best option for Britain, but this is pure assertion. Unlike in the US and Australia, public scrutiny has been minimal. If ministers want taxpayers to trust this mainstay of the nation’s defence they should be honest about its shortcomings and let parliament decide whether to persevere despite them.