We haven't been able to take payment
You must update your payment details via My Account or by clicking update payment details to keep your subscription.
Act now to keep your subscription
We've tried to contact you several times as we haven't been able to take payment. You must update your payment details via My Account or by clicking update payment details to keep your subscription.
Your subscription is due to terminate
We've tried to contact you several times as we haven't been able to take payment. You must update your payment details via My Account, otherwise your subscription will terminate.

End game in Najaf

Iraq’s prospects take a turn for the better

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, head of the Shia hierarchy in Iraq and revered not only by Shia but also by all its citizens, rarely steps on to the political stage. When he does, he has invariably been heard. In conditions taut with danger, he returned yesterday to offer his cornered rival, Hojatoleslam Moqtada al-Sadr, an “honourable” exit from the shrine of Imam Ali, now ringed by US and Iraqi troops. It will not be represented as such, but this is an outcome with vital bearing on the leadership of the Shia world.

These two men are polar opposites. The elder is a reclusive ascetic who represents the quietist, scholarly Shia tradition that shuns political activism. The younger, a highly politicised populist firebrand who attracts both Islamist extremists and jobless malcontents, has not only usurped control of Shia Muslims’ most holy shrine but has also, while disingenuously declaring respect for the Supreme Ayatollah, designs on the spiritual leadership. The immediate goal is to extract Hojetoleslam al-Sadr and his militia from the shrine of Imam Ali without violence, but more than that is at stake. The reassertion of the ayatollah’s authority will not end violence, but it would improve the prospects for political moderation in Iraq.

The grand ayatollah had to be seen to win. He picked his moment carefully, waiting until the Americans had tightened the tourniquet to the point where the militias were effectively outflanked and cornered. His silence in the three weeks since the fighting began — and his decision to go to London for minor surgery that could have been performed in Baghdad, thus literally removing himself from the field — had begun to strain the loyalty of his aides. It was deliberate. He had tried to eject Hojatoleslam al-Sadr when he and his militia seized the shrine last spring. They said that they would go, but did not. Thereafter their insurgency grew in power and influence. Ayatollah al-Sistani wants Hojatoleslam al-Sadr down as well as out: out of Najaf, in conditions that diminish him.

That means wresting back control of the shrine by the Marjaiyah — the traditional combined leadership of Iraq’s four ayatollahs — while being seen also to have distanced US forces from the city and brought an end to the fighting. But no side will be entirely easy with any deal struck.

Failure was, however, all too possible. The 24-hour ceasefire granted by Ayad Allawi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, expires at three this afternoon, and with it the “safe passage” offered to Hojatoleslam al-Sadr if his followers disarm and disperse. That was a tight deadline in ordered circumstances. The reality is chaos.

Advertisement

In Najaf, big crowds took advantage of the ceasefire to force their way into the shrine. Many thousands more are heading for the city — with al-Sadr banners almost as prominent on the pick-up trucks and buses as the ayatollah’s portrait. By deliberately heightening the significance of his move by urging “all believers” to follow him to Najaf, the ayatollah also compounded confusion and, with confusion, risk; 450 people were killed or wounded yesterday in the nearby town of Kufa; police desperate to control crowds fired on others elsewhere.

The greatest risk is the survival of the al-Sadr militias. Having outflanked and exhausted them in Najaf, the US and Iraqi forces surrounding the shrine must angrily reckon that many of its members will now slip through the net, whatever has been agreed. Saving the shrine is an objective shared by all, but destroying the Najaf insurgency is key to civil order in Iraq. The ayatollah was probably the best man for this endgame. But for Iraq’s sake, this accord must now be extended beyond Najaf.