The carrier of bird flu to the European Union was, officially, the majestic wild swan. Images of the giant, but diseased, birds being gathered up from Greek and Italian wetlands have galvanised Brussels into launching emergency procedures designed to prevent the H5N1 virus spreading to domestic poultry or humans. “Protection” and “surveillance” zones have been established around sites where sick birds have been found. These birds have been destroyed, others are being tested and total “exclusion” zones will follow if the virus mutates into a form that can jump from human to human.
Whether these procedures will prove effective remains to be seen. They do nothing to prevent waves of infected birds flying wherever they please, and it is clear that birds having the virus can still travel vast distances. But this new development does not mean a human pandemic is inevitable. There is no confirmed case yet of human infection from a wild bird, and the virus has not yet mutated into a human-to-human form. But the chances of such a transition are now higher because of a development far more alarming than the sight of stricken swans in Europe — the spread of H5N1 to sub-Saharan Africa.
Confirmed reports of the virus being found in poultry in Nigeria have produced a consensus among scientists and health officials on two key points: H5N1 is likely to mutate quicker in populations already ravaged by HIV than in healthy ones, because of the potential for gene-swapping between viruses in human carriers with weakened immune systems. Secondly, governments that wait until confirmation of human H5N1 cases before taking action will have waited too long. By then, the number is likely to be large, especially in the developing countries where human-avian contact is close and health reporting patchy.
In Britain, as elsewhere, the official response to the bird flu threat must be based on the premise that human-to-human infection is a matter of when, not if. The Government’s plan to stockpile 14.6 million courses of the Tamiflu drug is a start, but no more than that. At best, Tamiflu may ease symptoms of infected humans. At worst, it could prove useless; it was designed as a treatment for conventional flu, and some avian variants in China have already shown resistance to it.
The extra doses of generic drugs ordered by the Government for front-line workers in the event of a pandemic may also prove ineffective, as we report today. But these are not grounds for panic. Wise use of the $1.5 billion earmarked by the UN to combat bird flu could still contain it before the relatively low human cost — fewer than 100 deaths so far — begins to accelerate. That means equipping Africa with more labs able to identify the virus. Above all, it means insisting on total transparency from China and her neighbours in reporting new outbreaks. The instinct to hush them up for fear of economic loss or Beijing’s wrath is a significant factor in the global spread of H5N1. Openness and swift co-operation are essential ingredients of a sound global anti-virus plan.