Live: Geoff Hoon at the Iraq Inquiry

- Budget cuts in 2003 did not affect the war in Iraq but contributed to a lack of helicopters in Afghanistan now

- Mr Hoon refused to accept Mr Blair’s suggestion to increase troops in Afghanistan while there were so many British soldiers operating in Iraq

- He accepted that the aftermath planning had been inadequate - blaming the American for not doing more and for refusing to allow British officials into the planning preparation sufficiently early

- Mr Hoon said he had initially thought it would be “a big ask” for Britain to contribute a division of troops on the ground in Iraq

- A letter criticising Mr Hoon was de-classified by the inquiry - Lord Goldsmith wrote to him prior to the invasion criticising his confident public assertion that it would be legal to invade

4.55pm Mr Hoon says he was asked to prepare to send more troops to Afghanistan while there was still a significant British presence in Iraq. But, he says, he refused to do so.

“I believe that it was necessary to reduce out commitment in Iraq before taking on what was a Nato mission. I believe that at the time it would be better to allow others” in Nato to take over.

He is asked what his military staff told him: “They wanted to be clear that they would not be involved in two major operations simultaneously.”

Sir Lawrence says but that is exactly what did happen.

Mr Hoon replied that it did not happen when he was still Defence Secretary.

“I don’t think the decision was actually taken until after the election of 2005,” he says. “I think my agreement was conditional. . . once the numbers had been drawn down in Iraq.”

Once again he repeats his criticism of the Afghan expansion: “I think it would have been better to draw down our numbers in Iraq before committing our troops to a Nato operation in Southern Afghanistan.”

4.39pm Here comes a complex part on the MoD budget that lead to a “dispute” with the Treasury in September 2003.

In July 2002 the Treasury employed a new budget structure which changed the way existing property was paid for. Mr Hoon says: “What I think the Treasury overlooked was that this gave enormous flexibility to the MoD to do just that – I think after six months the Trealised that the MoD was spending rather more than the Treasury thought we should.

It came to a head 18 months later. “There was a fair amount of correspondence, I think it’s fair to say in the aftermath,” he says stopping short of describing heated rows.

“They didn’t just put the brakes on, they told us we had to stop.”

The Treasury insisted that we should have some kind of independent assessment of the rules and our spending.

Did it affect Iraq? “I don’t think that is the case in fact”

Mr Hoon says the forward equipment plan was affected but did not affect Iraq

What about Helicopters?

“Again, I don’t want to overstate the position,” Mr Hoon says. “I don’t believe it was relevant to helicopters in Iraq but I think it’s reasonable to assume that . . . those helicopters would be coming into service anytime now.”

4.29pm Mr Hoon says his budget was increased through the period. “Well, certainly defence spending increased in the time I was there I dare say others in the department would question whether it increased in the way other department’s budgets increased.”

4.24pm They have taken another short break before the final segment which could be good. The questions will be led by Sir Lawrence Freedman, a military historian, he is expected to zero in on funding concerns as the war developed. Gordon Brown could be in the frame here.

4.14pm Mr Hoon says that it was easier in the US to get they key Government players in a single room to make a decision on funding.

4.04pm Mr Hoon says: “I’ve always seen the position of any Secretary of State as a two-way process – the voice of the department at Cabinet as well as the Cabinet’s voice in the department.”

He says there were times when he had to, for example, ask for more money or times when he had to tell the MoD that they should allow DifD to do something – or rely on the Foreign Office.

3.57pm Mr Hoon says that news of US actions at Fallujah and Abu Ghraib emphasised the way we were seen in our sector as being foreign occupiers – which made it much harder to win hearts and minds.

3.45pm After a short break, Sir Roderic is now asking about the “hearts and mind” and reconstruction campaign - he characterises it as “impossible” given the security issues. Mr Hoon says that is not the case across the board – some work was achieved.

Mr Hoon is asked if it was right that he was in charge of training the Iraqi police. “Probably not, no,” Mr Hoon concedes. He says there were not enough British policemen to carry out the mission.

3.11pm Mr Hoon says the rapid advance of the frontline meant that the line between frontline soldiers and support troops became blurred – he says this is an area from which lessons could be learnt. In modern warfare there is no longer a traditional consolidated frontline which advances uniformly.

3.08pm One of the problems with the body armour according to Mr Hoon was that there was not a very effective tracking mechanism once deliveries had arrived in theatre.

“I expect what happened was that some units ended up with two sets of everything and some ended up with nothing,” he says.

Sir Lawrence points out that the same problem occurred in the 1991 conflict – and should have been improved. Mr Hoon accepts this.

3.04pm Mr Hoon says: “The advice that I got in the course of September was that we had enough [light-weight body armour] for the fighting echelon.”

He decided to ask for more vests for those who would be in the secondary wave of soldiers, but he says he was told by the military logisticians that this was not an urgent inquiry.

3.00pm Sir Lawrence says only 40 per cent of the extra boots and clothing required were available to the troops in theatre on April 30.

Mr Hoon says he is not sure what percentage of those were boots, which were more crucial than clothing.

“There were not widespread problems of boots melting in the sun,” Mr Hoon says.

2.57pm Mr Hoon is asked whether he thinks the military were bound to say they were ready – as they wanted to be involved alongside the Americans and they may not have been “brave” enough to stand up and say ‘look we’re not ready’.

“I accept that there is that risk . . . I accept that the great strength of the Armed Forces is a ‘can do’ attitude” – but, he says, it would not be at all appropriate for a politician to give primacy to their own opinion over the military assessment.

2.53pm Mr Hoon says “operational readiness” was assessed by the military not politicians.

2.52pm “I’m not sure I accept the phrase ‘cutting corners’,” Mr Hoon says. Some of these UORs were not necessarily for war fighting, some for the aftermath. “Some got to theatre in time, some did not.”

Would you have found an additional nine weeks (requested by Britain for diplomatic reasons) useful – “Undoubtedly,” he says.

2.48pm Mr Hoon says once we had the approval of the Treasury for the Urgent Operational Requirements at the start of October we could go ahead but he says “partly for reasons of visibility” they could not get on with all of the equipment preparation.

2.46pm By September 2002, Mr Hoon told No.10 that six months preparation was required for war – ie a March war had to be agreed immediately. But, he says, the PM and Foreign Secretary were fully involved in negotiating a Security Council resolution at that time.

Mr Hoon says that he and Lord Boyce, then Chief of the Defence Staff, went to Downing St: “Saying ‘look you’ve got to get on with this’ – we were told in a sense: ‘calm down’.”

“That was central to what we were saying about the need to get on with preparations.” – which is why in October the US were planning to go to war without us.

“We were both made very well aware” that we must not publicly prepare for war. “If we were seen to be overtly preparing for war” it would hamper the diplomatic negotiations.

2.37pm Mr Hoon say those discussions were straightforward but arguing for sufficient maintenance and training budgets to make the equipment useable was harder - “that was an area of difficulty”.

Mr Hoon says “he does not have the figure to hand” for the overall Iraq budget. Sir Lawrence suggests it would have been in the region of half a billion to a billion – “I think that’s not far out,” Mr Hoon says.

2.34pm When did he start discussing Iraq funding with Chancellor? Mr Hoon says he does not remember a precise date but there were some “exploratory discussions” before the summer of 2002.

2.31pm Sir Lawrence asks whether the Strategic Defence Review was fully funded because it required a major and expensive shift in emphasis.

Mr Hoon says when he arrived at the MoD “there was quite a strong feeling that it was not fully funded”.

The inquiry has already heard that the MoD was under funded was that true? Mr Hoon says: “We asked for significantly more money than was eventually received.”

He was asked about his feeling looking ahead at the ‘02-‘03 finances – was it a budget in depression? “Yes,” Mr Hoon says.

2.26pm Now we will discuss equipment – and military preparedness. This is where Mr Hoon has come under most pressure in the past.

Sir Lawrence sets that scene with the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 (Mr Hoon became Defence Secretary in ‘99) – one of its main focuses was on improving moveable expeditionary forces.

Mr Hoon says he was incredibly impressed with a training exercise in Oman – in which the Army put its logistical operation to the test.

2.21pm Mr Hoon says it took him a long time to accept that there were no WMD in Iraq. “I’m prepared to admit that I was probably among the last to concede it.”

2.17pm Mr Hoon is asked whether he was awarethat his Defence Intelligence Staff had serious concerns with the September dossier that made the “45-minute claim”.

“I wasn’t aware of the detailed points I think until the Butler inquiry,” he says. What he says he did see was a letter from the DIS on September 20, 2002 that it was “content” with the dossier.

Mr Hoon says: “The only thing in the draft that I was not familiar with was this 45-minute claim. . . I asked about what that meant. . . and they got someone to come and explain what that meant. . .the explanation was fairly straight forward that Saddam had guns that could fire chemical weapons.

“I certainly saw the draft, I didn’t comment on it, because it did reflect the intelligence”

2.15pm Mr Hoon says he regularly saw intelligence reports and military assessments on Iraq in the years before the invasion.

“I was in no doubt at all from the material I read that they had both chemical and biological capabilities,” he says, he think they could have moved quickly towards nuclear weapons if they secured fissile material. He accepts that is a “big if”.

2.11pm Sir Lawrence sets us up for the real meat expected from this witness: WMD and equipment shortages.

2.09pm Mr Hoon says he cannot think of much he would change in the initial military phase. “The war fighting part was remarkably successful,” he says.

The main issues were that “those loyal to Saddam Hussein were not necessarily wearing uniform”.

2.07pm We kick off after lunch with discussion of the very quick initial military element of the conflict. Sir Roderic asks what Mr Hoon’s reaction was to the claim that it was “mission accomplished” in May 2003.

Did he think the hard part was over or still to come?

Mr Hoon says: “I don’t think I put the emphasis on one side or the other – the post-conflict phase is always going to be longer and more difficult.”

1.45pm David Brown down at the inquiry has filed a round-up of the morning’s action. He concentrates on Mr Hoon saying he was in the dark over Tony Blair’s letters to George Bush, in which he promised to support American military intervention.

12.57pm Geoff Hoon and the Iraq Inquiry panel will now adjourn for an hour to take lunch.

12.55pm Sir Lawrence contends that no matter what we say about the level of British planning for the aftermath in Basra – the most important security factor would be the state of Baghdad. Mr Hoon agrees. Given the widespread concerns over the lack of US planning, asks Sir Lawrence, was there any discussion that becoming an occupying power was simply an unacceptable risk?

“I don’t think the case was put quite like that,” Mr Hoon says. But he says he had written to the PM to point out that no one had identified someone to replace Saddam Hussein and there was “very real concern about what Iraq might look like” once he was removed.

12.48pm “I think things went badly wrong when the security situation deteriorated.”

12.47pm Sir Roderic says that based on the evidence the inquiry was heard on the aftermath: “The British Government had nothing planned.”

Mr Hoon says he does not accept that nothing was planned – but says it did not work as planned.

Sir Roderic asks if that was because the planning started so late?

“I think that’s probably fair,” Mr Hoon replies. “I don’t exactly know what the problems were.”

12.42pm Sir Roderic asks when did Britain know it would be an occupying power in southern Iraq and a co-occupying power of the whole of Iraq?

“When we decide that we would do the third option – or even before we decided,” Mr Hoon says. This was an assumption thoughout the planning. “That was accepted,” he says. “That was why we were so keen to see a second UN resolution.”

Sir Roderic is pushing now: if it was apparent for so long why did the planning for the aftermath only start in February?

Mr Hoon’s only answer, really, is that British troops are good at this kind of switch to peacekeeping.

12.35pm Mr Hoon says Britain did not anticipate the extent of the logistical challenge they would face.

12.32pm Mr Hoon says he was disappointed that the civilian assistance, which was supposed to take over the practical running of the country, did not materialise by the allotted date.

“We had reservists carrying out their civilian roles in Basra” – ie teachers working in Education ministry – a city worker trying to build a new currency. He says, they may have been enjoying it, but that’s not why they were there.

“I was increasingly frustrated with other departments who failed to provide” the people who were supposed to come and replace them. He is almost certainly referring to Clare Short’s Department for International Development here.

But he says she was “very, very committed to ensuring that there was no humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq”.

12.23pm Mr Hoon admits: “We knew there was a problem [on the aftermath]”

So what steps did you take? Asks Baroness Prashar, who has taken over the questioning. Did you inform the PM.

“I don’t think the Prime Minister needed separately alerting by me,” he says. He accepts that British officials witnessing the American plans were shocked at the paucity of detail.

12.16pm “We were concerned that the planning for the aftermath was not as detailed as we would have liked,” Mr Hoon says. He took a list of things he would like them to consider to Washington in February 2003. It included the question of security, how would they deal with the immediate aftermath and how would they counter the Iraqi people’s reliance on the Oil for Food programme. “I know we spent a lot of time in planning for the prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe,” he says.

What response did the list get from the Pentagon?

“At the time a very positive one,” he says. “They welcomed the suggestions we were making but I accept that not all the items on the list [were accounted for].”

12.12pm Sir John asks whether the British military reviewed its missile targeting procedures – he says, yes. Mr Hoon says: “Initially I was very cautious” He says as the war went on he became more confident about the ability to accurately target parts of buildings – causing limited collateral damage.

12.07pm Mr Hoon says: “Our legal base was always predicated on the fact that we were disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.” Therefore, Mr Hoon says the military targets had to be Saddam and his regime rather than a conventional war against a country – hence Shock and Awe, Sir John surmises.

11.58am Mr Hoon says it was right and proper that the full legal advice was never given to the Cabinet - he says what would have been the point of having a debate over legal advice.

11.56am “You wouldn’t need lawyers if there weren’t arguments. . . he came to a view” and it was that view we were waiting for.

11.54am A year later Lord Goldsmith gave his verdict on the eve of the war. Mr Hoon says: “I was clear that his conclusion was that there was a legal justification for military action based on 1441 reviving 678 [a previous UN resolution].”

11.50am Sir John Chilcot asks him to explain that BBC interview: “I was trying quite hard not to answer any questions. . . I don’t remember giving any detail.” As I recall, he says, essentially I gave an example of self-defence being a reason to invade without a further UN resolution.

Mr Hoon says he thinks Lord Goldsmith was angry because he did not want to be boxed in - rather than because Mr Hoon had misspoken.

11.48am The inquiry published a letter this morning written to Mr Hoon by Lord Goldsmith about the legality of the Iraq war. In the memo, the apparently furious Attorney General says he has been placed “a difficult position”.

The de-classified letter says: “I think you should know that I see considerable difficulties in being satisfied that military action would be justified on the basis of self-defence.”

Lord Goldsmith criticised Mr Hoon for giving a television interview with Jonathan Dimbleby in March 2002 in which he appeared to say that Britain was entitled to take military action without a new UN resolution.

11.43am Mr Hoon says it was only after a trip to Turkey early in 2003 that he realised Ankara would not allow a northern attack over their border.

11.39am Sir Lawrence asks whether Mr Hoon was under pressure to advise No.10 to take the land invasion route (Option 3). “It wasn’t that I was under huge pressure form Downing St to offer Option 3 but it was my assumption that that’s what they wanted.”

11.37am He says that in another note - Mr Hoon wrote that although the land invasion operation would be expensive - it might save some money because the US demands for support in post-conflict Iraq may be less onerous and long-lasting. Sir Lawrence Freedman, a military historian, sums up - you’d rather do the cooking than the washing up.

11.34am Mr Hoon says he checked his notes during a ten-minute interval and says that he wrote to Sir David Manning, the PM’s foreign policy adviser, in October 2002 saying that the US was planning for war without Britain.

11.14am Asked if there were ministerial voices questioning the land element of the military support for America. He says, “I think it was regarded ultimately as a political decision for the Prime Minister.”

11.12am Mr Hoon says British troops were not on the front line. “It wasn’t as if we were the ones pushing on to Baghdad. . . we were relief in place.”

11.10am Mr Hoon says that even if Britain had not gone with Option 3 (see 10.31am) they would have been expected to provide peacekeeping troops afterwards.

He says one of the arguments for joining the land invasions was that: “It was better to be there at the beginning to establish ourselves” rather than arriving afterwards – possibly with even more troops.

“There was a sense, particularly among the Army, that they did not want to be left out but I wouldn’t have regarded that as a substantial argument.”

11.07am Sir Roderic asks Hoon to list some examples of Britain’s influence succeeded in changing US policy – which was supposed to be the trade-off for Britain giving so many troops.

Mr Hoon says: “I’m pretty confident that we persuaded them about the Northern option – going through Turkey.” – which did not happen because Ankara refused. He says that they also succeeded in persuading the US of “the requirement” for better aftermath planning.

Sir Roderic points out that it can hardly be said that Britain succeeded on the aftermath – which was a disaster. Mr Hoon replies: “I don’t think it turned out to be a disaster but it did not go as well as we’d wanted it to.”

11.02am Mr Hoon says that Donald Rumsfeld “did not sit around chatting” – he said his meetings with him were business-like not friendly.

11.00am Mr Hoon says that we were not committed to military action in Iraq in 2002. Sir John Chilcot says: “I think we’re in a difficulty here, Mr Hoon.”

He quotes Admiral Boyce, who told the inquiry that the US did not believe British officials when they said no decision had been made, Mr Hoon accepts that this may be true.

10.54am “We were a little disappointed after Crawford that we did not immediately receive a request” to take part in the military planning – a British team did not go to join in until July 2002.

“I was not convinced that it was possible to provide the land division required” in the time allowed.

He says Mr Hoon thinks the full division option was discounted by the autumn of 2002 “simply because we had not taken the decisions in the time scale required”.

10.50am He says he thinks the “tenor” of the notes described by Mr Campbell were consistent with British policy at the time. Re-cap: Mr Campbell told the inquiry: “the Prime Minister wrote quite a lot of notes to the President. . . I would say the tenor of them was that... we share the analysis, we share the concern, we are going to be with you in making sure that Saddam Hussein is faced up to his obligations and that Iraq is disarmed.

“If that cannot be done diplomatically and it is to be done militarily, Britain will be there. That would be the tenor of the communication to the President.”

10.49am We are on to the letters between the PM and Mr Bush.

Mr Hoon says: “I saw the exchanges that you had with Alastair Campbell, I think there were probably two sorts of letters . . . what you may call a round-robin – that I certainly would have seen and was used to seeing . . . my impression from your exchanges was that there were probably more private notes that I did not see.”

The former Defence Minister says he would not be surprised to learn that there were notes he did not see. He is asked, though, if he would have expect to be shown any notes committing British troops. “I would have been and that’s why I don’t believe he was every committing us to anything unconditionally.”

10.41am On to the threat assessment of Saddam Hussein in 2001.

“There was no doubt that his agents were trying to acquire fissile material,” he says.

Did the policy of containment (restricting weapons) have any positive effect? “There were areas in which he was able to get around the rules – but, but for that policy he could have done more and been more dangerous.”

On the overall threat: “He was a potential threat and that’s what, I think, changed - especially in the United States.” Instead of being worried about a threat today – post 9/11 the US “were not prepared to tolerate” a potential threat.

But he accepts: “His nuclear programme had been frozen.”

10.34am A few months after Crawford, Mr Hoon says military action in Iraq was becoming very likely. “I think it was getting pretty real by then,” he says. “We had no doubt at that stage in the summer [of ‘02] that they meant business.”

10.31amThe paper that the PM took to Crawford was a Cabinet Office paper not an MoD paper – so it did not come through Mr Hoon. He says there had been some level of military planning for Iraq already.

He thinks there were three options:

Option 1 Access to bases eg Diego Garcia

Option 2 Maritime and air package

Option 3 Full armoured division “was something that I probably thought at that stage was quite a big ask ghiven our military commitments in Afghanistan at that time.”

“I think it goes without saying . . . that if you are involved to a considerable extent then your voice would be louder.”

Mr Hoon says there’s no doubt that knowing a bigger military presence would give us more weight – was a factor in the planning.

10.24am Mr Hoon says he is “confident” that the PM asked at Crawford for access to military planning beyond Afghanistan. It did not happen.

“There was a sense that we wanted to know what was happening,” he says, perhaps so that we could influence it, or play a part in what was at the time a political process.

10.22am Before the famous meeting between Tony Blair and George Bush at the President’s Texan ranch, Mr Hoon says his main concern was to get a clearer understanding of what he meant in his “axis of evil” speech.

“I wrote a note to the PM at the time saying that Iraq was of concern but. . .” the greatest long-term threat came from Iran. “I don’t think that was a remarkable thing to say.”

10.19am Mr Hoon says that sanctions and no-fly zones were not working “politically they were failing” because we were seen to be attacking Iraq - and the view on the Arab street was that we were starving people.

10.14am Unlike some of the previous witnesses, Mr Hoon says he cannot recall any discussion at all of Iraq before September 11

10.11am The opening exchanges concern Mr Hoon’s relationship with the Ministry of Defence - he says it was good and praises the impressive department.

10.01am Today we have the first member former member of the Government giving evidence about the war in Iraq. Geoff Hoon was the Defence Secretary from 1999 to 2005.

During the course of the war he was implicated in fatal equipment shortages, the controversial September dossier, the death of Dr David Kelly, and the abuse of Iraqi prisoners among others.

We have two full sessions of questions and we are going to need them.