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The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future
The Shia Revival is a historical account of sectarian conflicts in the Muslim world, and how the future rests in finding a peaceful solution to the ancient rivalries between the Shias and the Sunnis. Nasr provides an understanding of this 1,400-year bitter struggle between the two sects - tracing its roots from the succession of the Prophet Muhammad - forcing us to differentiate the religious and theological aspect of Islam from its political and military rivalries. Outlining the rich history of a people and a vibrant culture that has spanned not only the Middle East but also modern-day Pakistan and India, Nasr explains the traditional hostilities and scrutinizes their current embodiment in the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia for political and spiritual leadership of the Muslim world.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
About the author
Vali Nasr
28 books93 followersSon of renowned Iranian academic Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Vali Nasr was born in Tehran in 1960, went to school in England at age 16, and immigrated to the U.S. after the 1979 Revolution. He received his BA from Tufts University in International Relations summa cum laude. He earned his masters in International Economics and Middle East Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1984, then went on to earn his PhD in Political Science from MIT in 1991.
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May 2, 2021
Vali Nasr presented relevant and important information on the Shi'ite-Sunni issue from both the historical context and well as modern problems. The book was written in 2007 (and that's when I read it) but the information can still be used to help the Western world understand the Shia and their community. A worthy read at helping get a glimpse into the Middle Eastern current affairs. Recommended for anyone interested in Middle Eastern affairs. Thanks!
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July 26, 2011This is obviously from the Shia perspective, but in my limited-knowledge opinion (which I'd argue we all speak from) I'd say calling Khomeini the Sunnification of Shiism went a little far. Basically, the author appeared to back-peddle from his established opinion that Shia was the democratic and modernist alternative to a backward, fundamentalist Sunniism. Of course Khomeini is Shia and there was a Safavid empire based in Iran - but he tries to take what would be scary to the west and label it Sunni and lists good about the Shia.
Regardless, as long as one is aware of the continual bias of the book (hard to believe one would not be) it offers a great comparison and the information in it allows you to see what the author is saying. The books point is to explain the difference and conflict between Shia and Sunni sects of Islam - it would be wrong to allow this focus to encourage readers to see the world in these terms.... only that this is one religious issue to consider. The reality, as it so often is, is far more complicated.
Regardless, as long as one is aware of the continual bias of the book (hard to believe one would not be) it offers a great comparison and the information in it allows you to see what the author is saying. The books point is to explain the difference and conflict between Shia and Sunni sects of Islam - it would be wrong to allow this focus to encourage readers to see the world in these terms.... only that this is one religious issue to consider. The reality, as it so often is, is far more complicated.
November 18, 2008
The first chapter of this book is the single best explanation I have ever seen explaining the distinction between Shias and Sunnis. Nasr has performed a valuable service in writing this book. Most explanations reduce the Shia/Sunni distinction to a mere theological point, rendering both sides foolish in the telling. Nasr explains the economic, political, and often ethnic differences that gave rise to such passionately held ideological differences. And he does so in an easy-to-read, captivating account.
Chapter 2 does a terrific job of refuting any monolithic understanding of the categories laid out in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 describes the role of Arab nationalism in fomenting organized Shia dissent (think Hezbollah). Chapter 4 describes Khomeini's success as the basis for global Shia empowerment--and organization, strategy and money. I also recommend Ch. 7, an account of current events in Iraq.
However, as at least one other reader has pointed out, Nasr’s insistence that the Shia/Sunni split is THE defining political dichotomy should be balanced by other perspectives. And I must agree with others, too, that Nasr’s portrayal of the victimized Shias is harder to sympathize with in the face of Iran, Hezbollah, etc. And yet, of course, historically, Shias certainly have been political and economic outcasts.
If you only read the first half of the book though, you may be left with the (bizarre) impression that Sunni prejudice against Shias generally, and Iranians specifically, functioned for the last 50 yrs or so as a geopolitically stabilizing force.
So you must push through to the afterword, which I can only refer to as his "American idealism" chapter, in which he insists that "democracy" and US "commitment to genuine political reform" in the region will ultimately prevail.
Given the violence of the Sunni backlash in response to Shia ascendancy, it is hard to see how ideas like "democracy" can have much effect on stabilizing the Middle East. Yet Nasr points to subtle changes within Iran as one indication that they can. It is difficult in the extreme, given the shape of the Saudi govt., to name but one example, to imagine regional "political reform" as a solution. And yet I don't suppose there is any other option.
Chapter 2 does a terrific job of refuting any monolithic understanding of the categories laid out in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 describes the role of Arab nationalism in fomenting organized Shia dissent (think Hezbollah). Chapter 4 describes Khomeini's success as the basis for global Shia empowerment--and organization, strategy and money. I also recommend Ch. 7, an account of current events in Iraq.
However, as at least one other reader has pointed out, Nasr’s insistence that the Shia/Sunni split is THE defining political dichotomy should be balanced by other perspectives. And I must agree with others, too, that Nasr’s portrayal of the victimized Shias is harder to sympathize with in the face of Iran, Hezbollah, etc. And yet, of course, historically, Shias certainly have been political and economic outcasts.
If you only read the first half of the book though, you may be left with the (bizarre) impression that Sunni prejudice against Shias generally, and Iranians specifically, functioned for the last 50 yrs or so as a geopolitically stabilizing force.
So you must push through to the afterword, which I can only refer to as his "American idealism" chapter, in which he insists that "democracy" and US "commitment to genuine political reform" in the region will ultimately prevail.
Given the violence of the Sunni backlash in response to Shia ascendancy, it is hard to see how ideas like "democracy" can have much effect on stabilizing the Middle East. Yet Nasr points to subtle changes within Iran as one indication that they can. It is difficult in the extreme, given the shape of the Saudi govt., to name but one example, to imagine regional "political reform" as a solution. And yet I don't suppose there is any other option.
January 19, 2009
In spite of its obviously pro-Shia bias, which many other readers have also noted, this is a superb book; I cannot imagine a better introduction to the current sectarian religious strife in the Middle East and Central Asia, nor to the general theological as well as political differences between Shia and Sunni believers. In fact, it's hard to imagine a better introduction to the history and theology of Islam, period. Nasr achieves what I think I most admire in a writer of this sort of study, managing to treat his topic with scholarly rigor but without being dull. He also manages to to use his 300 pages to offer 300 pages worth of information and insight, unlike so many books on contemporary politics (and especially the War on Terror) that generally seem to have about a 10-1 ratio of fluff/repetition/bombast-to-substance (more like 25-to-1 in the case of Thomas Friedman's books, but that's another story). If I were to choose one book to give to someone interested in contemporary international politics, it might well be this one.
October 24, 2007
Should be read both by (Sunnah) Muslims and non-Muslims. Let's face it, what do we know about the Shia Muslims? Next to nothing, most probably. And yet we want to discuss about them and some of us want to bomb them to the stone age. Read. Understand. Chill out.
June 11, 2008
This book basically has two parts and both are very informative. The first part is a sort of history or introduction to the Shias, who they are, and how they fit in the middle east vis-a-vis the Sunnis. The second part of the book is less historical, more of an analysis of the current situation along with thoughts on how the middle east is shaping up and what the rise of the Shias (and, the rise of Iran's influence - read influence, not domination or control) could do to change the region.
It appears to be a very Pro-Shia book, but the audience (Americans) must be considered. Nasr has a big hurdle to get over in this country as the popular perception of Shias in the USA was created during the Iranian Revolution and we tend to think of Shias as, in the words of a friend of the author, "blood-thirsty, baby-eating monsters."
Nasr does a great job in unveiling a frame of the region that most Americans are lost on - the raging Shia/Sunni rivalry that burns ever brighter today since the decline of Arab nationalism and the rise of Saudi influence and Sunni extremist groups such as al-Qaeda.
It appears to be a very Pro-Shia book, but the audience (Americans) must be considered. Nasr has a big hurdle to get over in this country as the popular perception of Shias in the USA was created during the Iranian Revolution and we tend to think of Shias as, in the words of a friend of the author, "blood-thirsty, baby-eating monsters."
Nasr does a great job in unveiling a frame of the region that most Americans are lost on - the raging Shia/Sunni rivalry that burns ever brighter today since the decline of Arab nationalism and the rise of Saudi influence and Sunni extremist groups such as al-Qaeda.
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January 6, 2015I don't want to speak ill of Vali Nasr and I hope this review doesn't come off like I am. I've never met him, but I know of him and he seems much loved and respected. That being said, I kind of really hated this book. I think what happened is you have a man who knows SO MUCH about this and tried to write a book for a general audience and then handed the transcript off to an editor who didn't really get it and didn't want to come across as stupid, so they gave the green light to have it published. There is just SO MUCH information and, in my opinion, it's not organized well, he throws names and places around and I was confused most of the time. Full disclosure, I don't know much of anything on the Middle East, or Islam. But I'm pretty smart and I learn quickly, but this book tested my patience and my self-doubt. I just didn't understand a thing.
I'm not saying don't try to read this. It could just be me. Everyone else loved it. I'm glad I struggled through it. I think. I'm gonna read a really basic book on Islam and the history of mid and near east and then come back to this one. Maybe that will help.
I'm not saying don't try to read this. It could just be me. Everyone else loved it. I'm glad I struggled through it. I think. I'm gonna read a really basic book on Islam and the history of mid and near east and then come back to this one. Maybe that will help.
March 14, 2016
كيف لكاتب علماني ومتخرج من أعرق الجامعات الأمريكية أن يكتب هذا الكتاب الطائفي؟
على طول الكتاب والمؤلف يصم السنة بالتطرف والتزمت والارهاب، ويضع الشيعة بخانة الضعفاء المغلوب على أمرهم. تجده يغلظ القول على الظلم الحاصل للشيعة في العراق وباكستان ولبنان والخليج، لكنه لم يذكر ولا بجملة واحدة الظلم الحاصل على السنة أو عرب الأحواز في إيران! حتى القومية العربية وصمها بأنها مطية السنة للحكم ولا أدري كيف غاب عنه حزب البعث السوري وبشا�� الأسد.
أيضاً لم أفهم كيف لكاتب علماني أن يمتدح قائد ديني مثل الخميني، لم يمدحه بحسن السياسة فقط ولكن أيضاً مدحه بطريقته بخلط الدين مع السياسة، وهذا من أعجب ما قرأته!
اعتقد أن الكتاب موجه للقارئ الغربي خصوصاً وليس للعربي ولا الإيراني. وفكرته الأساسية هي أن من مصلحة الغرب هو التحالف مع الشيعة لأنهم الأكثر تقبلاً للديموقراطية والحداثة الغربية من السُنة المتطرفين المتزمتين.
أخيراً، اتفق مع الكاتب بأن التشيع بإيران ارتبط بشكل كبير مع القومية الفارسية. وهذا الاعتقاد برأيي هو ما ينطلق منه المؤلف بدفاعه عن التشيع .
على طول الكتاب والمؤلف يصم السنة بالتطرف والتزمت والارهاب، ويضع الشيعة بخانة الضعفاء المغلوب على أمرهم. تجده يغلظ القول على الظلم الحاصل للشيعة في العراق وباكستان ولبنان والخليج، لكنه لم يذكر ولا بجملة واحدة الظلم الحاصل على السنة أو عرب الأحواز في إيران! حتى القومية العربية وصمها بأنها مطية السنة للحكم ولا أدري كيف غاب عنه حزب البعث السوري وبشا�� الأسد.
أيضاً لم أفهم كيف لكاتب علماني أن يمتدح قائد ديني مثل الخميني، لم يمدحه بحسن السياسة فقط ولكن أيضاً مدحه بطريقته بخلط الدين مع السياسة، وهذا من أعجب ما قرأته!
اعتقد أن الكتاب موجه للقارئ الغربي خصوصاً وليس للعربي ولا الإيراني. وفكرته الأساسية هي أن من مصلحة الغرب هو التحالف مع الشيعة لأنهم الأكثر تقبلاً للديموقراطية والحداثة الغربية من السُنة المتطرفين المتزمتين.
أخيراً، اتفق مع الكاتب بأن التشيع بإيران ارتبط بشكل كبير مع القومية الفارسية. وهذا الاعتقاد برأيي هو ما ينطلق منه المؤلف بدفاعه عن التشيع .
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January 22, 2014ي��اجه شيعة العرب مآزقاً أخلاقياً تجاه اتخاذ قيادات المذهب مواقف مساندة لنظام بشار الأسد ، المآزق الأخلاقي أصبح قاتل في جسد شباب شيعة العرب تحديداً ، لأنهم ميالون لإنفتاح ثقافي ، متفاعلون الكترونياً، يؤشك العرب الجدد ( شيعة، سنة،مسحيون، يهود) الخروج على تلقين رجال دين تخوض أقدامهم في مستنقعات السياسية .
يصعب أن يجد الشيعي ( عربي أو فارسي ) قدرة على إقناع إنسان اوربا و امريكا بعدالة اتخاذ قيادة مذهبه موقفاً عدوانياً تجاه ثوار سوريا، لأن حرباً ( سورية - سورية ) لا تستوجب وجود إيراني أو لبناني أو عراقي حامل بندقية في طرقات دمشق دفاعاً عن حاكم لا يرغب به قومه ، و لن يفعلها العرب في طهران ذات عهد متوقع ، و غير بعيد.
تعترض ( برتوكولات شيوخ فارس ) لخسائر إستراتيجية جسيمة تجاه تمدد المذهب الشيعي على أراضي الوطن العربي بعد أن اتخذت طهران قرار حماية طفلها الطويل ،( فكل ركض العقول السياسية و العقائدية الشيعية خلال السنوات السبعون الماضية نحو احتلال المواطن العربي قبل التراب أصبح على فراش الموت بسبب بشار الأسد ) ، الطموح الشيعي الفارسي قتله عربي واحد ، لأنه تمسك بكرسي و خذل صانعه .
يدرك مخلصون للمذهب الشيعي أن ( أسدهم ) بات أرنب ، و أن عرب الشيعة دخلوا مربع تساؤلات عن ماذا تريد طهران ؟ و لماذا تسعى إلى شراء مواقف سياسية بدماء شيعة العرب ؟ و إيهما أهم : المذهب ، أم بشار ؟ فالعقل العربي مهووس بالشك، و التوجس ، خاصة عندما يتم الإسراف بإراقة الدم العربي على السور الخارجي للقلعة الفارسية .
بات واضحاً أن المذهب الشيعي يخسر مكتسباته على الاراضي العربية ، فدعم قياداته لجيش بشار يؤدي إلى انسلاخات عاجلة أو آجلة في كتلة شيعة العرب ، لأن أهم عناصر قيادة الشعوب يكمن في وجود عدالة ، عدالة واضحة ، فليس كل ما يراه الشيعي الفارسي موقف عادل يكون حتماً عادل لدى الشيعي العربي ، لأن كليهما ينتمي إلى عرقٍ مختلف ، و لكل عرق مقاييس اساسية خاصة به ، فالدين مهما تثبتت قواعده يصبح دوماً صفة مكتسبة و اقل درجة مقارنة بصفات العرق .
تُكرر طهران خطأ الدولة العثمانية ، عندما أرادت قيادة العرب بعقلية تركية ، كانت النتيجة تفضيل الغرب المسيحي على الشرق الاسلامي ، و هو حظ تعيشه طهران حالياً لأن��ا تريد قيادة العرب بعقلية فارسية ، و منحهم دين جديد ، و نمط معيشي لا يتوافق مع سمات عرقية أحترمها الأسلام و لم يمسسها ( إنما بعُثت لأتمم مكارم الأخلاق )
مارس سواد كبير من عرب ال��زيرة تعنتاً في مطالبتهم للنبي بوجوب رؤيتهم لله قبل أن يدخلوا إلى الإسلام ، و لم يمنعهم من الالحاح أرتفاع السماء ، و عندما لم يتحقق لهم ذلك ماتوا خارج دائرة الاسلام ، و هو طلب قد يكون بارزاً في سنوات قادمة لمصلحة رؤية المهدي ، فهكذا هو العرق العربي لن يؤمن كلياً لطهران حتى يشاهد، و يتحدث إلى المهدي خاصتهم ، كما أن إمتداد نفقه ليس بذات ارتفاع السماء .
يصعب إستمرار الرهان على الريال الإيراني ، فالقلوب ليست غُرف فندقية تستقبل أدياناً و مذاهباً وفق مبدأ ( زبون باذخ ) ، تسقط كل مكتسبات المال بذهابه، و ههنا فإن الحصار الإقتصادي، و تجفيف موارد إيران يخنق أجنحتها المسلحة بالبنادق أو الفتاوي كما حدث لقاعدة بن لادن و وريثه الظواهري ، عندما اتضح أن القناعات الركيكة تشبه الثياب المتسخة ، لا احد يرتديها طويلاً
كاد أن يكون الإنتقال من المذهب السني الى الشيعي في الستينات و قبلها مثل انتقال احدنا في مبارة كرة قدم داخل حارتنا ، فالشوط الاول مع الفريق الاحمر و الثاني مع الازرق ، وحده كان صدام حسين حامل البوق ، الصارخ بأن لإيران رغبة في إدارة العرب و ثرواتهم من خلال توزيع فيروس اسمه مذهب ، لو عاش أحد من أجداد شيعة العرب حتى يشاهد حسن نصر الله يرسل عرب لبنان لقتل عرب سوريا من أجل طموح فارسي ، فأنه سيقول لن اتشيع الآن .
يتموضع في حياتي أصدقاء شيعة العرب ( شباب و فتيات ) يجدون أن حماقات طهران تنهك كواهلهم، كما تفعل حماقات القاعدة بأهل المذهب السني، فهم عرب بالفطرة ( لسان، و دم ) يمتلكون ذات جينات الشاعر العربي اليهودي ( إبن السمؤال) عندما ترك أبنه يموت أمام عينه قتيلاً بسيف الحارث الأعرج مقابل عدم تسليمه وصايا أمرؤ القيس ، وهي مجرد دروع ، و أسلحة، واتبعها بلاميته الشهيرة ( و ما ضيرنا أنا قليل و جارنا .. عزيز و جار الأكثرين ذليلُ ) فالدم العربي لا ي��ذل ذاته ابداً ، و لم يك امرؤ القيس يهودياً ، بل وثنيناً .
ترتكز نجاحات برتوكولات شيوخ فارس على تأجير العرب عقولهم لمطامع فارس، لم تعد كل العقول قابلة للتأجير ، قد يستمر عرب الشيعة على مذهبهم لكن لن يكونوا أبداً دمية فارسية حتى و إن كان قلة من العرب لبست العمائم ، و قبلت يد احمد نجاد و أسياده، فالعرب لا تنحني إلا في ركوع، و لن تستطيع خطط مكتوبة في حجرات مظلمة رؤية النور .
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January 17, 2024
If you're looking for a more succinct review of this book, I highly recommend the one by Valerie above, who briefly describes the contents of each chapter in the course of her review.
I don't know that I would recommend this as a first book for someone with very little knowledge of Islam. It might be better to start with something like _After the Prophet_ (Hazleton) or a book on the basics of Shi'a Islam. Once you have that background, you'll be much better positioned to take advantage of the wealth of information in this book.
I'll comment on a few of the chapters below:
The first chapter provides a lot of detailed information about the history of Shi'ism as well as some incidental cultural differences such as in dress, honorific titles such as Seyyid and Shah, and manner of prayer. And it has a lot of very interesting information about the difference between Shi'a rites as practiced in India, where other local religions have influened Shi'i culture, versus Iran and versus Iraq and other parts of the Arab world. There's also a lot of interesting information on the tombs of the imams and other Shi'i pilgrimage sites.
Later in the chapter, there's some mention of the similarities between Shi'ites and Sufis (as I understand it, Sufism has drawn from both branches of Islam, ie. is not exclusively one or the other) and examples of cooperation between them in countering extremist Sunni movements such as wahhabism and salafism. Toward the end of the chapter, the author points out some interesting information about Beshar Al-Assad's Alawi sect, which derives from Shi'a Islam and which, interestingly, sought and obtained from Lebanese and Iranian religious authorities a fatwa proclaiming them Shi'a just to prove that they are even Muslim at all. And that as a protection against Sunnis who, in many cases, don't consider Shi'ites true Muslims. Truth is truly stranger than fiction.
There's also an excerpt of several paragraphs from an interesting Rudyard Kipling story about observing Ashoura as a British official in Lahore in this chapter.
Chapter 2 talks about the concept of ayatollas and how, in traditional Shi'ite thought, they never sought a political role. It was Khomeini who, with his theory of velayæt-e feqh, first came up with the idea of a supreme leader.
On page 69, two schools of Shi'ite thought are presented. These are the Usuli or fundamentalists and the Akhbari or traditionalists. The latter are found mostly in Bahrain today, although apparently many have been lured over to the Usuli side in the wake of the rise of the Iranian Republic. The Usulis expect the ulama (clerics) to use reasoning to devise new ways of thinking to deal with innovations that arise in society and to push the law in new directions. The Akhbaris reject this idea, relying solely on the Quran and the Hadith and the recorded opinions of the Imams in constructing law.
The main (sole?) branch of Shi'ite law, Ja'afari law, which some more tolerant Sunni Muslims are willing to accept as a fifth school of law alongside the four Sunni schools, differs from those other schools in terms of inheritance, religious taxes, commerce and personal status, and it codifies a very odd practice known as temporary marriage.
Chapter 3 talks about Arab nationalism and how, at first, Shi'ites had embraced it. After a while, though, it became clear that they were not going to be beneficiaries of it, ie. that it was just one more movement which would make Shi'ites victims of it. And it's interesting to note that, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Shi'ites greeted them as liberators. That's certainly understandable considering the hardships they had had to endure as a result of the Palestinian presence. But Hezbollah, under the leadership of Iran, soon brought the Shi'ites into line with their desire to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. As Friedman points out in his book _Between Beirut and Jerusalem_, the Israelis missed out on an opportunity to ally themselves with the Lebanese Shi'ites. But I suppose they are not entirely to blame given that Iran was determined to interfere.
Chapter 4 is perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book. It talks about the rise of Iran and the relationship between Khomeini and other high-level Shi'ite clerics such as Abu al-Qasim al-Khoi. The latter vociferously rejected Khomeini's concentration of religious and political power into one body, and he competed with Khomeini for influence all over the Shi'ite world. I believe Ayatollah Al-Khoi foresaw the problems Shi'ites in Bahrain and Lebanon and other countries in which they lacked political recognition would face as a result of Khomeini's encouragement for them to rise up. And, indeed, we see today that a Sunni minority in Bahrain continues to repress the Shi'ite majority there all these years later. Saudi Arabia, too, has an abysmal track record in its treatment of its Shi'ite citizens. In fact, all of Iran's efforts to export its Shi'ite revolution have pretty much failed despite her best efforts. Whereas Iranians probably could have done a lot to use their considerable influence to promote their co-religionists in these areas if Khomeini hadn't been so determined to lash out at his perceived enemies rather than to try to work out compromises with them.
I'd like to comment on one last chapter, as well. That is chapter 8 which is entitled 'The Rise of Iran'. Ever since Khatæmi won the presidential elections in 1996, the public has made it clear in election after election that it wants reform, but the authoritarian mullas are determined to keep their grasp on power no matter what, and the people be damned. The description of evening events at the Jamkaran mosque near Qom and of Iranian pilgrims' increasing support of Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq make it clear that, though they wish to remain close to their Shi'ite roots, they are fed up with sanctimonious leaders who seem to care nothing about helping to move Iran forward out of poverty and into a brighter future.
This chapter also talks about the increase in repression which Shi'ite Muslims in eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have had to endure as a result of Iranian posturing against the Arab Gulf. It seems pretty clear then that the Islamic Republic hasn't done much at all to improve the lot of Shi'ite Muslims outside of Iran.
Even more repulsive is their decision to name a street in Tehran after Anwar Sadat's murderer.
I also want to point out that several of the reviews of this book express the opinion that the book is biased in favor of the Shi'a viewpoint. I'm not sure I agree. Certainly, Iran under the Islamic Republic discriminates against and horribly mistreats religious minorities, among them Sunni Muslims. They've also stirred up trouble abroad through their support of terrorism in a variety of countries. And I am sure there are probably other examples of Shi'ite aggression I'm not aware of. But my sense is that, throughout history, it's the Shi'a who have pretty consistently been the victims of Sunni aggression and not the other way around.
I don't know that I would recommend this as a first book for someone with very little knowledge of Islam. It might be better to start with something like _After the Prophet_ (Hazleton) or a book on the basics of Shi'a Islam. Once you have that background, you'll be much better positioned to take advantage of the wealth of information in this book.
I'll comment on a few of the chapters below:
The first chapter provides a lot of detailed information about the history of Shi'ism as well as some incidental cultural differences such as in dress, honorific titles such as Seyyid and Shah, and manner of prayer. And it has a lot of very interesting information about the difference between Shi'a rites as practiced in India, where other local religions have influened Shi'i culture, versus Iran and versus Iraq and other parts of the Arab world. There's also a lot of interesting information on the tombs of the imams and other Shi'i pilgrimage sites.
Later in the chapter, there's some mention of the similarities between Shi'ites and Sufis (as I understand it, Sufism has drawn from both branches of Islam, ie. is not exclusively one or the other) and examples of cooperation between them in countering extremist Sunni movements such as wahhabism and salafism. Toward the end of the chapter, the author points out some interesting information about Beshar Al-Assad's Alawi sect, which derives from Shi'a Islam and which, interestingly, sought and obtained from Lebanese and Iranian religious authorities a fatwa proclaiming them Shi'a just to prove that they are even Muslim at all. And that as a protection against Sunnis who, in many cases, don't consider Shi'ites true Muslims. Truth is truly stranger than fiction.
There's also an excerpt of several paragraphs from an interesting Rudyard Kipling story about observing Ashoura as a British official in Lahore in this chapter.
Chapter 2 talks about the concept of ayatollas and how, in traditional Shi'ite thought, they never sought a political role. It was Khomeini who, with his theory of velayæt-e feqh, first came up with the idea of a supreme leader.
On page 69, two schools of Shi'ite thought are presented. These are the Usuli or fundamentalists and the Akhbari or traditionalists. The latter are found mostly in Bahrain today, although apparently many have been lured over to the Usuli side in the wake of the rise of the Iranian Republic. The Usulis expect the ulama (clerics) to use reasoning to devise new ways of thinking to deal with innovations that arise in society and to push the law in new directions. The Akhbaris reject this idea, relying solely on the Quran and the Hadith and the recorded opinions of the Imams in constructing law.
The main (sole?) branch of Shi'ite law, Ja'afari law, which some more tolerant Sunni Muslims are willing to accept as a fifth school of law alongside the four Sunni schools, differs from those other schools in terms of inheritance, religious taxes, commerce and personal status, and it codifies a very odd practice known as temporary marriage.
Chapter 3 talks about Arab nationalism and how, at first, Shi'ites had embraced it. After a while, though, it became clear that they were not going to be beneficiaries of it, ie. that it was just one more movement which would make Shi'ites victims of it. And it's interesting to note that, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Shi'ites greeted them as liberators. That's certainly understandable considering the hardships they had had to endure as a result of the Palestinian presence. But Hezbollah, under the leadership of Iran, soon brought the Shi'ites into line with their desire to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. As Friedman points out in his book _Between Beirut and Jerusalem_, the Israelis missed out on an opportunity to ally themselves with the Lebanese Shi'ites. But I suppose they are not entirely to blame given that Iran was determined to interfere.
Chapter 4 is perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book. It talks about the rise of Iran and the relationship between Khomeini and other high-level Shi'ite clerics such as Abu al-Qasim al-Khoi. The latter vociferously rejected Khomeini's concentration of religious and political power into one body, and he competed with Khomeini for influence all over the Shi'ite world. I believe Ayatollah Al-Khoi foresaw the problems Shi'ites in Bahrain and Lebanon and other countries in which they lacked political recognition would face as a result of Khomeini's encouragement for them to rise up. And, indeed, we see today that a Sunni minority in Bahrain continues to repress the Shi'ite majority there all these years later. Saudi Arabia, too, has an abysmal track record in its treatment of its Shi'ite citizens. In fact, all of Iran's efforts to export its Shi'ite revolution have pretty much failed despite her best efforts. Whereas Iranians probably could have done a lot to use their considerable influence to promote their co-religionists in these areas if Khomeini hadn't been so determined to lash out at his perceived enemies rather than to try to work out compromises with them.
I'd like to comment on one last chapter, as well. That is chapter 8 which is entitled 'The Rise of Iran'. Ever since Khatæmi won the presidential elections in 1996, the public has made it clear in election after election that it wants reform, but the authoritarian mullas are determined to keep their grasp on power no matter what, and the people be damned. The description of evening events at the Jamkaran mosque near Qom and of Iranian pilgrims' increasing support of Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq make it clear that, though they wish to remain close to their Shi'ite roots, they are fed up with sanctimonious leaders who seem to care nothing about helping to move Iran forward out of poverty and into a brighter future.
This chapter also talks about the increase in repression which Shi'ite Muslims in eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have had to endure as a result of Iranian posturing against the Arab Gulf. It seems pretty clear then that the Islamic Republic hasn't done much at all to improve the lot of Shi'ite Muslims outside of Iran.
Even more repulsive is their decision to name a street in Tehran after Anwar Sadat's murderer.
I also want to point out that several of the reviews of this book express the opinion that the book is biased in favor of the Shi'a viewpoint. I'm not sure I agree. Certainly, Iran under the Islamic Republic discriminates against and horribly mistreats religious minorities, among them Sunni Muslims. They've also stirred up trouble abroad through their support of terrorism in a variety of countries. And I am sure there are probably other examples of Shi'ite aggression I'm not aware of. But my sense is that, throughout history, it's the Shi'a who have pretty consistently been the victims of Sunni aggression and not the other way around.
January 12, 2021
The whole Islamic world looks strikingly different from a Shia perspective, and Nasr's presentation of that view offers vast scope for fresh thinking. His book is so packed with insight that it took me a month to consume it. It puts the Shia into focus as an important religious minority, concerned with minority rights, and devoted more to justice than legalism. It is a faith born in protest against tyranny, which has therefore been treated as a treasonous heresy by most autocratic rulers of the Middle East. Nasr gives a detailed account of Shia fortunes in nations from Lebanon to India. In the process he powerfully challenges a host of misconceptions which commonly cloud our view of modern events. For example:
"Expecting to have more rights and powers under the emerging order, Shias have welcomed both the fall of Sunni domination and the rise of prospects for political change. This makes them in principle more likely to work with the United States. Greater democracy serves Shia interests across the region, and hence Shia revival is favorably disposed toward democratic change. The Shia universe of discourse is now the site of the entire Muslim world's most interesting and thorough debates about Islam's relationship with democracy and economic growth, and indeed about Islam's situation vis-a-vis modernity." (p. 179-180)
"Expecting to have more rights and powers under the emerging order, Shias have welcomed both the fall of Sunni domination and the rise of prospects for political change. This makes them in principle more likely to work with the United States. Greater democracy serves Shia interests across the region, and hence Shia revival is favorably disposed toward democratic change. The Shia universe of discourse is now the site of the entire Muslim world's most interesting and thorough debates about Islam's relationship with democracy and economic growth, and indeed about Islam's situation vis-a-vis modernity." (p. 179-180)
February 23, 2024
قبل نقد الكتاب ينبغي ان نعلم ان الكاتب استاذ في الدراسات العليا التابعة للأكاديمية البحرية الامريكية وهو عضو سابق في مجلس السياسة الخارجية بوزارة الخارجية الامريكية وعلى ما يبدو من خلال مقدمة الكتاب ان دائرة علاقاته تشمل ايضا ضباطا باكستانيين مرتبطين بوزارة الدفاع الامريكية ..وهو شيعي حاصل على جنسية امريكية..
بالتالي حين توكل لهؤلاء مهمة تدريس علوم حساسة كالعلوم السياسية والقانونية للطلبة الامريكيين في اعرق جامعات امريكا فإن هذا الامر مدعاة للريبة والشك اذا ما قِسناه بالخطابات الامريكية السابقة فهذا شاهد آخر على ان الامر لا يتعلق فقط بإنهاء عصر الهيمنة السنية على العراق والشرق الاوسط حسب قول بول بريمر لكن الامر يتعلق ايضا بنشر الفكر المناهض للتسنن (كما يسميه الكاتب) في الدول الغربية ايضا وعلى رأسها اميركا ..وهذا ان دل على شيء فإنما يدل على ان التشيع هو الطريق الاقرب للفكر العلماني والالحادي وان الحلف الصفوي-الصليبي-الصهيوني لم يعد مسألة خرافية تسبح في خيالات أعتى الجماعات السنية راديكالية وأكثرِها عداءاً للطائفة الشيعية انما هو مشروع له أسس وجذور تمتد عبر التاريخ ..
اخيرا اتمنى من الجميع قراءة هذا الكتاب الخطير جدا فبه معلومات غاية في الاهمية قد تكشف لنا النظرة الغربية الحقيقية نحو التشيع عامة ومستقبل العلاقات الامريكية الايرانية علما ان الكتاب تم إصداره للعامة سنة 2007 .
بالتالي حين توكل لهؤلاء مهمة تدريس علوم حساسة كالعلوم السياسية والقانونية للطلبة الامريكيين في اعرق جامعات امريكا فإن هذا الامر مدعاة للريبة والشك اذا ما قِسناه بالخطابات الامريكية السابقة فهذا شاهد آخر على ان الامر لا يتعلق فقط بإنهاء عصر الهيمنة السنية على العراق والشرق الاوسط حسب قول بول بريمر لكن الامر يتعلق ايضا بنشر الفكر المناهض للتسنن (كما يسميه الكاتب) في الدول الغربية ايضا وعلى رأسها اميركا ..وهذا ان دل على شيء فإنما يدل على ان التشيع هو الطريق الاقرب للفكر العلماني والالحادي وان الحلف الصفوي-الصليبي-الصهيوني لم يعد مسألة خرافية تسبح في خيالات أعتى الجماعات السنية راديكالية وأكثرِها عداءاً للطائفة الشيعية انما هو مشروع له أسس وجذور تمتد عبر التاريخ ..
اخيرا اتمنى من الجميع قراءة هذا الكتاب الخطير جدا فبه معلومات غاية في الاهمية قد تكشف لنا النظرة الغربية الحقيقية نحو التشيع عامة ومستقبل العلاقات الامريكية الايرانية علما ان الكتاب تم إصداره للعامة سنة 2007 .
April 20, 2024
Good overview of Shia history and how Islamic sectarianism has and still does shape the geopolitics of the Middle East.
June 23, 2013
كتاب رائع يتكلم عن حالة النهوض لدى الشيعة بعد عام 2003م أي تحرر العراق من حكم صدام حسين وتحوله إلى ديمقراطية أكثرية.
الكتاب يبدأ بعدة فصول يسرد فيها خلفيات الأوضاع السياسية والدينية الاضطهادية التي عاشها الشيعة خلال العقود الثلاثة الأخيرة، والمواجهات التي خاضوها بعد انتصار الثورة الاسلامية في إيران، وحالة التكفير والتهميش التي عانوا منها، والأخطاء التي وقعوا فيها، ونقاط القوة التي اكتسبوها، ثم يبدأ في الاطلالة على المستقبل.
من الأمور الجيدة في الكتاب تحليله لتأثيرات القيادة الشيعية على الأوضاع السياسية للساحات الشيعية، سواء من الجانب السلبي أو الإيجابي.
الكتاب كان فاتحة لمجموعة كبيرة من البحوث والدراسات والتحليلات المتعلقة بنهضة الشيعة أو صحوتهم كما يشير العنوان العربي، وإن كان العنوان الأصلي يعبر عن "إعادة إحياء" الوضع الشيعي Shia Revival.
أنصح بقراءة الكتاب وأيضاً بمتابعة تسجيلات الفيديو (يويتيوب) للمؤلف عن نفس الموضوع وهي عبارة عن ندوات أكاديمية (باللغة الانجليزية).
الجدير بالذكر أن الكتاب تحول إلى منهج أكاديمي في العلوم السياسية يحمل نفس العنوان لتدريس مادة الشيعة وأوضاعهم في الشرق الأوسط في بعض الجامعات الأمريكية، ويمكن الحصول على مواد اضافية حول موضوع الكتاب من الوصلة التالية لمجلس العلاقات الخارجية الأمريكي http://www.cfr.org/religion/academic-... .
الكتاب يبدأ بعدة فصول يسرد فيها خلفيات الأوضاع السياسية والدينية الاضطهادية التي عاشها الشيعة خلال العقود الثلاثة الأخيرة، والمواجهات التي خاضوها بعد انتصار الثورة الاسلامية في إيران، وحالة التكفير والتهميش التي عانوا منها، والأخطاء التي وقعوا فيها، ونقاط القوة التي اكتسبوها، ثم يبدأ في الاطلالة على المستقبل.
من الأمور الجيدة في الكتاب تحليله لتأثيرات القيادة الشيعية على الأوضاع السياسية للساحات الشيعية، سواء من الجانب السلبي أو الإيجابي.
الكتاب كان فاتحة لمجموعة كبيرة من البحوث والدراسات والتحليلات المتعلقة بنهضة الشيعة أو صحوتهم كما يشير العنوان العربي، وإن كان العنوان الأصلي يعبر عن "إعادة إحياء" الوضع الشيعي Shia Revival.
أنصح بقراءة الكتاب وأيضاً بمتابعة تسجيلات الفيديو (يويتيوب) للمؤلف عن نفس الموضوع وهي عبارة عن ندوات أكاديمية (باللغة الانجليزية).
الجدير بالذكر أن الكتاب تحول إلى منهج أكاديمي في العلوم السياسية يحمل نفس العنوان لتدريس مادة الشيعة وأوضاعهم في الشرق الأوسط في بعض الجامعات الأمريكية، ويمكن الحصول على مواد اضافية حول موضوع الكتاب من الوصلة التالية لمجلس العلاقات الخارجية الأمريكي http://www.cfr.org/religion/academic-... .
July 22, 2008
Interesting central hypothesis about how the position of Shiites within the Muslim world is changing, but wasn't overly impressed with his argument. Too much of it felt a bit anecdotal.
January 17, 2020
Provocative, informative, but misleading. Fiction disguised as nonfiction!
First, Nasr manipulates the Western reader into believing that only he (not even Khomeini, p.135) can define Shia: Claiming Ashoura celebrations define it (p.48), yet admits the Shia scholars deem them as heresy. On p.31, he claims “Shia..see spirituality in passion..rather than in law" and ‘Shia scholars emphasis on Law is sunnification of Shia’ (misleading Western readers then to seeing Sunnis as less spiritual and as rigidly legalistic, which isn’t true. Sunnism isn’t a monolith) These aren’t innocent differences in opinion: he wants to -deceitfully- win over Westerners who are enchanted by spiritual fests, coercing them into picking teams!). Nasr conveniently forgets that Shia scholars get alms from their masses (Sunni scholars don't). Had his opinion -about whatShia is- been right, then the scholars advocating Law over 'Shia spirituality' would’ve been ‘driven out of the market’.
He sneakily uses wordplay (p.238): "..turn to militancy among some Saudi Shias". Here only ‘some’ Shia are turning to terrorism. But on the preceding pages discussing Sunni terrorism, he portrays all the residents of entire Sunni cities as terrorists or their supporters.
On p.49, he likens Shia's passion (not an innocent choice of words, when addressing mostly Christian readers) of Husayn to that of Christ's passions. And on p.64, he uses (one) word to Justify why Shia hate Omar (2nd Muslim Khaliph, reveared by Sunnis). The word is "cruelty". A Western reader not knowing Omar, now only thinks he was 'cruel'. Nasr didn't even try to conceal his bias (such as saying 'alleged cruelty').
He masters omissions too, ignoring the identification of who the victim (Sunnis) is, lest that reveals the aggressor’s identity (Shias): "Tens of thousands more had been driven from their homes" (p.265). Since Sunni terrorists had no territorial claims then (2006; no ISIS yet), Sunni civilians were the ones displaced by Shia militia dominating the Iraqi security forces (p.262).
It’s smart and cunning little lies like these, that deserve admiration for the expert narrative-weaving (like a Persian rug), and also deserve disgust with its manipulative intent (like a Persian Bazaar hustler).
Once this invented Shia portray is established, then the true con begins. Nasr starts referring to Shia and Iran interchangeably, only making rare distinctions. Here is where Nasr’s scheming becomes dangerous: By conflating Shia with Iran, a reader’s misplaced rooting for Shia, becomes easily distorted into undeserved fondness of Iran (example: he frames Iran's attempts to destabilize its Sunni neighbors to realize its Persian hegemony, as Iran supporting oppressed Arab Shia minorities). Over time, if we buy this poisoned logic, the Western stance of Iran becomes a matter of difference in opinions, and not a clash of ideals (democracy-theocracy).
On p.109, he mentions that "there are ideological and ethnic dimensions to the divide that separates the Arab[s] from Iran.., but the rivalry's historical mainstay was always the Shia-Sunni split." His 'always' is a lie: A) Iran only became Shia a few centuries ago. The Iranian king of the time wanted to make his game of thrones with the Turks more interesting than mere Persians vs Turks, so he forcibly converted the populace, making it PersianShia vs SunniTurks. B) that same act shows that even that king figured that power-grabbing in the name of Persia is just too obvious as a racist line of battle. He too, like Iran of our era, needed a religious drape to hide the true nature of the conflict. It isn’t sectarian; it is political and ethnic. Sectarianism in politics is merely a mask to hide the ugly face of the authoritarianism that cripples the Mideast.
Iran is riding the cultural and political revival of the Arab Shia to reach its own goals. Nasr tries to deny this fact ("This is a regional Shia project, not an Iranian one" -p.184). But judged by history (now in 2019), it’s clearly an Iranian one, clothed in Shia attire: Iran dictates what happens in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and Iran deforms Arab-Shia's identity to Shia-pawns in Iran's geopolitical game. Nasr, for instance, admitted on p.224 that Iranians were indeed inflating the Shia votes in Iraq's elections (a charge he had previously denied -p.200).
Duplicitous again on p.223: "They [Iran's Revolutionary Guards trained militias in the region] are links in a chain that represents the muscle of the Shia." =meaning Iran. This duplicity is shameful, but it’s also telling, and enlightening.
Nasr misinforms us (p.20): "it is paradoxically, a very old, very modern conflict." echoing the Western media that had us believe that the Shia-Sunni bloody conflict in Iraq was yet another battle in a lengthy bloodbath. This is a myth. Throughout Islamic history, Shia and Sunnis lived and traded together, intermarried, etc. The perpetual conflict myth serves Nasr’s fictional narrative of depicting Shia as a historical underdog that’s finally emerging a winner, rather than an opportunistic Iran using Arab Shia minorities to achieve Persian hegemony over the Arab Mideast, and using the Shia underdog narrative, much like Nasr, to conceal the truth.
Both Shia and Sunnis masses are manipulated by their despotic elites, who draw on a historical cache of sectarian anecdotes to rally them around unfounded fears, and reinvented identities, to use them as fuel in the regional power games, instead of fighting the true battle for democracy, and against these same fear-mongering elites.
Iran outsmarted the calcified Arab political class, by using Arab Shia as its Trojan horse to undermine the Arab Sunni rulers, but it isn’t a sectarian conflict except on the surface. It’s a politico-racial conflict, between the Arabs, and Iran’s desire to rule the Mideast and to have a (huge) foothold onto the Mediterranean shores, the Gulf, and the Red Sea (all major waterways in the area have wars now, and all have Iranian hands in Arab lands). On p.80, the mask is lifted a little, Nasr admits "the identification of Iran and Shiism endured, with highly provocative consequences for the Middle East in the [20th] century"
True, there are historical roots to the current bloody sectarianism, but they’re mere cards in the hands of Iran and other regional (Sunni) players. Saddam did indeed derogatorily use the name of a Shia man who conspired with the Mongol invaders a thousand years ago, to bring the fall of Baghdad. Nasr belittled that catastrophe as "a grudge" Sunnis carry, yet he had to admit that Iraqi Shia collaborated with US forces for the 2nd fall of Baghdad (2003). He also paraphrased the term collaboration with occupiers, when talking of India a few centuries ago (p.99): "Shia ascendancy appeared to be a consequence of Britain's growing commercial and political influence." He was even uncharacteristically honest when he stated (p.114) that Lebanese "Shia greeted the invading Israeli army as liberators, with flowers", but honesty here was also calculated to conjure approving nods from Western Israeli supporters, and probably not for honesty's sake.
Based on bias, the book is riddled with false conclusions. Nasr accepts democracy and majority rule as a good idea for Lebanon's Shia (a quasi-majority), but argues for sectarian quotas in Afghanistan (to help the Shia minority there -p.27). Could we imagine the US congress divided based on religious affiliations?!
Worse yet, he indirectly argues against majority rule in all of the Arab Mideast by arguing against Arab Nationalism (p.92). In my opinion, if Sunnis are the majority, then democratically speaking, they should be able to rule their lands. For Nasr, that’s no good, as it curbs Iran’s influence.
While it’s true that the National State project failed in the region, national identity remains the answer to sectarian strife. Had Iraqis instead of fostering sectarian political identities, focused on building an Iraqi identity, a lot of bloodshed would have been avoided (but that wasn’t in Iran's interest, hence its heavy sectarian hand).
Nasr, too blinded by his sectarianism (and Iranian-ism) to fathom Arab nationalism, sees a split in Arabs' public opinion on Iran. On p.270, he contrasts the Arab street support for Iran against Israel in Lebanon with the Arab anti-Iranian feeling when it comes to Iraq. He fails to comprehend that while the national state project failed, Arab Nationalism is alive and well. For the Arabs, Iran is the enemy of their enemy in Lebanon; but in Iraq, Iran is the enemy. When Iran is at odds with the Saudis or Saddam's Iraq, the real story is about dictators fighting dictators. When ordinary Arabs join in, it’s for ethno-national reasons, not for sectarian ones (after all, Iraqi Shia fought off Iran for 8 years in the 1980s).
Another false conclusion: mistaking the cause for the result (p.82). He opined that the old Sunni-Shia feud "draws political boundary lines". The cause for the rising sectarianism is the failure of the modern State (occupations by foreigners; and corruption rotting all Arab governments). When any State fails, people look for sub-State ties for protection. Had there been a true representative State for all its citizens regardless of sect, people would have maintained the national and modernizing trend that swept the Mideast in the 1950s-1960s, rather than turning to fundamentalism, be it Sunni or Shia. Yet Nasr, even on this indisputable fact, appropriates modernization to 'his team' only (p.86), forgetting that modernization was a national Arab project then, without exclusion of Sunnis or Shia.
By his biased attribution of the failure of modernization to Sunnis, Nasr misses its true cause: Authoritarianism. Dictatorships have no religion. Sunnism is a numerically confounding factor! The disease is dictatorship and corruption; the symptom is sectarianism; but Nasr mistakes one for the other (p.86-89). The Arab street rising from Tunisia to Iraq in recent years, is the proof. Sunni protesters rose against mostly Sunni rulers. It isn’t sectarianism that drove the dictatorship or the rebellion; corruption and authoritarianism did.
Nasr doesn’t want the reader to realize that while sectarianism exists, it became bloody, after centuries of calm, only because both Iran’s theocratic dictatorship and Sunni dictators are exploiting it (Yet the truth has its own way of seeping in. See Iran’s sectarian hand in the last paragraph on p.154, and the Saudi sectarian response on p.156). Nasr ignores this fact entirely, and moves on to contradict himself (p.161) stating that Iran sought to avoid the sectarian definition (no supporting resources cited), and that :"..they [Iran Shia] are offended by the tenor and ferocity of sectarian violence [in Iraq]" (p.226). But Iran -per Nasr's own words- threatened Pakistan on sectarian grounds (p.138), and "Elements of the Iranian regime are even producing anti-Sunni polemics in Arabic for dissemination beyond Iran" (p.225). So which is it? offended by sectarianism? or fueling it?
Iran's regional power-play isn’t assessed in this book. He focuses on Shia as a minority sect in need of empowerment. But the book indirectly reveals that Iran is using Arab Shia minorities-cum-militias to destabilize Arab Sunni States. When Arab rulers decry "the growing Iranian influence", Nasr accuses them of trying to "gain international support for resisting Shia empowerment" (p.242). When Arab rulers respond with corrective measures, Nasr says it isn’t enough (p.234-235). When Arab rulers (or terrorists) respond violently, well, we all agree with Nasr that should not pass. When democracy is advocated, Nasr ascribes it to Shia only (p.251) dismissing all Sunnis to be anti-democracy radicals, thus alienating most Arabs out of the democratic process. What Nasr (and Iran) seem to want from Sunni Arabs, both rulers and ruled, is to roll over, and hand the Mideast over to Iran.
He even states (p.251) that "The Shia revival constitutes the most powerful resistance and challenge to Sunni extremism and Jihadi activism". This conclusion is both misleading, and dangerous because, if adopted, it would perpetuate the sectarian Sunni-Shia divide, and invite more extremism on both sides. The true anti-extremism is political and economic opening, it’s representative democracy, rather than awaiting a Mulla to dictate politics.
Nasr isn't a rookie; he weaves his false arguments, but tries to preempt potential refutations. He sugarcoats Iran in a more palatable flavor of Shia, but knows that some Westerners would frown upon this, since Iran has been a thorn in our side for decades. So on p.260, he uncouples Iran from the Shia (verbally only, as you’ll see). He advises Western policy makers to support the Shia in Lebanon (as was done in Iraq) because it may lessen their support of (Iran's) Hezbollah. A flawed argument since on the same page, he admits that support for Hezbollah is strong among Lebanon's Shia. So empowering Lebanon Shia leads automatically to empowering Hezbollah AND Iran (also see p.270). The answer here, again, is empowering citizenry -regardless of sect (but Nasr wouldn't advocate that as it weakens Iran).
And so on p.271, he denies "equating Shia with Iran", even though this is literally what he did throughout the book (from the first he stated "most Iranians are Shia", and "Iran is riding the crest of Shia revival"), but if he flat-out admits to equating them, then his target audience would reject most of his book conclusions.
His whole goal is to convince you that Iran and its Shia Trojan horses aren't too bad ("Shia masses were not driven by anti-American militancy" -p.272. Really? What of Hezbollah? What of 'Death to America' chants in Tehran's streets? Even Shia support of the U.S. presence in Iraq was merely a waiting game till they control every inch of the State and economy, before turning it over to their Iranian Masters/Mullas).
Nasr thinks, as Iran does, that the vacuum created by Saddam’s fall in Iraq should be filled with Iranian hegemony masked as Shia revival. While I agree that the ripple effects of the fall of Baghdad touched the whole region, I disagree with the Shia revival being the deciding factor here. What the fall of Saddam showed the Arabs (Shia and Sunnis) is that dictators do fall, hence the Arab Spring; that corruption isn’t destiny; that an oppressed majority can curb the oppressive rule of a minority (be it poor vs rich, Sunni vs Shia, or democrats vs dictators). Unfortunately books like this, and policies like Iran's, are only trying to thwart that eventuality.
(End of part 1 of this review. Part 2 will be the 1st comment on this review.)
First, Nasr manipulates the Western reader into believing that only he (not even Khomeini, p.135) can define Shia: Claiming Ashoura celebrations define it (p.48), yet admits the Shia scholars deem them as heresy. On p.31, he claims “Shia..see spirituality in passion..rather than in law" and ‘Shia scholars emphasis on Law is sunnification of Shia’ (misleading Western readers then to seeing Sunnis as less spiritual and as rigidly legalistic, which isn’t true. Sunnism isn’t a monolith) These aren’t innocent differences in opinion: he wants to -deceitfully- win over Westerners who are enchanted by spiritual fests, coercing them into picking teams!). Nasr conveniently forgets that Shia scholars get alms from their masses (Sunni scholars don't). Had his opinion -about whatShia is- been right, then the scholars advocating Law over 'Shia spirituality' would’ve been ‘driven out of the market’.
He sneakily uses wordplay (p.238): "..turn to militancy among some Saudi Shias". Here only ‘some’ Shia are turning to terrorism. But on the preceding pages discussing Sunni terrorism, he portrays all the residents of entire Sunni cities as terrorists or their supporters.
On p.49, he likens Shia's passion (not an innocent choice of words, when addressing mostly Christian readers) of Husayn to that of Christ's passions. And on p.64, he uses (one) word to Justify why Shia hate Omar (2nd Muslim Khaliph, reveared by Sunnis). The word is "cruelty". A Western reader not knowing Omar, now only thinks he was 'cruel'. Nasr didn't even try to conceal his bias (such as saying 'alleged cruelty').
He masters omissions too, ignoring the identification of who the victim (Sunnis) is, lest that reveals the aggressor’s identity (Shias): "Tens of thousands more had been driven from their homes" (p.265). Since Sunni terrorists had no territorial claims then (2006; no ISIS yet), Sunni civilians were the ones displaced by Shia militia dominating the Iraqi security forces (p.262).
It’s smart and cunning little lies like these, that deserve admiration for the expert narrative-weaving (like a Persian rug), and also deserve disgust with its manipulative intent (like a Persian Bazaar hustler).
Once this invented Shia portray is established, then the true con begins. Nasr starts referring to Shia and Iran interchangeably, only making rare distinctions. Here is where Nasr’s scheming becomes dangerous: By conflating Shia with Iran, a reader’s misplaced rooting for Shia, becomes easily distorted into undeserved fondness of Iran (example: he frames Iran's attempts to destabilize its Sunni neighbors to realize its Persian hegemony, as Iran supporting oppressed Arab Shia minorities). Over time, if we buy this poisoned logic, the Western stance of Iran becomes a matter of difference in opinions, and not a clash of ideals (democracy-theocracy).
On p.109, he mentions that "there are ideological and ethnic dimensions to the divide that separates the Arab[s] from Iran.., but the rivalry's historical mainstay was always the Shia-Sunni split." His 'always' is a lie: A) Iran only became Shia a few centuries ago. The Iranian king of the time wanted to make his game of thrones with the Turks more interesting than mere Persians vs Turks, so he forcibly converted the populace, making it PersianShia vs SunniTurks. B) that same act shows that even that king figured that power-grabbing in the name of Persia is just too obvious as a racist line of battle. He too, like Iran of our era, needed a religious drape to hide the true nature of the conflict. It isn’t sectarian; it is political and ethnic. Sectarianism in politics is merely a mask to hide the ugly face of the authoritarianism that cripples the Mideast.
Iran is riding the cultural and political revival of the Arab Shia to reach its own goals. Nasr tries to deny this fact ("This is a regional Shia project, not an Iranian one" -p.184). But judged by history (now in 2019), it’s clearly an Iranian one, clothed in Shia attire: Iran dictates what happens in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and Iran deforms Arab-Shia's identity to Shia-pawns in Iran's geopolitical game. Nasr, for instance, admitted on p.224 that Iranians were indeed inflating the Shia votes in Iraq's elections (a charge he had previously denied -p.200).
Duplicitous again on p.223: "They [Iran's Revolutionary Guards trained militias in the region] are links in a chain that represents the muscle of the Shia." =meaning Iran. This duplicity is shameful, but it’s also telling, and enlightening.
Nasr misinforms us (p.20): "it is paradoxically, a very old, very modern conflict." echoing the Western media that had us believe that the Shia-Sunni bloody conflict in Iraq was yet another battle in a lengthy bloodbath. This is a myth. Throughout Islamic history, Shia and Sunnis lived and traded together, intermarried, etc. The perpetual conflict myth serves Nasr’s fictional narrative of depicting Shia as a historical underdog that’s finally emerging a winner, rather than an opportunistic Iran using Arab Shia minorities to achieve Persian hegemony over the Arab Mideast, and using the Shia underdog narrative, much like Nasr, to conceal the truth.
Both Shia and Sunnis masses are manipulated by their despotic elites, who draw on a historical cache of sectarian anecdotes to rally them around unfounded fears, and reinvented identities, to use them as fuel in the regional power games, instead of fighting the true battle for democracy, and against these same fear-mongering elites.
Iran outsmarted the calcified Arab political class, by using Arab Shia as its Trojan horse to undermine the Arab Sunni rulers, but it isn’t a sectarian conflict except on the surface. It’s a politico-racial conflict, between the Arabs, and Iran’s desire to rule the Mideast and to have a (huge) foothold onto the Mediterranean shores, the Gulf, and the Red Sea (all major waterways in the area have wars now, and all have Iranian hands in Arab lands). On p.80, the mask is lifted a little, Nasr admits "the identification of Iran and Shiism endured, with highly provocative consequences for the Middle East in the [20th] century"
True, there are historical roots to the current bloody sectarianism, but they’re mere cards in the hands of Iran and other regional (Sunni) players. Saddam did indeed derogatorily use the name of a Shia man who conspired with the Mongol invaders a thousand years ago, to bring the fall of Baghdad. Nasr belittled that catastrophe as "a grudge" Sunnis carry, yet he had to admit that Iraqi Shia collaborated with US forces for the 2nd fall of Baghdad (2003). He also paraphrased the term collaboration with occupiers, when talking of India a few centuries ago (p.99): "Shia ascendancy appeared to be a consequence of Britain's growing commercial and political influence." He was even uncharacteristically honest when he stated (p.114) that Lebanese "Shia greeted the invading Israeli army as liberators, with flowers", but honesty here was also calculated to conjure approving nods from Western Israeli supporters, and probably not for honesty's sake.
Based on bias, the book is riddled with false conclusions. Nasr accepts democracy and majority rule as a good idea for Lebanon's Shia (a quasi-majority), but argues for sectarian quotas in Afghanistan (to help the Shia minority there -p.27). Could we imagine the US congress divided based on religious affiliations?!
Worse yet, he indirectly argues against majority rule in all of the Arab Mideast by arguing against Arab Nationalism (p.92). In my opinion, if Sunnis are the majority, then democratically speaking, they should be able to rule their lands. For Nasr, that’s no good, as it curbs Iran’s influence.
While it’s true that the National State project failed in the region, national identity remains the answer to sectarian strife. Had Iraqis instead of fostering sectarian political identities, focused on building an Iraqi identity, a lot of bloodshed would have been avoided (but that wasn’t in Iran's interest, hence its heavy sectarian hand).
Nasr, too blinded by his sectarianism (and Iranian-ism) to fathom Arab nationalism, sees a split in Arabs' public opinion on Iran. On p.270, he contrasts the Arab street support for Iran against Israel in Lebanon with the Arab anti-Iranian feeling when it comes to Iraq. He fails to comprehend that while the national state project failed, Arab Nationalism is alive and well. For the Arabs, Iran is the enemy of their enemy in Lebanon; but in Iraq, Iran is the enemy. When Iran is at odds with the Saudis or Saddam's Iraq, the real story is about dictators fighting dictators. When ordinary Arabs join in, it’s for ethno-national reasons, not for sectarian ones (after all, Iraqi Shia fought off Iran for 8 years in the 1980s).
Another false conclusion: mistaking the cause for the result (p.82). He opined that the old Sunni-Shia feud "draws political boundary lines". The cause for the rising sectarianism is the failure of the modern State (occupations by foreigners; and corruption rotting all Arab governments). When any State fails, people look for sub-State ties for protection. Had there been a true representative State for all its citizens regardless of sect, people would have maintained the national and modernizing trend that swept the Mideast in the 1950s-1960s, rather than turning to fundamentalism, be it Sunni or Shia. Yet Nasr, even on this indisputable fact, appropriates modernization to 'his team' only (p.86), forgetting that modernization was a national Arab project then, without exclusion of Sunnis or Shia.
By his biased attribution of the failure of modernization to Sunnis, Nasr misses its true cause: Authoritarianism. Dictatorships have no religion. Sunnism is a numerically confounding factor! The disease is dictatorship and corruption; the symptom is sectarianism; but Nasr mistakes one for the other (p.86-89). The Arab street rising from Tunisia to Iraq in recent years, is the proof. Sunni protesters rose against mostly Sunni rulers. It isn’t sectarianism that drove the dictatorship or the rebellion; corruption and authoritarianism did.
Nasr doesn’t want the reader to realize that while sectarianism exists, it became bloody, after centuries of calm, only because both Iran’s theocratic dictatorship and Sunni dictators are exploiting it (Yet the truth has its own way of seeping in. See Iran’s sectarian hand in the last paragraph on p.154, and the Saudi sectarian response on p.156). Nasr ignores this fact entirely, and moves on to contradict himself (p.161) stating that Iran sought to avoid the sectarian definition (no supporting resources cited), and that :"..they [Iran Shia] are offended by the tenor and ferocity of sectarian violence [in Iraq]" (p.226). But Iran -per Nasr's own words- threatened Pakistan on sectarian grounds (p.138), and "Elements of the Iranian regime are even producing anti-Sunni polemics in Arabic for dissemination beyond Iran" (p.225). So which is it? offended by sectarianism? or fueling it?
Iran's regional power-play isn’t assessed in this book. He focuses on Shia as a minority sect in need of empowerment. But the book indirectly reveals that Iran is using Arab Shia minorities-cum-militias to destabilize Arab Sunni States. When Arab rulers decry "the growing Iranian influence", Nasr accuses them of trying to "gain international support for resisting Shia empowerment" (p.242). When Arab rulers respond with corrective measures, Nasr says it isn’t enough (p.234-235). When Arab rulers (or terrorists) respond violently, well, we all agree with Nasr that should not pass. When democracy is advocated, Nasr ascribes it to Shia only (p.251) dismissing all Sunnis to be anti-democracy radicals, thus alienating most Arabs out of the democratic process. What Nasr (and Iran) seem to want from Sunni Arabs, both rulers and ruled, is to roll over, and hand the Mideast over to Iran.
He even states (p.251) that "The Shia revival constitutes the most powerful resistance and challenge to Sunni extremism and Jihadi activism". This conclusion is both misleading, and dangerous because, if adopted, it would perpetuate the sectarian Sunni-Shia divide, and invite more extremism on both sides. The true anti-extremism is political and economic opening, it’s representative democracy, rather than awaiting a Mulla to dictate politics.
Nasr isn't a rookie; he weaves his false arguments, but tries to preempt potential refutations. He sugarcoats Iran in a more palatable flavor of Shia, but knows that some Westerners would frown upon this, since Iran has been a thorn in our side for decades. So on p.260, he uncouples Iran from the Shia (verbally only, as you’ll see). He advises Western policy makers to support the Shia in Lebanon (as was done in Iraq) because it may lessen their support of (Iran's) Hezbollah. A flawed argument since on the same page, he admits that support for Hezbollah is strong among Lebanon's Shia. So empowering Lebanon Shia leads automatically to empowering Hezbollah AND Iran (also see p.270). The answer here, again, is empowering citizenry -regardless of sect (but Nasr wouldn't advocate that as it weakens Iran).
And so on p.271, he denies "equating Shia with Iran", even though this is literally what he did throughout the book (from the first he stated "most Iranians are Shia", and "Iran is riding the crest of Shia revival"), but if he flat-out admits to equating them, then his target audience would reject most of his book conclusions.
His whole goal is to convince you that Iran and its Shia Trojan horses aren't too bad ("Shia masses were not driven by anti-American militancy" -p.272. Really? What of Hezbollah? What of 'Death to America' chants in Tehran's streets? Even Shia support of the U.S. presence in Iraq was merely a waiting game till they control every inch of the State and economy, before turning it over to their Iranian Masters/Mullas).
Nasr thinks, as Iran does, that the vacuum created by Saddam’s fall in Iraq should be filled with Iranian hegemony masked as Shia revival. While I agree that the ripple effects of the fall of Baghdad touched the whole region, I disagree with the Shia revival being the deciding factor here. What the fall of Saddam showed the Arabs (Shia and Sunnis) is that dictators do fall, hence the Arab Spring; that corruption isn’t destiny; that an oppressed majority can curb the oppressive rule of a minority (be it poor vs rich, Sunni vs Shia, or democrats vs dictators). Unfortunately books like this, and policies like Iran's, are only trying to thwart that eventuality.
(End of part 1 of this review. Part 2 will be the 1st comment on this review.)
November 7, 2018
A look at history and politics between the Shias and the Sunnis. Interesting, but a bit biased in his viewpoint.
June 11, 2013
Just a warning: I have mixed feelings about this book and they come in difficult-to-articulate forms, so this review is going to be a mess.
First, I do not think I was the target audience for this book. I was expecting a more accessible overview of the Sunnis-Shia conflict, while the author was expecting his readers to come in with a fair bit of knowledge already (at least it felt that way to me). However, even this observation of mine is a bit complicated by the fact that the author seems to oscillate between expecting me to catch onto every historical reference (battles, prominent figures) and spending time explaining the most basic tenets of Islam - so beginners are frustrated by esoteric details and allusions, while novices are bored by the Nasr's stating the obvious. Nasr also jumps around in how he presents the information. He will first transition chronologically, explaining the development of Islam in an area, and then he will abruptly start talking about a particular strain of thought (including historical figures with contemporary people inspired by them, so that I don't know what era certain things actually took place in), and then he will move geographically through the information, and then he will start presenting it chronologically again. To be fair, though, I think that tracing the development of different strains within a religion is inherently tricky, so I'm complaining about something that cannot be fixed. Furthermore, I went into this book knowing shamefully little about Islam. political/ideological groups/bodies in the Middle East throughout its history/into the contemporary period, and the history of nations featured here (Wikipedia came in handy a lot while I was reading!), so maybe the parts I found frustratingly complex are more simple than they seemed to me.
And this is where the review will fall apart. I just said that I found the book confusing about how the author goes through his subject matter. At the same time, though, Mr. Nasr's writing is engaging and clear - when I catch his references, that is, he is wonderfully lucid. The chapters about contemporary issues (with which I'm more familiar, which may explain why I enjoyed it more and found the book more fulfilling - I went into THOSE chapters with background knowledge) read like stories. He contextualizes current conflicts within the broader schisms in the region, offering a thoughtful perspective and a historical background of current situations in order to provide a more comprehensive overview for readers. He's also clarified things that I've heretofore struggled to understand.
There is one issue that I'm sure has been brought up before. Despite the author's charming anecdotes and thoughtful commentary, the book has a glaring flaw - it seems unfortunately biased against Sunnis. Again, this is bit messy to explain. He might only appear biased because the book is about Shias and their struggles so that Sunnis are, as a result, disproportionately represented as perpetrators of violence. However, it seems like he focuses a lot on the violence, repression, and so forth committed by Sunnis, all the while presenting Shias as hapless victims, noble sufferers, or people who only resort to violence when absolutely left with no other choice. To be fair, maybe he's fairly depicting the situation - like I've already said, I went into this book knowing very little. It may be that Sunnis are as repressive and Shias as graceful as they are presented here. However, it seems to me that the depiction of Sunnis is rather unfair. That's just an impression I get.
First, I do not think I was the target audience for this book. I was expecting a more accessible overview of the Sunnis-Shia conflict, while the author was expecting his readers to come in with a fair bit of knowledge already (at least it felt that way to me). However, even this observation of mine is a bit complicated by the fact that the author seems to oscillate between expecting me to catch onto every historical reference (battles, prominent figures) and spending time explaining the most basic tenets of Islam - so beginners are frustrated by esoteric details and allusions, while novices are bored by the Nasr's stating the obvious. Nasr also jumps around in how he presents the information. He will first transition chronologically, explaining the development of Islam in an area, and then he will abruptly start talking about a particular strain of thought (including historical figures with contemporary people inspired by them, so that I don't know what era certain things actually took place in), and then he will move geographically through the information, and then he will start presenting it chronologically again. To be fair, though, I think that tracing the development of different strains within a religion is inherently tricky, so I'm complaining about something that cannot be fixed. Furthermore, I went into this book knowing shamefully little about Islam. political/ideological groups/bodies in the Middle East throughout its history/into the contemporary period, and the history of nations featured here (Wikipedia came in handy a lot while I was reading!), so maybe the parts I found frustratingly complex are more simple than they seemed to me.
And this is where the review will fall apart. I just said that I found the book confusing about how the author goes through his subject matter. At the same time, though, Mr. Nasr's writing is engaging and clear - when I catch his references, that is, he is wonderfully lucid. The chapters about contemporary issues (with which I'm more familiar, which may explain why I enjoyed it more and found the book more fulfilling - I went into THOSE chapters with background knowledge) read like stories. He contextualizes current conflicts within the broader schisms in the region, offering a thoughtful perspective and a historical background of current situations in order to provide a more comprehensive overview for readers. He's also clarified things that I've heretofore struggled to understand.
There is one issue that I'm sure has been brought up before. Despite the author's charming anecdotes and thoughtful commentary, the book has a glaring flaw - it seems unfortunately biased against Sunnis. Again, this is bit messy to explain. He might only appear biased because the book is about Shias and their struggles so that Sunnis are, as a result, disproportionately represented as perpetrators of violence. However, it seems like he focuses a lot on the violence, repression, and so forth committed by Sunnis, all the while presenting Shias as hapless victims, noble sufferers, or people who only resort to violence when absolutely left with no other choice. To be fair, maybe he's fairly depicting the situation - like I've already said, I went into this book knowing very little. It may be that Sunnis are as repressive and Shias as graceful as they are presented here. However, it seems to me that the depiction of Sunnis is rather unfair. That's just an impression I get.
June 22, 2021
A prescient commentary on the sectarian fissures that define the post-Saddam politics of Iraq and its spill-over effect in the Middle East.
February 7, 2017
Ada beberapa masalah yang ditemukan sepanjang membaca buku yang menyorot evolusi Syiah dengan tumpuan lebih terarah dalam konteks politik dan geopolitik serantau, Iran-Iraq-Lubnan-Arab Saudi-Syria-Yaman ini.
Pertama, penggunaan konsep Sunni yang terlalu longgar sehingga sering mengelirukan tetapi boleh dikatakan tidak ada langsung yang memberikan makna Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah. Sunni yang digunakan lebih kepada rakyat sesuatu negara yang secara umum, pemerintah sesebuah negara tanpa mengambil kira ideologi yang dipegangnya dan faham Wahabisme yang dalam banyak hal, sering dikeluarkan daripada ASWJ kerana pertentangan pegangan pada peringkat dasar termasuk pengkafiran dan tuduhan kesesatan akidah.
Kedua, kecenderungan menggunakan kerangka hegemoni menyebabkan pengarang membentuk persepsi kepada pembaca bahawa cubaan memperluaskan akidah 'Sunni' adalah berkait dengan usaha berunsurkan teologi atau agama meskipun pemerintah yang disebut boleh saja berfahaman dengan ideologi moden.
Ketiga, hegemoni ini juga diburukkan apabila persoalan kedudukan politik dan pemerintahan di sisi ASWJ tidak sama dengan Syiah sama ada sebelum Khomeini atau revolusi Iran atau sesudahnya. Politik dan pemerintahan tidak menjadi perkara yang asas dalam akidah di sisi ASWJ sehingga kaitannya dengan pentadbiran negara dalam zaman moden khususnya tidak boleh disamakan dengan Sunni atau tidak. Ini berbeza dengan Syiah yang menjadikan pemerintahan sebagai perkara yang sudah ditentukan secara wahyu sehingga akhirnya mewujudkan konsep wilayah faqih yang kemudiannya mengalami perubahan selepas kematian Khomeini dan ketika Sistani menduduki kedudukan paling tinggi dalam hirearki Syiah.
Bagaimanapun secara keseluruhan, buku ini memberikan gambaran bahawa isu yang berlaku di Timur Tengah tidak boleh 'disederhanakan' kepada isu Syiah vs Sunni atau berlegar dalam sentimen antara mazhab (baca aliran kalam) semata-mata, sebaliknya ia sudah melalui kompleksiti bukan saja diakibatkan oleh sejarah sejak awal lagi, bahkan (terutama) dengan pembaratan melalui modenisasi (yang antara lain mewujudkan gerakan revivalis agama) dan politik mutakhir yang berkait dengan hegemoni kekuasaan dan faktor minyak, nuklear dan sebagainya.
Pertama, penggunaan konsep Sunni yang terlalu longgar sehingga sering mengelirukan tetapi boleh dikatakan tidak ada langsung yang memberikan makna Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah. Sunni yang digunakan lebih kepada rakyat sesuatu negara yang secara umum, pemerintah sesebuah negara tanpa mengambil kira ideologi yang dipegangnya dan faham Wahabisme yang dalam banyak hal, sering dikeluarkan daripada ASWJ kerana pertentangan pegangan pada peringkat dasar termasuk pengkafiran dan tuduhan kesesatan akidah.
Kedua, kecenderungan menggunakan kerangka hegemoni menyebabkan pengarang membentuk persepsi kepada pembaca bahawa cubaan memperluaskan akidah 'Sunni' adalah berkait dengan usaha berunsurkan teologi atau agama meskipun pemerintah yang disebut boleh saja berfahaman dengan ideologi moden.
Ketiga, hegemoni ini juga diburukkan apabila persoalan kedudukan politik dan pemerintahan di sisi ASWJ tidak sama dengan Syiah sama ada sebelum Khomeini atau revolusi Iran atau sesudahnya. Politik dan pemerintahan tidak menjadi perkara yang asas dalam akidah di sisi ASWJ sehingga kaitannya dengan pentadbiran negara dalam zaman moden khususnya tidak boleh disamakan dengan Sunni atau tidak. Ini berbeza dengan Syiah yang menjadikan pemerintahan sebagai perkara yang sudah ditentukan secara wahyu sehingga akhirnya mewujudkan konsep wilayah faqih yang kemudiannya mengalami perubahan selepas kematian Khomeini dan ketika Sistani menduduki kedudukan paling tinggi dalam hirearki Syiah.
Bagaimanapun secara keseluruhan, buku ini memberikan gambaran bahawa isu yang berlaku di Timur Tengah tidak boleh 'disederhanakan' kepada isu Syiah vs Sunni atau berlegar dalam sentimen antara mazhab (baca aliran kalam) semata-mata, sebaliknya ia sudah melalui kompleksiti bukan saja diakibatkan oleh sejarah sejak awal lagi, bahkan (terutama) dengan pembaratan melalui modenisasi (yang antara lain mewujudkan gerakan revivalis agama) dan politik mutakhir yang berkait dengan hegemoni kekuasaan dan faktor minyak, nuklear dan sebagainya.
August 9, 2011
The sectarian conflict that has taken and is taking place in the Middle East is certainly not what the Prophet had in mind in propagating Islam, in my opinion.
Are the Shia, Muslims? Are the Sunnis right? Honestly, no one knows. Instead, we have both groups, each trying to out-shout each other, saying that theirs is the true Islam. And most often, by violent means.
What a waste of time and resources. They are sitting on huge deposits of oil which could greatly help them build their countries and educate their people so that they can finally contribute constructively to the global economy instead making the news headlines all the time and for the wrong reasons.
While this book gives a better explanation about the sectarian conflict (albeit with a Shia bias), what I get is that it's going to get much worse before it gets better.
Peace always seems to be an elusive dream in this region. But it looks like they never wanted this dream unless it is on their own selfish terms.
Are the Shia, Muslims? Are the Sunnis right? Honestly, no one knows. Instead, we have both groups, each trying to out-shout each other, saying that theirs is the true Islam. And most often, by violent means.
What a waste of time and resources. They are sitting on huge deposits of oil which could greatly help them build their countries and educate their people so that they can finally contribute constructively to the global economy instead making the news headlines all the time and for the wrong reasons.
While this book gives a better explanation about the sectarian conflict (albeit with a Shia bias), what I get is that it's going to get much worse before it gets better.
Peace always seems to be an elusive dream in this region. But it looks like they never wanted this dream unless it is on their own selfish terms.
April 25, 2015
There are a few paradigms to explain regional violence in the Middle East. The Sunni - Shia divide is one of them, also known as "civil war within Islam". This book is probably the best articulation of that paradigm, starting from the origins of the split to current events. The author traces upheavals in the region to readjustments of political and social trends between these two main branches of Islam.
As many pointed out, it's a one sided analysis from the Shia perspective. I don't think it is a disadvantage, since that is what the author proposes to write about without pretending to depict the whole picture. What Vali Nasr does best is 1) to describe the sense of prosecution and injustice felt by the Shia in the Middle East and 2) convey how big and diverse is the Shia world, from India to Lebanon.
While I don't agree with this paradigm, is hard not to agree with most of Nasr's insights.
As many pointed out, it's a one sided analysis from the Shia perspective. I don't think it is a disadvantage, since that is what the author proposes to write about without pretending to depict the whole picture. What Vali Nasr does best is 1) to describe the sense of prosecution and injustice felt by the Shia in the Middle East and 2) convey how big and diverse is the Shia world, from India to Lebanon.
While I don't agree with this paradigm, is hard not to agree with most of Nasr's insights.
July 18, 2020
This is an extremely shia biased book . Sunnis are presented as tyrannical bigots while the shias before iranian revolution are presented as people who had never taken any interest in power and were innocent as hell
The author has manipulated early islamic history ! He says that shias didn’t like power so they continued to be oppressed by their sunni masters and never made a bid for power . He didn’t mention that there were many shia uprising in early history and they failed due to the incompetence and poor-decision making of their leaders . He goes on to mention the repression of shias in sunni-abbasid caliph but doesn’t write in detail about sunni repression in Safavid iran.
Moreover, he makes every things about shia-sunni divide . He says that Pakistan is not making hunza (a shia majority area ) because of its hatred for sunnis , completely ignoring other politicial factors . He makes it world vs shia .
All in all . This book is not worth it 2/5
The author has manipulated early islamic history ! He says that shias didn’t like power so they continued to be oppressed by their sunni masters and never made a bid for power . He didn’t mention that there were many shia uprising in early history and they failed due to the incompetence and poor-decision making of their leaders . He goes on to mention the repression of shias in sunni-abbasid caliph but doesn’t write in detail about sunni repression in Safavid iran.
Moreover, he makes every things about shia-sunni divide . He says that Pakistan is not making hunza (a shia majority area ) because of its hatred for sunnis , completely ignoring other politicial factors . He makes it world vs shia .
All in all . This book is not worth it 2/5
January 7, 2012
I am really hesitant to give this book 3 starts but I gave it that because it is a great book in terms of covering many untouched issues and it leaves the reader with enough curiosity to read more on the issue.
What was apparent for me in the book, which I did not like especially that the author has a big academic back ground, is his apparent sympathy with Shies. I noticed that when ever he talks about bloody acts committed by Shies he is giving them the excuse that they were retaliated. He stressed on highlighting violence committed by so called Sunni religious groups, without mentioning that they also attach Sunnies who do not follow them.
What was apparent for me in the book, which I did not like especially that the author has a big academic back ground, is his apparent sympathy with Shies. I noticed that when ever he talks about bloody acts committed by Shies he is giving them the excuse that they were retaliated. He stressed on highlighting violence committed by so called Sunni religious groups, without mentioning that they also attach Sunnies who do not follow them.
February 23, 2015
What I liked:
- Accessible narrative
- Engaging
What I did not like:
- Not just biased towards Shia-Islam but also towards one particular sect within Shi'ism (12 Imams)
- Oversimplification of issues.
- At times it felt like the author was forcing the entire Middle Eastern issues to fit into the Shia-Sunni conflict box
I think in order to understand the Shia-Sunni split within the historical framework with minimum subjectivity, the best book around is Shi'ite Islam by Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai.
If the aim is to have a general understanding of the impact and the current direction that the Shia-Sunni split is resulting in, then this book is a good introduction.
- Accessible narrative
- Engaging
What I did not like:
- Not just biased towards Shia-Islam but also towards one particular sect within Shi'ism (12 Imams)
- Oversimplification of issues.
- At times it felt like the author was forcing the entire Middle Eastern issues to fit into the Shia-Sunni conflict box
I think in order to understand the Shia-Sunni split within the historical framework with minimum subjectivity, the best book around is Shi'ite Islam by Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai.
If the aim is to have a general understanding of the impact and the current direction that the Shia-Sunni split is resulting in, then this book is a good introduction.
September 1, 2015
From a completely neutral perspective the wool seemed biased towards the Shia perspective with very little good things to say for the Sunni side of the argument. Hence, whilst a good read, I would caution caveat emptor
October 6, 2023
يحوي الكتاب على معلومات تفصيلية عن الطائفة الشيعية تاريخا و حاضرا لكن يميل الكاتب الى المبالغة والاحتفاء بوضع الشيعة من دون نقد داخلي لبعض الاخطاء لكن الكتاب ي��وي معلومات شاملة وتفصيلية مثيرة خصوصا الفصل الاول من الكتاب
November 3, 2016
Heavily pro-Shia. More descriptive and not enough food for thoughts. But still good in the sense that it captured several important events.
January 17, 2020
Provocative, informative, but misleading. Fiction disguised as nonfiction!
First, Nasr manipulates the Western reader into believing that only he (not even Khomeini, p.135) can define Shia: Claiming Ashoura celebrations define it (p.48), yet admits the Shia scholars deem them as heresy. On p.31, he claims “Shia..see spirituality in passion..rather than in law" and ‘Shia scholars emphasis on Law is sunnification of Shia’ (misleading Western readers then to seeing Sunnis as less spiritual and as rigidly legalistic, which isn’t true. Sunnism isn’t a monolith) These aren’t innocent differences in opinion: he wants to -deceitfully- win over Westerners who are enchanted by spiritual fests, coercing them into picking teams!). Nasr conveniently forgets that Shia scholars get alms from their masses (Sunni scholars don't). Had his opinion -about whatShia is- been right, then the scholars advocating Law over 'Shia spirituality' would’ve been ‘driven out of the market’.
He sneakily uses wordplay (p.238): "..turn to militancy among some Saudi Shias". Here only ‘some’ Shia are turning to terrorism. But on the preceding pages discussing Sunni terrorism, he portrays all the residents of entire Sunni cities as terrorists or their supporters.
On p.49, he likens Shia's passion (not an innocent choice of words, when addressing mostly Christian readers) of Husayn to that of Christ's passions. And on p.64, he uses (one) word to Justify why Shia hate Omar (2nd Muslim Khaliph, reveared by Sunnis). The word is "cruelty". A Western reader not knowing Omar, now only thinks he was 'cruel'. Nasr didn't even try to conceal his bias (such as saying 'alleged cruelty').
He masters omissions too, ignoring the identification of who the victim (Sunnis) is, lest that reveals the aggressor’s identity (Shias): "Tens of thousands more had been driven from their homes" (p.265). Since Sunni terrorists had no territorial claims then (2006; no ISIS yet), Sunni civilians were the ones displaced by Shia militia dominating the Iraqi security forces (p.262).
It’s smart and cunning little lies like these, that deserve admiration for the expert narrative-weaving (like a Persian rug), and also deserve disgust with its manipulative intent (like a Persian Bazaar hustler).
Once this invented Shia portray is established, then the true con begins. Nasr starts referring to Shia and Iran interchangeably, only making rare distinctions. Here is where Nasr’s scheming becomes dangerous: By conflating Shia with Iran, a reader’s misplaced rooting for Shia, becomes easily distorted into undeserved fondness of Iran (example: he frames Iran's attempts to destabilize its Sunni neighbors to realize its Persian hegemony, as Iran supporting oppressed Arab Shia minorities). Over time, if we buy this poisoned logic, the Western stance of Iran becomes a matter of difference in opinions, and not a clash of ideals (democracy-theocracy).
On p.109, he mentions that "there are ideological and ethnic dimensions to the divide that separates the Arab[s] from Iran.., but the rivalry's historical mainstay was always the Shia-Sunni split." His 'always' is a lie: A) Iran only became Shia a few centuries ago. The Iranian king of the time wanted to make his game of thrones with the Turks more interesting than mere Persians vs Turks, so he forcibly converted the populace, making it PersianShia vs SunniTurks. B) that same act shows that even that king figured that power-grabbing in the name of Persia is just too obvious as a racist line of battle. He too, like Iran of our era, needed a religious drape to hide the true nature of the conflict. It isn’t sectarian; it is political and ethnic. Sectarianism in politics is merely a mask to hide the ugly face of the authoritarianism that cripples the Mideast.
Iran is riding the cultural and political revival of the Arab Shia to reach its own goals. Nasr tries to deny this fact ("This is a regional Shia project, not an Iranian one" -p.184). But judged by history (now in 2019), it’s clearly an Iranian one, clothed in Shia attire: Iran dictates what happens in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and Iran deforms Arab-Shia's identity to Shia-pawns in Iran's geopolitical game. Nasr, for instance, admitted on p.224 that Iranians were indeed inflating the Shia votes in Iraq's elections (a charge he had previously denied -p.200).
Duplicitous again on p.223: "They [Iran's Revolutionary Guards trained militias in the region] are links in a chain that represents the muscle of the Shia." =meaning Iran. This duplicity is shameful, but it’s also telling, and enlightening.
Nasr misinforms us (p.20): "it is paradoxically, a very old, very modern conflict." echoing the Western media that had us believe that the Shia-Sunni bloody conflict in Iraq was yet another battle in a lengthy bloodbath. This is a myth. Throughout Islamic history, Shia and Sunnis lived and traded together, intermarried, etc. The perpetual conflict myth serves Nasr’s fictional narrative of depicting Shia as a historical underdog that’s finally emerging a winner, rather than an opportunistic Iran using Arab Shia minorities to achieve Persian hegemony over the Arab Mideast, and using the Shia underdog narrative, much like Nasr, to conceal the truth.
Both Shia and Sunnis masses are manipulated by their despotic elites, who draw on a historical cache of sectarian anecdotes to rally them around unfounded fears, and reinvented identities, to use them as fuel in the regional power games, instead of fighting the true battle for democracy, and against these same fear-mongering elites.
Iran outsmarted the calcified Arab political class, by using Arab Shia as its Trojan horse to undermine the Arab Sunni rulers, but it isn’t a sectarian conflict except on the surface. It’s a politico-racial conflict, between the Arabs, and Iran’s desire to rule the Mideast and to have a (huge) foothold onto the Mediterranean shores, the Gulf, and the Red Sea (all major waterways in the area have wars now, and all have Iranian hands in Arab lands). On p.80, the mask is lifted a little, Nasr admits "the identification of Iran and Shiism endured, with highly provocative consequences for the Middle East in the [20th] century"
True, there are historical roots to the current bloody sectarianism, but they’re mere cards in the hands of Iran and other regional (Sunni) players. Saddam did indeed derogatorily use the name of a Shia man who conspired with the Mongol invaders a thousand years ago, to bring the fall of Baghdad. Nasr belittled that catastrophe as "a grudge" Sunnis carry, yet he had to admit that Iraqi Shia collaborated with US forces for the 2nd fall of Baghdad (2003). He also paraphrased the term collaboration with occupiers, when talking of India a few centuries ago (p.99): "Shia ascendancy appeared to be a consequence of Britain's growing commercial and political influence." He was even uncharacteristically honest when he stated (p.114) that Lebanese "Shia greeted the invading Israeli army as liberators, with flowers", but honesty here was also calculated to conjure approving nods from Western Israeli supporters, and probably not for honesty's sake.
Based on bias, the book is riddled with false conclusions. Nasr accepts democracy and majority rule as a good idea for Lebanon's Shia (a quasi-majority), but argues for sectarian quotas in Afghanistan (to help the Shia minority there -p.27). Could we imagine the US congress divided based on religious affiliations?!
Worse yet, he indirectly argues against majority rule in all of the Arab Mideast by arguing against Arab Nationalism (p.92). In my opinion, if Sunnis are the majority, then democratically speaking, they should be able to rule their lands. For Nasr, that’s no good, as it curbs Iran’s influence.
While it’s true that the National State project failed in the region, national identity remains the answer to sectarian strife. Had Iraqis instead of fostering sectarian political identities, focused on building an Iraqi identity, a lot of bloodshed would have been avoided (but that wasn’t in Iran's interest, hence its heavy sectarian hand).
Nasr, too blinded by his sectarianism (and Iranian-ism) to fathom Arab nationalism, sees a split in Arabs' public opinion on Iran. On p.270, he contrasts the Arab street support for Iran against Israel in Lebanon with the Arab anti-Iranian feeling when it comes to Iraq. He fails to comprehend that while the national state project failed, Arab Nationalism is alive and well. For the Arabs, Iran is the enemy of their enemy in Lebanon; but in Iraq, Iran is the enemy. When Iran is at odds with the Saudis or Saddam's Iraq, the real story is about dictators fighting dictators. When ordinary Arabs join in, it’s for ethno-national reasons, not for sectarian ones (after all, Iraqi Shia fought off Iran for 8 years in the 1980s).
Another false conclusion: mistaking the cause for the result (p.82). He opined that the old Sunni-Shia feud "draws political boundary lines". The cause for the rising sectarianism is the failure of the modern State (occupations by foreigners; and corruption rotting all Arab governments). When any State fails, people look for sub-State ties for protection. Had there been a true representative State for all its citizens regardless of sect, people would have maintained the national and modernizing trend that swept the Mideast in the 1950s-1960s, rather than turning to fundamentalism, be it Sunni or Shia. Yet Nasr, even on this indisputable fact, appropriates modernization to 'his team' only (p.86), forgetting that modernization was a national Arab project then, without exclusion of Sunnis or Shia.
By his biased attribution of the failure of modernization to Sunnis, Nasr misses its true cause: Authoritarianism. Dictatorships have no religion. Sunnism is a numerically confounding factor! The disease is dictatorship and corruption; the symptom is sectarianism; but Nasr mistakes one for the other (p.86-89). The Arab street rising from Tunisia to Iraq in recent years, is the proof. Sunni protesters rose against mostly Sunni rulers. It isn’t sectarianism that drove the dictatorship or the rebellion; corruption and authoritarianism did.
Nasr doesn’t want the reader to realize that while sectarianism exists, it became bloody, after centuries of calm, only because both Iran’s theocratic dictatorship and Sunni dictators are exploiting it (Yet the truth has its own way of seeping in. See Iran’s sectarian hand in the last paragraph on p.154, and the Saudi sectarian response on p.156). Nasr ignores this fact entirely, and moves on to contradict himself (p.161) stating that Iran sought to avoid the sectarian definition (no supporting resources cited), and that :"..they [Iran Shia] are offended by the tenor and ferocity of sectarian violence [in Iraq]" (p.226). But Iran -per Nasr's own words- threatened Pakistan on sectarian grounds (p.138), and "Elements of the Iranian regime are even producing anti-Sunni polemics in Arabic for dissemination beyond Iran" (p.225). So which is it? offended by sectarianism? or fueling it?
Iran's regional power-play isn’t assessed in this book. He focuses on Shia as a minority sect in need of empowerment. But the book indirectly reveals that Iran is using Arab Shia minorities-cum-militias to destabilize Arab Sunni States. When Arab rulers decry "the growing Iranian influence", Nasr accuses them of trying to "gain international support for resisting Shia empowerment" (p.242). When Arab rulers respond with corrective measures, Nasr says it isn’t enough (p.234-235). When Arab rulers (or terrorists) respond violently, well, we all agree with Nasr that should not pass. When democracy is advocated, Nasr ascribes it to Shia only (p.251) dismissing all Sunnis to be anti-democracy radicals, thus alienating most Arabs out of the democratic process. What Nasr (and Iran) seem to want from Sunni Arabs, both rulers and ruled, is to roll over, and hand the Mideast over to Iran.
He even states (p.251) that "The Shia revival constitutes the most powerful resistance and challenge to Sunni extremism and Jihadi activism". This conclusion is both misleading, and dangerous because, if adopted, it would perpetuate the sectarian Sunni-Shia divide, and invite more extremism on both sides. The true anti-extremism is political and economic opening, it’s representative democracy, rather than awaiting a Mulla to dictate politics.
Nasr isn't a rookie; he weaves his false arguments, but tries to preempt potential refutations. He sugarcoats Iran in a more palatable flavor of Shia, but knows that some Westerners would frown upon this, since Iran has been a thorn in our side for decades. So on p.260, he uncouples Iran from the Shia (verbally only, as you’ll see). He advises Western policy makers to support the Shia in Lebanon (as was done in Iraq) because it may lessen their support of (Iran's) Hezbollah. A flawed argument since on the same page, he admits that support for Hezbollah is strong among Lebanon's Shia. So empowering Lebanon Shia leads automatically to empowering Hezbollah AND Iran (also see p.270). The answer here, again, is empowering citizenry -regardless of sect (but Nasr wouldn't advocate that as it weakens Iran).
And so on p.271, he denies "equating Shia with Iran", even though this is literally what he did throughout the book (from the first he stated "most Iranians are Shia", and "Iran is riding the crest of Shia revival"), but if he flat-out admits to equating them, then his target audience would reject most of his book conclusions.
His whole goal is to convince you that Iran and its Shia Trojan horses aren't too bad ("Shia masses were not driven by anti-American militancy" -p.272. Really? What of Hezbollah? What of 'Death to America' chants in Tehran's streets? Even Shia support of the U.S. presence in Iraq was merely a waiting game till they control every inch of the State and economy, before turning it over to their Iranian Masters/Mullas).
Nasr thinks, as Iran does, that the vacuum created by Saddam’s fall in Iraq should be filled with Iranian hegemony masked as Shia revival. While I agree that the ripple effects of the fall of Baghdad touched the whole region, I disagree with the Shia revival being the deciding factor here. What the fall of Saddam showed the Arabs (Shia and Sunnis) is that dictators do fall, hence the Arab Spring; that corruption isn’t destiny; that an oppressed majority can curb the oppressive rule of a minority (be it poor vs rich, Sunni vs Shia, or democrats vs dictators). Unfortunately books like this, and policies like Iran's, are only trying to thwart that eventuality.
(End of part 1 of this review. Part two will be the 1st comment on this review.)
First, Nasr manipulates the Western reader into believing that only he (not even Khomeini, p.135) can define Shia: Claiming Ashoura celebrations define it (p.48), yet admits the Shia scholars deem them as heresy. On p.31, he claims “Shia..see spirituality in passion..rather than in law" and ‘Shia scholars emphasis on Law is sunnification of Shia’ (misleading Western readers then to seeing Sunnis as less spiritual and as rigidly legalistic, which isn’t true. Sunnism isn’t a monolith) These aren’t innocent differences in opinion: he wants to -deceitfully- win over Westerners who are enchanted by spiritual fests, coercing them into picking teams!). Nasr conveniently forgets that Shia scholars get alms from their masses (Sunni scholars don't). Had his opinion -about whatShia is- been right, then the scholars advocating Law over 'Shia spirituality' would’ve been ‘driven out of the market’.
He sneakily uses wordplay (p.238): "..turn to militancy among some Saudi Shias". Here only ‘some’ Shia are turning to terrorism. But on the preceding pages discussing Sunni terrorism, he portrays all the residents of entire Sunni cities as terrorists or their supporters.
On p.49, he likens Shia's passion (not an innocent choice of words, when addressing mostly Christian readers) of Husayn to that of Christ's passions. And on p.64, he uses (one) word to Justify why Shia hate Omar (2nd Muslim Khaliph, reveared by Sunnis). The word is "cruelty". A Western reader not knowing Omar, now only thinks he was 'cruel'. Nasr didn't even try to conceal his bias (such as saying 'alleged cruelty').
He masters omissions too, ignoring the identification of who the victim (Sunnis) is, lest that reveals the aggressor’s identity (Shias): "Tens of thousands more had been driven from their homes" (p.265). Since Sunni terrorists had no territorial claims then (2006; no ISIS yet), Sunni civilians were the ones displaced by Shia militia dominating the Iraqi security forces (p.262).
It’s smart and cunning little lies like these, that deserve admiration for the expert narrative-weaving (like a Persian rug), and also deserve disgust with its manipulative intent (like a Persian Bazaar hustler).
Once this invented Shia portray is established, then the true con begins. Nasr starts referring to Shia and Iran interchangeably, only making rare distinctions. Here is where Nasr’s scheming becomes dangerous: By conflating Shia with Iran, a reader’s misplaced rooting for Shia, becomes easily distorted into undeserved fondness of Iran (example: he frames Iran's attempts to destabilize its Sunni neighbors to realize its Persian hegemony, as Iran supporting oppressed Arab Shia minorities). Over time, if we buy this poisoned logic, the Western stance of Iran becomes a matter of difference in opinions, and not a clash of ideals (democracy-theocracy).
On p.109, he mentions that "there are ideological and ethnic dimensions to the divide that separates the Arab[s] from Iran.., but the rivalry's historical mainstay was always the Shia-Sunni split." His 'always' is a lie: A) Iran only became Shia a few centuries ago. The Iranian king of the time wanted to make his game of thrones with the Turks more interesting than mere Persians vs Turks, so he forcibly converted the populace, making it PersianShia vs SunniTurks. B) that same act shows that even that king figured that power-grabbing in the name of Persia is just too obvious as a racist line of battle. He too, like Iran of our era, needed a religious drape to hide the true nature of the conflict. It isn’t sectarian; it is political and ethnic. Sectarianism in politics is merely a mask to hide the ugly face of the authoritarianism that cripples the Mideast.
Iran is riding the cultural and political revival of the Arab Shia to reach its own goals. Nasr tries to deny this fact ("This is a regional Shia project, not an Iranian one" -p.184). But judged by history (now in 2019), it’s clearly an Iranian one, clothed in Shia attire: Iran dictates what happens in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and Iran deforms Arab-Shia's identity to Shia-pawns in Iran's geopolitical game. Nasr, for instance, admitted on p.224 that Iranians were indeed inflating the Shia votes in Iraq's elections (a charge he had previously denied -p.200).
Duplicitous again on p.223: "They [Iran's Revolutionary Guards trained militias in the region] are links in a chain that represents the muscle of the Shia." =meaning Iran. This duplicity is shameful, but it’s also telling, and enlightening.
Nasr misinforms us (p.20): "it is paradoxically, a very old, very modern conflict." echoing the Western media that had us believe that the Shia-Sunni bloody conflict in Iraq was yet another battle in a lengthy bloodbath. This is a myth. Throughout Islamic history, Shia and Sunnis lived and traded together, intermarried, etc. The perpetual conflict myth serves Nasr’s fictional narrative of depicting Shia as a historical underdog that’s finally emerging a winner, rather than an opportunistic Iran using Arab Shia minorities to achieve Persian hegemony over the Arab Mideast, and using the Shia underdog narrative, much like Nasr, to conceal the truth.
Both Shia and Sunnis masses are manipulated by their despotic elites, who draw on a historical cache of sectarian anecdotes to rally them around unfounded fears, and reinvented identities, to use them as fuel in the regional power games, instead of fighting the true battle for democracy, and against these same fear-mongering elites.
Iran outsmarted the calcified Arab political class, by using Arab Shia as its Trojan horse to undermine the Arab Sunni rulers, but it isn’t a sectarian conflict except on the surface. It’s a politico-racial conflict, between the Arabs, and Iran’s desire to rule the Mideast and to have a (huge) foothold onto the Mediterranean shores, the Gulf, and the Red Sea (all major waterways in the area have wars now, and all have Iranian hands in Arab lands). On p.80, the mask is lifted a little, Nasr admits "the identification of Iran and Shiism endured, with highly provocative consequences for the Middle East in the [20th] century"
True, there are historical roots to the current bloody sectarianism, but they’re mere cards in the hands of Iran and other regional (Sunni) players. Saddam did indeed derogatorily use the name of a Shia man who conspired with the Mongol invaders a thousand years ago, to bring the fall of Baghdad. Nasr belittled that catastrophe as "a grudge" Sunnis carry, yet he had to admit that Iraqi Shia collaborated with US forces for the 2nd fall of Baghdad (2003). He also paraphrased the term collaboration with occupiers, when talking of India a few centuries ago (p.99): "Shia ascendancy appeared to be a consequence of Britain's growing commercial and political influence." He was even uncharacteristically honest when he stated (p.114) that Lebanese "Shia greeted the invading Israeli army as liberators, with flowers", but honesty here was also calculated to conjure approving nods from Western Israeli supporters, and probably not for honesty's sake.
Based on bias, the book is riddled with false conclusions. Nasr accepts democracy and majority rule as a good idea for Lebanon's Shia (a quasi-majority), but argues for sectarian quotas in Afghanistan (to help the Shia minority there -p.27). Could we imagine the US congress divided based on religious affiliations?!
Worse yet, he indirectly argues against majority rule in all of the Arab Mideast by arguing against Arab Nationalism (p.92). In my opinion, if Sunnis are the majority, then democratically speaking, they should be able to rule their lands. For Nasr, that’s no good, as it curbs Iran’s influence.
While it’s true that the National State project failed in the region, national identity remains the answer to sectarian strife. Had Iraqis instead of fostering sectarian political identities, focused on building an Iraqi identity, a lot of bloodshed would have been avoided (but that wasn’t in Iran's interest, hence its heavy sectarian hand).
Nasr, too blinded by his sectarianism (and Iranian-ism) to fathom Arab nationalism, sees a split in Arabs' public opinion on Iran. On p.270, he contrasts the Arab street support for Iran against Israel in Lebanon with the Arab anti-Iranian feeling when it comes to Iraq. He fails to comprehend that while the national state project failed, Arab Nationalism is alive and well. For the Arabs, Iran is the enemy of their enemy in Lebanon; but in Iraq, Iran is the enemy. When Iran is at odds with the Saudis or Saddam's Iraq, the real story is about dictators fighting dictators. When ordinary Arabs join in, it’s for ethno-national reasons, not for sectarian ones (after all, Iraqi Shia fought off Iran for 8 years in the 1980s).
Another false conclusion: mistaking the cause for the result (p.82). He opined that the old Sunni-Shia feud "draws political boundary lines". The cause for the rising sectarianism is the failure of the modern State (occupations by foreigners; and corruption rotting all Arab governments). When any State fails, people look for sub-State ties for protection. Had there been a true representative State for all its citizens regardless of sect, people would have maintained the national and modernizing trend that swept the Mideast in the 1950s-1960s, rather than turning to fundamentalism, be it Sunni or Shia. Yet Nasr, even on this indisputable fact, appropriates modernization to 'his team' only (p.86), forgetting that modernization was a national Arab project then, without exclusion of Sunnis or Shia.
By his biased attribution of the failure of modernization to Sunnis, Nasr misses its true cause: Authoritarianism. Dictatorships have no religion. Sunnism is a numerically confounding factor! The disease is dictatorship and corruption; the symptom is sectarianism; but Nasr mistakes one for the other (p.86-89). The Arab street rising from Tunisia to Iraq in recent years, is the proof. Sunni protesters rose against mostly Sunni rulers. It isn’t sectarianism that drove the dictatorship or the rebellion; corruption and authoritarianism did.
Nasr doesn’t want the reader to realize that while sectarianism exists, it became bloody, after centuries of calm, only because both Iran’s theocratic dictatorship and Sunni dictators are exploiting it (Yet the truth has its own way of seeping in. See Iran’s sectarian hand in the last paragraph on p.154, and the Saudi sectarian response on p.156). Nasr ignores this fact entirely, and moves on to contradict himself (p.161) stating that Iran sought to avoid the sectarian definition (no supporting resources cited), and that :"..they [Iran Shia] are offended by the tenor and ferocity of sectarian violence [in Iraq]" (p.226). But Iran -per Nasr's own words- threatened Pakistan on sectarian grounds (p.138), and "Elements of the Iranian regime are even producing anti-Sunni polemics in Arabic for dissemination beyond Iran" (p.225). So which is it? offended by sectarianism? or fueling it?
Iran's regional power-play isn’t assessed in this book. He focuses on Shia as a minority sect in need of empowerment. But the book indirectly reveals that Iran is using Arab Shia minorities-cum-militias to destabilize Arab Sunni States. When Arab rulers decry "the growing Iranian influence", Nasr accuses them of trying to "gain international support for resisting Shia empowerment" (p.242). When Arab rulers respond with corrective measures, Nasr says it isn’t enough (p.234-235). When Arab rulers (or terrorists) respond violently, well, we all agree with Nasr that should not pass. When democracy is advocated, Nasr ascribes it to Shia only (p.251) dismissing all Sunnis to be anti-democracy radicals, thus alienating most Arabs out of the democratic process. What Nasr (and Iran) seem to want from Sunni Arabs, both rulers and ruled, is to roll over, and hand the Mideast over to Iran.
He even states (p.251) that "The Shia revival constitutes the most powerful resistance and challenge to Sunni extremism and Jihadi activism". This conclusion is both misleading, and dangerous because, if adopted, it would perpetuate the sectarian Sunni-Shia divide, and invite more extremism on both sides. The true anti-extremism is political and economic opening, it’s representative democracy, rather than awaiting a Mulla to dictate politics.
Nasr isn't a rookie; he weaves his false arguments, but tries to preempt potential refutations. He sugarcoats Iran in a more palatable flavor of Shia, but knows that some Westerners would frown upon this, since Iran has been a thorn in our side for decades. So on p.260, he uncouples Iran from the Shia (verbally only, as you’ll see). He advises Western policy makers to support the Shia in Lebanon (as was done in Iraq) because it may lessen their support of (Iran's) Hezbollah. A flawed argument since on the same page, he admits that support for Hezbollah is strong among Lebanon's Shia. So empowering Lebanon Shia leads automatically to empowering Hezbollah AND Iran (also see p.270). The answer here, again, is empowering citizenry -regardless of sect (but Nasr wouldn't advocate that as it weakens Iran).
And so on p.271, he denies "equating Shia with Iran", even though this is literally what he did throughout the book (from the first he stated "most Iranians are Shia", and "Iran is riding the crest of Shia revival"), but if he flat-out admits to equating them, then his target audience would reject most of his book conclusions.
His whole goal is to convince you that Iran and its Shia Trojan horses aren't too bad ("Shia masses were not driven by anti-American militancy" -p.272. Really? What of Hezbollah? What of 'Death to America' chants in Tehran's streets? Even Shia support of the U.S. presence in Iraq was merely a waiting game till they control every inch of the State and economy, before turning it over to their Iranian Masters/Mullas).
Nasr thinks, as Iran does, that the vacuum created by Saddam’s fall in Iraq should be filled with Iranian hegemony masked as Shia revival. While I agree that the ripple effects of the fall of Baghdad touched the whole region, I disagree with the Shia revival being the deciding factor here. What the fall of Saddam showed the Arabs (Shia and Sunnis) is that dictators do fall, hence the Arab Spring; that corruption isn’t destiny; that an oppressed majority can curb the oppressive rule of a minority (be it poor vs rich, Sunni vs Shia, or democrats vs dictators). Unfortunately books like this, and policies like Iran's, are only trying to thwart that eventuality.
(End of part 1 of this review. Part two will be the 1st comment on this review.)
June 2, 2022
The book is written by a Persian/ Iranian, but that is not something that comes across in the reading. The book is about 9 chapters and 250 pages of text. As I see it, every chapter had something that was significantly useful to know. In order to keep the review readable, I'll select one or two points from each chapter.
Chapter 1 ("Who are The Shia?): Here we get a brief overview of the details of the historical schism that made the Sunni and Shia who they are and the names and dates. We learn that although most of the Shia are in Iran, that a good chunk of them are also in Arab and South Asian countries
Chapter 2 ("The Making of Shia Politics"): Lots of information here. A bit more on the detailed training and ordination of Shia clergy (though I could have done with a little more), as well as some patterns on the spread of Shia Islam (for instance, how it got from Azerbaijan to Iran), and a bit more on the different subsects (Twelvers vs. Fivers).
Chapter 3 ("The Fading Promise of Nationalism"): This chapter is a retake on something that we have heard before, which is that the Arabs/ Persians have already tried Nationalism/ Communism/ etc before and that it didn't work and so now Islam is the last choice left standing.
Chapter 4 ("Khomeini's Moment"): Here there is a synopsis of the recent history of Iran, including: the overthrow of Reza Pahlavi (who was actually only the shah for a generation and not many centuries) and subsequent rise of Khomeini. Pahlavi's fatal mistake, it seems, was not making friends with the clergy ("men of words") in order to ensure the stability of his regime. Nasr also gave a characterization (again, a very neutral one) of Khomeini (and the mullahs) as people who were primarily scholars and men of words who were not worried about the nuts and bolts of running a republic. Before reading this, I didn't know that Khomeini had aspirations of pan-Islamism of which he himself was the leader. The dynamics of the mass movement in this chapter filled in some details and reminded the reader of things that have been written in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (Perennial Classics)
Chapter 5 ("The Battle of Islamic Fundamentalisms"): Here we learn that Shia fundamentalists and Wahhabi fundamentalists are not the same things by dint of the fact that the ideological differences between the two groups are just too great. In the Western mind, these two orthodoxies are the same thing. But in point of fact, they are two very different things.
Chapter 6 ("The Tide Turns"): Here is a discussion about the changing fortunes of the Shia in Iraq after Saddam is toppled from power. Nasr maintains an even tone (and does not go into denouncing the Americans for their lack of understanding of the dynamics of the sectarian divide) and also introduce us (with effusive praise) to the role pragmatic cleric, Sistani, whose efforts and restraint explain much of the success of keeping Iraq from falling into outright civil war.
Chapter 7 ("Iraq: The First Arab Shia State"): Oh! So that's why the people hated Saddam Hussein so much! Before, I had been under the misimpression that Iraq's government was secular (from reading Statecraft : Strategies for a Changing World). But Nasr recast the war between Iran and Iraq and a battle between Sunni and Shia, and many of the policies of Saddam Hussein as being motivated by Sunni chauvinism.
Things that I would have liked clarified:
1. I would like to know a bit more on the differences between Sunni and Shia ulama ("clergy"). Nasr lets us know (p. 70) that the clergy in Shia places are lawyers more than anything else, and that they go about dealing with religious affairs in a very litigious way, issuing rulings and the like. How does this compare with what Sunni clergy do? He uses the word "ulama" to refer to Sunni clergy several times throughout the book, but might they not be the same things as Shia clergy?
2. I could have done with a one page glossary of terms (and whether they were Farsi/ Persian words or Arabic words). We know that "Ayatollah" is Farsi (because we've never heard it to refer to anything other than Shia clergy), but what about "ijtihad," etc? (Arabs to whom I have spoken have recognized nearly all the words that I have referenced here, but not in the way that the author uses them).
This book was WELL WORTH the purchase price and the time spent reading it. Highly recommended!
Chapter 1 ("Who are The Shia?): Here we get a brief overview of the details of the historical schism that made the Sunni and Shia who they are and the names and dates. We learn that although most of the Shia are in Iran, that a good chunk of them are also in Arab and South Asian countries
Chapter 2 ("The Making of Shia Politics"): Lots of information here. A bit more on the detailed training and ordination of Shia clergy (though I could have done with a little more), as well as some patterns on the spread of Shia Islam (for instance, how it got from Azerbaijan to Iran), and a bit more on the different subsects (Twelvers vs. Fivers).
Chapter 3 ("The Fading Promise of Nationalism"): This chapter is a retake on something that we have heard before, which is that the Arabs/ Persians have already tried Nationalism/ Communism/ etc before and that it didn't work and so now Islam is the last choice left standing.
Chapter 4 ("Khomeini's Moment"): Here there is a synopsis of the recent history of Iran, including: the overthrow of Reza Pahlavi (who was actually only the shah for a generation and not many centuries) and subsequent rise of Khomeini. Pahlavi's fatal mistake, it seems, was not making friends with the clergy ("men of words") in order to ensure the stability of his regime. Nasr also gave a characterization (again, a very neutral one) of Khomeini (and the mullahs) as people who were primarily scholars and men of words who were not worried about the nuts and bolts of running a republic. Before reading this, I didn't know that Khomeini had aspirations of pan-Islamism of which he himself was the leader. The dynamics of the mass movement in this chapter filled in some details and reminded the reader of things that have been written in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (Perennial Classics)
Chapter 5 ("The Battle of Islamic Fundamentalisms"): Here we learn that Shia fundamentalists and Wahhabi fundamentalists are not the same things by dint of the fact that the ideological differences between the two groups are just too great. In the Western mind, these two orthodoxies are the same thing. But in point of fact, they are two very different things.
Chapter 6 ("The Tide Turns"): Here is a discussion about the changing fortunes of the Shia in Iraq after Saddam is toppled from power. Nasr maintains an even tone (and does not go into denouncing the Americans for their lack of understanding of the dynamics of the sectarian divide) and also introduce us (with effusive praise) to the role pragmatic cleric, Sistani, whose efforts and restraint explain much of the success of keeping Iraq from falling into outright civil war.
Chapter 7 ("Iraq: The First Arab Shia State"): Oh! So that's why the people hated Saddam Hussein so much! Before, I had been under the misimpression that Iraq's government was secular (from reading Statecraft : Strategies for a Changing World). But Nasr recast the war between Iran and Iraq and a battle between Sunni and Shia, and many of the policies of Saddam Hussein as being motivated by Sunni chauvinism.
Things that I would have liked clarified:
1. I would like to know a bit more on the differences between Sunni and Shia ulama ("clergy"). Nasr lets us know (p. 70) that the clergy in Shia places are lawyers more than anything else, and that they go about dealing with religious affairs in a very litigious way, issuing rulings and the like. How does this compare with what Sunni clergy do? He uses the word "ulama" to refer to Sunni clergy several times throughout the book, but might they not be the same things as Shia clergy?
2. I could have done with a one page glossary of terms (and whether they were Farsi/ Persian words or Arabic words). We know that "Ayatollah" is Farsi (because we've never heard it to refer to anything other than Shia clergy), but what about "ijtihad," etc? (Arabs to whom I have spoken have recognized nearly all the words that I have referenced here, but not in the way that the author uses them).
This book was WELL WORTH the purchase price and the time spent reading it. Highly recommended!
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