When President Yeltsin formally handed power to Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin four years ago, he uttered three memorable words: “Look after Russia.” His protégé has taken the order very literally indeed. President Putin’s guiding principle has been to defend and strengthen the Russian State, which he inherited in spectacular disorder. When the interests of the State have clashed with those of the many peoples of the Russian Federation, his attitude has been:
“So be it. The State prevails.” This attitude has proved politically astute. So far, it has won him vastly more admirers than enemies. But in the long term it presages a slide back to autocracy and a weaker, not a stronger, Russia.
The impetus for Mr Putin’s dogged recentralisation of power in Moscow has always been Chechnya. From the start of the current war there, he has characterised Chechen separatism as a mortal threat not just to stability in the Caucasus but to Russia’s territorial integrity. This week, seeking to justify sudden and sweeping curbs on regional democracy in the wake of the Beslan tragedy, he argued that “the unity of the country is the main prerequisite for victory in the war on terror”.
There is a difference between unity and a unitary state, however. Russia clearly needs effective border controls and a complete overhaul of its frontline security forces if it is to rid Chechnya of terrorists. Mr Putin has demanded both of these. He should also be encouraged to make good on his promise to alleviate poverty in the North Caucasus. But his insistence that Chechen separatism threatens the break-up of his entire country is disingenuous. Chechen efforts to export Islamist extremism west to Ingushetia and east to Dagestan have never come to much, and the President’s argument that separatism could catch fire in Tartarstan, the mainly Muslim region centred on Kazan, 800 miles east of Moscow, ignores 13 years of surprisingly cordial relations between its semi-autonomous government and the post-Soviet Kremlin.
Even more unacceptably he has ended the free election of regional governors, a measure which has little to do with fighting terror. It is an opportunistic lunge at the separate problem of wealthy industrialists buying their way into regional political fiefdoms, whose governors will now gradually be replaced by Mr Putin’s nominees. Sucking the life out of what remains of Russia’s regional democracy will block legitimate channels for dissent and could well heighten the risks of terrorism. From Mr Putin’s point of view, it is also unnecessary. He has already recentralised Russia and strengthened his own position quite enough. There is little doubt that the 2007 Duma elections will be a victory parade for the pro-Putin United Russia Party. The key question thereafter is whether it forces through a constitutional amendment allowing Mr Putin a third term. He has said he will not seek one, but the reasons for trusting him are fewer by the week.