The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding: Centering African knowledge and agency is key to building and sustaining peace in Africa. The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (SVNP) works with the Wilson Center’s Africa Program to attain the most appropriate, cohesive, and inclusive policy frameworks and approaches for achieving sustainable peace in Africa. Generously sponsored by Carnegie Corporation of New York since its establishment in 2011, the SVNP works to generate African knowledge to inform US and international peacebuilding policies on Africa; help build the next generation of African peacebuilders through its scholarship program; and create a pan-African network of African peacebuilding organizations, practitioners, and experts to collaborate and share knowledge, best practices, and lessons learned on peacebuilding in Africa. This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent the views of the Wilson Center or Carnegie Corporation of New York. For more information please visit:https://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding
Introduction
From 2020 to 2023, Africa experienced unconstitutional changes of government in the form of military coups in at least six countries, [1] as well as instances of extension of presidential term limits in countries including Cameroon, Togo, Uganda and Rwanda. Collectively these developments call into question the gains of more than half a century of efforts to consolidate democracy and sustain peace on the continent. What is more, political instability and election-related violence continue to characterise the political environment in countries such as Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, and Ivory Coast. Distrust in political and electoral processes and voter apathy are reaching new heights, as the regular conduct of elections fails to deliver on democratic expectations. This bleak outlook has implications for the practice of election observation, which at the turn of the 21st
Toward Greater Synergy Between International and Domestic Election Observation
By Kgalalelo Nganje, Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar January 2024
Image Credit: Shutterstock.com/ Abidemi Ajibodu
Research Paper No. 29
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century was seen as an important tool for consolidating democracy and sustaining peace in countries that were transitioning from autocratic rule. At the time, international and domestic election observers used their presence on the ground in countries to bolster the credibility of elections and their democratic quality. They promoted public confidence, electoral participation, and mitigated the potential for election-related conflict.In recent years, however, given negative political developments on the African continent, the practise of international election observation has come under much criticism by scholars [2] who have declared it to be in a state of crisis. They recommend institutional strengthening of citizen-based domestic observer groups as an alternative to sustaining international election observation [3]. COVID-19 also highlighted that international election observer missions could not travel to observe elections in Africa in countries such as Togo, Burundi, Malawi and Ethiopia in 2020 [4]. Yet domestic election observation is not without its flaws, either. In their current configuration, neither international election observation missions (IEOMs) nor domestic election observation offers a panacea for the challenge of consolidating democracy and promoting peace in Africa. Hence, attempts for collaboration through global mergers. The Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM) provides a springboard for exploring the intersection of international and domestic election observation, in order to optimise election scrutiny in ways that promote democracy and peace. Effective election observation can be found through a balance of these two practices. This research paper examines the state of election observation in Africa and the prospects for greater synergy between international and domestic election observation. The overarching aim of the paper is to contribute to the discourse and practice of election observation as a tool for consolidating democracy and peacebuilding, by exploring options for strengthening linkages between domestic and international observation. It discusses, firstly, the current nature of domestic and international election observation in Africa. The paper then delves into the intersection between international and domestic election observation, before concluding with recommendations for how to encourage greater cooperation and collaboration.
The Ebb and Flow of International Election Observation in Africa
During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a significant increase in the deployment of international election observer missions from the United States (U.S) and the European Union (EU) in Africa [5]. Their agenda was to detect and deter electoral fraud, promote voter confidence, and curb civil disobedience and violence. The larger aim was to safeguard the democratic principles of self-determination, free expression and genuine and periodic elections. Around the same period, African countries began to embrace multiparty elections as the route to acquiring political power. The EU, National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Carter Center were among the organizations that actively participated in the observation of transitional elections in countries such as Benin (1991), Angola (1992), and Lesotho (1993) [6]. In recent years, however, as African countries regularized the conduct of multiparty elections, the efficacy of IEOMs began to diminish. Within a context of growing electoral authoritarianism [7] in Africa — incumbent regimes have become adept at manipulating elections in order to prolong their stay in power — international election observers are criticized for compromising the legitimacy of elections by endorsing unworthy governments. This was highlighted in Kenya (2017) and Malawi (2019), when international elections gave a stamp of approval to the electoral processes only for citizens to successfully contest the outcomes through their own courts of law [8]. In Malawi, despite the positive pronouncements by the EU and African Union, the Constitutional Court of Malawi annulled the presidential election on the grounds that the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) was incompetent in managing the polls [9]. It declared that the incumbent was not duly elected, and that parliament should enact a law to ensure the use of the 50% plus 1 rule for the election of the country’s president. Similarly, after international observers cautiously endorsed the 2017 poll in Kenya, the Supreme Court invalidated the results on the grounds that it violated the country’s constitution, ruling that the election process was neither sufficiently transparent nor verifiable [10]. An almost similar development occurred with the EU election observation mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2011. By the time the EU observer mission released its final report in March 2012, the country’s focus had shifted from casting doubt on Kabila’s victory in the presidential polls to emphasising the need for electoral reforms ahead of scheduled provincial and local elections [11].
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Negative assessments of electoral processes by international election observers can work against the peace agenda. The aftermath of the EU’s condemnation of Kenya’s 2007 elections provides evidence to support a correlation between international condemnation of the outcomes of an election (by alleging fraud in this case) and the election loser’s inclination to challenge the election result. The pronouncements unintentionally emboldened the loser to challenge the result violently. Upon the release of the elections results in December 30, 2007, supporters of the electoral loser (Raila Odinga) immediately attacked the homes and businesses of the winner’s (Mwai Kibaki) supporters [12]. In a similar vein, Zimbabwe’s Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) called for a re-run of the August 2023 elections. The CCC drew on SADC’s report, which pronounced that some aspects of the election ‘fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2021)’ [13]. The above examples notwithstanding, organizations involved in international election observation believe that providing accurate assessments of the electoral process to the public, regardless of the consequences, is a moral obligation [14].For fear of igniting violence and in trying to address the repercussions of outright condemnation, election observers are thus confronted with the dilemma of either preserving relative peace or promoting democracy. This has far-reaching implications for the consolidation of democracy on the African continent. Assessments of international election observers focusing on stability and peace of the election period can have negative consequences, by ‘frequently overlooking irregularities and rubberstamping contests in Africa that would not be tolerated elsewhere because of the perennial expectation of violence and political unrest’ [15]. Yet, there is the guidance of global, continental and regional instruments and standards on how election observation can be technical and professional without lowering the standard of assessments from the higher goal of democracy and sustainable peace to that of mere periodic stability. Khabele Matlosa observes that this approach has resulted in observers becoming more comfortable in pronouncing on either the peaceful or violent nature of elections rather than their democratic quality or lack thereof [16]. Therefore, instead of advancing democratization, election observers have allowed authoritarians to promote ‘the emergence of a peaceocracy, in which the fear of conflict is used to prioritize stability and order to the detriment of democracy’ [17]. Violent elections in both Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2008, respectively, are cases in point where international election observers countenanced imperfect electoral processes fearing escalation of more political violence. Judith Kelley thus cautions that ‘fear of violence has entirely paralyzed the truth’ in these circumstances [18], all to the detriment of the credibility of international election observation.
Towards a local turn in election observation?
In more recent years, this evaluation of the state of international election observation in Africa has given prominence to domestic election observation as a viable tool to rectify the shortcomings of IEO and promote and enhance local ownership of democratic processes and peace initiatives. This is well aligned with the current peacebuilding discourse that argues for peace efforts rooted in the cultural values, norms, and practices of specific local contexts while also harnessing local capacities for sustainable peace. Civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in domestic election observation are seen to offer prospects for localizing and engendering local ownership of democracy promotion. Perhaps, the most quoted in advancing this discourse and the positive expectations among electoral assistance professionals is The Carter Center’s veteran election observer David Carroll, who declared that ‘in the international democracy promotion community, we are increasingly aware that the future is domestic observation — it has to be, everybody knows that’ [19]. The NDI also had this to say about domestic election observers: They contribute to more genuine election processes by encouraging fairer campaign practices and a more informed electorate, as well as by reducing the possibility of fraud and irregularities on election day. They also develop and strengthen institutions essential to the sustainability of a democratic political system, as well as help citizens learn organizational skills necessary to participate actively and effectively in the political life of a country between elections [20].In countries like Ghana and Zambia, for example, where there is a robust civil society, assessments of their
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