Mike Fravell’s Post

Though not a U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) text, this book contains useful insights. The Roman military took 14 years to adapt to the warfighting methods of an innovative and resourceful enemy. The successful (if unpopular) approaches of Fabius and Scipio Africanus compensated for much less effective leaders. Roman success was ultimately due to its ability to continually regenerate capability and its strategic and operational endurance. A key passage: "The factor which, in the end, defeated the invader was not the ability of Rome's generals, but the strength and vitality of her political institutions." How ready is our system, both internal and external to our Armed Forces, to sustain and prosecute a protracted, large scale conflict? The Army University Marshall Scholars at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Combined Arms Center US Army TRADOC

Check out this interesting and timely article on Wednesday at tmstconsultants.com

Great engagement and discussion today with the Cyber CoE CG, as part of the IA Scholars field study at Fort Eisenhower! Biggest takeaway was shifting my lens to look at how data is traversing the battlefield geometry and understanding that aspect to enable a commander to make better and faster decisions! #scholars #LeadershipDevelopment

Preparing for block 3 of U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) "Reflections on Warfare" course (our history course, 3 blocks, 28 total lessons). The US-RVN attack into Cambodia in April through June 1970 is a very useful campaign for the modern practitioner from the strategic to tactical levels. My TOP take-aways: (1) prioritizing operational surprise over logistical readiness is sometimes rewarding, but be wary of dipping in that well too often, (2) do not take C2 for granted, it just doesn't "happen" and its degradation or absence is usually catastrophic and (3) declaring you are "mobile" doesn't mean you actually are mobile ("show me"). TOP quote: "The tempo for supply troops could be numbing." Marshall Scholars at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies | The Army University | Army University Press | U.S. Army Combined Arms Center | US Army TRADOC

Building the Defense Innovation Base! Developing master innovators takes time and discipline. Cleo and Johnny have both made the commitment and are passing on their lessons to others! Cleo built out the #Gemini program for innovators at the ROTC Jr. level. She is developing mastery with project-based learning and innovation ecosystems to empower problem solving. Cleo is dedicated and driven. She loves a challenge! Say it can't be done, and watch her make miracles happen! Johnny is a powerful story-teller, narrative wizard, and leadership guru following the model laid out by Bob Quinn in the #FundamentalStateOfLeadership. His mastery of the Competing Values Framework for understanding organizational effectiveness is second to none!

I resisted reading this book for sometime. I am not really sure why. Having read a great deal on naval history and operations, I did not think it had much to offer (“the acclaimed bestseller” tag be darned). Boy, do I regret it. This book not only describes one of the US Navy‘s most exceptional victories it does so with great power from the perspective of the most senior admiral to the humblest of sailors. If the US Army is to prosecute multi-domain operations, it will help to appreciate each of the five domains and their interplay in each dimension. This book helps do that for land-lubbers like me. My TOP take-aways: (1) The training base and the industrial base matter and potentially have a decisive role to play in any protracted war. Japanese pilots flew until they died or were “de-planed”. American pilots had a regular system of supply and training that rotated and shared experience. (2) Deception works until it doesn’t and you cannot count on ALL of it working. (3) Yes - all 5 domains (air, land, sea, space and cyber) and 3 dimensions (human, information and physical) all played a role in the outcome. My TOP quote: “A fighting force cannot be reduced to its order of battle any more than a ship’s value can be reduced to the number of guns she carries or the shaft horsepower her turbines generate. A vessel draws life from the spirit of her crew, which derives in large part from the leadership qualities of her chiefs and officers. Morale defies quantification and yet it ways significantly on the ultimate lethality of the tools of war.” U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) | The Army University | Army University Press | U.S. Army Combined Arms Center | U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command | US Army TRADOC | U.S. Army Materiel Command | U.S. Naval War College | Marshall Scholars at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies

Having worked with and as part of the interagency community, Andrew Morgado's takeaways from Todd Schmidt, Ph.D.'s book, "Silent Coup of the Guardians," are spot on. ☝ "We may all prefer strategy driving the allocation of resources so we are able to meet our strategic position, but how long can we sustain this model?" If policy drives strategy, then flawed or inconsistent policy in turn drives bad strategy and misguided resource allocation. One side of that equation is a major challenge... and some of it follows below. ☝ The military’s size, expertise and ability to plan produces a level of preparedness not readily matched by other government agencies. Our ideas of what constitutes "planning" are also vastly different. One agency's idea of a tabletop wargame might involve little more than uninformed resource allocation while another's might boil down to "just tell me what to do." The inconsistency of planning culture is always a challenge. ☝ "Our societal 'intolerance' of complexity narrows options and limits implementation of truly effective solutions." Societally, we have a short attention span and a general dislike of messy things (the uncertainty that comes with thinking strategically). This also describes your average reality TV show and the beltway. If you try to explain to a member of congress a strategy that will require more than the length of their term to execute, their eyes gloss over. Trust me on this, I've seen it happen more than once. Andy's top quote is also painfully true, and a reflection of those three points: “The process by which the United States copes with and confronts such challenges requires an array of competent actors from different communities, backgrounds, experiences, knowledge and expertise with the commitment, capability, and capacity to take ownership and remain engaged over the long term.”

“Civilians no longer control the military because civilians have, for the most part, lost their will and way.” Agree or disagree, this topic and book require our consideration as professionals. Two-time U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) alumnus (#AMSP and #asp3) Todd Schmidt, Ph.D. presents a compelling arguement and traces the contemporary theory and history of Civil-Military relations in the US. Our military is incredibly capable due to its expertise, placement and resources, but is our efficiency and effectiveness crowding out broader and more enduring solutions? My TOP takeaways: (1) We may all prefer strategy driving the allocation of resources so we are able to meet our strategic position, but how long can we sustain this model? (2) The military’s size, expertise and ability to plan produces a level of preparedness not readily matched by other government agencies. (3) Our societal “intolerance” of complexity narrows options and limits implementation of truly effective solutions. My TOP quote: “The process by which the United States copes with and confronts such challenges requires an array of competent actors from different communities, backgrounds, experiences, knowledge and expertise with the commitment, capability, and capacity to take ownership and remain engaged over the long term.” Marshall Scholars at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies | The Army University | Army University Press | U.S. Army Combined Arms Center | US Army TRADOC

This book fills a gap in the study of command in battle. The Corps echelon is seldom studied. Understanding and visualizing Corps operations is essential to U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduates. At least 20 a year go directly to Corps staffs. In Dr. Winton's words: "The requirement for organic unity between high level strategy and the most minor of tactics contains an imperative for the mid-level direction of war to keep the two poles in consonance." Corps are a slice of this "mid-level" that provide "tactical direction to the flexible combination of forces required." One last gem - "Strategic muscle hangs on a logistical skeleton." This is an important book for practioners of operational art. The Army University U.S. Army Combined Arms Center US Army TRADOC #readwithSAMS