In late 2023 we brought together experts from across wider Europe (the Europe of the OSCE), including Ukraine and Russia, to discuss how different scenarios for Ukraine and the Russian invasion would affect the future of European security, including long term levels of conflict and risk, implications for NATO cohesion and European integration, societal frictions, arms control (or not), and the ability to tackle climate change. The report is attached in the link below and has a lot of food for thought.
It was obviously not an easy discussion to have. It is difficult even to find a common language to describe the war precipitated by Russia’s 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine. For Ukrainians it’s vitally important to acknowledge this as a full scale invasion (not the start of an invasion as that happened eight years ago). Meanwhile of course Russians living in Russia were originally supposed to call it “a special military operation”.
Over time there has been more talk in Russia of a “war” - but which war? The invasion of Ukraine is increasing bound up with the idea of a larger (permanent, unwinnable) “war with the West”. So how to find neutral language? In practice we can simply talk about “the war” but even so there’s a question of the scope (Ukraine, Russia and Europe, Russia and “the West”, even if the West is a nebulous enemy with no defined borders or membership).
The “Ukraine war” often used as shorthand triggered a sense in many east European participants that the reality of invasion and occupation was being papered over - even if the people using it were simply using it for convenience as they would speak of the Gulf war or the Falklands war. This sensitively reflects deeper concerns about the real intentions of outside observers and the subtle ways narratives can start to shift; being sidelined, neglected, misread; and in general about language and categories being defined by others who can’t be guaranteed to understand or care.
This recurs across conflicts: “the war in Gaza” is something I speak of a lot; but there are meaningful differences between speaking of “the Israel-Hamas war”; “Israel’s war on Hamas”; “Israel’s war in Gaza”; “Israel’s war on Gaza”, or putting it in the context of a major escalation in a 75 year conflict and occupation; and that’s before we even get to the discussion of genocide, plausible risks of genocide and genocidal acts against Palestinians or Hamas genocidal acts against Israelis.
Being able to actually discuss why these words matter can be worthwhile in itself as a way of discussing competing meanings and understandings.
Our broader discussion was not designed to discuss how people thought the invasion and war would end or should end. We used a set of possible outcomes as inputs, not outputs, to discuss how Europe would live together “afterwards”, several years down the road. Again “the day after” is a sort of fiction - it’s a thought experiment.
Please do read - would love to hear feedback.
In October 2023, the ELN, in partnership with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, convened a two-day scenario-building workshop in Istanbul featuring a diverse group of experts from Russia, Ukraine and Wider Europe.
The workshop participants explored the implications of several different outcomes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Europe, based on whether or not there was a clear victory on the battlefield and whether or not there was a negotiated peace settlement. Read the full report to view the scenarios, participants’ comments, and policy recommendations for European leaders.
https://lnkd.in/eRjtJvNc
Scenario building workshop report: “Europe after the war”
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org
EU Policy Officer - SAFRAN
4moCongrats Cyril Tregub and welcome back to Bruxelles 🎉🇪🇺