*Vale a pena refletir sobre o caso brasileiro sob essa perspectiva conceitual e analítica apresentada neste belo texto do sempre excelente Cass Sunstein. Igualmente, esse parece ser um dos possíveis pontos de partida para se explorar um tema muito raro (e muito importante) na discussão da "melhoria institucional" da economia brasileira.* *The Economic Constitution of the United States* "Suppose that the US Department of Transportation wants to issue a new regu-uppose that the US Department of Transportation wants to issue a new regulation, one that would require all new motor vehicles in the United States tolation, one that would require all new motor vehicles in the United States to be equipped with some state-of-the-art safety technology. Will the regulationbe equipped with some state-of-the-art safety technology. Will the regulation go forward? The answer might well lie in the hands of the Office of Information and go forward? The answer might well lie in the hands of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a small office in the Office of Management and Budget.Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a small office in the Office of Management and Budget. Headed by an administrator who is nominated by the president and confirmed byHeaded by an administrator who is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, OIRA consists of policy analysts, economists, and lawyers, who will askthe Senate, OIRA consists of policy analysts, economists, and lawyers, who will ask whether the benefits of the new regulation would justify the costs. That question whether the benefits of the new regulation would justify the costs. That question is asked not only for motor vehicle safety regulations; it is also asked for climateis asked not only for motor vehicle safety regulations; it is also asked for climate change regulations, occupational safety regulations, water pollution regulations,change regulations, occupational safety regulations, water pollution regulations, immigration regulations, animal welfare regulations, airline safety regulations, and immigration regulations, animal welfare regulations, airline safety regulations, and many others as well. But how do agencies assess costs and benefits? Where will theymany others as well. But how do agencies assess costs and benefits? Where will they look? As it turns out, the United States has something like an Economic Constitution, designed to answer those questions. Most Americans, and even most economists, know nothing about it. Its focus is on human welfare, understood essentially in the economic terms of cost-benefit analysis, with occasional doses of political philosophy (emphasizing, for example, obligations to future generations and the The Economic Constitution of the United States" - ■■ Cass R. Sunstein
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*Muito, muito criativo e refinado!* *Wisława Szymborska, 1923-2012, notável poeta polonesa, ganhadora do Prêmio Nobel de Literatura de 1996.* "Em “On Statistics,” publicado no The Atlantic em 1997, Szymborska usa a linguagem de dados para medir alguns dos aspectos mais confusos da natureza humana" -- The Atlantic
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*Certamente, a recente decisão da Suprema Corte dos EUA isentando o Presidente da República de certa classe de responsabilidades coloca a presidência em um nível "imperial" e, ademais, é muito casuística por livrar o ex-presidente Trump de acusações que pairavam sobre ele!* "How the imperial presidency was built" https://lnkd.in/dxVadE_d
How the imperial presidency was built
the.ink
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*Certamente, a recente decisão da Suprema Corte dos EUA isentando o Presidente da República de certa classe de responsabilidades coloca a presidência em um nível "imperial" e, ademais, é muito casuística por livrar o ex-presidente Trump de acusações que pairavam sobre ele!*
How the imperial presidency was built
the.ink
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"The emergence of political magicians is also not antidemocratic. It just shows that when people become fed up with the established alternatives, they are willing to take the risk of embracing untried solutions. When I studied elections that led to major shifts of policy paradigms—the accession to power of the Social Democrats in Sweden in 1932 and of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom and the United States in 1979 and 19 80, respectively—I assumed that voters would only support a party proposing something unprecedented if this party could claim a record of responsibility, meaning that it had been in office before and had acted like all other parties while holding office. Yet the victories of Trump, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, and Argentina’s Javier Milei show that when people are desperate, they are will ing to seek any remedies and grasp at straws, even those offered by charlatans who sell “miracle cures.” As a Rio de Janeiro Uber driver told an interviewer, “You see this decay, this moral crisis, these politicians who steal and don’t do anything for us. I’m looking at voting for somebody completely new.” When people have nothing to lose, they embrace all kinds of delusions, like curing diseases by applying cottage cheese or making gold from base metals in Weimar Germany. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign slogan was no more than that. So was Bolsonaro’s “clean government, jobs, and guns.” So is Milei’s “Viva la libertad, carajo.” So is “expelling immigrants,” the battle cry of Europe’s far-right parties. This is what we did not anticipate when we believed their victories unthinkable." -- "Who Decides What Is Democratic?", por Adam Przeworski. Free download: https://lnkd.in/dkwkGUr6
