Is it time to pull out of Afghanistan?

It seemed a terrible irony that the symbol of the fallen - a poppy - should be partly what is fuelling and funding this deadly war.

As Big Ben struck 12 o'clock, I watched a young woman kneel and weep. "She lost her boyfriend in Sangin," said her friend standing nearby. "Isn't that enough now?"

Also watching was Maureen Ryle, who had come down from Yorkshire with her husband Derek. "It's horrendous, all these young boys. It's time we brought them home," she said.

In a week where one of the policemen being trained by British soldiers to protect his own country turned on his mentors and shot dead five in cold blood, an increasing number of people are asking what we are doing in Afghanistan and whether it is worth it.

Public opposition to the war has risen sharply: in a ComRes survey for the BBC published today, 64% said the war was "unwinnable" and 63% thought British troops should be withdrawn "as soon as possible". In a YouGov poll last week for Channel 4, 35% of people thought all UK troops should be withdrawn immediately, up from 25% two weeks ago.

On radio phone-in and news programmes, discussion has been of little else. "There is a real chance we will lose this struggle in the bars and front rooms of Britain," warned Lord Ashdown, the former leader of the Liberal Democrats.

Among those now calling for a "fundamental rethink" is Kim Howells, chairman of the parliamentary intelligence and security committee and a former Foreign Office minister.

Howells last week wrote an article questioning whether spending £2.6 billion a year keeping troops in Afghanistan was the best way to protect national security. He called for a phased withdrawal and more focus on domestic spying.

Nobody doubts the courage and skill of the armed forces, or seeks to betray the memory of the fallen by walking away. But is it right to keep sending more? Or is it time we changed strategy or even pulled out?

EVEN those who strongly believe President Barack Obama was right to describe Afghanistan as "a war of necessity" have been sorely tested by the events of recent weeks.

First there was the fiasco of the August elections in which 1m votes for President Hamid Karzai turned out to be fraudulent - one in three of those cast. Ten weeks of stalemate were brought to an end a week ago by his opponent Abdullah Abdullah, who withdrew from a planned run-off election. He argued that with the same corrupt officials in place, another vote would be pointless.

While Karzai probably would have won anyway, that did not take away the shame of seeing world leaders sending Karzai messages of congratulation for being re-elected.

Amid the disarray, the Taliban sent gunmen storming into a United Nations guesthouse in Kabul, killing five UN workers and three Afghans, and showing they can attack in the capital despite its foreign troops. The attack sent chills through the international community and has forced the UN to withdraw half of its staff while security is stepped up.

Although much of Kabul is already cut off by concrete blocks and checkpoints, plans are under consideration for a Baghdad-style green zone.

So there were many doubts in the air when a young Afghan officer walked into a police

compound in Helmand last Tuesday afternoon carrying a machinegun. The 25-year-old, an unmarried man called

Gulbuddin, was part of a 15-strong team that manned a police station in the Nad Ali district, in the heart of Helmand's poppy-farming lands.

Embedded with the Afghan police were two trainers from the Royal Military Police and a protection force of 14 soldiers from Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, the Grenadier Guards.

The Taliban subsequently claimed Gulbuddin as one of theirs. Senior sources say local intelligence shows the claim is false, however. In addition, witnesses contacted by The Sunday Times say other factors lay behind the massacre.

According to two Afghans who knew him, Gulbuddin had complained of being brutally beaten, sodomised and sexually abused by a senior Afghan officer. A policeman named Ajmal, a friend of the gunman, said Gulbuddin had been constantly tortured. "He was being used for sexual purposes," said Ajmal.

Another policeman, Kharullah, who was injured in the shooting, said: "Gulbuddin was beaten many times and that's why he got angry. One day when he was patrolling with British soldiers, he swore he was going to kill him."

When Gulbuddin opened fire with a machinegun, his

target was his alleged abuser. According to the Afghan

sources, the five British soldiers were killed simply because they were present and considered to be the man's protectors.

Even if that is the case, the shooting casts doubt on British efforts to build an Afghan police force free from corruption and abuse.

In sexually repressed Pashtun society, it is common for those in dominant positions to take young men as sexual partners - known as bacha bazi - even though the penalty for anyone caught engaging in a homosexual act is brutal.

Jason Clarke, the padre of the Grenadier Guards, tried to play down the impact on trust between UK and Afghan forces. "They \ saw this as the work of a bad apple," he said. "They don't view it as representative of anything.

"These soldiers live alongside the Afghan policemen and soldiers and they know how much courage it takes to take on those jobs. They are brothers in arms and you can't judge the actions of entire groups by one or two persons."

The impact on public opinion in Britain, however, was dangerous. As news of the massacre spread, one person after another called radio phone-in programmes to ask what we were doing in Afghanistan.

Despite defending the war, Ashdown spoke for many when he said: "We have a government that has completely failed to make a cogent case for this war or convince us that it has a strategy worthy of the

sacrifices being made."

That case has not been helped by what one Downing Street aide described as "dilly-dallying across the Atlantic" where Obama has now spent 10 weeks considering whether to send more troops, as requested by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan.

IN the face of a collapse in

public support, Gordon Brown shoehorned into his agenda a speech setting out his reasons for the war. He decided that a conference already scheduled for Friday at the Royal College of Defence Studies was the

ideal stage.

The prime minister's biggest challenge is convincing a sceptical public that fighting in Afghanistan really makes Britain a safer place and that it is worth sacrificing lives and spending billions of pounds to support a corrupt government.

Is Afghanistan really a security threat to Britain? The war began as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the

US by Al-Qaeda, which had training bases in southern Afghanistan.

Brown said: "We know that Al-Qaeda continue to train and plot attacks on Britain from the region. We cannot, must not and will not walk away."

Many argue that all that

has been achieved in the past eight years is to push Al-Qaeda across the border into Pakistan. Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban have never carried out attacks outside Afghanistan and insist on their website that their only interest is re-establishing an Islamic emirate of Afghanistan.

If Pakistan is where the real threat lies, why are we in Afghanistan? Brown tried to get round this by arguing "the biggest domestic threat is from the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan" and that this should be "our first line of defence".

If we leave Afghanistan as "ungoverned space", the reasoning goes, Al-Qaeda would move back and Pakistan would be further destabilised. At the same time Ashdown claimed "failure or withdrawal would mean the certain fall of Pakistan".

There is no hard evidence for either statement. In areas where the Taliban now wield influence, Al-Qaeda has shown no inclination to return.

Second, many in Pakistan would argue that the reason for destabilisation of their country, which has suffered repeated

suicide bombings, is the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. Were they to leave, the country would be

safer, they say.

Even if Brown is right about the security threat, can we succeed in Afghanistan? Although the prime minister is probably correct to say the majority of Afghans do not want the Taliban back, international efforts to defeat the insurgency cannot succeed without a legitimate government that delivers to local people.

Most Afghans are on the fence, with the Taliban intimidating them on one side, and corrupt officials and police demanding bribes on the other. In southern Afghanistan there are many cases where locals have called on the Taliban to come back because the police have been raping their young boys or have failed to deal with highway robbers.

Brown said he had spoken with Karzai three times last week and set him five tests for dealing with corruption and maladministration. If the Afghan president did not fulfil these, warned Brown, he would "forfeit his right to international support".

He did not specify what this meant. After years of allowing Karzai to do as he wished in the name of "respecting Afghan sovereignty", getting tough now will not be easy.

The first test will be what Karzai does about his half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, widely alleged to be one of the biggest opium dealers in southern Afghanistan. This has been denied by the Afghan government.

President Karzai has ignored repeated suggestions that he send his brother abroad as an ambassador, and the situation has been clouded by revelations that Ahmed Wali Karzai is on the CIA's payroll.

As the terrible events of last week show, creating a reliable police force is another huge obstacle. Nato officials estimate that 90% of Afghan police officers are illiterate and a third are drug addicts. Paid just $100 a month for dangerous work - more than 1,000 officers have been killed in the past year - the threat of corruption is high. The rush to expand the force has meant training is minimal and background checks consist merely of two other policemen vouching for them.

More troops may not be the answer. Coalition numbers are doubling to 100,000 by the end of the year but, at the same time, the Taliban have spread from their traditional areas in the south and east to the north and west. Might it be time to face the possibility that the presence of foreign troops is

acting as a recruiting tool?

Recently the most senior US official in the southern province of Uruzgan quit, saying he believed the war fuelled the insurgency.

Matthew Hoh, a former marine captain who had served in Iraq, wrote in his resignation letter: "I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States's presence in Afghanistan.

"I fail to see the value or the worth in continued US casualties or expenditure of resources in support of the Afghan government in what is truly a 35-year-old civil war."

He went on: "Like the Soviets we continue to secure and

bolster a failing state."

In another parallel with the Russians in the 1980s, coalition commanders are now talking of retrenching to cities.

McChrystal has written of focusing on "population centres", pulling troops back from remote valleys and districts to concentrate on bolstering security in cities such as Kandahar and Lashkar Gah. The hope is that development projects in such areas would benefit from the presence of foreign troops. Afghan security forces will be used for outer rings of security.

"If we do send more troops, it will be for thickening not expanding," said one British official.

Despite the assertion of General Sir David Richards, the army chief, that Britain will be in Afghanistan for 40 years, Ministry of Defence officials insist he was referring simply to "some kind of presence", not troops. Officials say they are working on a timescale of three to five years.

The real hope is some kind of political settlement. Whether public support will last long enough to achieve one is far from certain.

Speaking on the eve of Remembrance Sunday, Richards conceded the gravity of the moment. "The Taliban are saying the elephant is down, all we need to do is kill it," he said. "This is one big psychological operation. If we don't do more now, show strong leadership and commitment, then we risk losing it."

The strategic options

Continue the current course

Pros: The presence of coalition troops keeps the Taliban out of official power and prevents the Afghan government from collapsing. Al-Qaeda has been forced out of the southern region, where it had built bases, and over the border into Pakistan.

Cons: The influence of the Taliban in the villages where ordinary Afghans live has grown unchecked. It was thought the Taliban's authority would drift away, but just 30% of the country is under government control. Continuing British casualties are undermining public support for the war: 93 servicemen have been killed in Afghanistan this year, making 2009 the worst year for British forces since the Falklands war of 1982. Costs are escalating, too: the war in Afghanistan cost Britain £2.6 billion last year, up from £1.5 billion the year before.

Send in more troops

Pros: General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, wants at least 40,000 more troops. It would be a powerful signal of the coalition's determination to win. A "surge" could help make more districts secure under a policy of "clear, hold and build", in which western soldiers clear an area of insurgents to stabilise it before passing control to their Afghan counterparts.

Cons: More troops mean more casualties and higher costs. Success depends on the Afghan government being strong enough to stop the Taliban reclaiming an area once western armed forces have left. It is not clear that the likely number of extra soldiers would lead to a significant improvement in the long term. It could increase the anger of Afghans who oppose the presence of troops.

Reduce troop numbers, concentrate on towns

Pros: Rather than spreading itself too thin, the coalition could focus on creating a functioning Afghan state in cities and the more stable areas of the centre and north of the country. Once this state is established, it could spread its influence to the rest of Afghanistan. Such an approach ought to mean better security in zones of coalition control and reduced troop casualties. It would provide clearer, more achievable targets, given the forces available.

Cons: The Taliban would expand their influence in rural areas. A country with such low income levels is unlikely to withstand corruption. Continuing control by local warlords and drug barons would make spreading central control and stability extremely difficult. This approach might do little to solve long-standing divisions between different ethnic groups in the north and south.

Pull out altogether

Pros: It could be argued that removing the western soldiers would remove the problem. There would be no more suicide bombs, no more civilian deaths - and no anger for the Taliban to exploit in the name of Afghan nationalism. It would save British lives and money.

Cons: It is unlikely the Afghan government would survive without the support of coalition forces. If the government falls, it could lead to civil war between rival Afghan elements in the north and south, and a Taliban takeover. Withdrawal by the coalition would probably boost the hopes of radical groups, particularly in Pakistan. It could lead to more terror attacks around the world. In the worst case, extremist groups might threaten the Pakistani government, causing regional instability and putting control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in jeopardy.

Keep going, get out fast, send in more troops: what politicians, generals and others think we should do now in Afghanistan

Gordon Brown

"When the main terrorist threat facing Britain emanates from Afghanistan and Pakistan . . . our mission must not fail. I have made clear to President Obama that the UK will play its full part."

Kim Howells, chairman of parliamentary intelligence and security committee and former Foreign Office minister

"It would be better to bring home the great majority of our fighting men and women and concentrate on using the money saved to secure our own borders. Sooner rather than later, a properly planned, phased withdrawal of our forces from Helmand province has to be announced."

Lord Ashdown, former Liberal Democrat leader and former UN high representative for Bosnia

"Failure or withdrawal [in Afghanistan] would mean the certain fall of Pakistan. Pakistan could, of course, fall of its own accord. Would this certainly result in jihadi hands on a nuclear bomb? Maybe not. But do we want to take that risk? Afghanistan must become the nation's No 1 priority or the people will withdraw support."

General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of UN forces in Bosnia

"Our strategy, clearly, is not working as it stands. We need to revisit that strategy . . . talking to the Pashtu people, the hereditary rulers of that country for centuries. We alienated them going in with the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks and Tajiks who never ruled the country.

"I am not against withdrawal and I am not against giving a date for withdrawal, but I think it has got to be realistic. It will then focus everybody's minds and powder."

Lord Powell, former adviser on defence and foreign affairs to Margaret Thatcher

"We need a clear timetable beyond which we will not continue. If we can't achieve what we need in three years, we shouldn't be doing it at all."

Major-General Julian Thompson, visiting professor of war studies at King's College London and a former commander in the Falklands war

"I don't think we can cut and run. My worry about washing our hands of it and saying, 'We have had enough of your lot', is that it would make the Pakistan problem worse.

"They would then find that their insurgents would have a country to which they could flee - Afghanistan. We would be in an even worse situation than we are at the moment.

"It would help hugely if the Americans made their minds up about putting more troops in."

Peter Kilfoyle, Labour MP and former defence minister

"It is time to say enough is enough and bring our troops home. How many more years do we have to put up with this attrition on the army and the lives of our soldiers by making them continue with this impossible task?"

Ian Kearns, senior fellow, Royal United Services Institute

"The threat to the UK from Al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is real and we must continue to do what is necessary to contain it.

A change of strategy might mean reducing troop numbers and relying more on special forces and air power to attack terrorist camps and training bases."

Charles Kupchan, professor of international affairs, Georgetown University, Washington DC

"President Obama should decisively scale back the mission in Afghanistan. He should do so by focusing coalition operations on consolidating control in strategically important locations as well as more stable areas in the centre and north of the country . . . with the aim of establishing the robust institutions and markets essential to a functioning state."

James Arbuthnot, Conservative MP and chairman of the Commons defence committee

"There is a question as to whether our presence stabilises or destabilises. We are not giving the British public the message our troops are engaged in a winnable conflict. That is what political leaders must do. The government has got to do a great deal more."

Geoff Hoon, Labour MP and former defence secretary

"We have no choice but to hold our nerve. What is the alternative? Abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban and Pakistan? Give them back their training bases? I just don't think it stands up."

Liam Fox, shadow defence secretary

"We have got to stop sending out mixed messages. Gordon Brown said this week that Afghanistan is a national security issue. At the same time, he said he would not put British troops at risk to defend a corrupt Afghan government. That just doesn't stack up - either it is a national security issue, or it isn't.

"Our aim should be to get Afghan forces maintaining their own security within four to five years. International commitment to reconstruction and so on should continue for much longer than that."

Tobias Ellwood, Tory MP and former officer in the Royal Green Jackets

"There is no economic plan for Helmand: £2.5 billion is the amount spent each year by the British government on the military campaign. The Department for International Development budget for Afghanistan is £25m.

"As long as there is this discord between the two figures, we cannot win hearts and minds. But no, it's not time to pull out."

Baroness Neville-Jones, shadow security minister

"If you pull out your troops, you will increase the threat to the UK. If we were not in Afghanistan, what you would clearly see is [extremists] moving back into that vacuum . . . and the threat and the activities they would be able to perpetrate would undoubtedly grow again.

"The boost given to terrorism worldwide would be huge. We would probably see a very big effect in Pakistan, and that would be extremely serious for stability in south Asia."

Reg Keys, father of Lance-Corporal Tom Keys, a military policeman who was killed by a mob in Iraq

"It's time for a very, very quick exit strategy."