‘Culturenomics’ will define new political era

• Matthew Lesh: Labour’s equal pay law risks ramping up racial tensions

“Culturenomics” means a cultural debate that has an economic cost embedded in it. Examples include the economic feasibility of net zero and the costs and benefits of immigration. Also, the pros and cons of affirmative action and workplace quotas, hiring practices sensitive to socioeconomic and racial status, and the role of diversity policies in corporate life.

Culture and economics have occasionally and obviously merged in the past. Remember Vote Leave’s promise of £350 million for the NHS? The evidence, though, is that for decades these tracks have been separate. In 2015 some of Britain’s top political scientists calculated which were the most economically right-wing constituencies (think most supportive of lower taxes and a smaller state).

Southern, London-bordering commuter seats such as Surrey Heath, Ruislip Northwood & Pinner, and Orpington came top. In other words, places with fairly high levels of education, wealth and home ownership, but also suburban in character.

In the same paper the authors found that the areas least supportive of same-sex marriage and most supportive of leaving the EU were far more rural, much poorer, less connected, with many fewer graduates. Seats such as South Holland & The Deepings, Louth & Horncastle, Christchurch and Clacton came out top. Voters considered these debates pretty separate things.

Today, however, there’s a subset of issues where culturenomics cuts through more effectively than just talking about culture or economics separately. My polling company, Focaldata, conducted research across the UK, US, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the Republic of Ireland.

Vote Leave’s promise to divert £350 million towards the NHS is just one example of culturenomics

JACK TAYLOR/GETTY IMAGES

We found that across all countries the main driver of why people may be open to voting for a right-wing populist party was their agreement with the statement: “It is likely that many white people are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead.”

This question, borrowed from the US census, proved more predictive than any other belief. Based on someone’s answer, we have a 67 per cent chance of inferring their populist-right inclinations correctly.

The question has already proved highly predictive in estimating which voters swapped between Democrats and Republicans from 2016 to today, but to find it as a clear dividing line across Europe is new. In Britain so far, it is Conservatives concerned about the pace of net zero and the economic impact of immigration who have disproportionately left the party since the 2019 election.

We also found that other cultural issues, when framed in terms of economic costs, became highly divisive, salient and predictive. While the British public overwhelmingly believes that climate change is real (eight to one), the importance that Britons place on tackling it has fallen. Only a fifth of Britons regard it as a top-three issue today, down from a third in autumn 2021.

One explanation is found in who pays for implementing net zero: 48 per cent of Britons want to delay or cancel net zero targets they regard as unaffordable, while 52 per cent wish to continue pursuing them.

The issue of immigration is also evolving away from a debate predominantly about culture and race into one that asks: does it make us wealthier or not? Both sides have their numbers. Supporters of higher rates of net migration point to it supplying health and care workers, propping up entire parts of the public sector and indeed Britain’s GDP growth; opponents cite strained public services, massive population growth and stagnant GDP per capita.

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So why have these debates started to fuse? One answer is this age of economic insecurity. The sheer dislocation of discussing flags, identity and history while seven million UK households struggle with their bills has led to economic issues asserting themselves.

How does culturenomics explain the polls, with Labour 20 points ahead and being supported by about 15 per cent of those who voted Conservative in 2019? Well, the political cycle still triumphs. Even if cultural and economic anxieties are converging, the electorate still votes for leaders and government records.

But there are signs that Labour doesn’t appreciate the implications of this new terrain. For instance, it has floated the idea of passing a new Race Equality Act to strengthen equal pay claims for non-white citizens. This could have serious consequences, both financial and social. Birmingham city council, Europe’s largest local authority, has already fallen into bankruptcy due to substantial equal pay settlements based on gender. All this in a context where, according to the Office for National Statistics, eight minority sub-groups of Britons earn less than white British people, but five sub-groups earn more.

The most difficult feature of culturenomics is the creation of a corpus of contested evidence and blunt-force mechanisms that don’t create fair outcomes. Just look at the fury surrounding the consultancy McKinsey and its reports on diversity which have suggested that firms can create better financial outcomes with diverse leadership. It’s a nice message but academics replicating the work basically don’t find that to be the case. In fact, the McKinsey report is now being used to argue the opposite — that representation doesn’t matter.

This furore shows how culturenomics is likely to lead to even more rancour in British political discourse and division in society. Campaigners may find this convergence makes their jobs easier. They no longer have to navigate the “awkward corners” of UK public opinion.

But for those of us who treasure a complicated and heterodox Britain, this is not a development to be welcomed.