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2024, Visegrad Insight
Some European countries continue to offer only extremely modest bilateral military aid to Ukraine. Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and France are among the most parsimonious members of the Ramstein coalition. They are thus taking advantage of the generosity of their allies, betraying their own past leadership and undermining the cohesion of Europe. https://visegradinsight.eu/ukraine-we-must-not-give-up/.
2022 •
Ukraine's response to Russian aggression in 2022 holds valuable lessons for the EU and its member states. Since 2014, Ukraine has transformed its armed forces, mobilised a network of reservists, and coordinated military and civilian defence agencies to prioritise cross-society resilience to crises. It has done so by adopting NATO best practices and through a unique movement of volunteers who help fund the war effort. The Ukrainian armed forces have also found innovative ways to use new technologies in mounting an asymmetric response to their much larger adversary. EU member states can learn from Ukraine's experiences, but this should be a two-way street-with European countries continuing to supply weapons and provide training to Ukraine, and gaining real-world wartime insights in return.
SCEEUS Guest Platform for Eastern Europe Policy
The EU-Ukraine Security & Defense Cooperation: Think Bigger, Act BolderRussia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has pushed security and defence cooperation between the European Union and Ukraine into new territory. Military assistance, an aspect of bilateral cooperation quasi-dormant before the war, has undergone a profound transformation. Although military assistance has grown significantly in scope, however, it remains reactive and mainly driven by the immediate defensive needs of Ukraine. EU-Ukrainian cooperation in the security and defence field needs a strategic reappraisal that examines the next stages of the war and far beyond. The EU needs to make military aid to Ukraine sustainable in the medium to long term. It should endow Ukraine with the capabilities required to liberate all its territory, and in future to be able to deter and, if necessary, repel any renewed Russian aggression. The EU should also fully institutionalize its cooperation with battle hardened Ukraine in order to absorb its war-time experience and integrate its armed forces into Europe’s crisis management initiatives.
Kyiv Post
How the EU Can Help Ukraine2014 •
The scheme of Russia’s intervention is simple: An already breeding domestic conflict, with a little help from the Kremlin, escalates and turns violent. The use of force leads to a request for protection from the clash’s pro-Russian side portrayed as being under a ruthless attack by local ultra-nationalists. Moreover, ethnic Russians or/and holders of Russian passports are real or potential sufferers of a supposedly home-made conflict. They may even be under the threat of becoming victims of an ethnic cleansing, in Russia’s neighborhood.In response to a desperate cry for help from potential prey of neo-fascists, Moscow starts a humanitarian intervention based on three assertions: First, Russia has the right to secure stability and security on its borders, for self-protection. Second, the Kremlin is obliged to save from suppression or/and mass-murder those who are bound to the Russian Federation either by blood (ethnic Russians) or by law (Russian passport holders). Third, the Russian army cannot help but to play the role of a Eurasian peace-maker who brings order to unfortunately chaotic regions, and pacifies unruly local politicians.
2024 •
The concerns over the future of the Atlantic Alliance’s continued assistance for Ukraine have escalated as the conflict in Ukraine has transformed into a war of attrition. Compared to the early months of the war, there are increasingly troubling discussions about how it might be better to attempt to bring an end to the conflict by initiating negotiations quickly. It should be realized that a feasible and practical solution that will provide perpetual peace in the region while ensuring the continuing sovereignty and independence of Ukraine can only be achieved by employing a new strategy, which focuses more on the political means. Considering this, this paper aims to evaluate the strategic significance of NATO’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine amid a new chapter of the modern world order marked by increasing multipolarity and shifting geopolitical dynamics.
2022 •
This commentary was published on the Guest Platform for Eastern European Policy for the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Current support for Ukraine must be guided by an informed recognition of Ukraine's prospects, a united and coherent vision of what a victory for Ukraine would look like and a long-term plan for what the European Union, its member states and international partners can and should do in the coming years to help Ukraine fulfil its potential and enact its vision. Misguided assumptions about Russia and shortsighted 'appeasement' proposals must be abandoned in favour of a more ambitious strategy: ensuring continued and comprehensive support for Ukraine is now a long-term investment in and not a threat to Europe's economic growth, security and resilience. This paper outlines key steps across five high-priority policy areas to turn this idea into reality: (1) defence and security; (2) economic and humanitarian assistance; (3) renewable energy and green technology; (4) diplomacy and reparative justice; and (5) strategic communications. The full text is available here: https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/sceeus/supporting-ukraines-victory-success-and-european-integration-as-a-safeguard.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2pBXor79NOR51Rh6SKOZf0GN16Silg9bsof9PP_BzeogdjN8cm4znv0g4 https://sceeus.se/en/publications/supporting-ukraines-victory-success-and-european-integration-as-a-safeguard-to-europes-future-security-prosperity-and-resilience/?fbclid=IwAR0AR2Z71s0yphOiWJL65S-6zAzDJWVQ3znwdr60xgXYj-toTvloeSWLVjA
2015 •
The war in eastern Ukraine has uprooted two million people formerly living in the conflict regions and put several million Ukrainians at risk of a humanitarian crisis. A war-torn Ukraine and its eastern break-away provinces are unable to bear the burden of humanitarian aid and the international community must step up relief efforts in order to prevent a large-scale crisis that could further threaten peace and stability in Europe.
Revista Portuguesa De Ciência Política
How the West Can Help Ukraine: Three Strategies for Achieving a Ukrainian Victory and Rebirth2023 •
The geopolitical salience of the Russia–Ukraine War and the remoteness of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union or NATO call for intensification and modification of and innovation in current Western approaches. While some existing instruments can be strengthened and adapted, new tools are needed, accompanied by better explanations of the rationale for long-term Western aid to Ukraine. Such support is not just about international solidarity, but Western states’ national security, as well as winning not only the war but also the peace afterward and renewing rather than merely rebuilding Ukraine. Ukraine’s defence, security, transport, communications and energy infrastructures are priority areas for support. Reconstruction should be closely linked to Ukraine’s staged accession to the EU as well as further decentralization. More direct contacts between Ukrainian and Western communities and companies could be promoted through simplified residence rules for EU and other citizens and insuring foreign investors and trading partners against political risk, among other things. Central to conditions for continuing Western help will be Kyiv’s ongoing strengthening of the rule of law and fight against corruption. Even after the current war, strong armament of Ukraine as a European frontier state will be unavoidable before the country’s full accession to NATO and beyond. https://rpcp.pt/index.php/rpcp/article/view/192
2023 •
Alliance
2014 •
Despite being the first of the former Soviet republics to join the NATO Partnership for Peace, and later signing the Charter on Distinctive Partnership, for the last 20 years Ukraine’s integration aspirations have been somewhat unstable. Kiev has struggled to maintain a balance between Russian influence and finding the optimal and most beneficial format for relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By announcing its non-bloc status in 2010, Kiev did not lower the level of interaction and coordination with Alliance, but in fact developed interoperability and cooperation in new areas. The 2013-2014 events in Ukraine raise new questions about the future of the Ukrainian-NATO cooperation, as well as about the future of NATO itself. What does partnership mean and can it guarantee the security of a non-member state? Should NATO return to Europe? These are just a few of the questions raised by the current crisis. Despite the fact that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not on the agenda, public opinion in Ukraine in support of further NATO integration is increasing dramatically, and a search for new options for cooperation is timely.
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