Last week Qatar was the world’s fifth largest gas producer and its richest country per capita, with a £300 billion sovereign investment fund, huge stakes in the British economy and a World Cup to host in 2022. Yesterday all this remained true, but Qatar was also a pariah among its neighbours, accused of aiding and abetting terrorism throughout the Middle East. Diplomatic links were severed. Qatar’s national airline was barred from much of the region and its only land border closed.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and most of their Sunni allies have turned on Qatar with what will seem to many outsiders like startling suddenness. In fact their action has been years in the making. Riyadh in particular has opposed Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood since its role in removing Hosni Mubarak from power in Egypt at the start of the Arab Spring.
For years the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has regarded Qatar as its least reliable member, too close to Iran for comfort and too rich to have much need of regional solidarity. Most of the Gulf’s ruling clans also resent the scrutiny of al- Jazeera, the state-backed Qatari broadcaster. The timing of the move against Doha is an object lesson in the law of unforeseen consequences. There seems little doubt that the Gulf states have been emboldened by Donald Trump’s visit two weeks ago, his first overseas trip as US president. His goal was to unite the region against Iran in order to smooth the way for a resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian territories. That could still happen, but it looks unlikely.
King Salman of Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, have chosen for the time being to forget President Trump’s appeal to Sunni unity. Instead they have effectively declared open season on Qatar for its alleged pro-Iranian leanings, and on their own Shia minorities.
A Saudi official claimed that the country was acting for the “protection of national security from the dangers of terrorism and extremism”. Qatar has in the past acknowledged links to Hamas and hardline Islamist factions in the Syrian war as well as to the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet jihadist groups, broadly defined, owe more to Saudi benefactors and Saudi Arabia’s dominant Wahhabi theology than to any other country. Riyadh appears to have interpreted the Trump ascendancy as a licence to attack Qatari’s patchy record on terrorism, the better to obscure its own. No western government should be taken in.
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The first sign that Mr Trump’s visit had changed the political landscape in the Gulf came in Bahrain. Two days after a meeting there between the president and King Hamad, hundreds of Shia opposition members were rounded up and five protesters killed. The second sign was a largely confected dispute over a story about remarks on Iran by the Qatari emir that his staff say was faked by his enemies.
Rex Tillerson, the US secretary of state, has offered to help to put the GCC back together again. This is wise. Picking sides between Sunni and Shia-dominated countries is high risk. Choosing between rival Sunni elites would have been even riskier. This crisis is mainly a result of posturing, but defusing it will take patience and diplomatic skill. Without a good deal of both, Mr Trump’s hopes of Middle East peace will soon look even more forlorn than before his maiden trip.