The exchange of correspondence between London and Edinburgh was meant to clear the air.
But the minutes of a meeting between the Scottish government and the Libyans on March 12 this year appears to have thickened the atmosphere.
Is it a smoking gun? It records that the Libyan Europe Minister quoted Foreign Office Minsiter Bill Rammell as saying that neither Gordon Brown nor David Miliband would want al-Megrahi to die in prison.
That is the first time either Mr Brown’s or Mr Miliband’s apparent views on a possible transfer to Libya of the Lockerbie bomber have been made public. And it could explain why Mr Brown has refused all invitations to say whether he agrees with the Scottish decision. It does not prove interference from London, but it shows the mindset.
It is by far the most explosive revelation in the lengthy release of letters and we await a response from Number 10 and the Foreign Office.
Advertisement
Before that bombshell hit Westminster the inescapable impression from the correspondence between the British and Scottish governments over the future of the Lockerbie bomber is that London became keener and keener on his release, while at all times telling Edinburgh and the Libyans that it was a Scottish decision.
The line from the British government chopped and changed in the early days. First we have Lord Falconer, then Lord Chancellor, in June 2007 telling Alex Salmond that he accepts any prisoner transfer agreement could not cover al-Megrahi.
In July that year Jack Straw, who had by then taken over at the Ministry of Justice, was even suggesting to Kenny MacAskill a way that the exclusion could be achieved - saying that the agreement should exclude all prisoners who had committed an offence before a specific date. In August his junior minister Lord Hunt was saying that it was not necessary to write a specific exclusion for al-Megrahi in the proposed PTA.
In September Mr Straw agreed with the Scots that there could be an exclusion clause that would not just apply to al-Megrahi but anyone convicted of involvement in Lockerbie. But by December 19 he was having to admit that he had been unable to secure an explicit exclusion.
In February Mr Straw’s line had hardened as he told Mr Salmond it was neither “necessary or sensible” to risk damaging Britain’s relationship with Libya by inserting a specific exclusion. Did that amount to pressure? Not quite, as Mr Straw continued to reiterate that it was a Scottish decision.
Advertisement
In his last published letter Mr Straw went that much further. In November 2008, as he anticipated the ratification of the PTA, he reminded Mr Salmond in a letter of Libyan concerns for al-Megrahi’s health and possible return to Libya.
The Foreign Office position was clearer. Without saying so, its letters suggest that it believed the transfer of al-Megrahi would be beneficial.
A letter from officials this July insisted that the United States was never given an absolute commitment - i.e. one that would bind future governments - that the Lockerbie accused would always be imprisoned in Scotland. And Ivan Lewis, the junior minister, as recently as August 3 said that Britain had never given the US a “definitive commitment”.
He then asked the Scots to consider the Libyan application for the transfer of al-Megrahi, the nearest the letters come to outright pressure. He then reminds the Scottish government that it is for the UK government to conduct the UK’s foreign relations and provide “advice on its international commitments to the devolved administrations”. Those remarks seemed to be putting the Scots in their place, without quite telling them what to do.
Gordon Brown and his ministers have not, since late 2007, done anything that suggests they oppose al-Megrahi’s transfer, as this correspondence shows. Tripoli must have felt it was pushing at an open door.