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Chilcot’s judgment

A case heard in the Court of Appeal shows that much of the concern over the risk of judicial challenge to the Chilcot report is unfounded

Sir, Much of the concern as to the risk of judicial challenge to the Chilcot report has been exaggerated (report and leader, Aug 21).

In 2000, the report was published of the company inspectors who had investigated the affairs of a company of which John Clegg had been the managing director. It included serious criticism of Mr Clegg. He brought judicial review proceedings seeking, ultimately, a declaration by the court that the inspectors had acted unfairly in failing to give him a proper opportunity to answer their criticisms.

The Court of Appeal held that in fact he had been given an adequate opportunity to address the inspectors’ provisional criticisms, and they had not acted unfairly. His claim was dismissed. Equally importantly, the Court of Appeal held that even if there had been procedural unfairness, it would have refused to grant any relief.

The Court of Appeal endorsed what I had said at first instance. In summary, this was that a declaration by the court that inspectors had acted unfairly would be perceived as undermining their entire report, even if the unfairness was minor or affected only part of the report. A declaration that an individual had been treated unfairly would undermine all the findings adverse to that individual. However, if the court tried to make a declaration over specific findings, it would have to try the facts in question, constituting itself as a court of appeal against the inspectors’ findings. Parliament has not provided for any such appeal procedure and such a declaration should only be given in exceptional circumstances.

This would apply equally to the Chilcot report.

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Sir Stanley Burnton

Lord Justice of Appeal 2008-12, Temple, London EC4

Sir, Jonathan Caplan, QC (letter, Aug 25), may have reservations about the wisdom of banging on the jury retirement room door, but this is something judges do all the time. It is often not long before a crown court judge will tell a jury that he is now willing to accept a majority verdict, and then, if the jurors are unable to reach such a verdict in reasonable time, to discharge them. Without such discipline courts would be unable to function. Although different considerations may apply to an inquiry such at Sir John Chilcot’s, a tap on the door to remind him that discussion cannot be endless and that an inquiry, like a jury, is there to reach a verdict, does not seem inappropriate.

Michael Cavaghan-Pack

Thurloxton, Somerset