Two clear issues came to light in the release of state papers about the 1988 killing of Aidan McAnespie at Aughnacloy, a British army checkpoint on the border of Tyrone and Monaghan.
First, that the recent judgment of manslaughter passed on David Holden, a former soldier, was the right call, albeit decades late. Second, that this was not state-sanctioned murder but criminal negligence which demonstrated the poor tradecraft and leadership in Holden’s unit of the Grenadier Guards.
Poor leadership and judgment, however, were not restricted to the British side.
Conflict often muddies the waters of justice and this matter could have been resolved faster if both the Dublin and London governments had not held so stubbornly to their particular positions.
The defence given by Guardsman Holden — that his general purpose machine gun went off because his hands were wet — was seen as a nonsense by anyone who has experience of that weapon.
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Every soldier who has served in the Irish Defence Forces will be familiar with that gun, also known as the MAG or mitrailleuse d’appui général. I trained to instructor level on it.
It is a “support weapon”, not one to be used for pinpoint accuracy. It is designed to lay down heavy fire either to cover troops engaged in an infantry assault or to defend a position under attack.
The edge this weapon gives its user is that it can be fired to a maximum distance of 3.5km, with an effective firing range of 800m to 1.8km, depending on whether it is mounted on a bipod or tripod.
It can fire 650 to 1,000 bullets a minute depending on the efficiency of the gunner and the quality of their belt- fed ammunition.
The MAG is not a gun to be used to take out a single person. It is designed for its 7.62mm bullets to be fired in bursts, anything from three shots upwards.
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It takes an experienced gunner to control the amount of rounds in the burst and to ensure that they are directed on to a target.
An inexperienced gunner is always likely to allow the weapon to fire up and away from the target area.
Holden was aged only 18 when he killed McAnespie and he had probably only fired an MAG as part of his basic training. Only experienced infantry soldiers would have received advanced training.
The weapon would most probably have been mounted in line with standard procedure at British army checkpoints at the time. One of the reasons for this was that it would allow sustained fire in a directed way over a distance. This would have enabled the troops in these highly fortified checkpoints to defend themselves from sniper or mortar attacks as well as from a direct attack by anyone trying to overrun the post.
All of this means that there is no military sense in the idea that an inexperienced soldier such as Holden could have been trying to assassinate someone whom he considered a known threat.
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The notion, too, that Holden was on duty with such a gun in an unready state, that is with wet hands and the safety catch off, brings another issue to bear: command and control.
Many reports suggest that Holden had greater agency than would have been the case. Holden would have been under the supervision of a junior non-commissioned officer (NCO). Despite the name, an NCO is not an officer and was most likely to have been a lance sergeant, equivalent to a corporal.
It would have been the NCO’s job to brief his juniors and supervise them. He in turn would have been answerable to either a more senior NCO such as a sergeant, or a junior officer such as a lieutenant or a captain.
It is not unknown for a young, inexperienced soldiers to play with their weapons on duty. This can include snapping on and off the safety catch, swinging the weapon or aiming it in an inappropriate direction.
It is at this point that military discipline should kick in. A good NCO will nip such behaviour in the bud and make sure that punishment is meted out. Sergeants and officers will be told about the soldier’s behaviour and, if necessary, steps taken to ensure the individual is not placed on armed duty.
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In short, I am saying that military discipline and actions taken by a chain of command should have averted McAnespie’s shooting.
It is highly probable that Holden was bored and fantasising and that he had focused on McAnespie simply because he was there. It is also likely, however, that Holden knew of McAnespie, had heard of him in derogatory terms and would have been more likely to have sighted in on him.
The fact that Charles Haughey, then taoiseach, instigated an independent investigation that ended up being suppressed showed an incomplete grasp of the situation by the Dublin government.
The investigation was seen as inflammatory by some and it achieved nothing.
Had the Irish government accepted that the shooting was not part of an orchestrated campaign but criminal negligence, it could have lobbied London to take action against those found at fault, including if appropriate soldiers of higher ranks than Holden.
