5.47pm We had some compelling evidence from Jack Straw today - he did not directly criticise Tony Blair but he made it perfectly clear that the two men had not agreed in the build up to the war in Iraq.
- He hinted that he had thought about coming out against the invasion and resigning from the Government (although when asked directly, he denied it).
- Questioned about the letters between Mr Blair and Mr Bush, the former Foreign Secretary became agitated. He tried to avoid discussing them but said he would not have written the notes in the same way. “Would I have written the memo in the same way? Probably not.”
- Mr Straw made it clear that he had told Mr Blair throughout 2002 that it would have been illegal to invade Iraq for the purpose of regime change. Asked it the Prime Minister agreed he said: “It is no great surprise to know that people at senior levels in government hold different views and debate those. What I had to offer the Prime Minister was my best judgment and my loyalty.”
- On the “45-minute claim” he said: “Plainly that reference should have been much more precise. . .That was an error and it is an error that has haunted us ever since.”
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5.26pm And that’s it - Jack Straw will be back in a couple of weeks. I will do a round-up of the afternoon’s progress in a minute.
5.18pm Sir Roderic asks whether Mr Straw went to the French and checked if Mr Chirac’s remark about vetoing any second resolution was an off-the-cuff quote in an interview or a definite policy. Mr Straw says he cannot remember – but he has good French, watched the television appearance himself and was confident about his interpretation that this was a final nail in the coffin of a resolution.
5.15pm Mr Straw says the minutes he wrote to the PM were not circulated to the Cabinet – he says they had to be held pretty close because of their nature.
We’re your views known to your colleagues?
Mr Straw says: “I think they were known to Geoff Hoon and they would be known to other senior ministers – I can’t say for certain – but I may have discussed them with Mr Brown”
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5.13pm Mr Straw agrees with Sir Lawrence that had suggested to Mr Blair that Britain pulled out of the planned invasion.
5.11pm Sir Lawrence asks if there was any point when Mr Straw considered resigning – and deciding he was in an impossible position?
“I never got to that point,” he says. “Did I ever think I’m going to resign over this? No, I didn’t.”
5.03pm Mr Straw says he was acutely aware of the strength of the opposition to the war. “Certainly I was very concerned about the anger of a great proportion of the British public including some good friends of mine.”
The former Foreign Secretary continues to insist that even as late as mid-February 2003 he was still desperately working on a second resolution - and had not accepted that the hope of a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis was dead.
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Let us remind ourselves at this point that the Treasury had begun paying for a war effort a full four months earlier.
5.01pm Sir Lawrence says Sir David Manning, the PM’s foreign policy advisor, and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British envoy to the UN, both agreed that more time to negotiate a second resolution would have been extremely useful. But Mr Straw insists that Jacques Chirac, the French President, had been very clear that France would never support it.
4.54pm Mr Straw says no one would have been happier than him to hear Dr Blix say that Saddam was in compliance with weapons inspections - he says there would not have been “a dog’s chance” of getting approval for the war through Parliament.
4.51pm Mr Straw says he was “astonished” by Dr Blix’s behaviour at the time.
Sir Lawrence suggests that the reason Mr Straw was so “irritated” by Dr Blix was because the British policy at the time was totally reliant on what he said.
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Sir Lawrence says that by February 15, once Mohammad ElBaradei had given Saddam a clean bill of health, Dr Blix was backing away and the British public had shown their displeasure with a huge march, the British policy was in major trouble.
4.45pm Mr Straw shows his frustration with the way Dr Hans Blix, the weapons inspector, has recorded his role in Iraq. He says: there are some who have given their accounts of the period as they remembered it without a gloss – there are others who have given accounts with gloss.
“I think the jury’s out on which camp Mr Blix is in,” he says, which, of course, means he thinks it is not.
4.41pm What’s driving our approach on second resolution negotiations?
Mr Straw says he could not understand why France and Germany were so reluctant to follow the peaceful path of a second resolution.
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“Had the second resolution passed military action would have been pushed to the right for a period,” he says. He keeps using that phrase - he means delayed.
4.38pm Was a deadline created by military planning? “The original dates were somewhat earlier than that,” Mr Straw says. He says Britain was trying to push the dates back as far as practical.
4.35pm Mr Straw says the moment he knew the second resolution was dead was the moment he saw President Chirac on TV threatening a veto.
He also accuses President Fox, of Mexico, of feigning acute injury to avoid speaking to Britain and America
4.33pm Sir Lawrence says: you told us before that 1441 was designed so that there would be no need for a second resolution – so why did you go for one?
Mr Straw says:
1. “It unquestionably would have made the handling of the issue easier – and the building of an international coalition”
2. If we set out achievable conditions explicitly backed by the threat of military action – he thought they would get compliance from Saddam
4.20pm Mr Straw says: “I was concerned that we might not be getting as much intelligence as we ought to be [on Iraq]”. But he says whenever he asked why - was given a reasonable answer ie gathering SIGINT (intercepted communications) was difficult in a hostile environment.
4.16pm “There was no war party on the Security Council,” Mr Straw says. Partly inaudible: “Well maybe on the part of the United States.”
“I certainly did not want war.”
4.14pm Asked about what kind of “smoking gun” was necessary to illicit military action – Mr Straw challenges the phrase and one that he would not use. Sir Lawrence catches him out saying that he did use the term in correspondence with Colin Powell.
Mr Straw says that there was no precise definition of what the weapons inspectors were looking for.
“First of all, the inspectors did find things, particularly if you look at the issue of missiles,” Mr Straw says. “The Iraqi’s were found to not be telling the truth.” (Because missile beyond agreed range limits were present).
4.05pm Sir Lawrence Freedman reminds Mr Straw of a quote he gave as he sought a second UN resolution, it was supposed to be anonymous: “I’ll give a nod on 60 to 40 against war.” Just as well, Sir Lawrence points out that “people didn’t put their life savings on you.”
Mr Straw says he was confident at the time that the weapons inspectors would help lead to a satisfactory result - and no invasion of Iraq.
3.52pm Mr Straw concedes that the “45-minute claim” was not written sufficiently clearly. “That was an error,” he says.
3.48pm On the September dossier – which claimed the notorious “45-minute claim” - Mr Straw says: “That document was never designed as a case for war” – it was designed to make the case that we must take this seriously.
3.45pm Mr Straw is asked to describe his view on evidence that WMD were present in Iraq: “If you say I used the word “thin” I’ll take your word for it,” he says. “But the case for taking Iraq seriously was in no sense based on intelligence alone.”
3.43pm He agrees with Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s chief of staff, who told the inquiry that the “assumption” that Saddam had WMD was not based mainly on intelligence.
3.41pm Mr Straw agrees that the immediate threat from Saddam was not the only reason to act. “When we were talking about a threat, we were talking about a threat in the future,” he says.
3.37pm Sir Lawrence Freedman will now address the attempt to secure the UN Security Council resolutions. To start with, he asks do you think there would have been no British involvement in the war without resolution 1441?
“Yes, Sir Lawrence,” Mr Straw says. “I think the PM understood that and he made it clear to President Bush.”
3.26pm During the brief interval I have found the 25-page memo submitted by Mr Straw. Let me know when you’ve all finished reading it. In the document, Mr Straw appears to hint that he thought about resigning over the war, claiming that this action would have prevented the invasion. “The moral as well as the political dilemma were profoundly difficult,” he wrote. “I was also fully aware that my support for military action was critical.
“If I had refused that, the UK’s participation in the military action would not in practice have been possible. There almost certainly would have been no majority in either the Cabinet of Commons.”
3.12pm On to the very close relationship between Mr Straw and Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State. Mr Straw says that Mr Powell agreed with many of Britain’s pre-conditions.
Sir Roderic asks about a secret meeting Mr Straw had with Mr Powell on Long Island – he says he does not want to breach confidences but says he thinks it’s a matter of public record that the two men were of a similar mind. Was Mr Straw worried after that meeting?
“Worried to a degree – but my job was to try and assist the immediate British foreign objective” – to persuade the US to take the UN route.
The fact that President Bush had been declared President had been decided, Mr Straw says. He said that Britain and Mr Powell had to restrain the US neo-cons who wanted to take “impetuous military action”. He says, the Bush Administration was successfully convinced that it must pursue disarmament – not merely regime change. “That was quite a significant achievement,” he says.
3.03pm Mr Straw appears to be listing the pre-conditions to be met by Washington for Britain to assist in the invasion of Iraq. Not sure we’ve directly had someone say what was on this list of pre-conditions before: “We go through the list,” Mr Straw says. “I mean obvious pre-condition: does it have a legal base, yes – UN approval, yes – war last resort, yes – Middle East peace process, yes.”
3.00pm Sir Roderic winning hands down – he even has the best jokes. Sir John Chicot suffers a coughing fit – and Sir Roderic promises “we’ll resuscitate the chairman over tea in a minute”. Even Mr Straw looks relaxed for a moment.
2.58pm Sir Roderic asked was he happy with the letter twice – Mr Straw does not answer directly.
2.57pm Did you see the key one from of July 2002 – delivered by Sir David Manning? Were you entirely comfortable with its contents?
“It would be much easier if these were private sessions. . .” he says, stuttering.
“Mainly - would I have written the memorandum in the same way? Probably not because I’m a different person, but what we are talking about is a personal relationship” that was very important for the country.
2.53pm The letters between President Bush and Mr Blair are now on the agenda – “You saw them I understand,” Sir Roderic says. – did you see them after they were written or in draft and did you see them all.
“I saw of them after they were written, I saw some of them in draft. . . it depended on the circumstances.”
“Did I see all of them – I think so – but I’m afraid its up to your archivist to say if I saw all of them . . . but I certainly saw the key ones.”
2.50pm Sir Roderic is really going toe-to-toe with Jack Straw now. Mr Straw tries says that the only alternative to invasion was to allow “containment to wither and die”.
“No,” says Sir Roderic – you could have strengthened and intensified containment and sanctions as supported by many other nations and embodied in Security Council Resolution 1441. Mr Straw looks momentarily chastened.
2.47pm Squirm time for Sir Lawrence Freedman now, we are talking about a vital speech given by Mr Blair setting out British policy on rogue states. It emerged this week that Sir Lawrence, one of the Iraq Inquiry panellists, had actually written the crucial sections on Saddam Hussein.
Mr Straw concurs that this speech was strengthening British policy – making intervention more likely. “On the Chicago speech, a really important speech”, Mr Straw says. The PM “was trying to alert the world that we had been too tolerant”.
2.42pm Sir Roderic refers to Mr Blair’s recent interview with Fern Brittan, where he was asked if would have still acted differently if he knew there were no WMD and he replied that he would have done so but using different arguments.
ie in direct contravention to what Mr Straw says was the correct legal advice.
Mr Straw says: “It’s no great surprise to know that people at senior levels hold strong views and debate those.” He says he tried to combine frank advice and loyalty.
2.36pm That’s all very well but hadn’t the PM already pre-empted you in private correspondence and via instructions in Washington from Sir David Manning? Sir Roderic asks. “I wouldn’t use the word pre-empted,” Mr Straw says. “There was a debate going on.”
2.35pm Mr Straw makes it clear that he discussed the illegality of war with the PM prior to the meeting at Crawford. At that he told the PM that he did not advocate regime change.
He says: “The route that I recommended was not one of regime change . . . I don’t want to use the word agonising. . . but you have to think very hard about what you are doing.”
“The problem of putting up with containment was that it wasn’t going anywhere.
This is in line with his note leaked in the Sunday Times this week.
2.30pm In the build up to Crawford, were there a range of options debated? “Yes there was a debate – and crucial that there was a debate and my mind wasn’t made up at the time.”
2.28pm Sir Roderic is pushing this line about what the local ambassadors were telling him about what would happen post-conflict. This time he says within Iraq – were they worried?
“We were all worried if I may say so,” Mr Straw replies.
Sir Roderic seems to be hinting that Mr Straw was warned about the devastating conflagration of al-Qaeda, Iran etc “Is it fair to say that we did fail to anticipate it,” he asks.
“What we anticipated were different problems, first of all we thought there would be a prolonged military phase,” he says. “The best way I can summarise this is there was a briefing that there would be a relatively short period where we would be welcomed . . . but the groups that were welcoming us would soon say thank you very much and show us the door.”
2.23pm Of course we were aware that if we got this wrong Britain’s standing in the world would be affected
2.21pm Sir Roderic wants to know what Britain’s Middle East ambassadors thought about the fallout from a potential war in Iraq. Mr Straw says the fear in many countries was that it would lead to disorder on the streets, although, he points out that never happened
2.16pm He explains that the US approach to failed and failing states was changed by 9/11. For example over Afghanistan – Mr Straw says we knew how bad it was before then, but we had come to accept that we must “hold our nose”. Until the Bush Administration changed their approach to become more interventionist.
2.13pm “It’s a truism, but 9/11 did change everything” – he says that in Europe we still do not understand the scale of the impact – after all, the US had not faced such a loss of life on their own soil since the Civil War.
2.10pm He says sanctions can have a perverse effect – by strengthening autocratic regimes and assisting corruption
2.08pm Mr Straw starts at the begining of his time as Foreign Secretary from early 2001. He says: “Before 9/11 we were essentially trying to contain a drifting policy which was containment [of Saddam].”
2.06pm Sir Roderic Lyne is starting the questioning - he says that the detailed memorandum means we will not have to go over all the detail covered in previous days
2.01pm Ahead of his evidence, Mr Straw has released a 25-page memo hinting that he considered resigning. “The moral as well as the political dilemma were profoundly difficult, he wrote. “I was also fully aware that my support for military action was critical.
2.00pm We are just hearing that today Jack Straw will only be talking about intelligence and invasion. He will come back at a later date to discuss the legality of the war.
1.55pm Chaos has broken out at the Iraq Inquiry - no revelations to report I’m afraid but: the QVC shopping channel is holding a beauty event on the ground floor which has attracted hundreds of women.