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Marche en arrière

Nervous France has second thoughts on Lebanon

Ten days ago this newspaper praised France’s efforts to find a realistic formula for ending the fighting in Lebanon. We did so in the belief that France stood ready to lead a “muscular” UN force of 15,000, mandated and equipped to assist the Lebanese Army to dismantle Hezbollah’s armed militias south of the Litani river.

We were perplexed when, with the unanimous passage of UN Resolution 1701 early this week, French diplomats appeared to be backing away from the idea that UN forces should help to disarm Hezbollah. We urged France’s leaders to follow the logic of a strategy for stabilising Lebanon that, long before Hezbollah precipitated the latest crisis, France had worked energetically to set in motion. Instead, the strategy has stalled.

France still wants command of the UN force, but is acting as though it wants control simply for the sake of it rather than for the purpose of ensuring a sustainable peace. France was universally expected to commit at least 3,500 troops — encouraging substantial contributions from countries such as Italy, Turkey and Germany and the politically important inclusion of Muslim contingents. France is right to insist on clear rules of engagement; vague orders are a chronic flaw in UN peace operations. But it was wrong to refuse for days on end to talk numbers, rendering coherent planning almost impossible, when speed in filling the security vacuum in Lebanon was of the essence. Yesterday President Chirac finally announced France’s decision: a paltry 200 extra troops on top of the 200 already there. Where the other 14,600 will come from is now anyone’s guess. For France to have retreated from a key role to the realm of “symbolic” gestures “symbolises” only one thing: a French loss of nerve.

Whatever wriggle room the precise wording of Resolution 1701 may contain, its thrust is clear: to prevent the resumption of hostilities by neutralising the Hezbollah threat. Unifil is specifically charged to take all necessary action to ensure that the area south of the Litani “is not utilised for hostile activities of any kind”. The goal is not new; the means are intended to be.

Ridding Lebanon of militias has been central to every international and UN negotiation since Unifil was first deployed there in 1978. Resolution 1701 does not stand alone. In 1989, the Taif accords with Syria agreed that “Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” must disband and hand in their weapons. At the UN in 2004 France co-sponsored Resolution 1559, de-manding an end to Syria’s occupation of Lebanon and all militia activity. Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm breaks its word to the Lebanese Cabinet, given on July 27. Shia crowds cheered the first Lebanese forces to enter Hezbollah territory yesterday. All Lebanese have reason to understand why the demilitarisation of Lebanese society is central to a return to normality. It is vital to regional stability. The job cannot be done without UN help, or overnight, but the pressure must be relentless. France has relaxed the pressure at a vital moment.

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