For the first time since Kim Jong-un embarked on his reckless sprint for a nuclear bomb, China and Russia have joined with the West in an attempt to thwart the North Korean leader. Sanctions unanimously agreed at the United Nations last weekend are a mark of a new seriousness about the threat he poses to global security.
If North Korea can be brought to the negotiating table, if it freezes and then scales back its ambitions, if it can be prevented from cheating, if a nuclear exchange can be averted, then the blunt instrument of a trade embargo will have served its purpose. President Trump tweeted after the 15:0 Security Council vote that the measures would have a “Very big financial impact!”. On paper at least he is right; they hit at the very heart of North Korea’s shrivelled economy. From next month the freight trains full of coal, iron and lead ore rolling into China will be stopped. So will the sale of other minerals and seafood. Joint ventures will be banned. North Korean workers will no longer be contracted out to China and Russia. The US calculation is that the regime will lose one third of its annual $3 billion exports.
Much will depend on China implementing this action against what is effectively its client state. It has been reluctant for a long time to sign up for wide-ranging sanctions for fear that the economic collapse of North Korea would bring a chaotic end to the regime, propel a flood of refugees to its borders and be the first step towards a united Korea under American tutelage. This ran counter to its long-term strategic goal, which was to lever the US out of Asia.
As Kim launched his second intercontinental ballistic missile test last month, it became plain to Beijing that there was another reason to be nervous: a possibility that the White House could order a pre-emptive attack on North Korea’s nuclear command centre rather than wait for Kim to develop and deploy his weapons. Such a strike, even if it left Kim’s regime intact, would be equally damaging for Beijing and would fundamentally destabilise Asia.
China has therefore opted to support sanctions. It should stick to its word. For now, China’s hope is that the US will agree to end joint military exercises with South Korea in return for Kim verifiably scaling back its nuclear programme. China was part of the international agreement with Iran and believes that there could be scope for a similar deal, arrived at after years of careful negotiation. It underestimates, however, the resolve of the Trump administration to disarm the Kim regime entirely.
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Diplomacy should not be dismissed. It is not appeasement; concerted political, economic and military efforts can be an expression of strength rather than weakness. The fact is, though, that Kim has a spectacular record of broken promises. He does not care if his people starve. And if he suspects that members of his regime are giving away too much in talks with the West, he will not hesitate to have them put to death. Talks will work only if Kim immediately stops work on missiles that can cause nuclear destruction to South Korea, Japan or the US.
White House thinking therefore has to be underpinned by the credible statement that all options, including various forms of military action, remain open. That is not so much sabre-rattling as an articulation of deterrence theory. It makes the assumption that the West is dealing not with a madman but with an amoral rational actor who cares only about his own survival. For the avoidance of doubt, all tentative attempts at a dialogue must be backed by a clearly stated readiness to deploy force should Kim try to cheat his way to a bomb. This threat has turned China into a seemingly co-operative, if nervous, ally of the West. Beijing now needs to have some stern words with those around Kim.