Replay: webchat with Miles Amoore

Lewis: What's it like being a Westerner in Kabul? Is it dangerous? What are the normalities about life there?

Miles Amoore: It's a question i get asked a lot. In three and a half years of living in Kabul I have never felt threatened inside the city. Afghans for the most part are incredibly friendly and hospitable.

I am greeted by stares wherever I go, but that's because i stick out like a sore thumb. Many foreigners are restricted by tight security rules by the organisations they work for. They tend to stick to their compounds and armoured cars, which builds a wall between them and the people they are here to support. I choose to walk the streets and have never had any problems. Suicide bombings inside the city are relatively rare compared, say, to Baghdad, so you'd be unlucky to be caught up in one. Kidnappings inside the city are mainly targeted at rich Afghans, who make easier targets.

But travel to the provinces is becoming increasingly difficult as security deteriorates. More and more of the roads that link the remote areas are increasingly open to Taliban ambush and Taliban checkpoints. An increase in the number of armed militias also hinders travel.

In Kabul, you can get a drink at a few bars that haven't yet been shut down by the government and you can find most western foodstuffs in the handful of western supermarkets that have opened in recent years. Still, it's expensive. The price of a small can of beer can be up to £4. Alcohol is increasingly hard to find. There are many restaurants that serve anything from Lebanese to Indian to Italian food.

Robin H: What degree of freedom are war reporters given? Are you able to accurately report if the army only permits you access to the areas they want you to see?

Miles Amoore: This is one of the greatest concerns among foreign correspondents here.

On one hand, because of the security risk, it is difficult to access areas where the fighting is at its worst without "embedding" with the military. So, in order to get to these places, you often have to go with a Nato unit.

I have had different experiences on "embeds". Sometimes, they are tightly controlled - you are given a minder who tells you where you can go and what you can see. Other times, I have been left to my own devices. Still, even in the latter case, you are getting a one-sided view of the war. Interaction with locals is difficult - you are surrounded by soldiers who make them feel uneasy. You hardly ever see the "enemy".

I try to stick to the rule that I will report what I see and nothing more. I try not to go down to places like Helmand with an agenda or a particular story in mind. I try to focus on what the fight is like for the soldiers caught up in it - the human angle. To attempt anything more or to pretend you are doing anything more is futile and could add bias to your work.

In order to balance my reporting, I conduct numerous interviews with Taliban fighters, often from areas where I have embedded, and I try to report on a wide range of topics so the readers who read my pieces get a balanced overview of what is happening here.

I am currently banned from Nato installations and embeds after US Marines took issue with a story I wrote about the death of a Lt Gen's son. This shows how Nato has the ultimate say over who gets to go down to places like Helmand and who doesn't. Nato's media campaign is very heavily managed.

Tobias: Were we right to go into Afghanistan and when should we leave?

Miles Amoore: I think we were initially right to go to war. Afghanistan suffered a lot under the Taliban and the regimes that pre-dated it: numerous war cimes and atrocities against civilians were committed; the Taliban's human rights record was appalling; and they helped shelter Al-Qaeda, although to what extent they knew of the 9-11 attacks before they happened is debatable.

Unfortunately, after the initial invasion, Nato and the diplomatic community failed Afghanistan. Nato was slow to react to the inevitable Taliban resurgence and government positions were filled with former warlords who the Taliban had risen up against in the first place (with vast popular support).

The warlords who now form Karzai's cabinet and the Upper House have no interest in a stable Afghanistan. The insurgent's destabilisation of the country allows them to fill their pockets with Western aid and military cash and with the proceeds from the drug trade.

Basically, we supported the wrong people after the collapse of the Taliban, alienating a population who initially welcomed Nato and the international community.

We have failed to provide even the most basic services in areas that were screaming out for help post 9-11. We have failed to expand the government's authority, largely because the government is unwanted because of the weakness and corruption that we have left to fester in the past 10 years.

The question about when to depart is a tough one to answer. I believe that before we leave we must first open political negotiations with the Taliban's leadership in Pakistan. If we were to pull out immediately, we would further add to the insecurity, plunging the country into another civil war fought along ethnic lines. This in turn, may once again turn Afghanistan into the safe haven it once was for groups like Al-Qaeda.

Henry: What has been your most dangerous assignment?

Miles Amoore: Helmand during Operation Moshtarak, which was launched in February last year by British and American forces. I spent one month with the Brigade Reconnaissance Force - an elite unit of men drawn from different British regiments. They operated in a way I had never seen before: running at Taliban positions so as to draw fire or force the Taliban into a mistake. This led to a number of hairy moments. During this time, an IED exploded 10m in front of me, killing a British soldier.

IEDs remain the largest threat for British and Nato soldiers.

Fred: Some of your stories on the ST website have been illustrated with amazing videos - do you take these yourself?

Miles Amoore: Yes - I have a small Flip camera which shoots video. I try and turn it on whenever something happens.

Luiz R: How did you get into journalism? I'd love to be a foreign correspondent

Miles Amoore: I worked on a local paper for a year before becoming bored of writing about sheep fairs, local councils and traffic congestion. But the local paper was a good place to cut my teeth and to learn more about news and reporting.

Afghanistan had always interested me, having travelled here twice before. I upped sticks and headed over here to freelance. It was a struggle to begin with. I made little money. Editors would never reply to my emails.

I got my first break in Helmand when a big story broke in the area I was embedded. I think foreign correspondency is part patience, part perseverance and part luck.

Sally H: One of the criticisms of the Wikileaks war logs reporting was that they identified and endangered sources in Afghanistan and Iraq. Was this actually the case? What are the challenges for a journalist in establishing and keeping reliable sources in the middle of a war zone?

Miles Amoore: No informant mentioned in the Wikileaks cables or the military documents has been killed yet. I am constantly on the look out for this story though. Their lives would certainly have been at risk after their names were published. The Taliban's information wing is incredibly sharp. They have lists of targets marked for assassination and their network of spies is extensive. This year, expect to see an increase in the number of Taliban assassinations.

I have a strong network of sources, including intelligence officials - both Afghan and other. They are reliable most of the time. I also work with a great fixer, without whom I would be very pressed.

Susie French: How important is the drugs trade to the Taliban? I've read that if the West bought opium from Afghan farmers for medical purposes it would be a blow to the insurgents.

Miles Amoore: It has its pros and cons. But my gut feeling would be that buying the opium from the farmers is not sustainable and would create an incentive to plant more, which could potentially lead to more illegal trade. Large socio-economic experiments in a country like Afghanistan may have incredibly negative effects. It is unchartered territory. We are still living with the last American-led experiment - the 1950s Helmand River project. I would argue that it is hard to predict what would happen even if you were able to persuade countries to buy the opium stock. I would refer you to the Senlis Council's report, which came out a few years ago in favour of this. It was largely discredited at the time though.

The Taliban take a 10% cut from the drug trade in areas where opium is grown, but the ISI and Middle-Eastern countries still provide the majority of the financial support received by the Taliban. Money from Nato military contracts (to supply bases and fuel and roads) also funds the Taliban.

As mentioned, the government also benefits from the drug trade. Many government officials take an active part in smuggling stockpiles out of the country.