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COMMENT

Fudge will be hard for first minister to stomach

Nicola Sturgeon’s plans do not cover a fudge that leaves the UK out of the EU in a formal sense, but still engaged in many of the EU’s trading institutions
Nicola Sturgeon’s plans do not cover a fudge that leaves the UK out of the EU in a formal sense, but still engaged in many of the EU’s trading institutions
PA:PRESS ASSOCIATION

There is one big problem with Nicola Sturgeon’s master plan — it deliberately ignores the most likely Brexit scenario.

Her 70-page strategy document looks at two different futures: one with the UK completely within the EU single market, and one with the UK completely outside.

The flaw is obvious. Neither of these is going to happen. All the signs from Whitehall are that Britain’s Brexit deal will be a compromise. To paraphrase Boris Johnson, Britain will keep half its cake and eat the other half.

Only this week Liam Fox, the cabinet’s most hardline Brexiteer, suggested that the UK could remain signed up to aspects of the EU customs union. His colleague David Davis had already confirmed that the UK might pay cash to Brussels to retain access to parts of the European single market.

Ms Sturgeon’s plans do not cover a fudge that leaves the UK out of the EU in a formal sense, but still engaged in many of the EU’s trading institutions.

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There is good reason why the first minister did not stray into this territory. It is dangerous ground for the SNP leader.

If the Brexit debate is triangulated — that is, if the extremes are rejected in favour of something in between — then any new referendum on Scottish independence will become that much harder to win.

Many Scots would be happy to settle for a middle way on Europe. In fact, they would seize on it with gratitude, preferring a solution — any solution — to further wrangling and conflict. If Ms Sturgeon gets some of what she is asking for, but not all, she will find herself with an agonising dilemma.

Does she call a referendum she is increasingly unlikely to win? Or does she knuckle down to the job of forging a new deal for Scotland within Brexit Britain?