South China Morning Post

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro adjusts his face mask during a news conference in Brasilia, Brazil, on March 18, 2020. Under Biden, Bolsonaro’s far-right discourse is likely to fall on deaf ears. Photo: Reuters

Opinion

Karin Costa Vazquez

Trump’s defeat leaves Bolsonaro rebalancing Brazil’s relations with US and China

Bolsonaro’s far-right discourse is likely to fall on deaf ears in the US unless it continues to serve the broader US anti-China strategy in Latin America
Bolsonaro is unlikely to shift his position on China soon, though he could take a more nuanced approach and seek new trade ties elsewhere in Asia

Karin Costa Vazquez

Published: 6:15pm, 28 Feb 2021

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In a recent letter to Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, US Senator Robert Menendez expressed “concern” with remarks made by Bolsonaro and his foreign minister, Ernesto Araújo, on the election of US President Joe Biden.

Menendez, the chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, called on Bolsonaro to join the US and the international community in “condemning the incitement of violence”. He said anything other than a “categorical rejection” of the January 6 attack on the US Capitol would have negative consequences for Brazil-US relations.

The letter was sent one day after Araújo and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had their first phone conversation since Biden took office.

For the US, the letter comes as a reminder for Washington not to soften its tone on Brasilia. This is because they are aware of Brazil’s relevance when it comes to one of the main US strategic concerns in Latin America: containing Beijing’s growing technological, economic and commercial influence.

Like his predecessor Donald Trump, Biden is also interested in having China out of the 5G bidding process and using infrastructure lending to curb Beijing’s financial muscle in the region. On the commercial front, Biden’s cautious efforts to facilitate trade ties with China are likely to pose constraints on Brazil-China trade and increase Brazil’s dependence on the US for its exports.

A worker inspects soybeans during the a harvest near the town of Campos Lindos in Brazil in February 2018. Brazil is the world’s largest soybean producer and China’s primary soybean supplier. Photo: Reuters

Biden will therefore need to balance the discourse to appease the most critical voices in the US Senate while maintaining Brazil in the US orbit.

For Brazil, the letter further pushes Bolsonaro and Araújo against the wall. Bolsonaro has always nurtured relationships with other like-minded, far-right governments such as the Trump administration. As the political tide turns, he now finds himself and his country increasingly isolated. Under Biden, Bolsonaro’s far-right discourse and automatic alignment with the US are likely to fall on deaf ears unless it continues to serve the broader US anti-China strategy in Latin America.

To continue playing the China card on the US and secure some support from Biden, Bolsonaro will be increasingly pressured to replace the antiglobalist Araújo with a more moderate diplomat, at the expense of his decision to turn Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as Itamaraty, into a platform to keep his most radical followers mobilised.

Brazilian Foreign Minister Ernesto Araujo speaks during an interview at the Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia on February 24. Bolsonaro will be increasingly pressured to replace the antiglobalist Araújo with a more moderate diplomat. Photo: AFP

The Menendez letter and Biden’s election open a new chapter in Brazil-China relations with three likely scenarios for the short, medium and long run. In the first scenario, Brazil continues to automatically align with the US to the detriment of China. Though the recent diplomatic debacle with the US is likely to push Bolsonaro to review his antiglobalist rhetoric, it is unlikely to make him change his position on China.

Bolsonaro and his closest allies will continue to plague Brazil-China relations with distrust. This would be part of a strategy to rally Bolsonaro’s far-right supporters and divert public attention from important domestic issues while signalling Brazil’s continued support to the US.

In the second scenario, Brazil-China relations are restrained by a broader strategy to grow and diversify Brazil’s presence in Asia in case relations with Western powers, mainly the US, fail or underperform. Economy Minister Paulo Guedes recently declared that looking east resonates with the strategy to expand Brazil’s presence in global agribusiness. “If we can have the same flow of trade with India that we have with China, Brazil will be feeding half the population of the planet,” he said.

In 2020, Bolsonaro and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed 15 agreements that provide a framework to increase trade and investment between Brazil and India. Since then, top officials from the two countries have heralded Indo-Brazilian relations. India’s ambassador to Brazil recently called them “one of the defining partnerships of this century”, and, according to Araújo, they have the potential to “form the core of a world of freedom, sovereignty, identity and progress”.

For the Brazilian private sector, increased ties with India could open new markets for Brazilian products and reduce dependence on China.

In the third scenario, Brazil does not align itself with either the US or China, in the illusion this would make it a privileged partner of the chosen side. Brazil would continue to expand the benefits of its economic complementarity with China and call for more investment and cooperation in strategic sectors. Bidding for Brazil’s 5G network construction would be based on technical criteria.

On global governance, Vice-President Hamilton Mourão noted that the two countries “exercise increasing influence in discussions and forums, such as the G20 and BRICS” and that Brazil’s accession to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the opening of the BRICS New Development Bank office in São Paulo could increase the flow of finance for Brazil.

The next three to six months will see a mix of the first and second scenarios. Despite the pressure, Bolsonaro is unlikely to substantially change his position towards China until he negotiates with Biden’s administration. In the long run, Bolsonaro might take a more nuanced approach to China with the second and third scenarios shaping the future of bilateral relations.

In this event, the main challenge would be to outline Brazil’s strategic objectives amid a deteriorating political environment, wherein Bolsonaro prepares for the presidential election in 2022. This could reduce China’s margin for manoeuvre in terms of diversifying and deepening its relations with Brazil, which are critical for the sustainability of bilateral relations in the long run.

Karin Costa Vazquez is a scholar at the Centre for BRICS Studies at Fudan University and an associate professor, assistant dean and executive director of the Centre for African Latin American and Caribbean Studies at O.P. Jindal Global University, India