MILITARY
General Sir Nicholas Houghton (current chief of the defence staff ) May be criticised over Britain’s decision to withdraw from southern Iraq despite a growing insurgency. Also in charge in 2008 when the Iraqi military requested US rather than British assistance to retake Iraq’s second city of Basra.
General Lord Walker (head of the army from 2000 to 2003 and then chief of the defence staff until April 2006) Assured ministers in 2005 that the decision to provide troops to Afghanistan would not affect British capabilities in Iraq, a claim questioned by other commanders. Admitted that post-invasion planning was not central to his “winning concept” and with hindsight “would have worried more about the aftermath”.
General Lord Dannatt (commander in chief, land, from 2005 to 2006 and then head of the army from August 2006 to August 2009) Raised concerns about the stretched troops but the inquiry may criticise him for failing to do more to secure new equipment including vehicles for British troops in Iraq.
General Sir Mike Jackson (head of the army from 2003 until 2006) May be criticised for not doing more to appraise ministers of the risks of going into both Afghanistan and Iraq or the effect on the troops’ morale.
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POLITICS
Tony Blair (prime minister)Accused of exaggerating the capacity of Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and agreeing to back an invasion of Iraq in 2002. Accused of misleading parliament as to the nature of legal advice from the attorney-general that the war was illegal.
Jack Straw (foreign secretary) Said he had agonised over the morality of backing the war and had offered Mr Blair a last-minute way out by drafting a plan that would have seen Britain support the US-led invasion but not send troops.
Alastair Campbell (Downing Street director of communications) Mr Campbell’s claim at the Chilcot inquiry that the September 2002 dossier about WMD was not a “case for war” was challenged by Major General Michael Laurie, head of intelligence gathering at the MoD, who said “those involved in the [dossier’s] production saw it exactly as that”.
Geoff Hoon (defence secretary) May be criticised over equipment flaws for British forces in Iraq. Lord Boyce, the former chief of the defence staff, said that Mr Hoon prevented him from addressing the issue in the run-up to the war “because of the concern of it becoming public knowledge that we were planning for a military contribution”.
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MANDARINS
Sir John Sawers (Mr Blair’s foreign policy adviser) Admitted that Mr Blair might never have gone ahead with the war if the post-conflict chaos had been foreseen: “Frankly, had we known the scale of the violence, it might well have led to second thoughts. It was not thought through.”
Sir John Scarlett (head of joint intelligence committee) Alleged to
have allowed Alastair Campbell to pressure him into “sexing up” claims about WMD. A secret memo showed how Sir John referred to “the benefit of obscuring the fact that in terms of WMD Iraq is not that exceptional”.
Sir Richard Dearlove (head of MI6) Could be challenged over MI6’s failure to prevent uncertain intelligence information about WMD being used to suggest that Iraq posed an immediate threat.
Jonathan Powell, (Downing Street chief of staff) Told the Chilcot inquiry that the WMD dossier should never have been published. “Iraq didn’t have weapons of mass destruction,” he said. “We were wrong. The intelligence was wrong.”