BRITAIN is destined to remain a perpetually awkward partner in the European Union. Tony Blair’s hopes of ending decades of ambiguity and doubt in the relationship have been dashed: indeed, the failure of his European policy was clear well before June 10.
The European election results have shown how narrow the terrain is in which British politicians have to operate.
The success of the United Kingdom Independence Party in winning 16 per cent of the national vote has not altered that landscape. It was more like a storm than an earthquake. The leaders of the UKIP have had their 15 days in the limelight. But contrary to some of the baloney that their euphoric leaders talked yesterday, Britain is not on its way out of the EU.
Even on June 10, just one in six voters backed a party demanding withdrawal. Repeated polls have shown that, even in the current heavily sceptic mood, a narrow majority would back continued membership of the EU. In any campaign on an “in/out” question, I have little doubt that the “in” side would win.
The real debate is about the nature of our membership. Mr Blair has failed to break the familiar pattern of reluctant acquiesence, “red lines” negotiations and the like. The old pro-European arguments no longer work. Euro entry, once just around the corner, has been postponed beyond the distant horizon. Mr Blair’s goal is now the main, minimal one of winning a referendum on the European constitution, if one is agreed in Brussels this week. Far from the fears of the sceptics about a superstate, this largely codifies the present position.
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Michael Howard has offered an alternative vision. Under the umbrella of “live and let live”, it is effectively a continuation and extension of the British opt-outs in the Maastricht treaty, on which he insisted at the time, plus some renegotiation of existing arrangements, such as the fisheries policy.
The UKIP and the proEuropeans alike doubt whether this strategy will work: why should any other EU member allow Britain to have the benefits of membership without the costs and obligations? For the UKIP, and its many Tory sympathisers, this means that withdrawal will have to be considered, but this would split the Tories as seriously as Labour was in the 1970s and 1980s.
A Howard government might be in the same position as the Wilson administration in 1974, committed to a renegotiation which its leaders know will be hard to achieve. Just as in 1974-75, the talks could be largely a sham, producing at most token changes on, say, fisheries, but leaving the status quo largely intact. A Howard government would not sign up to new EU policies, but it would probably not take the risk of a confrontation over the core relationship by trying to change the 1972 accession legislation. In that sense it would be Mr Howard’s “live and let live” relationship, with Britain further on the outside of European developments.
The UKIP upsurge, coupled with the fall in the Tory and Labour votes, underlines just how tricky Europe is to handle. Mr Blair no longer has the authority to take big leaps forward, and Mr Howard has been reminded that Euroscepticism is hard to control. No wonder they both quickly want to shift attention to domestic issues.