Nato is a military alliance, not a pick-and-mix “coalition of the willing”. Precisely because they are deemed to be binding, Nato decisions require the endorsement of all 26 members. When the alliance agreed last month to deploy an extra 6,000 troops to Afghanistan, it was clear that Nato was not merely expanding its existing mission, but preparing for a combat role that would, without doubt, involve casualties.
The division of labour since the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001 has been for Americans to do the bulk of the fighting; Nato’s 15,000-strong “security assistance force” has mainly handled policing, reconstruction and some relief work in Kabul and relatively stable parts of the country. By agreeing to take over from the US in the troubled southern region this spring, the Nato allies explicitly recognised that they would be taking on combat roles. The south remains a war zone.
The British and Canadians assumed from the start that they would be facing conflict; but the idea that their 1,200 troops would actually have to fight seems to have dawned somewhat late on the Dutch, the third-largest military contributor to the new force. The result has been endless shuffling of feet in the Netherlands. Its Government does not want to say “no” to deployment, dares not quite say “yes” and has passed the buck to a divided parliament. In Nato, planning is on hold and the embarrassment is extreme — though in fairness to the Dutch, they are far from being the least courageous of Nato members.
In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and the Taleban are — to judge by the upsurge in terrorist attacks — evidently out to influence the Dutch decision. The troubling consequence of so much agonising over whether it is right for their troops to fight is that if Dutch soldiers are, in the end, deployed, their anxious countrymen will unwittingly have made them prime targets for terrorists who expect them to cut and run.
The Dutch dilemma draws attention to a bigger question. It may be premature for the Americans to hand over security in the south to Nato. Britain will take command for the first six months, but operational uncertainties will be compounded by rotating commands, and it is far from clear how Nato and US forces will interact.
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The dominant factor, in Afghanistan’s still highly precarious condition, must be stability for Afghans and the successful suppression of its brutal insurgencies. Although the White House denies it, plans by the Pentagon to pull 2,500 US troops out of Afghanistan are linked to the Nato deployment; and they coincide, moreover, with a reduction in US financial aid. Both to the Afghan Government and to its enemies, this suggests weakening US resolve.
The Afghans believe that they were deserted by the West before, and could be again; and that fear is the source of the lingering influence that the Taleban and al-Qaeda exert. Nato must be committed to its mission; the last thing Afghanistan needs is military indecisiveness. And the US must, in parallel, stay the course.