France has plunged into one of the most serious political crises of the Fifth Republic, following President Emmanuel Macron’s unexpected decision to call for new elections in the wake of a historic defeat for his party in the European elections on June 9.
In a twenty-day campaign—the shortest period allowed by the French constitution—candidates are competing across 577 legislative constituencies during two rounds of elections on June 30 and July 7. The political landscape is dominated by the far-right National Rally party, which came out on top in the European Parliament elections with 31.4 percent of the vote. It was the highest vote share in the party’s history and twice as much as Macron’s party received. National Rally—an anti-immigration, Euroskeptic, and extremist party co-founded in 1972 in part by a former Waffen SS member—was the leading political force in 93 percent of French towns.
The prospect now on everyone’s mind is “cohabitation,” featuring a president and prime minister from opposing parties and a far-right or left party at the head of the French government. But cohabitation is just one of several potential outcomes.
Based on my experience as a former French minister and ambassador, I can envision at least four political scenarios that could play out in the coming weeks. Until this month, nobody could imagine that such scenarios might happen in a country like France. A lot will depend on the “front républicain” (the past tendency of French voters, in the name of moral principles, to vote en masse against the far right to keep it from power) and on voter turnout. In almost any scenario, France will face an unprecedented constitutional crisis and have to fight to preserve its influence in the European Union (EU) and on the international stage.
Scenario 1: A majority for the far right
In this scenario, the twenty-eight-year-old president of National Rally, Jordan Bardella, would likely become prime minister in a historic cohabitation with Macron, who would remain president.
Four new elements are combining in ways that indicate this outcome is quite possible.
First, polls for the legislative elections suggest that the far right might receive between 33 percent and 35 percent of the vote, earning between 235 and 265 seats in the new assembly, roughly triple its current number.
Second, a vote for National Rally is no longer viewed as shameful, and the party is no longer a niche interest. Increasingly, pensioners and high earners, who have traditionally not voted for the far right, are joining the working-class vote for National Rally.
Third, many French now credit the far right with an ability to govern better than the country’s traditional parties. In several cities run by far-right mayors, National Rally got larger shares in the recent European Parliament elections than the party did in the nation overall (31.4 percent). This includes Henin-Beaumont (61.4 percent), Frejus (47.4 percent), Beziers (40.5 percent), and Perpignan (36.8 percent).
Fourth, while the far right has never been able to secure enough votes or allies to hold a majority in the legislature, it is now finding support among traditional parties, as demonstrated by the unexpected backing of Éric Ciotti, president of France’s conservative party, the Republicans, who recently spoke about forming an “alliance” with National Rally and is fielding sixty-two National Rally/Republican candidates. Even though Ciotti was expelled from his own party following the incident, a coalition of Republicans and Macron’s former voters could join together to support the “alliance” to push back against the widely demonized far left. These additional supporters may help National Rally reach an absolute majority of 289 seats in France’s National Assembly.
This cohabitation would have a deep impact internationally. It would not be the first cohabitation in the Fifth Republic’s history—the arrangement happened in 1988 under then President Francois Mitterrand and in 1995 under then President Jacques Chirac. But it would be the first cohabitation with a party not previously known for governing. France would be represented by Bardella and Macron, together, at European summits. Even if large parts of National Rally’s international program have disappeared from its published materials and public discussions (such as a “Frexit” from the EU and an exit from NATO’s integrated military command for now) because there is no consensus on these topics among National Rally voters, the far right has long been more friendly toward Russia and less supportive of NATO. This position dates back to Jean-Marie Le Pen, the father of former party president Marine Le Pen.
It’s clear that a National Rally parliamentary majority would question France’s long-term financial commitments to Ukraine and would not prioritize the containment of Russia’s disinformation activities in France. The relationship between National Rally and President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where Marine Le Pen found financial support for her political campaigns, has been at the heart of many controversies, including legal cases. In Brussels, the party will be able to count on a larger group of thirty French members of the European Parliament, including the controversial former head of the EU border agency Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, as well as European allies such as Italy’s Lega and Hungary’s Fidesz.
Finally, National Rally, usually known for its anti-Semitic background, has used the tragedy of the Gaza war to serve its domestic agenda by joining demonstrations against anti-Semitism after the October 7 attacks in Israel. So far, National Rally has received the support of several respected Jewish figures, who announced that they may vote for the party in the event of a matchup against the far left.
Scenario 2: A majority for the united left
In this scenario, the left, against all odds, could unite around the New Popular Front, which brings together La France Insoumise, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Ecologists, and the New Anticapitalist Party. Mathematically, the left’s chances of leading the country have increased to the point that polls suggest it could win 25 to 32 percent of the vote.
But since politics is not always a matter of numbers, it is unclear whether the left will transform this promising start into electoral success. Doing so will depend on the ability of these left-wing parties to remain united amid both internal pressures (with allies on the left hesitant to back the hard-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon in his bid to be prime minister) and external pressures (La France Insoumise is facing accusations of anti-Semitism in the context of the war in Gaza).
Yet, if it leads the French government, the New Popular Front says it will “defend Ukraine and peace on the European continent,” in particular “through the delivery of the necessary weapons.” It also advocates for “the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas and Palestinian political prisoners.” In addition, the left-wing parties call on the French government to “immediately recognize the State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel,” and to “break with the French government’s guilty support for the far-right supremacist government” of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The new Popular Front wants to “impose an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and enforce the [International Court of Justice] order which unambiguously evokes a risk of genocide.”
At the EU level, the New Popular Front is calling for the “end of free trade agreements” and a “reform of the EU common agricultural policy.” It also proposes to “tax the richest at the European level.”
A Macron cohabitation government would only be stable if its partner wins an absolute majority in the National Assembly. In scenario one or two, if the far right or united left win only a relative majority—meaning they are the largest group but hold less than 289 seats—they will face a powerful opposition and repeated threats of no-confidence votes. Their hold on power would be shaky at best.
On the international stage, Macron won’t be alone in defining French foreign policy, including the country’s approach toward Ukraine and Israel. Even though he would remain the “commander in chief,” chairing France’s defense councils and trying to carve out a domaine réservé (“reserved domain”) in foreign policy areas, Macron would be challenged by the National Assembly, which votes on the defense budget, and by the prime minister, who is in charge of the general defense organization.
Scenario 3: The absence of a majority
According to the latest polls, it is possible that no majority will emerge on July 7. In such a scenario, Macron would be unable to call the leader of a winning party to Matignon, the residence of the prime minister. This is a Belgium-like scenario of total blockage. A political crisis would turn into a regime crisis. In that case, the number of options is limited.
First, Macron could appoint an external respected figure and ask that person to build a coalition. In the meantime the current prime minister, Gabriel Attal, would likely remain in power to manage affairs until a majority is formed, but he would be unable to pass any laws. Given that French foreign policy occupies a domaine réservé dominated by the president’s decisions, Macron could continue to operate as he has on the world stage. But with no majority in the National Assembly and the constitutional impossibility to dissolve it before the next year, the president will be so weak politically that his legitimacy will be questioned every day by his international peers in Brussels and elsewhere. This situation cannot last long.
That is why Macron may have no choice other than to resign, as Marine Le Pen and Pierre Mazeaud, former president of the Constitutional Council, noted recently. According to the French constitution, the president of the Senate would then be the acting president of the country and a presidential election should be organized between twenty and thirty-five days after the resignation. To preempt the critics who might question his legitimacy after two defeats in one month, Macron has already vowed that he will stay at the Élysée “until May 2027.”
In this scenario, would his resignation allow him to run in a new presidential election and win?
According to constitutional experts, the French constitution would not allow Macron to run for a third term. Article 6 of the Constitution says that “the President of the Republic is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage. No one can serve more than two consecutive terms.” The Constitutional Council would have the last word on this matter.
Scenario 4: A victory for Macron’s party
Although nobody—not even his supporters—mentions this possibility at this point, an outright win is what Macron, the architect of the current chaos, is hoping for. In this short legislative campaign, he intends to find allies in other political parties who reject the far left and the so-called “devil’s pact” between the head of the conservatives and National Rally. Macron is betting that the two-round system will provide “clarification” from French voters on National Rally’s win in the European Parliament elections. With a majority of seats, a decisive win for Macron might reveal National Rally’s victory earlier this month as an aberration. It could even enable Macron to obtain the majority that he was unable to secure in 2022, when he was reelected to a second term. It might then allow him to make more progress on his agenda in the National Assembly, where he has been threatened by a motion of censure as part of a budget vote.
Even if it is not clear why the French would vote differently in twenty days, a victory would mean that Macron was able to make up the difference thanks to an incredibly efficient campaign. For the EU, such an outcome would mean a return to normal business with a strong French interlocutor who has survived a major test and emerged stronger (and with a reshuffled cabinet).
. . .
Even if French institutions are strong, the divisions in society and French citizens’ pessimistic mood make the political context very volatile. If one side wins without a clear and absolute majority, they will face a strong opposition and threats of being turned out by a no-confidence vote in the parliament.
Any majority is likely to be so tight or nonexistent that the scenario of the president’s resignation and the organization of a new presidential election is already being discussed. Markets are reacting poorly to the instability.
Since 2017, Macron has built his political success on crushing the traditional governing parties of the left and the right, without building anything strong to replace them. He is now facing his fiercest opposition and is reduced to anticipating a “civil war” if the “extremes” win. He chose the battle, but at this moment the president appears to be outgunned.
Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).
Further reading
Tue, Jun 11, 2024
Macron rolls the dice on France’s future
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The French president could have responded in many ways to Sunday's humiliation in European elections. He took perhaps the riskiest course available.
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‘Our Europe is mortal. It can die.’ Decoding Macron’s Sorbonne speech.
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The French president recently delivered a nearly two-hour speech outlining an ambitious agenda for Europe.
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Setting the European Parliament elections in the ‘right’ context
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The center-right European People’s Party, not the far- and hard-right parties, was the biggest winner of the elections.
Image: French President Emmanuel Macron pictured during a press conference concerning early parliamentary elections at Pavillon Cambon Capucines in Paris, France on June 12 2024 after the French President announced on June 9 2024, the dissolution of the French Parliament. Photo by Eliot Blondet/ABACAPRESS.COM