Agents watching agents: The promise of institutional investor voice
BS Black�- UCLA l. Rev., 1991 - HeinOnline
UCLA l. Rev., 1991•HeinOnline
AGENTS WATCHING AGENTS: THE PROMISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR VOICE Bernard
S. Black* Page 1 AGENTS WATCHING AGENTS: THE PROMISE OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR VOICE Bernard S. Black* I. Introduction ........................................ 812 II. The Possibility
of Shareholder Monitoring ........... 820 A. Collective Action Problems ...................... 821 B. Legal
Obstacles to Shareholder Action ........... 822 C. Agenda Control by Corporate Managers .........
825 D. Institutional Investor Conflicts of Interest ........ 826 E. Trends in Institutional Shareholdings�…
S. Black* Page 1 AGENTS WATCHING AGENTS: THE PROMISE OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR VOICE Bernard S. Black* I. Introduction ........................................ 812 II. The Possibility
of Shareholder Monitoring ........... 820 A. Collective Action Problems ...................... 821 B. Legal
Obstacles to Shareholder Action ........... 822 C. Agenda Control by Corporate Managers .........
825 D. Institutional Investor Conflicts of Interest ........ 826 E. Trends in Institutional Shareholdings�…
The shareholder role in corporate governance is again on the national agenda. Commentators bemoan the competitive failures of American corporations, and point to Germany, with its strong uni-
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