The Afghan police chief sat shivering at his desk, his hands in the pockets of his wool coat, as he tried to answer questions about his men. Police station three is in one of central Kabul's better districts but it had had no electricity for days. It was colder inside than out.
Lieutenant-Colonel Amanullah, the acting chief, was having a tough time satisfying his American "mentors", young soldiers from Camp Phoenix. They were, in fact, being quite gentle, but the facts about his station kept eluding him.
How many of his men had been trained, asked Staff Sergeant Jimmie Stokely, 30. "Ninety per cent studied, but I don't know how many passed," replied Amanullah, sinking a bit in his chair.
He answered a question about staffing by saying he had 105 men on active duty. His personnel manager interjected. The station had "16 officers, 44 sergeants, and 98 soldiers". Were they all on duty? That was unclear. Amanullah slumped further down.
Did he still have 13 checkpoints? At that point Amanullah took a mobile phone call and practically ran out of the room, saying a fight had broken out. He turned the meeting over to Shamsullah Habibzani, the deputy, who sat rigidly erect.
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Did police district three still have 13 checkpoints? He would get back to the Americans on that.
Not a piece of paper appeared during the meeting, and the ancient computer on the desk remained dark without power. "I have to go to the internet cafe to file my reports," Habibzani, 25, said sadly.
The Afghan police and army are at the forefront of the strategy announced by President Barack Obama last week, which called for a "surge" of 30,000 new US troops in the country.
Nearly a brigade of the newcomers - 3,000-4,000 troops - would be trainers, and much of the rest would work with or mentor Afghan security forces. Obama proclaimed that the surge would mean that "more Afghans can get into the fight".
Within 18 months, the Afghan army is scheduled to grow from 97,000 to 134,000, and the police force to double. From July 2011, Afghan forces will take gradual control of their own territory and the Americans will begin withdrawing.
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At least that is the theory. Last week, however, in visits to the Afghan security forces, a woeful picture emerged of the reality on the ground. The model endorsed by Obama could well work, but to do so, there will have to be an acknowledgement of just how threadbare the forces are, and measures taken to reverse the neglect and ignorance that has caused the problem.
Lieutenant-Colonel Todd Goehler is the head of a 12-man training team that since July has been mentoring Charlie kandak - Afghan for battalion - in Kabul's capital division.
Goehler, a 24-year veteran of the special forces, described a disastrous situation that differed dramatically from the official projections. "They have been putting Band-Aids on this for a while," he said.
On paper, Charlie kandak is one of six battalions in the brigade covering the 14 districts of Kabul and outlying areas. In reality, he revealed, only one other exists. Two kandaks are only at 30% capacity and are consequently not deployable. The final two are still "in the training pipeline".
Decrepit Russian barracks at Kabul international airport have been earmarked for their arrival. The buildings lack running water and all the electrical fittings have been stripped. At any given moment, 20% to 30% of the 600 soldiers on Charlie kandak's roster are absent without leave. In the Afghan army, a soldier can be missing for up to 60 days before any action - other than the suspension of his pay - is taken.
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Illiteracy is high: 70% of inventory receipts are signed with a thumbprint. This engenders corruption because a soldier who cannot read has no idea what he has just confirmed receipt of.
Compounding the difficulties, senior commanders had so little understanding of the mentoring process that they were undermining the programme by breaking up teams that worked well together to plug holes elsewhere. "They're ripping apart our teams," said Goehler. "They [the Afghans] would be much further ahead if they had solid mentoring teams, the right people with the right experience."
Nevertheless, Charlie kandak has started to fall into some kind of shape. When Goehler's team took over, its colonel refused to leave the base; officers had no idea of logistics, the need to brief for missions, or the inventory and supply process.
On a trip last week to Farzeh, a tiny village in the mountains northwest of Kabul, the difficulties of the transfer to Afghan control were obvious - and so was an image of how it could succeed.
The Americans are anxious that Afghans accept their national security forces, which is felt to be as much a part of the transition process as getting them up to speed technically. So Goehler's team put together humanitarian aid parcels, planned the trip to impoverished Farzeh, then put Charlie kandak in the lead to make the delivery while they followed.
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The Afghans were enthusiastic, revving their Humvees like drag racers. "They drive like a 14-year-old boy joyriding in the spare family car he grabbed when the parents went out," said one American mentor in exasperation.
Once they reached Farzeh, Colonel Rahmatsha Qimati, commander of Charlie kandak, took the lead. He told the gathered elders: "You can call us any time, day or night. We know Farzeh is very poor, so we have brought 50 parcels of food and clothing." Afghan soldiers handed them out to the elders, who complained a bit about the paucity of supplies but seemed happy to have been remembered.
While offering the prospect of hope, this was an isolated example: the army remains in poor shape. However, it is a well-oiled machine compared with what could be seen of the Afghan police force last week. Station three should have had some of the best policemen in the city. The neighbourhood is home to more than 30 foreign companies, a university and two ministries.
Habibzani, the deputy, spelt out the problems. He had graduated from the Kabul police academy, but he could barely support his family of five on an officer's salary of $200 (£120) a month.
The $120 paid to the lowest ranks meant the force attracted those who had no other possibilities - and needed the three meals a day that come with the job - but also meant they felt no guilt about demanding bribes.
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A key aspect of the US strategy is to make working for the state more attractive than taking the Taliban's shilling. Yet there was no sign of the wage increase to $165 that the government had announced. Meanwhile, the Taliban pay $220 a month.
Habibzani said 90% of the police could not read or write. Abdullah Fattah, a police trainer standing with him in the gloom of the hallway as black cables dangled uselessly from the ceiling, said police received five months' training. "They start from such a low level. I need five years," he said. "With all the attention of the international community, maybe three years minimum."
Corruption is rife, and many police are addicted to drugs. There is some evidence that Hamid Karzai, the president inaugurated last month amid allegations of fraud in the election and corruption in his government, has got the message.
"I can confirm we have this cancer of corruption in the police but very soon we will start cleaning it out," said General Haider Basir, deputy at the interior ministry, which is responsible for the police. Biometric prints have been taken of 25,000 police so that if they moonlight for the Taliban, they might be caught.
But Basir set official standards fairly low. "To be a policeman, it is necessary to be healthy and not addicted to drugs," he said. "They don't need to read and write."