Post-Soviet neighbours navigate the orbit of Russian power

After the USSR’s collapse in 1991, the Kremlin made it a priority to retain a pre-eminent position in the newly independent former Soviet republics on Russia’s western and southern borders. This was apparent even during the relatively democratic era under Boris Yeltsin. It became unambiguously clear after Vladimir Putin took power in 1999-2000, constructing an authoritarian system with a more truculent foreign policy. Moscow’s methods included supporting separatist movements and ensuring its neighbours relied on Russia for energy, trade and investment.

Now Russia’s influence in its neighbourhood is under pressure. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 made Moscow look at best like an unreliable guarantor of regional security, and at worst like a threat to the territorial integrity and independence of some post-Soviet states. Ukraine’s military successes in the second half of 2022 created the impression that Russia might suffer an irreversible loss of power in the region. However, the picture is not so clear-cut.

Five countries illustrate the point: Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In each case, the fighting in Ukraine will weigh heavily on future developments. Russia’s regional influence will wax or wane to the extent that it achieves or falls short of its ambition to permanently dismember Ukraine and keep it out of western alliance systems. As things stand today, Russia’s presence remains strong in some of the five states, while in others it has receded without entirely disappearing.

The most obvious case of Russian domination is Belarus, where the Ukraine war has drawn Alexander Lukashenko’s regime more tightly into Moscow’s orbit. Yet it is noteworthy that the Kremlin has so far made no attempt to absorb Belarus into Russia proper and has not forced its neighbour to become a full participant in the war. Either move might destabilise Lukashenko’s dictatorship. Neither Moscow nor Minsk has forgotten that a peaceful pro-democracy uprising in 2020 threatened to sweep away the tyrant of Belarus.

In Moldova, by contrast, Russian influence has declined since Russia invaded Ukraine. There was some concern in western capitals last week when leaders of Transnistria, a Russian-backed breakaway region of Moldova, held an emergency congress. It appeared to be a possible prelude to an appeal for incorporation into Russia.

In the event, the leaders confined themselves to a rather plaintive call for Transnistria to be “protected” against the Moldovan government. Here lies the real story of recent trends in Moldova. For the first time since Russia under Yeltsin fomented Transnistrian separatism, the authorities in Chișinău are making a concerted attempt to reintegrate the region.

Last year, Moldova’s parliament made “separatism” a criminal offence. Moldova has also tightened customs controls on Transnistrian companies. The pressure is intense because Ukraine closed its border with Transnistria after the 2022 invasion, making the region almost entirely dependent on Moldova proper to gain access to the outside world.

Moldova feels emboldened by the promise it has received of eventual EU membership. But it will have to tread carefully. Much of Transnistria’s population consists of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, and they could evolve into a Trojan horse for Moscow if the Moldovan government mishandles the reintegration effort.

Russia’s standing in Armenia collapsed after the Kremlin did nothing to prevent Azerbaijan’s seizure in September of the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. This episode destroyed the Armenian view of Russians as protectors that had held sway since the early 19th century. However, Armenia continues to rely on Russia for energy, and Moscow still operates a military base on Armenian soil. Conversely, the Nagorno-Karabakh attack has strained Azerbaijan’s relations with the west and aligned the country more closely with Russia, although Baku is determined to preserve its independence.

In Georgia, Moscow exerts influence through Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Kremlin-backed breakaway regions, and a government that often seems sympathetic to Russia. Much of Georgia’s population is, however, strongly in favour of EU membership, a path to which has opened since 2022.

Across the region, Russia’s prestige and power are not what they were even three years ago. However, the region is not integrated with western democracies, either. The contest between Moscow and the west appears set to continue, with Ukraine its main focus.

tony.barber@ft.com