Terror attack creates a central Asian dilemma for Putin

Harmony among peoples of different faiths and ethnicities will be the theme of a Kremlin-organised conference next month called the “Russia-Islamic World: Kazan Forum”. Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan, a region whose conquest by Ivan the Terrible in the 1550s marked the point at which Islam, though subordinate to the state religion of Orthodox Christianity, became prominent in Russian society. However, the conference will take place at a time of rising tensions since last month’s Islamist terrorist attack in Moscow that killed at least 144 people.

These tensions take two forms. One involves the millions of central Asian Muslim immigrants working in Russia, some of whom have faced pressure from the authorities since the attack on the Crocus City Hall concert venue. The other relates to frictions between Russia and the states of central Asia, which have enjoyed a precarious but much-prized independence from Moscow since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. These tensions seem unlikely to dissipate as long as Vladimir Putin continues his war of attempted conquest in Ukraine and concomitant militarisation of Russian society and the economy.

The Kremlin’s insinuations that Ukraine was involved in the terrorist attack are more than a propaganda tool to distract Russians from the failure of state intelligence agencies to prevent it. They also provide an excuse to ramp up pressure on central Asian states for their reluctance to support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. One member of parliament suggested that last week’s Ukrainian drone attack on an industrial facility and refinery in Tatarstan could have been launched from Kazakhstan — drawing an indignant denial from the Kazakh government.

Sergei Karaganov, a leading Russian foreign policy analyst, also drew specific attention to Kazakhstan in an article warning that Moscow’s patience with its neighbours might be wearing thin. “We should not by any means repeat the Ukrainian failure, permitting anti-Russian elites to take power in neighbouring countries or allowing those countries to be destabilised from outside. Kazakhstan is of greatest concern in this regard,” Karaganov wrote.

Others have hinted that the Kazakh authorities are ungrateful for the Russian-led military intervention that restored order after political unrest in 2022. Just as Putin justifies war in Ukraine partly to “protect” Russian speakers, so Kazakhstan is of particular interest to Moscow because of its large ethnic Russian minority.

The issue of central Asian immigrants poses a different headache for the authorities. According to the interior ministry, some 6mn foreigners lived in Russia at the end of 2021, with the largest share from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These are often low-skilled young men employed in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, personal services and trade.

As Putin has put the economy on a wartime footing and hundreds of thousands of Russians have joined the armed forces, labour shortages have grown. Central Asians are indispensable in filling these jobs. Yet of 11 detained over the concert hall attack, 10 are Tajiks and one is reported to be a Kyrgyz-born Uzbek with Russian citizenship.

The radicalisation of some central Asian Muslims, above all in Tajikistan, is a problem that Russia has neglected in recent years because of its preoccupation with Ukraine. The police raids and deportations of immigrants since the terror attack are an unconvincing response, not least because of the reliance on central Asian workers.

As it happens, central Asia’s conservative authoritarian regimes are just as anxious as Russia to stamp out Islamist extremism. But threats to their independence and pressure on their migrant workers may not bring the results Putin wants.

tony.barber@ft.com