A reformist wins the presidency in Iran

After an unexpectedly competitive election, Masoud Pezeshkian’s surprise victory in a run-off gives Iran its first reformist president in two decades. Friday’s poll displayed the contrasting faces of the Islamic republic’s politics: Pezeshkian, who promises to re-engage with the west and relax social restrictions, and Saeed Jalili, who represents the most ideologically hardline regime faction.

Pezeshkian’s success demonstrated the direction the majority of Iranians want the republic to take: away from extremism, economic malaise, confrontation and isolation, and towards a society free of oppression and engaged with the outside world. It also showed that elections in the republic can still surprise, even though all candidates have to be approved by the authorities.

Arguably the loudest message, however, came from those who boycotted the vote. Millions of Iranians have lost faith in any of their leaders, reformist or hardline. Turnout of 49.8 per cent beat the first round’s record low of 40 per cent. But many Iranians now see elections as a moment for silent protest, refusing to deliver the facade of legitimacy the regime seeks through the ballot box.

The increased turnout in the run-off probably reflects the stark choice Iranians faced. Many were driven by fears that a Jalili victory would steer Iran in an even more extreme direction. Pezeshkian’s victory cannot mask the fact that the republic is facing a legitimacy crisis. Growing numbers of Iranians have given up any hope of change from within the system.

Recent events have exacerbated this sentiment. The 2021 presidential election provided no pretence of democracy, with leading reformist candidates barred to clear the way for hardliner Ebrahim Raisi to take the role. (His death in a helicopter crash triggered this snap poll.) The next year, nationwide anti-regime protests erupted after the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini, arrested for not properly wearing her hijab. The protests were crushed by a brutal official crackdown, but the legacy of the crisis hangs over society.

The question is whether Pezeshkian will be able to deliver any serious change at a critical juncture for the republic. It is grappling with deep domestic pressures and heightened tensions with the west and in the region due to the Israel-Hamas war. It must also prepare for the succession to the supreme leader and ultimate decision maker, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 85, when he dies. This will be the pivotal event that shapes the republic’s future.

Still, the presidency can influence the tone and approach of government. Pezeshkian has pledged to negotiate to resolve Iran’s nuclear stand-off with the US and European powers and secure sanctions relief to revive the economy. He has promised to ease social restrictions, including on internet use and the enforcement of the hijab. He is, though, very much a regime loyalist who has made clear his obedience to Khamenei. And hardliners can be expected to resist reform. The US and major European powers will not be easily persuaded to soften their approach to the regime. Experience has made them deeply sceptical of any potential shift away from Iran’s belligerent backing of militant groups, domestic crackdowns and expansion of its nuclear programme.

The election will not alter Tehran’s support for regional proxies, considered vital to the republic’s security strategy and overseen by the powerful Revolutionary Guards. But if Pezeshkian can usher in a degree of change, he could bring some respite to Iranians and start to cool tensions at home and abroad. Failure will deepen Iran’s problems, and the crisis of legitimacy of the republic.