“I cannot pretend that nothing has happened,” stated French President Emmanuel Macron on June 9, as he called snap elections for the National Assembly following the stifling defeat of his Renaissance party in the European elections. The situation in France is now uncertain with the far right surging. Our experts are breaking down the biggest issues to watch and what the election might mean for France in a critical era for the transatlantic community.
What did we learn from the June 30 first-round results, and what do they tell us about what’s to come in the July 7 second round?
The first round of the French parliamentary elections has been an unmitigated disaster for Macron. As foreseen by the polls, his party has been crushed between the far right and the coalition of the left. Macron’s Ensemble alliance only got a bit more than 20 percent on June 30, while National Rally is the winner of the day. The only question is whether National Rally, along with its conservative allies, will get a relative or an absolute majority on July 7—the second scenario being quite possible. It will depend on the way centrist and leftist voters will rally in the second round to defeat the far right.
In any case, France is entering a long crisis. If the far right governs, it will sooner or later enter into a confrontation with Macron. If the parliament is ungovernable, France will be totally self-centered and unable to act. It’s a sad day for France and for Europe.
—Gérard Araud is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former ambassador of France to the United States.
Macron’s gamble in calling a snap legislative election already appears to have backfired, but things still remain very uncertain ahead of the next round on July 7. Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally party is in the lead with 33 percent of the vote, but that does not suggest the party will be able to achieve an absolute majority in the second round to control the parliament. The left-wing alliance came not far behind, with 28 percent. Macron’s centrists came third with 20 percent—a dramatic decrease from their position before, but not low enough to be knocked out of the second round in most constituencies.
High turnout and fewer candidates will mean an unprecedented number of three-way contests in the second round. It is therefore now up to the center and the left to decide if they join forces to stand down candidates in specific constituencies to prevent the far right from taking power. But this may be difficult because there are huge divisions between them, especially with far-left frontman Jean-Luc Mélenchon continuing to provoke Macron and presenting himself as the head of the left-wing alliance.
—Dave Keating is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center and Brussels correspondent for France24.
The first round has been a punishment for Macron. His party is in third place with 20 percent of the vote. He has lost the (relative) majority he got in 2022 after his election as president. He will face a cohabitation in which his power will be shared with a government from another political party.
The National Rally is in first place, with 29 percent alone and 33 percent when grouped with its far-right allies. The New Popular Front obtained nearly 28 percent, while other small parties accumulated scores that may help the left when it comes to building coalitions. Whereas some polls had anticipated the National Rally would win as much as 37 percent, the official results indicate their victory wound up being smaller than those polls expected. There could be a slight sense of disappointment in the National Rally headquarters. The left has not lost yet; if the various member parties of the coalition stick with each other and, more importantly, if the “front republicain” joins together with the center, that would work perfectly to block the National Rally. Macron’s message is not very clear on whether he is calling on his voters to do that or not. A lot will depend on his candidates that did not qualify for the second round: Will they vote for the far right or the left? Despite the president’s weak situation, a lot will depend on Macron and his voters. Whether the far right will get an absolute or a relative majority depends on the level of the center’s mobilization.
As soon as the first results were published Sunday evening, thousands and thousands of French gathered in the streets to protest against the National Rally and remind the world that, despite the doublespeak, the far right will remain the far right—steeped in anti-immigration, Euroskeptic, and racist rhetoric that has defined it for decades.
—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).
The below responses were compiled before the June 30 first round of elections.
What are the stakes?
Never, in the last fifty years, have the stakes in a French election been so high. This electoral campaign has been unprecedentedly short, dramatic, intense, and uncertain. The country has been totally surprised by Macron’s decision to call snap elections. The defeat of the president’s party in the European elections was expected and didn’t have any direct consequence in domestic politics. It wasn’t necessary to rush to elections at such short notice. And there is no assurance that the election’s outcome will take France on a stable path.
The opposite is the most likely scenario. Some are saying that Macron has thrown the country under the bus. Polls show increasing bitterness toward him.
Suddenly, France is facing the prospect of a government led by the far right or far left, considering that the president’s centrist party is generally expected to lose ground. A government led by the far right or far left would face domestic and international backlash. In the best-case scenario (or more accurately in the least-bad scenario), the elections could lead to a hung parliament and therefore an essentially ungovernable country. In any case, France has been stepping into a prolonged political crisis with unpredictable consequences. Some opponents even suggested that in the event of political deadlock, the president would need to resign to avoid political crisis.
No matter what Macron will try to assert, France will be much weakened in international affairs. That will particularly be the case on two issues. The first is Ukraine, where the far right and far left have advocated for more engagement and negotiation with Russia. The second is the European Union (EU), where the two extremes of the political spectrum share similar Euroskepticism. With the United Kingdom drifting away and Germany facing its own crisis, there will be a vacuum in the European leadership at a moment when the continent can hardly afford it.
—Gerard Araud, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and former ambassador of France to the United States.
What are Macron’s goals and ambitions in calling this election now?
There are numerous theories as to why Macron called early parliamentary elections, especially with his party lagging so far behind in the polls. Macron has described the move as the “most responsible” decision following his party’s disastrous showing in the recent European Parliament elections. It could be that the French president is simply respecting the electorate’s overwhelming decision. But more realistically, Macron’s calculation is more complicated. Among the going theories as to why he called for elections, a handful stand out:
- Macron could be hoping to catch his competitors by surprise, forcing them to pull together last-minute campaigns, while spurring action among his base with the memory of the far right’s gains fresh in their minds. The move could also be a bet that the French public would not actually double down on their protest vote, a vote often exercised in European elections, and would rather choose unpopular prudence in Macron’s party over the populist anger of protest parties on the far right and far left. This move assumes that the public’s vote in June was, in fact, just a protest vote and not a deeper shift within France to the extremes.
- Macron might be making a tactical retreat. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is in a strong position to win the most seats in the National Assembly and thus has the best shot at forming a government with Le Pen’s protégé, Jordan Bardella, at the helm. A far-right government could demonstrate the potential failures of far-right leadership. The move could grant the public its desire for change while presenting a sobering reality ahead of the vastly more critical presidential elections in 2027. However, this thinking assumes that the far right—when handed the keys to the government—will fail and that any dysfunction would fall at their feet, not at Macron’s.
- Macron could be looking to carve out a new place for himself. In the wake of Macron’s announcement, a number of left-leaning parties—including the Socialist Party, the Ecologists, La France Insoumise, and the Communist Party—united to form the New Popular Front, which is now polling second behind the far right. With both the left and right having the potential to emerge victorious from the elections, Macron can present himself as the savior of the center, potentially swaying some less radically inclined voters to his camp, similar to what he did when he first ran for office. However, this approach assumes that the ground hasn’t shifted under Macron’s feet and risks another electoral disaster for the second time in a month.
- Finally, and most simply, Macron might just be hoping that his party can pull off a miracle. Prior to dissolving the parliament, Renaissance did not have an absolute majority in the National Assembly and had to build coalitions on a case-by-case basis for every piece of legislation. If he thinks Renaissance has a shot to regain its majority through snap elections, Macron could avoid serving the rest of his term as a lame duck. But looking at the polls, and barring any major changes or shocks, this is the least likely scenario of them all.
—Emma Nix, assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
What do the polls say and what might their results mean for the rest of Macron’s term?
At first glance, the polls spell trouble for Macron. The far right leads with a healthy margin (34 percent for the National Rally, 29 percent for the left, and 22 percent for Renaissance).
However, because of how France votes, it isn’t clear just how bad the situation really is for the French president’s party. Candidates must get at least 12.5 percent of the registered voters in their district to even continue to the second-round election. While the polls appear decidedly in favor of the National Rally, turnout has the potential to impact how many candidates make it to the second round. In general, high turnout is expected to bolster Renaissance’s chances of making it out of the first round, and Renaissance competes better against the far right (though still not great) than the left does in polls regarding the second round. Further adding to Macron’s glimmer of hope is a recent boost in the polls after the first week of campaigning. Even so, the National Rally appears poised to win the most seats in the National Assembly, which would hamper Macron’s agenda and legacy.
The polls are hinting that some of Macron’s policies are at risk. The French system assigns the president significant influence over foreign and defense policy, while domestic policy is implemented by the prime minister and the government, which controls the budget and other key levers of power and could spell trouble for Macron. For example, both the left and far right have expressed interest in overturning Macron’s controversial pension reforms and have pledged to spend more despite France’s precarious budgetary position. For Macron, implementing his vision for France hasn’t been easy. Renaissance already lacks an absolute majority in the National Assembly, making the passage of Macron’s agenda difficult. But in any event of “cohabitation,” or a president and prime minister of different parties, paralysis in government is a likely outcome for the rest of Macron’s term.
What are the key drivers impacting voters in this election?
Ahead of the European elections held earlier in June, French voters indicated that their top concerns were poverty and social exclusion, climate change, and public health. French constituents cared for these issues up to 10 percentage points more than the European average. Inflation and purchasing power also ranked among the most pertinent issues and are expected to similarly drive voter dynamics in the upcoming snap election. Current polls point to immigration, social protection, and security as other issues driving voter preferences, laying the groundwork for a shift to the right.
For many, this election will be personality-driven. Dissatisfaction with Macron’s leadership seems to be fueling anti-elite sentiments among voters. Only 28 percent of the French public is favorable towards the president, ranking lower than right-wing figures such as Bardella and Le Pen and also lower than current Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, a member of Renaissance.
France’s political blocs have moved in the past to cater to voter priorities. Macron’s Renaissance announced an unemployment insurance reform decree between the two voting rounds, and the National Rally promises to reduce energy prices drastically and to toughen immigration laws. During this campaign, left-wing parties have attempted to appeal to voters in part by promising to repeal Macron’s controversial 2023 pension reform.
—Moritz Ludwig, young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
What might the election outcomes mean for France’s foreign policy approach?
Whatever the actual results of the snap election, its implications for France’s foreign policy might actually take a long time to be felt. This has to do with the practices of the country’s institutions and with the goals a new government would actually pursue (assuming Renaissance will not pull off a victory).
On the first point, the French constitution does not provide clear guidelines on the roles assumed by the president and the prime minister. The president traditionally has domaine réservé (“reserved domain”) on foreign and defense policies. If the polls prove true, the president will have to govern with a majority from the opposition. This isn’t the first time the president would need to do so, but two features make today’s case exceptional: It could be the first time that a far-right party such as the National Rally would rule, and there seems to be less potential for consensus on foreign policy between parties than in the past.
What has worked in the past is no guarantee for the future, and the foreign-policy role of the prime minister (and the government he or she oversees) remains a question mark. Paralyzed domestically, Macron may be tempted to spend more energy on the international stage. Or, on the contrary, he might need to get much more involved domestically on issues he prioritizes, such as the budget law. In both cases, there are effects to be felt. Should he focus abroad, he would likely be undermined by his government should it have conflicting foreign-policy priorities. Should he focus inward, France would risk its credibility on the international stage, and there would be an increasing likelihood that many French voices push their own contradictory proposals.
What’s more, French domestic politics could spill into the international scene. If there is no majority in the National Assembly, delivering on promises made to the voters may prove to be increasingly difficult. The necessity for political wins might encourage a new government to be more active in foreign policy. Because of the greater difficulty in reaching consensus, both the president and the governing party will have to prioritize which political battles to fight. Foreign policy might well be collateral.
The specific foreign-policy aims that will actually be pursued remain uncertain. Here, the personnel may well determine policy. The political party of the minister of defense or the minister for Europe and foreign affairs will be much more critical now in determining France’s foreign-policy direction than in the past few years. On the left, despite remarkable differences, the New Popular Front succeeded in finding consensus on issues that initially split them (Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on Israel had a major impact in dissolving the left coalition in the National Assembly, for instance). However, foreign policy is definitely one of the areas in which the parties have the least in common. As for the far right, the ever-changing positions on key foreign-policy issues—like France’s leadership in the European Union, support to Ukraine, and France’s approach to NATO—indicates more about what it would not do (at least for now) and less about the issues it would realistically pursue.
Foreign policy has rarely been a key issue for French voters in elections, and these snap elections are no exception. Yet, the belief that French foreign policy would be preserved from the turmoil of the domestic scene is, at best, wishful thinking.
—Marie Jourdain, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
What might the election outcomes specifically mean for…
France’s role in NATO
Since 1958, France’s constitution, combined with its institutional and political norms, has afforded the president broad discretion—a “reserved domain”—on issues involving defense and foreign policy. During three previous periods of “cohabitation,” when French parliamentary elections were won by the opposition party, a broad consensus on those issues allowed the president and opposition figures (including the prime minister) to avoid major clashes. Will the past be prologue?
If Macron’s party suffers minimal losses, he likely would muster continued support for his stance on NATO—and, most notably, his steps to increase bilateral and multilateral military assistance to Ukraine—from a number of center-right and moderate leftist members of the National Assembly.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the far-right National Rally has scaled back its most explicit anti-NATO rhetoric. It no longer calls for France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structures (as Le Pen did in the 2022 presidential race), and it currently calls for support to Ukraine. But National Rally leaders are skeptical of the scale of aid to Ukraine, especially Macron’s recent calls for supplying offensive French combat aircraft, more sophisticated missiles, and training for Kyiv’s embattled forces. A prime minister and foreign and defense ministers drawn from—or acceptable to—the National Rally would likely trim back French contributions to NATO’s forward posture enhancements in Eastern Europe and oppose Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU.
A parliamentary majority led by the left’s New Popular Front coalition, perhaps the least likely election outcome, could be disruptive for NATO and support for Ukraine. On one hand, the recently unveiled program provides very little information on military issues, including NATO, but it clearly calls for “indefectible defense of Ukrainian people’s sovereignty and freedom, including integrity of borders through the necessary arm transfers.” But on the other, there is reason to doubt that Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the far-left France Insoumise party, and his loyalists take that statement seriously as during the 2022 legislative elections, they played down Russian aggression and the illegal annexation of Crimea, questioned the effectiveness of sanctions against Moscow, and blamed NATO for causing trouble. Mélenchon has been a longtime and virulent opponent of French membership in NATO and, in effect, has accused Macron of getting closer to dragging France into war with Russia. But a push by Mélenchon for French retrenchment on a range of issues, including NATO and Ukraine, would be fought by others in the leftist coalition, especially from members of the Socialist and Ecologists parties. The result could be, as the French expression goes, that chaos “reigns, but does not govern.”
—Leo Michel, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.
France’s role in the EU
A French legislature controlled by the far left or far right could spell big problems for the EU. The past term saw a huge raft of EU legislation passed, which now needs to be transposed and implemented into national law. Macron may be sticking around regardless of the legislative election outcome, and he will remain in charge of the country’s foreign policy, but it will be up to the French legislature to transpose these EU directives.
With both the far right and the far left having expressed antipathy toward the EU, there is a big question about whether they may refuse to do that. This was highlighted with the European Commission’s announcement that it is launching an excessive deficit procedure against France, which will be followed by instructions in the fall for fiscal tightening to reduce France’s deficit. Both the far right and far left have made campaign promises that would significantly increase France’s spending and borrowing, and politicians on both sides were quick to attack the Commission and say they would not follow such instructions. If they don’t, fines will follow.
But France is no ordinary EU member state. It is the most powerful and influential country in the EU institutions (not, as many think, Germany). That is why France usually gets lenient treatment. For instance, the Commission declined to trigger the excessive deficit procedure against France many times over the past decade even though the country’s deficit was beyond the threshold. Open fighting between the Commission and the French Parliament could spell trouble for the future of the EU since France sits at the heart of the European project. If the French parliament openly defies Brussels and refuses to abide by the country’s international obligations, how far is the Commission willing to go as the guarantor of the EU treaties?
—Dave Keating, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
France’s role in Africa
These historic elections present a serious reputational risk for France, which—after having suffered snubs from the Sahel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and frictions with Morocco and Algeria under Macron—may see anti-French sentiment strengthen in Africa if the far right comes to power. Although Le Pen has made a few trips to the continent, including Chad in 2017 and Senegal in 2023, the far right is not appreciated in Africa.
Whatever the result of these elections—in which Africa is only discussed as part of the topic of immigration—Africans no longer have any great illusions about France because of its repressive migration policy and the way in which it has become the driving force behind populist movements.
Long gone are the days when Africa, especially French-speaking Africa, looked mainly to the former colonial power. For twenty years, Africans have expressed their need to prioritize their sovereignty and to diversify their partnerships. Now, France is only the fifth-largest trading partner of African states, falling behind China, India, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates.
But for Africans living in or still aspiring to go to France, the country is likely to be an even more complicated destination than before. If he becomes prime minister, Bardella is set to increase the number of expulsions of and repressive measures against immigrants. National Rally’s reputation has been further damaged since it welcomed Fabrice Leggeri, who formerly led the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (known as Frontex) but resigned when the agency faced accusations from a watchdog organization of mistreating migrants and other misconduct. Leggeri won a seat in the European Parliament this month as a National Rally member.
As for those already settled in France, they are in the crosshairs of the far right through a policy proposed by National Rally that many consider racist: national preference, which seeks to grant French people an advantage over immigrants in accessing social benefits or finding work. (Although, Le Pen has argued that national preference was inscribed in law with a controversial immigration bill backed by Macron and passed in the National Assembly.)
If he wins, Bardella may be the final nail in the coffin of French influence in Africa.
—Rama Yade, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former French deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights
Further reading
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Image: Posters with images or names of local candidates for the first round of the 2024 French legislative elections in the 5th constituency of Calvados, displayed in front of Port-en-Bessin Town Hall, on June 25, 2024, in Port-en-Bessin-Huppain, Normandy, France. (Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Reuters)